Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and the Discourse on Executive Remuneration by Crombie, Neil Alan
  
Institutional Logics of Corporate 
Governance and the Discourse on Executive 
Remuneration  
 
 
 
 
Neil Crombie 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
at the University of Canterbury,  
Christchurch, 
New Zealand, 
 
 
 
July 2013
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Table of Contents 
 
Table of Contents 3 
List of Figures 9 
List of Tables 10 
Acknowledgements 12 
Abstract 13 
Chapter 1: Introduction 14 
1.1. Introduction 14 
1.2. Motivation for My PhD Research 16 
1.3. Research Architecture 19 
1.4. Overview of this Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge 25 
1.5. Conclusion 28 
Chapter 2: Corporate Governance Theories and Research 30 
2.1. Introduction 30 
2.2. Corporate Governance 31 
2.2.1. The Publicly Listed Company and Its Stakeholders 32 
2.2.2. Corporate Objectives 34 
2.2.3. Behavioural Models of Management 36 
2.2.4. External Corporate Governance 38 
2.2.5. Internal Corporate Governance 40 
2.2.6. Summary 44 
2.3. Theories of Executive Remuneration 45 
2.3.1. A Critique of Theories of Executive Remuneration 52 
2.4. Institutional Theory and the Concept of Institutional Logics 54 
2.5. Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance 60 
2.5.1. Political Logic 66 
2.5.2. Stakeholder Logic 67 
2.5.3. Corporate Logic 68 
2.5.4. Investor Logic 69 
2.5.5. Competing Institutional Logics in Organisational Fields 70 
2.5.5.1. United States of America 70 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
4 
2.5.5.2. Canada 71 
2.5.5.3. United Kingdom 71 
2.5.5.4. Germany 73 
2.5.5.5. Other Countries 74 
2.5.6. Gaps in Research 75 
2.6. Conclusion 76 
Chapter 3: Institutional Logics and Executive Remuneration 79 
3.1. Introduction 79 
3.2. Prior Research on Executive Remuneration 80 
3.3. Principles of Executive Remuneration 85 
3.4. Executive Remuneration Practices 98 
3.5. Remuneration Decision-Making 105 
3.6. Institutional Logics and Executive Remuneration 115 
3.7. Conclusion 120 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods 123 
4.1. Introduction 123 
4.2. Research Objective and Questions 124 
4.3. Research Methodology 132 
4.4. Research Question 1 135 
4.4.1. A Pilot Study 135 
4.4.2. Sample of Texts 136 
4.4.3. Variables 140 
4.4.4. Data Analysis 146 
4.5. Research Question 2 147 
4.5.1. Discourse Analysis 147 
4.5.2. A Pilot Study 149 
4.5.3. Sample of Texts 149 
4.5.4. Stage 1: A Discourse Analysis of Executive Remuneration Practices 154 
4.5.4.1. Variables 154 
4.5.4.2. Data Analysis 156 
4.5.5. Stage 2: A Discourse Analysis of Exemplars of Institutional Logics 157 
4.6. Research Question 3 158 
4.6.1. A Pilot Study 158 
4.6.2. Sample of Interviewees 159 
 5 
4.6.3. Data Collection 161 
4.6.4. Data Analysis 163 
4.7. Conclusion 165 
Chapter 5: The Diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 166 
5.1. Introduction 166 
5.2. Corporate Governance Codes of Practice 167 
5.3. Corporate Annual Reports 174 
5.4. Diffusion of the Remuneration Principles and Institutional Logics 183 
5.5. Conclusion 185 
Chapter 6: Institutional Logics and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 186 
6.1. Introduction 186 
6.2. The Discourse on Executive Remuneration 187 
6.2.1. The Standard Remuneration Package for Executives 187 
6.2.2. Salaries and Benefits 190 
6.2.3. Pension/Superannuation 192 
6.2.4. Other Fixed Remuneration 193 
6.2.5. Short-term Incentives 194 
6.2.6. Long-term Incentives 199 
6.2.7. Minimum Shareholding Requirements 205 
6.2.8. Mix of Fixed and Variable Remuneration 207 
6.2.9. Level of Fixed, Variable and Total Remuneration 208 
6.3. Exemplars of Institutional Logics 209 
6.3.1. Stakeholder Logic 211 
6.3.2. Corporate Logic 213 
6.3.3. Investor Logic 217 
6.3.4. Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 224 
6.3.5. No Logics 224 
6.4. Conclusion 225 
Chapter 7: Remuneration Decision-Making in the Boardroom 227 
7.1. Introduction 227 
7.2. Background on Executive Remuneration in New Zealand 228 
7.3. Corporate Objective 233 
7.4. Behavioural Models of Executives 237 
7.5. Influence of Stakeholders 241 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
6 
7.5.1. Executives 241 
7.5.2. Directors’ Network and Competitors 242 
7.5.3. Recruitment Consultants 243 
7.5.4. Remuneration Consultants 244 
7.5.5. Investors and Analysts 245 
7.5.6. Regulators and Code Issuers 248 
7.5.7. Media and the Public 249 
7.5.8. Employees, Customers, Suppliers and Others 250 
7.5.9. Summary and Implications 251 
7.6. Remuneration Principles 251 
7.6.1. Human Resources Principle 252 
7.6.2. Market Principle 253 
7.6.3. Fairness Principle 254 
7.6.4. Pay-for-Performance Principle 254 
7.6.5. Motivation Principle 255 
7.6.6. Agency Principle 256 
7.6.7. Responsibility Principle 258 
7.6.8. Conformance Principle 258 
7.6.9. Remuneration Principles as a Set 259 
7.6.10. Summary and Implications 260 
7.7. Remuneration Practices 261 
7.7.1. Fixed Remuneration 263 
7.7.2. Short-term Incentives 265 
7.7.3. Long-term Incentives 266 
7.7.4. Mix of Fixed and Variable Remuneration 268 
7.7.5. Level of Remuneration 269 
7.8. Remuneration Processes 271 
7.8.1. Hiring and Replacing Executives 271 
7.8.2. Making Remuneration Decisions 275 
7.8.2.1. Designing Remuneration Policies and Practices 275 
7.8.2.2. Selecting Performance Measures 276 
7.8.2.4. Performance Reviews 277 
7.8.2.5. Hiring and Evaluating Remuneration Consultants 278 
7.8.2.6. Awarding Remuneration to CEOs 279 
 7 
7.8.3. Reporting Remuneration Decisions 280 
7.8.4. Summary and Implications 284 
7.9. Conclusion 284 
Chapter 8: Discussion 287 
8.1. Introduction 287 
8.2. Nature of and Distribution of Belief in the Institutional Logics 288 
8.3. Origins and Diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 291 
8.3.1. Origins of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 292 
8.3.2. Diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in Recent Times 294 
8.4. An Institutional Logics Perspective on Remuneration Decision-Making 297 
8.4.1. Competitive and Institutional Pressures 298 
8.4.2. Making Remuneration Decisions 301 
8.4.3. Reporting Remuneration Decisions 304 
8.4.4. Implications for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 306 
8.5. Institutional Positions 307 
8.6. Conclusion 313 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 314 
9.1. Introduction 314 
9.2. Main Findings and Contribution to Knowledge 314 
9.2.1. Research Question 1 316 
9.2.2. Research Question 2 318 
9.2.3. Research Question 3 320 
9.2.4. Further Findings 322 
9.2.5. Contribution to Knowledge 323 
9.3. Theoretical Implications 325 
9.4. Practical Implications 331 
9.5. Future Research Opportunities 334 
9.6. Conclusion 337 
References 338 
Appendix A: List of Codes of Practice 377 
Appendix B: List of Companies 382 
Appendix C: Examples of Remuneration Principles 390 
Appendix D: Institutionalising the Discourse on Executive Remuneration 397 
Appendix E: Other Aspects of Codes of Practice 450 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
8 
Appendix F: Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance 454 
Appendix G: Human Ethics Approval 475 
Appendix H: Documents for Interviewees 477 
Appendix I: New Zealand’s Discourse on Executive Remuneration 484 
 
 
 
 9 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Research Architecture 23 
Figure 2.1: The Publicly Listed Company and its Stakeholders 33 
Figure 3.1: Remuneration Committee’s Institutional Environment 107 
Figure 5.1: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in the UK’s Codes  169 
Figure 5.2: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in AU’s Codes 170 
Figure 5.3: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in NZ’s Codes 171 
Figure 5.4: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Codes and Corporate Annual 
Reports from the UK, AU and NZ between 1989 and 2010 184 
Figure 8.1: Institutional Positions 309 
Figure 9.1: Towards an Institutional Theory of Executive Remuneration 328 
 
 
 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
10 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 20 
Table 2.1: Theories of Executive Remuneration 47 
Table 2.2: Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance 62 
Table 2.3: A General Framework of Corporate Governance 64 
Table 3.1: Theory Testing in Prior Research 83 
Table 3.2: Principles of Executive Remuneration 88 
Table 3.3: Presence of the Remuneration Principles in Organisational Discourse 90 
Table 3.4: Remuneration Principles and Practices 100 
Table 3.5: Executive Remuneration Principles and Practices – Revisited 117 
Table 4.1: Discourse on Corporate Governance 126 
Table 4.2: Paradigmatic Assumptions of This Research 134 
Table 4.3: Sample of Codes of Practice and Official Reports 138 
Table 4.4: Sample of Corporate Annual Reports 140 
Table 4.5: Coding Procedure for Remuneration Principles 142 
Table 4.6: Sub-sample of Codes and Corporate Annual Reports 150 
Table 4.7: Sub-sample of Codes 151 
Table 4.8: Sub-sample of Companies 153 
Table 4.9: Investigative Procedure for Executive Remuneration Practices 155 
Table 4.10: Sample of Interviewees 161 
Table 4.11: Interview Topics 162 
Table 5.1: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Codes of Practice 168 
Table 5.2: Incidence of Institutional Logics in Codes of Practice 172 
Table 5.3: Change in Incidence of Institutional Logics in Codes of Practice 173 
Table 5.4: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies 175 
Table 5.5: Number of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies 177 
Table 5.6: Influence of the Number of Stock Exchange Listings on the Incidence 
of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of the Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies 178 
 11 
Table 5.7: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of the Largest 
Continuously Publicly Listed Companies 178 
Table 5.8: Number of Remuneration Principles Dropped or Added between Time 
Periods in Annual Reports of the Largest Continuously Publicly 
Listed Companies 180 
Table 5.9: Incidence of Institutional Logics in Annual Reports of Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies 181 
Table 5.10: Change in Incidence of Institutional Logics in Annual Reports of 
Largest Continuously Publicly Listed Companies 182 
Table 6.1: Qantas’ Reward Framework 188 
Table 6.2: Pearson’s Main Elements of Remuneration 189 
Table 6.3: Code Issuers’ Recommendations on the Composition of Boards and 
Remuneration Committees 214 
 
 
 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
12 
Acknowledgements 
 
It has been a long, winding and shaking road that I have travelled along.  At times, the road 
looped back on itself or, suddenly, veered off at a right angle.  I have been lucky enough to 
have a best friend, a partner in life and a wife who has accompanied me along this road.  
There have been bumps in the road that I have tripped over, but Tracy has been there to pick 
me up and get me moving again and again.  Tracy – Words cannot express my gratitude for 
your support over many, many years.  Thank you from the bottom of my heart! 
 
And now we have a baby girl, Penelope Jennifer… The thought of spending time with her 
helped me run faster as the end of the road came into view. 
 
Without my supervisors, Prof. Markus Milne and Dr. Warwick Anderson, there would have 
been no road to follow.  Markus – As I wrote this, I looked up the word “professor” in a 
dictionary to find inspiration, but all I found was your photo. Warwick – Your balanced and 
thoughtful advice and expert editorial skills were invaluable.  Thank you. 
 
To the 16 non-executive directors and 5 senior executives from NZX-listed companies, 7 
recruitment and remuneration consultants, and 5 representatives from other bodies who were 
interviewed: Thank you for giving up your valuable time to share your experiences and 
opinions with me.  Your contribution to the research was immeasurable. 
 
To Sanjaya Kuruppu: You lent me your ear when I needed to vent, provided me with moral 
support and helped to me to complete the list of references. Thank you.  
 
To all the current and former staff of the Accounting and Information Systems Department at 
the University of Canterbury:  Thank you for your support.   
 
Special thanks to the University of Canterbury and the New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants for awarding me PhD scholarships.  Your support was much appreciated. 
 
Very special thanks to my family and friends for all of their support.  I know they have 
wondered if I would ever complete my PhD thesis… my days of “thesicising” are over. 
 13 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This PhD research examines how two different institutional logics of corporate 
governance have shaped the discourse on executive remuneration.  Corporate Logic implies 
executives are intrinsically motivated and will act in the best interests of shareholders as long 
as their total remuneration is competitive and fair.  On the other hand, Investor Logic implies 
executives are extrinsically motivated (opportunistic) and will only act in the best interests of 
shareholders if short- and long-term incentive schemes are designed appropriately. 
 
Approach: The research has an interpretive methodology and consists of three phases.  First, 
the diffusion of both Logics is examined through a content analysis of a large sample of 
corporate governance codes of practice and corporate annual reports.  Second, how both 
Logics are embedded in the remuneration principles and practices that are recommended by 
code issuers and adopted by companies is scrutinised using discourse analysis.  Third, how 
both Logics have shaped the beliefs and decision-making of non-executive directors, 
executives, and others is studied using discourse analysis. 
 
Findings: Both Logics are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration, although 
there has been a strengthening of Investor Logic over time.  Both Logics co-exist as distinct 
from compete in the discourse because it has become taken-for-granted that executives should 
be remunerated comparably to other executives (Corporate Logic) and in line with 
shareholder returns (Investor Logic).  Directors and others manage tension between Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic by prioritising (or ordering) the Logics.  
 
Theoretical implications: The research shows how competitive and institutional pressures 
influence how remuneration decisions are made and reported.  However, institutional change 
is complex because companies influence and are influenced by code issuers and others. 
 
Practical implications: As both Logics are embedded in the beliefs of companies, code issuers 
and others, executive remuneration practices have become unnecessarily complex and 
convoluted.  The case for a simpler approach to executive remuneration is advanced. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 “The directors of [joint stock] companies… being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they 
are apt to… very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company.” 
(Adam Smith, 1776, The Wealth of Nations, p.941) 
 
“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it… [S]entiment… is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane… The 
greatest ruffian… is not altogether without it.” 
(Adam Smith, 1790, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.3) 
 
1.1. Introduction  
How do chief executives officers and their direct reports (hereinafter, executives) behave if 
they receive mainly fixed or variable (performance-based) remuneration?  In the spirit of 
Adam Smith’s (1776) The Wealth of Nations, agency theorists argue that if executives receive 
mainly fixed remuneration, they will aim to increase firm size and decrease firm risk in order 
to increase and protect their salaries; whereas if executives receive mainly variable 
remuneration, they will optimise firm size and risk in order to maximise their own wealth and, 
consequently, shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).  
Executives are portrayed as agents who are capable of maximising shareholder value, but only 
if the short- and long-term incentive schemes are designed in such a way as to align their 
interests with those of shareholders.  This set of beliefs is known as Investor Logic (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).
1
  In the spirit of Adam Smith’s (1790) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
stewardship theorists argue that irrespective of whether executives receive mainly fixed or 
variable remuneration, they will act in the best interests of shareholders (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson, 1990).  Executives are portrayed as stewards who are motivated by intrinsic 
rewards and a sense of sentiment and duty.  This set of beliefs is known as Corporate Logic 
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
                                                 
1
 Zajac and Westphal (2004) used the term Agency Logic, rather than Investor Logic.  However, the term 
Investor Logic is used in order to distinguish agency theory from Investor Logic. 
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The present study investigates the beliefs of non-executive directors (hereinafter, directors), 
executives, representatives of code issuers (e.g. regulators, stock exchanges and directors’ 
associations) and, to a lesser extent, remuneration consultants in order to understand and 
explain how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have shaped the discourse on executive 
remuneration in Australia (AU), New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK).  
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are institutional logics of corporate governance.   
 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p.804) define institutional logics as:  
“[T]he socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
reality…” 
 
Corporate governance is constituted by the relationships, processes and systems, both internal 
and external to the publicly listed company
2
, which influence and are influenced by the board 
of directors
3
 (du Plessis et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007).  As a subset of corporate governance, 
executive remuneration is constituted by principles, practices and processes that concern how 
much and how executives should be and are remunerated and how remuneration decisions 
should be and are reported.  By studying discourse
4
, it is recognised that the social reality of 
directors, executives and others is constructed by institutional logics, of which there are many 
within any given organisational field
5
 (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Phillips et al., 2004; 
Thornton et al., 2005).   
                                                 
2
 There are many forms of organisation, but this research is limited to the publicly listed company (hereinafter, 
company). 
3
 This includes the board’s sub-committees such as the remuneration committee.  The remuneration committee is 
responsible for evaluating the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and making a recommendation of his/her 
remuneration to the board, and approving the CEO’s recommendations on the remuneration of his/her direct 
reports (e.g. Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer), as well as designing the remuneration 
policies for the companies (Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council, 2010; 
Financial Reporting Council, 2010).  However, some companies do not have remuneration committees or 
delegate more/less responsibility to the remuneration committee than is described here (Hermanson et al., 
2011; Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005). 
4
 Discourse is interpreted to mean talk, texts and other artefacts that are produced and consumed by individuals, 
and in consuming discourse, individuals construct, reconstruct and make sense of their social reality 
(Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Phillips and Hardy, 2002).  Further, Hall (2001, p.72) points out that 
discourse “‘rules in’ certain ways of talking about a topic, defining an acceptable and intelligible way to talk, 
write or conduct oneself… [as well as] ‘rules out’, limits and restricts other ways of talking, of conducting 
ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about it.”  In this respect, institutional logics are 
a strong form of discourse that enables and constrains organisational decision-making (see Grand Discourse 
and Mega-Discourse in Alvesson and Karreman, 2000, pp.1133-1134). 
5
 In the context of the present study, an organisational field consists of companies that are listed on the same 
stock exchange and the parties in society that are interested in (or have a stake in) the affairs of these 
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Several aspects of the discourse on executive remuneration are studied.  Most prior research 
on executive remuneration has a positivist methodology and uses quantitative methods to 
examine the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (for reviews, 
see Devers et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009).  This research differs as an interpretive 
methodology is adopted and qualitative methods are used to deconstruct and make sense of 
the discourse on executive remuneration.  Extending the research of Point and Tyson (2006), 
Wade et al. (1997) and Zajac and Westphal (1995), content and discourse analysis are used to 
study how institutional pressures in the form of corporate governance codes of practice 
(hereinafter, codes) influence how remuneration decisions are reported in corporate annual 
reports.  Advancing prior qualitative research on remuneration committees (e.g. Bender, 
2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008), this thesis scrutinises the talk of directors, 
executives, remuneration consultants and representatives of code issuers in order to shed 
further light on how competitive and institutional pressures influence how remuneration 
committees make and report remuneration decisions.  This enables the investigation of how 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, which have opposing implications for executive 
remuneration, are able to co-exist in the discourse.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses what motivated me to undertake this 
research.  This includes my personal and academic reasons.  Section 3 outlines the 
architecture of the research.  The implications of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic for 
executive remuneration are detailed.  The prior research on which the present study builds is 
briefly reviewed.  The gap in prior research and how it is investigated, in the form of three 
research questions, is articulated.  Section 4 presents a brief overview of the nine chapters that 
form the body of this PhD thesis.  How it contributes to knowledge is also discussed.  
Concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
1.2. Motivation for My PhD Research 
My impetus for carrying out this research arose from a curiosity about how directors and 
others believe executives are motivated.  In addition, I was curious as to how academic ideas 
such as those encapsulated in agency theory and stewardship theory influence what directors 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies such as customers, employees, investors, media, regulators, and suppliers (including remuneration 
consultants and other advisors to boards) as well as associations of advisors (e.g. accountants and lawyers), 
directors, executives, investors and others. 
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and others believe.  As an academic who enjoys both researching and teaching, I believe that I 
am motivated by intrinsic and, to a lesser extent, extrinsic rewards.  However, I was puzzled 
by the short- and long-term incentive schemes that form part of the remuneration package for 
executives.  Such arrangements imply that executives are capable of calculating the course of 
action that they and their companies should undertake in order to maximise their incentive 
payments.  This does not appear to be realistic given that executives are rationally bounded or 
have limited calculative abilities (March and Simon, 1993).  Thus, I wondered if the beliefs of 
directors and others may be compelling them to recommend or enact incentive schemes that, 
ultimately, cannot influence executives in the way that agency theory implies.  Further, I was 
also concerned that incentive schemes may alter executives’ beliefs and teach them to be 
opportunistic and to be motivated by extrinsic rewards (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Ghoshal, 
2005). 
 
Much of my original motivation for carrying out this research was generated by a concern in 
by some in the academic community that agency theory has unwarrantedly dominated the 
research agenda (Ferraro et al., 2005; Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005; Lubatkin, 
2005).  Ghoshal (2005, p.77) argues that, “this ideology has led management research 
increasingly in the direction of making excessive truth claims based on partial analysis and 
both unrealistic and biased assumptions.”  Further, agency theory may be a self-activating 
ideology because it assumes that executives are self-interested (Arce, 2007).  If agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) is interpreted normatively, then shareholders and 
directors will believe that executives are self-interested and will use incentives and controls to 
align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.  However, using incentives and 
controls will signal to executives that they cannot be trusted and are expected to act 
opportunistically, which encourages the type of behaviour that the incentives and controls are 
trying to avoid (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Davis et al., 1997; Miller, 1999; Ghoshal, 2005).  
Thus, Ghoshal (2005) believes that this potential for self-activation makes agency theory bad 
for practice. 
 
After some time, my motivation shifted from a concern about how agency theory has affected 
practice to fascination with how beliefs in general can become diffused and institutionalised 
in the discourse of business and society.  For example, the ideology of shareholder value 
maximisation as the corporate objective and executive share option schemes became widely 
diffused in companies from the United States of America (US) during the 1990s (Boyer, 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
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2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; and Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  This is consistent with a strengthening of Investor Logic.  Neo-institutional 
sociology provides a theoretical lens through which the diffusion and institutionalisation of 
beliefs and practices, which are borne out of beliefs, can be studied (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2008).  Competitive and institutional pressures compel companies to become 
increasingly similar over time.  However, companies can resist these pressures as their 
conformance to societal expectations can be symbolic.  For example, Westphal and Zajac 
(1998) found that US investors reacted favourably to companies that adopted long-term 
incentive schemes particularly when justified with the agency principle,
6
 but many of these 
companies did not actually implement these schemes.  This illustrates that the process of 
diffusion and institutionalisation is not straightforward.  Much research was and still is 
required. 
 
After reading Zajac and Westphal (2004), an institutional logics perspective was adopted for 
the present study.  They found (2004, p.433): 
“[T]he [stock] market’s reaction to particular corporate practices, such as stock 
repurchase plans, are not, as financial economists contend, simply a function of 
the inherent efficiency of such practices. Rather, stock market reactions are also 
influenced by the prevailing institutional logic and the degree of 
institutionalization of the practice.” 
 
Other prior research that has adopted an institutional logics perspective is also instructive (e.g. 
Alford and Friedland, 1985; Dune and Jones, 2010; Reay and Hinings, 2009; Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999).  The present study is differentiated from this prior research in that it 
investigated how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on 
executive remuneration as a whole.  Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) conclusion that there has 
been a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in terms of what is the legitimate 
discourse in society is based on investors’ changing reactions to the adoption of stock 
repurchase plans and, to a lesser extent, long-term incentive schemes.  However, the discourse 
on executive remuneration is complex and multi-faceted.  Long-term incentive schemes and 
how they are justified (e.g. the agency principle) are a significant but small part of that 
discourse.  To understand how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the 
discourse and the extent to which there has been a transition requires many aspects of the 
                                                 
6
 The agency principle states that short- and long-term incentive schemes can align the interests of executives 
with those of shareholders.   
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discourse to be studied.  Thus, executive remuneration principles, practices and processes are 
investigated. 
 
1.3. Research Architecture  
Table 1.1 outlines the differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Zajac and 
Westphal’s (2004) definitions of both Logics are reiterated and then extended.  The rationale 
for this extension of their work is located in Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and Chapter 3, Sections 
3.3 and 3.6.  Corporate Logic is part of the Mega Discourse on managerial capitalism, 
epitomised by John Kenneth Galbraith’s (1967) The New Industrial State, where the economy 
is dominated by mega corporations that are controlled by specialist executives.  Stewardship 
theory portrays executives as motivated by intrinsic rewards and willing to act in the 
shareholders’ best interests without the need for coercion (Davis, et al., 1997; Donaldson, 
1990).  They are not driven to maximise their own wealth, but they are driven to maximise 
shareholder value, which will result in economic efficiency and growth (Englander and 
Kaufman, 2004; Kaen et al., 1988).  On the other hand, Investor Logic is part of the Mega 
Discourse on investor capitalism, epitomised by Milton Friedman’s (1962) Capitalism and 
Freedom, where competitive markets hold corporations and their generalist executives to 
account, which will also result in economic efficiency and growth (Ghoshal, 2005; Kaen et 
al., 1988).  Agency theory portrays executives as motivated by extrinsic (monetary) rewards 
and opportunistic (Davis et al., 1997; Ghoshal, 2005).  While capable of maximising 
shareholder value, they will only do so if short- and long-term incentive schemes are designed 
appropriately (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). 
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Table 1.1: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
Key Facets Corporate Logic
1
 Investor Logic
1
 
Links to Mega 
Discourses (or 
higher-order 
cultural frames) 
- Managerial capitalism: top management 
have primary responsibility for 
allocating resources to different 
businesses in the corporation 
- Norms of professional autonomy 
- Investor capitalism: shareholders can 
diversify better and more easily than 
firms 
 
- Logic of capitalist markets 
Links to theories 
of organisation 
- Managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962) 
- Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; 
Donaldson, 1990) 
- Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976) 
Corporate 
objective 
- Shareholder value maximisation 
(Donaldson, 1990; Sundaram and 
Inkpen, 2004a) 
- Shareholder value maximisation 
(Jensen, 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004a) 
Behavioural 
model of 
executives 
- Professionals with unique strategic 
knowledge that is required for efficient 
allocation of corporate resources  
- Stewards of their organisations 
 
- Executives are motivated by intrinsic 
rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Frey and 
Osterloh, 2005) 
- Relatively fungible agents of 
shareholders 
 
- Pursue strategies that advance personal 
interests at expense of shareholders 
- Executives are motivated by extrinsic 
rewards (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990b) 
Remuneration 
philosophy 
- Use salary and other rewards to attract 
and retain scarce managerial talent 
- “Fixed Pay: Recruit good people  
Pay them well  Expect good 
performance” (Anthony and 
Govindarajan, 2007, p.524) 
- Use incentives to align management 
and shareholder interests 
- “Performance-Based Pay: Recruit 
good people  Expect good 
performance  Pay them well if 
performance is actually good” 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007, 
p.524) 
Remuneration 
principles 
- Fairness: Vertical equity between 
executives and employees 
- Human resources: Remuneration  
tailored to executives’ preferences 
- Market: Horizontal equity between 
executives in similar roles, i.e. 
executives are paid comparably to their 
peers 
(See Chapter 3, Table 3.2) 
- Agency: Use incentives to align 
executives’ interests with those of 
shareholders 
- Motivation: Use monetary incentives to 
motivate executives 
- Pay-for-performance: Executives paid 
well only if firm performance meets or 
exceeds expectations 
(See Chapter 3, Table 3.2) 
Remuneration 
practices 
- Performance measures: Internal; 
financial and non-financial 
 
- Desired mix: Mainly fixed remuneration 
 
- Level: Positioned at the median relative 
to other executives in similar roles, 
although the level may be constrained 
by the rate of change in employees’ 
salaries and wages. 
(See Chapter 3, Sections 3.4 and 3.6) 
- Performance measures: External, e.g. 
Economic Value Added
TM
 and total 
shareholder return 
- Desired mix: Mainly variable 
remuneration 
- Level: Positioning depends on firm 
performance (e.g. high relative firm 
performance will mean that executives 
are paid at the upper quartile relative 
to other executives in similar roles) 
(See Chapter 3, Sections 3.4 and 3.6) 
Remuneration 
processes 
- The board and remuneration committee 
are strategic advisors to executives 
- Executives have input into how their 
remuneration is structured 
 
(See Chapter 3, Sections 3.5 and 3.6) 
- The board and remuneration 
committee, comprised of mainly 
independent non-executive directors, 
monitor executives and contract with 
them at arm’s length 
(See Chapter 3, Sections 3.5 and 3.6) 
1 These columns are verbatim from Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436), except for the italicised text.  The 
italicised text is based on my understanding of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Further explanation of 
both Logics is provided in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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The normative implications of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic for executive 
remuneration are not articulated in any depth by Zajac and Westphal (2004).  However, both 
Logics have significant and wide-ranging normative implications as shown in Table 1.1.  
Corporate Logic is akin to a fixed pay philosophy, where executives are remunerated 
competitively and fairly.  As executives are stewards who put shareholders’ interests ahead of 
their own, monitoring and incentives are not required to the extent that Investor Logic implies 
(Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990).  On the other hand, Investor Logic is akin to a variable 
pay philosophy, where executives are remunerated for their individual contributions to firm 
performance (i.e. meritocracy).  As executives are agents who put their interests ahead of 
shareholders’ interests, monitoring (e.g. boards and remuneration committees comprised of 
mainly independent non-executive directors) and incentives (e.g. executive share option 
schemes) are required (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Murphy, 1990b).  Further, executives should 
be evaluated using external (market-based) measures of firm performance, rather than internal 
(accounting) measures of performance because external measures are less susceptible to 
manipulation by executives (Jensen, 2001; Jensen et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1997).  While 
Corporate Logic denies that there is a widespread agency problem, Investor Logic assumes 
that there is such a problem and it can only be resolved with incentive schemes. 
 
There is a small but growing body of research on institutional logics in general (for a review, 
see Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) and on Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (Green et al., 
2008; Lok, 2010; Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).
7
  The latter research has 
investigated several aspects of corporate governance.  Notably, Zajac and Westphal (2004) 
found that there had been a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in terms of 
what US investors perceive as the legitimate discourse.   However, their earlier research 
revealed that both Logics were embedded in US companies’ discourse (Zajac and Westphal, 
1995).  Interestingly, they found that both logics are embedded in US companies’ 
justifications of the adoption of long-term incentive schemes, although there was a 
strengthening of Investor Logic over time.  Further, Lok (2010) found that both Logics were 
embedded in UK discourse on corporate governance, but executives and investors managed 
their institutional identities in such a way that one of the Logics was de-emphasised.  
However, this prior research has not investigated many of the implications that Corporate 
                                                 
7
 Zajac and Westphal’s earlier work is also relevant (see Westphal and Zajac, 1998 and 2001; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1995).  However, Zajac and Westphal (2004) is their first work to explicitly have an institutional 
logics perspective.  Further, researchers have also studied Investor Logic and alternative Logics (e.g. Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004).  These and other relevant studies are reviewed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. 
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Logic and Investor Logic have for executive remuneration.  There is a significant gap in 
knowledge on how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic shape the discourse on executive 
remuneration. 
 
Figure 1.1 outlines the architecture for this research, from the theoretical foundations at the 
top to the research questions and methods at the bottom.  Prior research that has had a strong 
influence on the present study is noted.  Remuneration principles, practices and processes are 
investigated in order to generate insight into how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
embedded in (and able to co-exist in) the discourse on executive remuneration that is 
produced by companies, code issuers and, to a lesser extent, remuneration consultants.  As a 
result, this research draws on prior research from four broad fields of inquiry: Mainstream 
corporate governance research (e.g. agency and stewardship theories); qualitative research on 
executive remuneration (including on how remuneration committees make decisions); an 
institutional logics perspective (i.e. the study of how beliefs, norms, rules and values enable 
and constrain organisational decision-making); and discursive institutionalism (i.e. the study 
of how individuals and organisations use discourse to construct and interpret their social 
realities).  The present study is the first to examine the discourse on executive remuneration, 
as a whole, from an institutional logics perspective, and, therefore, it has broad, exploratory 
research questions.  These are discussed next. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
23 
Figure 1.1: Research Architecture 
Corporate Governance
Executive 
Remuneration
Institutional Logics 
Perspective (Alford 
and Friedland, 1985)
Neo-institutional  
Sociology (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983)
The Embedding of Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic in the Discourse on Executive 
Remuneration in AU, NZ and the UK
Corporate Logic Investor Logic
Discursive 
Institutionalism 
(Phillips et al., 2004)
Discourse Theory 
(Alvesson and 
Karreman, 2000)
Research Question 1: To what 
extent have Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic become embedded in 
AU, NZ and UK organisational 
texts with respect to executive 
remuneration?
Research Question 2: How, if at all, 
have Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic influenced how executive 
remuneration has been 
conceptualised in AU, NZ and UK 
organisational texts?
Coercive and 
normative pressures 
(in the form of 
regulation and codes 
on remuneration) are 
expected to be strong 
in Australia (AU) and 
the United Kingdom 
(UK), but weak in 
New Zealand (NZ)
Content analysis: Patterns in the 
incidence of remuneration 
principles in a large sample of 
codes and corporate annual reports 
from AU, NZ and the UK are 
examined
Institutional Logics of 
Corporate Governance (Zajac
and Westphal, 1995; 2004)
Stewardship Theory 
(Donaldson, 1990; 
Davis et al., 1997)
Agency Theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 
1976)
Remuneration Committees (Bender, 
2004; Main, 1993; Main et al., 2008)
Principles of Remuneration (St-Onge et 
al., 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995)
Research Question 3: How, if at all, 
do Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic influence the thinking and 
decision-making of NZ 
organisational actors with respect 
to executive remuneration?
Discourse analysis: Remuneration 
principles and practices in a 
moderate sample of codes and 
corporate annual reports from AU, 
NZ and the UK are scrutinised
Discourse analysis: Based on 
interviews with a small sample of 
NZ directors, executives, 
consultants and code issuers, 
remuneration principles, practices 
and processes are studied
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
24 
Three countries, AU, NZ and the UK, were selected as opportune sites to study Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic for the following reasons.  First, Corporate Logic is likely to be 
weak in the US because Wall Street exerts much pressure on executives to meet quarterly 
earnings targets (Boyer, 2005; Jensen, 2005; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  The US is not an 
opportune site to study the tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Second, 
Corporate Logic is likely to be stronger in AU, NZ and the UK compared to the US because 
AU, NZ and UK companies have comparatively conservative approaches to executive 
remuneration (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Fernandes et al., 2009; Mishel et al., 2007).  Third, 
despite this conservative approach, there has been much public outrage in AU and the UK, 
but not in NZ, over cases of executives receiving large pay increases for no apparent reason or 
when their companies have (almost) failed (AU: Productivity Commission, 2009; UK: 
Chambers and Weight, 2008).  Consistent with a strengthening of Investor Logic, AU and UK 
Governments have bolstered remuneration disclosure requirements and shareholder rights 
(e.g. AU’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004; UK’s The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002).  Thus, 
there may be a tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in AU and UK, but not 
NZ. 
 
The tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in three different organisation fields 
is investigated.  The UK has been the leader in corporate governance reform, although 
business has led much of this reform (Jones and Pollitt, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  It has 
provided a blueprint for corporate governance reform in other countries (Enrione et al., 2006).  
AU rapidly adopted the UK’s reforms (Hill, 2006, 2008).  In addition, AU and UK code 
issuers have produced many official reports and codes that include discussion of and 
recommendations on corporate governance and executive remuneration (Chambers and 
Weight, 2008; du Plessis et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007).  These changes are indicative of a 
strengthening of Investor Logic.  However, prior research has not studied how these changes 
in AU and the UK have influenced how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in 
the discourse on executive remuneration.  Further, while there have been changes in NZ, the 
changes in terms of executive remuneration have been negligible (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2 
and Chapter 7, Section 7.2). Thus, NZ is an opportune site to study how both Logics are 
embedded in the discourse in the near-absence of regulation and codes related to executive 
remuneration.  
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The objective of this research is to study how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have 
shaped the discourse on executive remuneration.  Given the preceding discussion, the research 
questions are as follows: 
1. To what extent have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic become embedded in AU, 
NZ and UK organisational texts with respect to executive remuneration? 
2. How, if at all, have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influenced how executive 
remuneration has been conceptualised in AU, NZ and UK organisational texts? 
3. How, if at all, do Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence the thinking and 
decision-making of NZ organisational actors with respect to executive remuneration? 
 
The research questions represent three sequential phases in which the discourse on executive 
remuneration is studied in different ways.  First, Research Question 1 is addressed by 
studying the incidence of six remuneration principles (see Table 1.1) that are related to either 
Corporate Logic or Investor Logic, not both, in a sample of 68 codes and 414 corporate 
annual reports from AU, NZ and the UK, produced between 1989 and 2010.  This period is 
selected so that the effects of the corporate governance reforms can be observed.  Second, 
Research Question 2 is addressed by examining how remuneration principles and practices 
are framed in a sample of 55 codes and 75 corporate annual reports from AU, NZ and the UK, 
produced between 1989 and 2010.  Third, Research Question 3 is addressed by analysing 
remuneration principles, practices and processes in the discourse of directors, executives, 
remuneration consultants and representatives of code issuers.  While Research Questions 1 
and 2 involved gathering data from organisational texts, Research Question 3 involved 
gathering data from 33 interviews. 
 
1.4. Overview of this Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge 
There are nine chapters in this thesis.  A brief overview of each chapter, except this chapter, is 
provided below including this research’s contribution to knowledge.   
 
The literature review is presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  Four aspects of corporate governance 
theories and research are discussed in Chapter 2: The prescriptions of academics and 
regulators, theories of executive remuneration, institutional theory and the institutional logics 
perspective, and institutional logics of corporate governance.  In terms of the latter, prior 
research is reinterpreted using a new and original framework that conceptualises institutional 
logics of corporate governance including but not limited to Corporate Logic and Investor 
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Logic.  Chapter 3 then reviews prior research on executive remuneration and discusses how 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in a range of remuneration principles, 
practices and processes.  Tensions between remuneration principles and between 
remuneration practices are explored.  Also, particular attention is given to the effects of 
competitive and institutional pressures on how remuneration committees make and report 
remuneration decisions.  Overall, Chapters 2 and 3 contribute to knowledge by advancing 
Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) work on Corporate and Investor Logic into the realm of 
executive remuneration as well as developing frameworks for synthesising prior research on 
institutional logics of corporate governance (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3) and prior qualitative 
research on remuneration committees (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.5). 
 
The research objective, questions, methodology and methods are discussed in Chapter 4. Two 
types of discourse on executive remuneration (public/texts and private/talk) produced by two 
different parties (companies and code issuers) are studied.  AU, NZ and the UK are the 
subject of study in the first two phases of this research, while only NZ is studied in the third 
phase.  First, extending research by Point and Tyson (2006) and Zajac and Westphal (1995), 
the present study examines the incidence of six remuneration principles in a large sample of 
corporate annual reports and codes from AU, NZ and the UK that span 1989 to 2010.  
Second, a new and original approach is taken to the study of the discourse on executive 
remuneration in a moderate sample of corporate annual reports and codes from AU, NZ and 
the UK that spans 1989 to 2010.
8
  Third, building on qualitative research on remuneration 
committees (e.g. Bender, 2004; Main, 1993; Main et al., 2008), the talk of directors, 
executives, consultants and code issuers is also deconstructed and interpreted.  Overall, this 
research is differentiated from prior research because an institutional logics perspective is 
adopted and both content and discourse analysis are used to study talk and texts.   
 
The findings from the content and discourse analyses are presented in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively.  Chapter 5 explores the incidence of remuneration principles and, consequently, 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in three parts.  First, the incidence in codes is examined.  
Second, the incidence in corporate annual reports is analysed.  Third, the overall pattern of 
diffusion of remuneration principles and, consequently, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is 
studied.  There has been a shift from no Logics to both Logics, although Investor Logic is 
                                                 
8
 While Point and Tyson (2006) used thematic content analysis to explore 23 corporate annual reports, this study 
used discourse analysis to deconstruct and interpret 75 corporate annual reports and 55 codes. 
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stronger than Corporate Logic.  The practiced version of Corporate Logic is different to the 
theoretical version because the fairness principle is much less widely diffused than other 
principles (see Table 1.1).  Chapter 6 illustrates that remuneration principles are closely tied 
to remuneration practices, although remuneration practices are justified with a range of 
remuneration principles.  This shows that companies have much discretion in how they design 
remuneration practices.  However, a standard remuneration package for executives is 
recommended by code issuers and adopted by companies.  Changes in this package over time 
have been changes in form, but not substance.  On the whole, Chapters 5 and 6 contribute to 
knowledge by documenting and explaining how both Logics are able to co-exist in the 
discourse on executive remuneration. 
 
Chapter 7 presents the findings from the discourse analysis of the talk of 16 directors, 5 
executives, 7 consultants and 5 code issuers from NZ.  However, the findings are heavily 
skewed towards the talk of the directors and executives because consultants and code issuers 
have a limited influence on how remuneration decisions are made and reported.  Directors and 
executives are dismissive of NZ code issuers and their codes.  Instead, the discourse analysis 
closely scrutinises the beliefs of directors and executives and what and who they perceive to 
influence their decisions (e.g. investors), as well as how directors balance tensions between 
what they perceive as the rational (or efficient) course of action and the legitimate course of 
action.  In terms of the latter, directors believe that some recruitment and remuneration 
decisions are sub-optimal because the public, particularly investors, would not support the 
optimal decisions.  Further, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are deeply embedded in 
the talk of directors and executives.  However, Investor Logic may be symbolic and Corporate 
Logic may be substantive because the human resources/market principles are prioritised ahead 
of agency/pay-for-performance principles.  Chapter 7 contributes to knowledge by explaining 
how both Logics can co-exist in the discourse, despite directors and others having a range of 
beliefs, and tensions existing between remuneration principles and between remuneration 
practices. 
 
The findings from Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are discussed in Chapter 8 and conclusions drawn in 
Chapter 9.  There are four parts to the discussion presented in Chapter 8.  First, the definitions 
of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are revisited and the likely distribution of beliefs 
amongst directors, investors, code issuers and others is contemplated.  Reasons why both 
Logics co-exist are considered.  Second, the origins of both Logics and the process by which 
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both Logics may be been diffused are pondered.  It appears that societal support for each of 
the Logics has waxed and waned over time.  Third, the process of making and reporting 
remuneration decisions is revisited from an institutional logics perspective.  Particularly 
attention is given to how competitive and institutional pressures influence remuneration 
committees.  Fourth, the concept of the institutional position is introduced.  This is an original 
and novel concept.  It illustrates how there can be much variety between companies despite 
both Logics being embedded in all companies’ discourse as well as how tensions can arise 
when symbolic conformance is discovered by society.  Finally, Chapter 9 outlines the 
research’s main findings and contributions to knowledge as well as the theoretical and 
practical implications. 
 
The most significant contributions to knowledge that the present study makes are as follows.  
First, Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) conceptual work on Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is 
extended (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.6).  Second, the 
findings show how both Logics are able to co-exist in the discourse on executive 
remuneration, despite an apparent strengthening of Investor Logic (i.e. corporate governance 
reform) (see Chapters 5 and 6).  Third, the findings extend prior qualitative research on 
remuneration committees (e.g. Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2010; Main et al., 2008) by 
studying how both Logics influence how remuneration decisions are made and reported (see 
Chapter 7).  Fourth, the processes by which both Logics have been diffused and 
institutionalised are clarified including how competitive and institutional pressures influence 
remuneration decision-making (see Chapter 8).  Fifth, an original concept, the institutional 
position, is introduced and used to further explain how companies can manage societal 
expectations (or institutional pressures).  This demonstrates that both Logics can be 
substantive or symbolic in nature (see Chapter 8).  These and other contributions to 
knowledge are discussed in Chapter 9.  Thus, this research makes a significant contribution to 
knowledge in the fields of corporate governance and neo-institutional sociology.   
 
1.5. Conclusion 
Adam Smith (1776; 1790) presents a pragmatic but inconsistent portrayal of human 
behaviour.  People are portrayed as greedy and opportunistic in some passages, while they are 
motivated by sentiment and duty in other passages.  This underscores that there are multiple 
competing beliefs within societal discourse.  Two sets of opposing beliefs, Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic, are studied with respect to how both Logics are embedded in the 
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discourse on executive remuneration in AU, NZ and the UK, whether each of the Logics has 
become stronger or weaker over time, and how both Logics influence how remuneration 
decisions are made and reported.  Particular attention is given to remuneration principles, 
practices and processes within the talk and texts of companies, code issuers and, to a lesser 
extent, remuneration consultants.  The research contributes to knowledge by building on and 
extending Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) work.  It generates much insight into how both Logics 
are able to co-exist in the discourse on executive remuneration.  The next chapter reviews the 
literature on corporate governance, executive remuneration and then discusses prior research 
on Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and alternative Logics. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Governance Theories and 
Research 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In her novel, Sudden Death, Rita Rae Brown (1983, p.68) wrote “Insanity is doing the same 
thing over and over again, but expecting different results.”  This form of insanity has been 
occurring in the field of corporate governance following the issuance of Cadbury’s (1992) 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.  Since the late 
1980s, there have been multiple waves of high-profile accounting and corporate scandals, 
where directors and executives have been accused of being incompetent and greedy (Cheffins, 
2011; Solomon, 2007).  To solve this reoccurring corporate governance problem, academics, 
directors, investors, regulators and others have repeatedly recommended the following: 
Independence of directors, auditors and remuneration consultants from executives; disclosure 
of executive remuneration (including policies, practices and processes); and shareholder 
activism and power (e.g. voting on the remuneration report) (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; 
Hill, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010; Solomon, 2007).  However, the empirical evidence indicates 
that these prescriptions have not dramatically improved the performance of listed companies 
or prevented further corporate scandals (e.g. Global Financial Crisis) as had been expected, 
yet these prescriptions are still recommended (Dalton and Dalton, 2005, 2011).   
 
This chapter reviews ideas and practices that have become taken-for-granted, particularly in 
Anglo-American countries.  Independence, disclosure, shareholder activism and pay-for-
performance are consistent with the prescriptions of codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004, 2009) and agency theory (Dalton et al., 2007).  Some in the media (Cassidy, 23 
September 2002; Madrick, 20 February 2003, 28 October 2004) and academia (Ferraro et al., 
2005; Ghoshal, 2005; Frey and Osterloh, 2005) have questioned neo-classical economics’ 
(including agency theory’s) influence on society.  The teaching of agency theory, Ghoshal 
(2005) argues, has indoctrinated managers to believe that society expects them to behave 
opportunistically.  Further, Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that investors are reacting 
increasingly positively to the adoption of long-term incentive plans and stock repurchase 
plans by US companies, particularly when those plans are justified using agency theory 
language.  Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that there are competing sets of ideas and 
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practices (or institutional logics) that have become embedded in academic and public 
discourse on corporate governance, but agency theory (or Investor Logic) is dominant in the 
UK and US (Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
This chapter is organised as follows.  An overview of corporate governance is presented in 
Section 2.  Particular attention is given to ideas and practices that researchers have commonly 
studied including the corporate objective, models of human behaviour, external corporate 
governance and internal corporate governance.  This is followed by a brief review of theories 
of executive remuneration in Section 3.  The Holy Grail of corporate governance research has 
been to identify the governance mechanisms that moderate the relationship between executive 
remuneration and shareholder value (Gomej-Mejia, 1994).  It is argued that questing for this 
Holy Grail is irrational.  Instead, this research draws on institutional theory to explain why 
ideas and practices become taken-for-granted.   A review of institutional theory and corporate 
governance is detailed in Section 4.  Drawing on the themes of the chapter, Section 5 presents 
a framework that yields alternative institutional logics of corporate governance: namely, 
Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic.  Concluding 
comments are made in Section 6. 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance 
Since the early twentieth century the defining features of the publicly listed company 
(hereafter, the company) have been limited liability, tradable shares, widely held 
shareholdings, and separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932).  While the 
precise origins of these features of the company are unknown, Petram (2011) argues that the 
Dutch East India Company (founded in 1602) was the first company to have shares traded 
actively on a stock exchange in 1650.  However, shareholders were not granted limited 
liability until the enactment of the British Companies Act of 1856 and 1862.  Since then 
limited liability has become the cornerstone of corporate law throughout the world, and 
privately-held and publicly listed companies have become ubiquitous (Carey, 1998; 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003). As a form of organisation, the company has allowed 
management to gain access to vast amounts of capital and shareholders to diversify their risk, 
which fuelled the early and modern industrial revolutions (Jensen, 1993; Tricker, 2011).   
 
During the mid-to-late nineteenth century, many Governments granted companies the rights 
and responsibilities of a living person and shareholders the right of limited liability, and in 
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exchange, companies were expected to maximise firm value and, through competition with 
other companies, maximise economic efficiency and growth (Kaen, 1988; Jensen, 1993).  
Boards of directors are legally accountable for fulfilling these responsibilities (Monks and 
Minow, 2004; Tricker, 2011).  There has been much academic and public debate about 
whether granting these rights to companies have led to the desired economic outcomes, and 
boards have been heavily scrutinised as a result (Tricker, 2011).  Corporate governance has 
emerged from this debate as a discipline that not only describes how boards of directors 
oversee management, but also can evaluate how boards of director make decisions and 
provides solutions to problems faced by boards of directors (Cheffins, 2011).  Academic and 
public debate on corporate governance is reviewed next. 
 
2.2.1. The Publicly Listed Company and Its Stakeholders 
Figure 2.1 shows the company and its stakeholders, which may be inside or outside the 
company.  Traditionally, corporate governance has been focused on shareholders, directors 
and executives (Berle and Means, 1932; Mace, 1971; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Shareholders appoint the board of directors to act on their behalf, who ensure that executives 
act in the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  However, this traditional 
perspective is too narrow (Solomon, 2007).  A broader conceptualisation of corporate 
governance recognises that there is a network of stakeholders.  Some are primary (or core) 
stakeholders such as shareholders, customers, employees, and suppliers; whereas others are 
secondary stakeholders such as oversight bodies, special interest groups and society 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  These stakeholders have varying interests, power (i.e. ability 
to influence the company and other stakeholders) and salience (i.e. desire to be involved in 
how the company is governed) (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
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Figure 2.1: The Publicly Listed Company and its Stakeholders 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates that many stakeholders are a party to corporate governance.  The board 
of directors and its committees are legally obligated to ensure that executives and employees 
act in the best interests of the company.  While customers and suppliers do usually not have a 
significant role in corporate governance, shareholders and debt-holders have a prominent role 
in corporate governance because they can gain control of the company.  Service providers 
such as accountants, auditors, consultants and lawyers have been cast as the gatekeepers of 
‘good’ corporate governance, although some have failed in this role (Coffee, 2006).  
Government, regulators and stock exchanges set the regulatory framework that the company 
operates in, and, along with academia and media, monitor the company’s compliance (Gillan, 
2006).  Oversight bodies and special interest groups also issue codes that set the normative 
framework that the company operates in (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  However, the 
company is not a passive pawn and can exert influence over its stakeholders and the 
regulatory and normative framework (Jones and Pollitt, 2004).  
 
2.2.2. Corporate Objectives 
Given the number of stakeholders that companies have and their varying interests, there has 
been much debate over which stakeholder/s should have their interests served by the company 
and be ‘the principal’.  There are two main camps: Shareholder primacy and stakeholder 
primacy (for debates, see Green, 1993 vs. Bainbridge, 1993; and Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004a, b vs. Freeman et al., 2004).
 9
   Shareholder primacy asserts that management (directors 
and executives) should use the company’s resources and non-shareholding stakeholders as the 
means to maximise shareholder value (Friedman, 1962; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  On 
the other hand, stakeholder primacy asserts that management should use the company’s 
resources to engender cooperation among stakeholders in order to maximise stakeholder value 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004).  Both camps claim that if companies 
pursue their corporate objective, then companies will produce the greatest good (in economic 
terms) for the greatest number.
10
   
                                                 
9
 There are other corporate objectives, but these have received much less attention in the corporate governance 
literature.  For example, institutional theorists suggest that the corporate objective is legitimacy, i.e. to 
survive in the long-term, the company should act, or at least claim to act, in accordance with stakeholders’ 
expectations, particularly powerful ones (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).  Further, Heracleous 
and Lan (2012) argue that the corporation itself should be the principal and this is the case under corporate 
law in the US and UK.  They argue that the corporate objective should be profit maximisation, but to survive 
in the long-term, the company will have to satisfy, to some extent, all stakeholders’ claims. 
10
 This phrase invokes Jeremy Bentham’s Moral Axiom, “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong” (Burns, 2005, p.46), which was originally published in A Fragment on 
Government in 1776. 
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Proponents of shareholder primacy argue that shareholders are the ultimate risk bearer in the 
company as they are only entitled to the company’s residual value (assets less liabilities) and, 
therefore, have the strongest incentive among all stakeholders to ensure that management 
maximises performance, or in this case, the company’s residual value (Bainbridge, 1993; 
Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  Also, shareholders do not have the same legal protection as 
non-shareholding stakeholders (with respect to consumer, employment and environment 
laws), which adds to shareholders’ incentive to monitor management (Bainbridge, 1993; du 
Plessis et al., 2005).  Unlike stakeholder value maximisation, it is argued that shareholder 
value maximisation is an unambiguous and measurable (e.g. economic profit and total 
shareholder return) corporate objective (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  Further, Jensen 
(2001) and Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) suggest that the interests of non-shareholding 
stakeholders must be satisfied in order to maximise shareholder value in the long-term. This 
corporate objective is termed enlightened shareholder value maximisation.
11
 
 
On the other hand, proponents of stakeholder primacy argue that shareholders have less risk 
than non-shareholding stakeholders because they can diversify their risk and sever their 
relationship with the company by selling their shares, while the livelihoods of non-
shareholding stakeholders are often dependent on one company (e.g. employees) or a few the 
companies (e.g. suppliers) (Freeman et al., 2004; Ghoshal, 2005).  Freeman et al. (2004, 
p.364) argue that to maximise stakeholder value, “Managers must develop relationships, 
inspire their stakeholders, and create communities where everyone strives to give their best to 
deliver the value the firm promises.”  While acknowledging that the company must make 
profits to satisfy the interests of shareholders, Freeman et al. (2004) argue that management 
must balance the multiple interests of stakeholders to produce superior results, and this will 
result in both ethically and economically desirable outcomes for society. 
                                                 
11
 Shareholder value maximisation has been heavily criticised for encouraging management to maximise profits 
in the short-term, ignore non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests and welfare, and act unethically (Ghoshal, 
2005; Smith, 2003).  A focus short-term on profits at the expect of long-term value and survival has been, it 
is claimed, fuelled by stock market pressure to meet quarterly earnings’ targets and executive share options 
(Ghoshal, 2005; Jensen, 2005).  Also, US corporate scandals in the first years of the twenty-first century such 
as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom and the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis have also been partially attributed 
to management’s pursuit of shareholder value maximisation (Smith, 2003; Jensen, 2005; Parmar et al., 2010).  
Enlightened shareholder value maximisation has been put forward as solution to a short-term focus in both 
the academic (Jensen, 2001; Jensen et al., 2005) and political arenas (Wen and Zhao, 2011).  However, 
adding the word ‘enlightened’ does not alter the fundaments tenets of shareholder value maximisation as it 
has never been argued that management should maximise short-term profit at the expense of long-term 
shareholder value (Bainbridge, 1993). Shareholder value maximisation, whether enlightened or not, implies 
that non-shareholding stakeholders are a means to the end of shareholder value. 
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It is not expected that there will be any resolution to the academic debate between proponents 
of shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy.  Outside of academia, the espoused and 
practiced corporate objective varies between companies, countries and time periods (Edmonds 
and Hand, 1976; Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Witt and Redding, 2012).  Stakeholder value 
maximisation has been dominant in Continental Europe and Japan (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010), although prior to the Global Financial Crisis shareholder value maximisation was 
being increasing adopted in some of these countries (e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Lee and Yoo, 
2008).  In the US, stakeholder value maximisation became dominant among large companies 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Boyer, 2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004), but the primacy of 
shareholder value maximisation was re-established following increased competition from 
Japanese companies in the 1980s (Lazonick, 2010), the takeovers movement in the 1980s 
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004) and the wide adoption of executive share option plans in the 
1990s (Boyer, 2005; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).  Shareholder value maximisation is 
also dominant in the UK (Lok, 2010). 
 
2.2.3. Behavioural Models of Management 
Arguments for and against shareholder and stakeholder value maximisation are entrenched in 
different conceptions of human behaviour.  Maximising shareholder value requires 
competition (i.e. individuals acting in their own interests) in all aspects of the economy (i.e. 
organisations and markets) (Jensen, 2001); whereas maximising stakeholder value requires 
cooperation (i.e. individuals acting in the interests of others) in some aspects of the economy 
(i.e. organisations, but not necessarily markets) (Freeman et al., 2004).  Jensen (1994) argues 
that organisations exist and can survive because individuals have an incentive to resolve 
conflict and act collectively for the betterment of their own interests in the long-term.  This 
conception of human behaviour is known as enlightened self-interest and is consistent with 
enlightened shareholder values maximisation.  Thus, Jensen (1994) argues that cooperation 
involves individuals acting in their own interests, rather than in the interests of others.  
However, this claim is contested. 
 
Generally, neo-classical economists and capitalists believe that individuals are only motivated 
by self-interest (Collison, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where self-interest is formally 
defined as maximising utility, but commonly expressed as maximising monetary wealth 
(Baker et al., 1988).  The behaviour of self-interested individuals is restricted because they 
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follow ‘the rules of the game’ by acting within the law and fulfilling their obligations in 
accordance with formal and social contracts (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).  However, 
Williamson (1979) argues that individuals are opportunistic – defined as self-interest with 
guile – and can choose to not follow the rules and to renege on their promises.  However, 
cooperation (or promise keeping among opportunistic individuals) may be induced through 
markets, organisations and regulations.  In the case of the company, where there is a 
separation of ownership and control, contracts, surveillance and performance-based 
remuneration are required to govern the behaviour of management and induce cooperation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1979). 
 
However, Adam Smith (1776; 1790), the founding father of modern economics, recognised 
that individuals are not entirely self-interested and are motivated by a range of ‘passions’ 
including sentiment (or altruism), which is defined as acting in the interests of others.  
Altruistic individuals not only consider the impact of their actions on others and attempt to 
negate negative impacts, but also provide financial, physical and social support to those in 
need.  Such behaviour is different to that predicted by enlightened self-interest (Rocha and 
Ghoshal, 2006).  Further, Rocha and Ghoshal (2006) argue that individuals are motivated by 
duty and excellence, where duty is defined as acting in accordance with moral and ethical 
norms, and excellence is defined as acting to develop human potentiality.  Collectively, the 
motives of self-interest, sentiment, duty and excellence can help explain the range of 
behaviours observed among stakeholders and management in companies. 
 
Based on the assumption of managerial self-interest, neo-classical economists have argued 
that directors should use incentives and controls to govern executives (Donaldson, 1990).  
They believe that “compensation plans are designed to align the interests of risk-averse self-
interested executives with those of shareholders” (Murphy, 1999, p.2519).  Since the Dot-com 
Bubble and Global Financial Crisis, these normative statements have been increasingly 
questioned (Cassidy, 23 September 2002; Ghoshal, 2005; Parmar et al., 2010).  Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996) and Ghoshal (2005) contend that assuming executives are self-interested and 
using incentives to control their behaviour will teach them that self-interested behaviour is 
desirable.  Pro-organisational behaviour or intrinsic motivation will be crowded-out (or 
reduced) as a result (Donaldson, 1990; Frey and Jegen, 2001).  Thus, Frey and Osterloh 
(2005) argue that paying executive like bureaucrats (i.e. mainly fixed remuneration) will 
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produce more socially desirable outcomes than paying them like entrepreneurs (i.e. mainly 
variable remuneration).   
 
This debate has led to a behavioural model of management, where individuals are either 
agents or stewards, not both.  Agents are self-interested (or opportunistic) and extrinsically 
motivated, whereas stewards are collective-serving and intrinsically motivated (Davis et al., 
1997).  As Donaldson (1990, p.377) explains, stewards “are team players, and the optimal 
structure is one that authorizes them to act, given that they will act in the best interests of 
owners [or stakeholders].”  Thus, management efforts can be optimised for agents with 
performance-based remuneration and stewards with competitive fixed remuneration (Grundei, 
2008).  Note that stewards may be de-motivated by performance-based remuneration because 
it signifies a lack of trust by the board (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008).  However, 
executives may change their behaviour between agent and steward (e.g. Angwin et al., 2004).  
Due to uncertainty in deciding whether executives are agents or stewards and the cost in 
making the wrong decision, boards are most likely biased towards believing that executives 
are agents.  This may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ghoshal, 2005). 
 
Debate on human behaviour is often normative.  While psychologists are concerned with how 
individuals actually behave, proponents of shareholder and stakeholder primacy both make 
assumptions about how individuals behave.  The debate is characterised by a dichotomy of 
agent (self-interest) versus steward (cooperation).  However, Furnham (2005) highlights that 
individuals have multiple motives and their motives may change.  Individuals desire both 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in differing quantities.  Some value money and status, whereas 
others value challenging and enjoyable work.  A perception of reward equity is also 
important.  Further, individuals’ preferences and motives are not autonomous and stable, but 
are subject to external influences, particularly societal norms and peer pressure, and can 
change over time.  As human behaviour is multi-faceted and dynamic, characterising 
individuals as agents or stewards results in a ‘straw man’ conception of human behaviour.  
Nevertheless, corporate governance theory and practice does oversimplify human behaviour. 
 
2.2.4. External Corporate Governance 
There are many definitions of corporate governance.  Consistent with shareholder primacy, 
Cadbury (1992, pp.15-16) defined corporate governance as “the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled.  Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
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companies… [and] are accountable to their shareholders…”  Consistent with stakeholder 
primacy, Solomon (2007, p.14) defined corporate governance as “the system of checks and 
balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge 
their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas 
of their business activity.”  In contrast, Daily et al. (2003, p.371) defined corporate 
governance without reference to the corporate objective, “as the determination of the broad 
uses to which organizational resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among 
the myriad participants in organizations.”  Irrespective of the definition, there are two spheres 
of corporate governance: Internal (see Section 2.2.5.) and external. 
 
External corporate governance refers to the relationship between society (e.g. external 
stakeholders) and the company (e.g. the board).  This includes culture, markets, politics and 
regulation, and other sources of oversight (Gillan, 2006).  Culture (e.g. national differences) 
influences both regulation and how internal corporate governance is structured and practiced 
(Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004).  Emerging from the political 
arena, regulation sets ‘the rules of the game’ and the penalties for breaking these rules 
(Chambers and Weight, 2008), although companies (e.g. directors) do lobby politicians and 
regulators to change the rules (Bebchuk and Neeman, 2010; Volpin and Pagano, 2005).  
Markets for capital, information (e.g. analysts), financial services (e.g. auditors and lawyers), 
labour, products-services (e.g. customers and competitors) also act as a constraint on 
corporate behaviour, although large companies are able to resist market forces to some degree 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Gillan, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Other sources of 
oversight include academia and the media (Core et al., 2008; Dyck and Zingales, 2002; 
Gillan, 2006).  Overall, external corporate governance is a two-way relationship as the 
company influences and is influenced by society. 
 
Corporate governance has been a topic of public interest since the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission investigated the collapse of Penn Central in 1970 (Cheffins, 2011) and 
the UK’s Cadbury Committee reported on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
following the collapse of Polly Peak in 1990 and BCCI and Maxwell Communications in 
1991 (Chambers and Weight, 2008).  While business history is littered with corporate 
collapses, these companies gained notoriety because their boards failed in their fiduciary 
responsibility to monitor executives.  Fuelled by accounting and corporate scandals (e.g. 
Arthur Anderson and Enron in 2001) and financial crises (Asian financial crisis in 1997; Dot-
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com Bubble in 2001; and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008), code issuers including 
regulators, stock exchanges, investor associations, director associations around the world have 
produced a plethora of codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009).  Notably, the 
Cadbury Committee’s code has become the blueprint for code issuers around the world 
(Enrione et al., 2006). 
 
Corporate governance reform (particularly in the form of codes) is concerned with the 
independence of directors, auditors and remuneration consultants from management, 
disclosure of executive remuneration, institutional investor activism, and shareholder voice 
(e.g. non-binding vote on the remuneration report)  (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Daily et al., 
2003; Hill, 2006, 2008; Solomon, 2007).  Regulators and stock exchanges produce codes to 
improve the efficiency of capital markets and companies as well as to calm investor and 
public anxiety (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  While most mandatory codes take a ‘comply or 
explain’ approach, companies comply with codes even though compliance does not result in 
improved firm performance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  It may be that companies 
comply with codes because their directors and advisors (e.g. accountants) guided corporate 
governance reform by becoming members of and lobbying code issuers (Jones and Pollit, 
2004).  For instance, Sir Adrian Cadbury, who chaired the Cadbury Committee, was the 
former Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, a large multinational company.  There is also mixed 
evidence on whether enhancing shareholder voice results in greater CEO pay to firm 
performance sensitivity (Alissa, 2009; Conyon and Sandler, 2010; Ferri and Maber, 2009).  
Overall, corporate governance reforms have not improved firm performance or prevented the 
occurrence of corporate scandals (Dalton and Dalton, 2005), but reforms have demonstrated 
to an outraged public that regulators and directors will do something.  
 
2.2.5. Internal Corporate Governance 
Internal corporate governance is concerned with the board’s structure and role, and with 
executive remuneration (Gillan, 2006; Solomon, 2007).
12
  The board’s structure refers to the 
number of directors, leadership (i.e. separate or combined roles for the Chairman and CEO), 
and composition (i.e. mix of executive, affiliated and independent directors).
13
  While all 
                                                 
12
 Internal corporate governance also refers to director ownership and remuneration, corporate bylaws and 
charters (or articles of association), capital structure, internal control systems, corporate strategy and risk, and 
hiring, evaluating and dismissing the CEO (Boyd et al., 2011; Gillan, 2006; Pugliese et al., 2009). 
13
 Board structure also refers to the composition of the board’s committees, e.g. audit, nominations and 
remuneration (Chambers and Weight, 2008). 
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directors have the same legal duties, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) argue that different types of directors add value to the company in different ways.  
First, executive directors are valued for their in-depth knowledge of the company. Second, 
affiliated non-executive directors – who are former executive directors, transact with the 
company (e.g. consulting services) or have a large shareholding – are valued for their 
knowledge of the company and their resources (e.g. business network).  Third, independent 
non-executive directors – who have no financial ties to the company – are valued for their 
outside perspective and ability to monitor executives.   
 
Board leadership has only two structures: Separate persons as chairman and CEO, or one 
person as combined chair-CEO.  Both structures have pros and cons.  Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) argue that having an executive chairman will improve the clarity and speed of 
decision-making because boards will be less likely to oppose or confound executives. On the 
other hand, Cadbury (1992, p.21) argued against boards having an executive chairman 
because “…it represents a considerable concentration of power.”  An executive chairman may 
subvert the company for their own purposes at the expense of stakeholders.  Until recently, 
executive chairman were common in many countries, particular the US (Dalton and Dalton, 
2005; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  However, having separate persons as chairman and CEO 
as well as a majority of independent directors is now favoured among policymakers and 
practiced by most companies in Anglo-American countries (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; 
Solomon, 2007). 
 
There has been considerable research on the influence of board structure on firm performance.  
Dalton et al.’s (1999) meta-analysis revealed that there is positive relationship between the 
number of directors and firm performance, particularly for smaller firms.  In contrast, Dalton 
et al.’s (1998) meta-analysis found that there is no relationship between board structure 
(leadership and composition) and firm performance.  Recent studies have also found that there 
is minimal evidence for a consistent relationship between board structure (including 
committee structures) and firm performance (Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Finegold et al., 2007; 
Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005).  But some empirical evidence indicates that an executive 
chairman can positively influence firm performance in smaller or entrepreneurial companies 
(Boyd, 1995; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Overall, the empirical evidence indicates that there 
is no optimal board structure, which goes against the recommendation for independent boards 
found in codes around the world (Dalton and Dalton, 2005, 2011). 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
42 
  
It has been argued that it is the board’s role, particularly the roles played by individual 
directors, that can add value, rather than board structure (Leblanc and Gilles, 2005; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  Hung (1998) describes six roles for the board: linking to 
others (e.g. directors’ networks); coordinating with stakeholders; control (e.g. monitoring 
executives); strategic (e.g. advising executives); maintenance (or conformance with societal 
norms and rules); and support (e.g. legitimate or rubber stamp executives’ decisions).  While 
all of the roles are important, prior research has tended to study the control, strategic and, to a 
lesser extent, the linking roles (Roberts et al., 2005).  Further, policymakers have also debated 
the board’s role.  Typically, codes recommend that executive directors perform a strategic role 
and independent directors perform a control role (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Higgs, 2003). 
 
Summarising the debate, Becht et al. (2007, p.916) postulates: “Should the board of directors 
be seen as having only an (inevitably adversarial) monitoring role, or should directors also 
play an advisory role?”  Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Davis et al. (1997) put forward that 
the board’s role will be control-oriented or advice-oriented, but not both.  They argue that if 
executives are assumed to be agents, then the board should be comprised of independent 
directors who are control-oriented; whereas if executives are assumed to be stewards, then the 
board should be comprised of executive and affiliated directors who are advice-oriented.  A 
combined control/advice role is not possible.  Executive and affiliated directors cannot 
monitor executives as they are financially tied to the company, and independent directors 
cannot advise executives as they do not have an in-depth knowledge of the company. 
 
However, the board may be able to both monitor and advise executives.  Directors can have 
different but equally important roles and can switch roles from being an evaluator of the 
CEO’s performance to a collaborator on the CEO’s strategic plan (Leblanc and Gilles, 2005).  
Non-executive directors may be both monitors of executives and possess expertise that is 
valued by executives (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  The relationship between the board and the 
CEO is complex and dynamic, where both control and collaboration are necessary to meet 
shareholders’ or stakeholders’ expectations (Tricker, 2009).  For example, in a US study of 
social ties between directors and the CEO, and boardroom collaboration in strategic decision-
making, Westphal (1999, p.19) found “CEO-board collaboration and control are 
independently and positively related to subsequent firm performance.”  The empirical 
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evidence suggests that effective boards operate between these two extreme positions, 
combining elements of both (Roberts et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007; Tricker, 2009).   
 
Similar to the debate on the board’s structure and role, debate on executive remuneration is 
centred on opposites: fixed versus variable pay philosophies.  If executives are assumed to be 
agents, then variable pay (i.e. performance-based remuneration) is required to direct their 
behaviour (Fama, 1980).  On the other hand, if executives are assumed to be stewards, then 
only fixed pay is required because they will maximise their effort as long as they perceive 
their pay to be fair (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008).  The empirical evidence is mixed, but 
indicates that there is a weak relationship between executive remuneration and firm 
performance, although firm size has greater explanatory power that firm performance (Devers 
et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009; Tosi et al., 2000).  This implies that executive remuneration 
does influence firm performance, but not in all cases.  Therefore, Davis et al.’s (1997) 
proposition that some executives are agents, while others are stewards is supported.
14
   
 
There is a standard executive remuneration package that includes salary and benefits, pension 
(or superannuation), other fixed remuneration (e.g. recruitment, retention and severance 
payments), and short- and long-term incentives (for reviews, see Chambers and Weight, 2008; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Murphy, 1999).  Note that short- and long-term incentives may be 
dependent on a range of performance measures including financial, non-financial and market-
based (e.g. total shareholder return), where the short-term is one year and the long-term is 
multiple years (e.g. 3-5 years).  The basic elements of the standard package have not varied 
much over time, but certain elements and practices do fall in and out of fashion, e.g. share 
options (Frydman and Saks, 2010).  However, there are national differences in the standard 
package with greater use of variable remuneration in Anglo-American countries and fixed 
remuneration in Europe and Asia (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010; Sanchez Marin, 2008). 
 
There is also a standard process for determining how and how much to remunerate executives 
(Chambers and Weight, 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Murphy, 1999).  The level of fixed 
remuneration is based on survey data of a peer group, usually provided by remuneration 
consultants.  The board (or remuneration committee) has to decide the basis of comparison 
                                                 
14
 As Bebchuk and Fried (2004) believe that all executives are agents (i.e. opportunistic), they argue that the 
mixed empirical evidence indicates that executives are able to control the pay-setting process and receive 
ever-increasing remuneration irrespective of firm performance.   
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(e.g. composition of the peer group) and the relative level (e.g. lower-quartile, median or 
upper-quartile).  The potential level of variable remuneration is based on a multiple of fixed 
remuneration.  The board has to decide the targets on which variable remuneration is 
determined (e.g. hurdles or a range) and the range of multiples (e.g. minimum and maximum 
pay-out).  Note that there is a difference between awarded and realised remuneration for 
equity-based incentives that are deferred over a specified period.  The board’s decisions can 
be significantly influenced by executives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) and remuneration 
consultants (Bender, 2011; Conyon et al., 2011; Crystal, 1991). 
 
Executive remuneration has been the most controversial topic in corporate governance since 
at least the 1930s in the US (Wells, 2010).
15
  There has been much academic and public 
debate particularly in Anglo-American countries because of the dramatic increase in the 
absolute level of CEO pay and the ratio of CEO-to-employee pay in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Ezzamel and Watson, 1998; Froud et al., 2008; Michel et al., 
2007; Shields et al., 2003).  In the US, this debate has been fuelled by large awards of 
executive share options (Hall and Murphy, 2003), corporate scandals and executives being 
rewarded for failure (Anderson et al., 2008, 2009, 2010).  There have been similar concerns in 
Australia and the UK (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Productivity Commission, 2009; Trade 
and Industry Committee, 2003).  Further, empirical evidence indicates that many boards 
believe that their executives are above average performers deserving of above average pay, 
which results in ever-increasing executive remuneration (Bizjak et al., 2008; 2011; Hayes and 
Schaefer, 2009).   
 
2.2.6. Summary 
Following corporate scandals and financial crises, boards have been accused of being ‘asleep 
at the wheel’ and CEOs have been accused of being ‘greedy’ (Monks and Minow, 2004).  For 
example, Chambers (2005, p.836) comments that during 1990s in the UK, “Directors were 
caricatured as ‘fat cats’ smoking cigars and licking the cream…”  Reforming both external 
and internal corporate governance has been proposed as the solution to these problems; this is 
evidenced by the issuance of more than a hundred codes around the world since the UK’s 
Cadbury Report in 1992 (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; Enrione et al., 2006).  
                                                 
15
 For example, Cooper (1933, p.358) commented: “It appears that in some instances the potential social and 
economic value of such plans [employee stock option plans] is not realized… because… intrenched [sic] 
managements of great corporations pervert the plan into a fraudulent device to obtain huge bonuses of cheap 
stock for the managerial officers at the expense of the shareholders.” 
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The solution consists of board independence, remuneration disclosure, pay-for-performance 
(e.g. executive share option schemes), shareholder voting on the remuneration report, and 
shareholder activism (Monks and Minow, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  Companies and 
institutional investors have adopted this solution (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), 
although it is debatable whether it has led to improved firm performance (Dalton and Dalton, 
2005, 2011). 
 
2.3. Theories of Executive Remuneration 
Numerous theories have been put forward to describe how corporate governance is practiced, 
explain how and why corporate governance practices have arisen as well as prescribe how 
corporate governance practices can be reformed (for reviews, see Hung, 1998; Tricker, 2009, 
Chapter 9).  However, all corporate governance theories are not reviewed here because the 
subject of the present study is executive remuneration.  This is still a broad, interdisciplinary 
subject with theories of executive remuneration originating from economics (e.g. marginal 
productivity theory), finance (e.g. agency theory), law (e.g. managerial power theory), 
management (e.g. stakeholder and stewardship theories), psychology (e.g. expectancy and 
equity theories) and sociology (e.g. institutional theory) (for reviews, see Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010; Otten, 2007).  The purpose of this section is to briefly review theories of executive 
remuneration and then explain why institutional theory is chosen as the theoretical lens for 
this research.  
 
Table 2.1 summarises the key implications for executive remuneration of a number of 
theories.  Included in Table 2.1 are only those theories that have been widely discussed and 
researched in the literature on executive remuneration.  Not included are theories that have 
rarely been applied to executive remuneration such as resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978)
16
 and under-researched theories such as political figurehead theory 
(Ungson and Steers, 1984).  While there are many theories of executive remuneration, agency 
theory has become the dominant theoretical lens of researchers (Durisin and Puzone, 2009; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  Empirical evidence provides limited and qualified support for 
most theories including agency theory.  Many have questioned the dominance of agency 
theory (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005; Lubatkin, 2005), while others have 
                                                 
16
 Hillman et al.’s (2009) review of resource dependence theory does not mention executive remuneration.  
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reformulated agency theory to incorporate insights from other theories (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 
2007; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
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Table 2.1: Theories of Executive Remuneration 
Theories Seminal Articles  Key Implications for Executive Remuneration 
Economics, Finance and Law   
Agency Theory  
- Positive Agency Theory 
- Optimal Contracting Theory 
- Managerial Power Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
- Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) 
- Harris and Raviv (1979) 
- Bebchuk et al. (2002) 
Conflicts of interest arise because shareholders delegate responsibility to the board, which 
in turn delegates responsibility to the CEO.  Agency theory asserts that external and 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. incentive schemes) can align the interests 
of directors and executives with those of shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Labour Market Theory 
- Marginal Productivity Theory 
- Extreme Value Theory 
- Human Capital Theory 
Hicks (1932) 
- Roberts (1956) 
- Rosen (1981; 1992) 
- Becker (1964) 
Labour market theory contends that executive remuneration is determined by the forces of 
supply and demand (Hicks, 1932).  However, executives will be remunerated at different 
rates depending on firm size (Roberts, 1956), education and experience of executives 
(Becker, 1964) and the supply of high-calibre (‘superstar’) talent (Rosen, 1981). 
Management   
Contingency Theory 
- Strategic Management Theory 
Chandler (1962) 
- Salter (1973); Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia (1987) 
Contingency theory states that firm performance is dependent on the fit between the 
company’s executive remuneration practices (e.g. performance measures and mix of fixed 
and variable pay) and its strategy and environment (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
Stakeholder Theory Freeman (1984) and Jones (1995) Stakeholder theory asserts that executive remuneration is dependent on fulfilment of 
salient and powerful stakeholders’ interests (Arora and Alam, 2005). 
Stewardship Theory Donaldson (1990) and Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) 
Stewardship theory claims that performance-based remuneration is unnecessary because 
executives are pro-organisational and collective-serving (Davis et al., 1997). 
Upper Echelons Theory 
- Managerial Discretion 
Hypothesis 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
- Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
Upper echelons theory asserts that firm performance is partially dependent on the fit 
between executives (e.g. personalities) and the company’s remuneration practices, and 
this dependence intensifies as managerial discretion increases (Hambrick, 2007). 
Psychology   
Expectancy Theory  
- Cognitive Evaluation Theory  
- Motivation Crowding Theory  
Vroom (1964); Lawler and Porter (1968) 
- Deci and Ryan (1985) 
- Frey (1997) 
Executives’ effort (or motivation) dependents on their perceptions of the likelihood of 
receiving desirable rewards (Furnham, 2005).  But as the level of potential extrinsic 
rewards increases, there is a decrease in intrinsic motivation; thus, performance-based 
remuneration can decrease executives’ motivation (Frey and Osterloh, 2005).  
Structural Theory 
- Tournament Theory 
Simon (1957) 
- Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
Structural theory contends that there is a social norm that supervisors (e.g. CEO) will be 
paid more than their subordinates, and it can be expressed as a ratio (Simon, 1957).  
Tournament theory asserts that this ratio exists because executives are competing to 
become the CEO, and the CEO’s higher pay represents a prize (O’Reilly et al., 1988). 
Social Comparison Theory 
- Equity Theory 
Festinger (1954); O’Reilly et al. (1988) 
- Adams (1963) 
Social comparison theory asserts that how much the CEO is paid depends on how much 
board members (and their peers) are paid, while equity theory claims that it depends on 
how much the CEO’s peers are paid (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  
Sociology   
Institutional Theory Meyer and Rowan (1977); DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983); Suchman (1995) 
Institutional theory states that the board’s remuneration decisions will be influenced by 
societal expectations, but the board can manage societal expectations by decoupling its 
public account of decisions from internal practices (Scott, 2008).  
 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
48 
Agency theory asserts that an agency problem (or a conflict of interests) occurs when 
shareholders delegate decision-making responsibility to management because shareholders 
and management have different preferences and are utility maximisers (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  Management’s interests can be aligned to those of shareholders through a variety of 
governance mechanisms including markets for corporate control, products-services and 
labour, as well as regulation, monitoring (by shareholders and the board) and contracting (e.g. 
performance-based remuneration) (Dalton et al., 2007).  There are two branches of agency 
theory: First, optimal contracting theory refers to how boards should design contracts with 
executives to maximise shareholder value; Second, positive agency theory refers to 
identifying how governance mechanisms solve agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Overall, 
agency theory predicts that if the agency problem is resolved, then executive remuneration 
will be tied to shareholder value (Haugen and Senbit, 1981; Murphy, 1999). 
 
The empirical evidence provides limited and qualified support for agency theory’s 
assumptions and predictions (for general reviews, see Dalton et al., 2007; Davis et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; for reviews on executive remuneration, see Devers et al., 2007; Gerhart et 
al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Rost and Osterloh, 2009; Tosi et 
al., 2000).  Tosi et al.’s  (2000, p.301) meta-analysis reveals that, “firm size accounts for more 
than 40% of the variance in total CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5% 
of the variance.” Similarly, Rost and Osterloh’s (2009) meta-analysis found that CEO pay to 
firm performance sensitivity has declined over time.  However, this evidence does not 
necessarily falsify agency theory.  It has been argued that CEO pay to firm performance 
sensitivity is constrained by political forces (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a; Murphy, 1999) and 
managerial power (Bebchuk et al., 2002).   
 
There are many friendly and hostile critics of agency theory.  Friendly critics contend that the 
fundamental tenets of agency theory are sound, but agency theory needs to be expanded to 
improve its explanation power (Tosi, 2008; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 2012).  For example, 
Bebchuk et al. (2002) argue that CEO pay is not sensitive to firm performance because CEOs 
are able to effectively set their own pay (for reviews of managerial power theory and optimal 
contracting theory, see Edmans and Gabaix, 2009; and Weisbach, 2007).  Some hostile critics 
dispute agency theory’s assumptions and propositions (Ghoshal, 2005; also see stewardship 
theory: Donaldson, 1990; Davis and Donaldson, 1991).  Other hostile critics suggest that 
agency theory is not universally applicable to all institutional settings (Bruce et al., 2005; 
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Lubatkin et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, many academics believe that “…well designed pay 
packages can “mitigate”… [but not] eliminate… agency problems…” (Jensen et al., 2005, 
p.ii).  Thus, Dalton et al. (2007, p.40) conclude that, “we describe agency as the worst theory 
of corporate governance, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” 
 
Theories of the managerial labour market explain how boards reach remuneration agreements 
with executives when they enter and exit the company and following annual reviews (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010).  A number of researchers have used these theories to explain why 
worldwide CEO pay increased dramatically in 1990s and 2000s (for statistics on CEO pay, 
see Fernandes et al., 2009; Michel et al., 2007).  Frydman (2007) and Murphy and Zabojnik 
(2004) argue that increasing demand for executives with general skills, not firm-specific 
knowledge explains increasing CEO pay because firm-specific knowledge is non-transferable 
and, therefore, undervalued relative to general skills.  Drawing on marginal productivity 
theory, Gabaix and Landier (2008) contend that increasing market capitalisation of companies 
explains increasing CEO pay.  Also, Fulmer (2009) finds that CEO pay is strongly influenced 
by competitors’ CEO pay.  These findings are consistent with labour market theory (see Table 
2.1) and indicate that the managerial labour market may be efficient.   
 
However, the managerial labour market may be inefficient for several reasons.  First, 
management has the power to set its pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Consistent with 
managerial power theory, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005, p.283) found that, “the growth of US 
executive pay during the period 1993-2003… [is] much beyond the increase that could be 
explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry classification.”  Second, 
recruitment and remuneration consultants are not unbiased market intermediaries, but are 
conflicted because they may be hired by management and/or sell other services to the 
company (Crystal, 1991).  Although the empirical evidence offers mixed support for this 
argument (Cadman et al., 2010; Conyon et al., 2009, 2011; Voulgaris et al., 2010).  Third, 
remuneration committees are cognitively biased because they all believe that their CEO is an 
above-average performer, resulting in CEO pay being ratcheted upwards (Greenbury, 1995; 
Murphy, 1999).
17
   Again, there is mixed support for this argument (Ezzamel and Watson, 
1998; Hayes and Schaefer, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2009). 
                                                 
17
 This is known as the Lake Wobegon Effect (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009, p.280): “In public radio host Garrison 
Keillor’s mythical home town of Lake Wobegon, Minnesota, all the children are above average.” Or, all of 
the parents believe that their children are above average, but someone must be below average. 
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The tenor of management theories are captured in Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988, p.554) 
remark that, “a CEO’s pay is not likely to strongly motivate behavior. Nevertheless, 
compensation bears on firm performance…”  Stakeholder, stewardship and upper echelons 
theories argue that remuneration schemes should unlock the potentiality of executives (Davis 
et al., 1997; Hambrick, 2007; Parmar et al., 2010).  The empirical evidence offers mixed 
support for stewardship and stakeholder theories (Bruce et al., 2005; Davis et al., 1997; 
Parmar et al., 2010).  Similarly, the managerial discretion hypothesis has mixed support 
(Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  Note that upper echelons theory’s implications for executive 
remuneration have been rarely studied (Hambrick, 2007).  On the other hand, contingency 
theory has an instrumental view of executives, where remuneration schemes are thought to 
moderate their behaviour (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987).  The empirical evidence provides 
strong support for contingency theory in the sense that other theories of executive 
remuneration only have explanatory power in a limited range of circumstances; that is, other 
theories are contingent (e.g. Combs and Skill, 2003; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
 
An expanded model of expectancy theory encapsulates a range of psychological theories 
including equity, social comparison, and goal-setting theories (Furnham, 2005; Liccione, 
2007). The empirical evidence offers support for expectancy theory, and combined with 
agency theory, explains how performance-based remuneration influences executives’ 
motivation and behaviour, and how this influences firm performance (Devers et al., 2007). 
However, the empirical evidence also indicates that performance-based remuneration 
diminishes intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2005).  Further, the 
empirical evidence offers mixed support for equity, social comparison and tournament 
theories (Eriksson, 1999; Fredrickson et al., 2010; Main et al., 1993; O’Reilly, et al., 1988; 
Wade et al., 2006).  However, there is strong support for the propositions that changes in CEO 
pay are mirrored in subordinates’ pay, and underpaying employees relative to the CEO and 
their peers will result in higher employee turnover (Wade et al., 2006).  This implies that the 
ratio of supervisor to subordinate pay is a significant determinant of employee turnover 
(Simon, 1957). 
 
Institutional theory contends that in designing or, at least, when reporting executive 
remuneration practices, boards have to account for societal expectations or risk being 
sanctioned (Suchman, 1995; Bruce et al., 2005).  For example, Aguliera and Cuervo-Cazurra 
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(2009) argue that companies comply with codes issued by regulators, stock exchanges and 
director associations in order to demonstrate that their governance practices are legitimate.  
Further, companies deal with uncertainty in decision-making by adopting practices that are 
prescribed by legitimate actors (e.g. management gurus) or their competitors have adopted 
(Sturdy, 2004).  For example, Staw and Epstein (2000) found that US companies that adopted 
popular management techniques improved their reputation but not firm performance relative 
to non-adopters, and an enhanced reputation also resulted in higher CEO pay.  While societal 
expectations enable and constrain the actions of companies, companies can manage 
institutional pressures to conform by decoupling external reporting from internal practices 
(Suchman, 1995).  For example, Westphal and Zajac (1998, 2001) found that investors 
reacted increasingly positively to the adoption of long-term incentive plans and stock 
repurchase plans by US companies, despite an increasing proportion of plans not being 
implemented. 
 
In formal terms, institutional theory is concerned with institutions and institutional logics (for 
reviews, see Scott, 2008; and Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  Institutions are processes, 
practices and structures that are self-sustaining and supported by regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements.  Institutional logics are sets of beliefs, ideas, norms, rules and 
values that give meaning to institutions.  Institutions and institutional logics are often 
localised to particular institutional settings (e.g. companies listed on the same stock 
exchange), but may span the world.  The empirical evidence supports the notion that 
institutions and institutional logics materially influence how corporate governance is 
conceptualised and practiced (for a review, see Fiss, 2008).  An example of an institution is 
the set of executive remuneration practices within any given country because these practices 
are often standardised (Murphy, 1999; Sanchez Marin, 2008) and supported by laws, codes, 
directors’ networks (e.g. social comparison) and remuneration consultants (Conyon et al., 
2011).   Further, an example of an institutional logic is agency theory-based justifications of 
executive remuneration practices, which are widely diffused and have been found to 
positively influence investors’ reactions to the adoption of long-term incentive plans and 
stock repurchase plans by US companies (Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995, 2004).   
 
O’Reilly and Main (2010, p.1) argue that there is “need for a more comprehensive model of 
executive compensation that incorporates both economic and psychological determinants.”  
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Indeed, multiple theories have been used to study executive remuneration.  For example, 
Bender (2004) and Main et al. (2008) interpreted their findings using agency and institutional 
theories.  In the pursuit of a comprehensive model, theorists have combined multiple theories.  
Bruce et al. (2005) argue that institutional theory explains when agency, stakeholder or 
stewardship theories are applicable in any given institutional setting.  Similarly, Lubatkin et 
al. (2007) develop a cross-nationally accommodating theory of agency, where institutions 
(e.g. national culture) influence how executives behave (e.g. propensity for opportunistic 
behaviour) and how companies design their governance mechanisms (e.g. necessity of 
performance-based remuneration).  Alternatively, Wiseman et al. (2012, p.207) contend that 
“agency problems… are universal, even though the explicit manifestation of these problems 
and ways to deal with these problems may vary depending on institutional context.”  Thus, 
they develop a social theory of agency that describes and predicts how agency problems are 
handled in different institutional settings. 
 
2.3.1. A Critique of Theories of Executive Remuneration 
Drawing on theories of executive remuneration, researchers have investigated the antecedents 
and consequences of executive remuneration, and much progress has been made.  However, 
Devers et al. (2007, p.1016) aptly comment that, “The failure to document a consistent and 
robust relationship between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and 
practitioners for over three quarters of a century.”  In essence, researchers have been questing 
for the Holy Grail: Corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. executive remuneration practices) 
that will maximise firm performance (Gomej-Mejia, 1994).  As aforementioned, this had led a 
number of researchers to develop a unified theory of corporate governance.  While the quest 
for the Holy Grail may be noble, it is irrational because there are too many dynamic and 
ethereal variables to take into account.  For example, there are 26 variables in Wiseman et 
al.’s (2012, p.207) framework including complex variables such as “Political Intervention”, 
“Ownership Concentration”, “Variable Compensation” and “Performance Outcomes” and 
nebulous variables such as “Belief in Meritocracy”, “Social Capital”, “Opportunistic Agent 
Behaviour” and “Impression Formation”. 
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988, p.544) suggest that, “The complexity of CEO compensation 
cannot be easily understood by adopting simple models… It is only when economic, social, 
political, and individual forces are considered jointly that effective analysis can occur.”  This 
line of reasoning assumes that it is possible for researchers to find a universal way of 
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organising that maximises firm performance, or at least, contingent ways of organising that 
maximise firm performance in particular institutional settings (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 2007; 
Wiseman et al., 2012).  However, positivistic, deterministic thinking oversimplifies the social 
reality of corporate governance.  Firm performance is not grounded in physical reality, but 
social reality: It is a socio-political construct and as such, its meaning is continually 
renegotiated by powerful stakeholders (e.g. see debate on shareholder value vs. stakeholder 
value in Section 2.2.2).  For example, Tosi et al. (2000) found that researchers have used 30 
different measures of firm performance to study the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance.  This criticism equally applies to most variables studied in prior research. 
 
Theories of corporate governance, particularly those rooted in neo-classical economics have 
been accused of being self-activating (Arce, 2007; Ferraro et al., 2005; Ghoshal, 2005; 
Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).  For example, as traders widely adopted the Black-Scholes-
Merton option pricing formula, the method for pricing options changed and actual prices 
converged on theoretical prices derived from the formula (Watson, 2007).  Similarly, Ghoshal 
(2005) argues that agency theory is self-activating because if people are taught to believe that 
executives are opportunistic, then directors will adopt performance-based remuneration to 
control the assumed opportunistic behaviour of executives and this coupled with the diffusion 
of agency theory signals to executives that opportunistic behaviour is expected and normal.  
Further, theories of corporate governance are self-activating because of their dual nature, i.e. 
positive and normative.  For example, positive agency theory predicts how the agency 
problem can be resolved, while normative agency theory asserts how the agency problem 
should be resolved. 
 
In contrast to theories rooted in neo-classical economics, the present study draws on 
discursive institutionalism to investigate institutional logics of corporate governance and their 
implications for executive remuneration.  Schmidt (2010, p.3) explains that, “Discursive 
institutionalism… take[s] account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive 
processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse.”  Discursive 
institutionalism does not deny that institutional logics have consequences (e.g. adoption or 
non-adoption of ideas and practices can influence firm performance), but it does recognise the 
socially constructed nature of such influences (Phillips et al., 2004; Zajac and Westphal, 
2004).  That is, how ideas and practices influence firm performance will vary across 
institutional settings and over time.  For example, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that US 
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investors’ reactions to the adoption of stock repurchase plans changed from negative in the 
1970s to positive in the 1980s.  Thus, what is irrational and illegitimate today may become 
rational and legitimate tomorrow. 
 
Most studies on executive remuneration have examined the variables that moderate the 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (Devers et al., 2007; 
Gerhart et al., 2009).  However, it is recognised that corporate governance is socially 
constructed.  That is, ideas materially influence how people think and act (Phillips et al., 
2004; Scott, 2008).  Discursive institutionalism can shed new light on corporate governance.  
For example, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that US companies adopted shareholder 
value maximisation as the corporate objective in the 1980s and 1990s because they believed it 
was rational and legitimate.  Shareholder value maximisation became popular and legitimate 
due to advocacy from politicians, regulators, investors and consultants.  They also evidence 
that the adoption of this idea materially influenced how governance and management was 
practiced.  Shareholder value maximisation was used to rationalise and legitimise the 
downsizing of workforces and the increasing of CEO pay (also, see Boyer, 2005; Englander 
and Kaufman, 2004).  These arguments are further elaborated in the following section, which 
reviews institutional theory and corporate governance. 
 
2.4. Institutional Theory and the Concept of Institutional Logics 
Institutional theory has traditionally explained why organisations within an organisational 
field become homogenous over time (Scott, 2008).
18
  Weber (1968) posited that the desire for 
profits (‘the spirit of capitalism’) and market forces drive companies to find and adopt the 
most efficient and rational way of organising (e.g. bureaucratic structures).  This process is 
known as competitive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  On the other hand, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that coercive, normative and mimetic pressures compel 
companies to adopt similar structures and processes that do not necessarily increase 
efficiency.  Coercive pressure refers to companies complying with rules and laws, and being 
sanctioned for non-compliance.  Normative pressure refers to companies enacting norms, 
standards and values because their members are also members of trade and professional 
                                                 
18
 There are different levels of analysis in institutional theory.  Scott (2008, p.89) identifies the following levels 
from micro to macro: Organisational subsystem, organisation, organisational population (e.g. an industry), 
organisational field, societal (e.g. a country) and world-system.  Note that an organisational field refers to a 
group of organisations that are united by their frequent interactions.  For example, all companies listed on a 
stock exchange and their stakeholders (see Figure 2.1) constitute an organisational field. 
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associations (e.g. directors’ associations have codes of ethics that members are expected to 
follow).  Mimetic pressure refers to the tendency of companies to mimic the actions (e.g. 
structures) of their competitors, particularly when faced with uncertainty.  These processes are 
known as institutional isomorphism.  Metaphorically, competitive and institutional 
isomorphism acts as an iron cage that constrains organisational behaviour. 
 
While institutional theorists initially examined how and why organisations become similar 
over time, they have more recently studied how and why organisations become diverse over 
time.  Thus, institutional theory also explains why organisations change, particularly why 
organisations within an organisational field may become homogenous or heterogeneous over 
time (Scott, 2008).  First, changes in the constituents of an organisational field (e.g. entry of 
new competitors) and mergers between organisational fields (e.g. trade agreements) result in 
changes in competitive and institutional pressures (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008).  Second, 
social, technological and regulatory jolts can bring about change in an organisational field 
(Greenwood et al., 2002).  For example, accounting and corporate scandals have led to 
official inquiries and the issuance of new corporate governance codes (Enrione et al., 2006).  
Third, institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. innovation by an organisation) can result in new 
ways of organising being widely adopted, particularly if the entrepreneur has credibility 
(Battilana et al., 2009).  Fourth, organisations may be afforded some flexibility in how they 
organise because of weak or conflicting competitive and institutional pressures (Scott, 2008).  
For example, there is no clear ‘winner’ in the political debate on what corporate objective will 
maximise economic efficiency and growth in society (Kaen, 1988; also, see Section 2.2.2).  
 
Institutional theory is about organisations and institutions (i.e. the taken-for-granted ways of 
organising), the institutional lifecycle (i.e. the rise and fall of institutions), institutional change 
and stability (i.e. prevention of change), and organisational resistance to institutions (i.e. 
symbolic and illegitimate action) (Scott, 2008).  Given this broad scope, institutional theory is 
best described as a discipline or meta-theory.  Unsurprisingly, there are many different 
branches of institutional theory.  Schmidt (2010) identifies four branches.
19
  First, rational 
                                                 
19
 Scott (2008, p.78) identified eight branches of institutional theory including: economic history, historical 
institutionalism in political science, neo-institutionalism in economics, traditional institutional sociology, 
neo-institutional sociology, population ecology, evolutionary theory in economics and ethno-methodology.  
As a result, Philips and Malhotra (2008) argue that institutional theory has become too loosely defined and 
related research has become too broad.  They argue that there is a risk that institutional theory means nothing 
at all.  This is an echo of Zucker’s (1977) concern that unless institutional theory is more tightly defined, it 
will not be a theory because it will not be falsifiable.  
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choice institutionalism refers to how institutions (“Incentive structures”, p.2) constrain 
organisations (“rational actors who pursue their preferences”, p.2), and is exemplified by 
agency theory.  Second, historical institutionalism asserts that organisational behaviour is 
path-dependent (i.e. bound by history) because of institutions (“Macro-historical structures 
and regularities”, p.2).  Third, sociological institutionalism explains how institutions 
(“Cultural norms and frames”, p.2) shape and are shaped by organisations.  Fourth, discursive 
institutionalism refers to how organisations through communication (i.e. producing and 
consuming texts) are shaped by and shape institutions (“Meaning structures and constructs”, 
p.2).  While rational choice and historical institutionalisms evoke an image of institutions as 
constraints (or iron cages), sociological and discursive institutionalisms conceptualise 
institutions as changeable constraints.  
 
Rational choice institutionalism is limited because it assumes that individuals are 
opportunistic utility-maximisers (see Section 2.3.1) and society should strive to maximise 
economic efficiency and growth.
20
  On the other hand, sociological institutionalism (or neo-
institutional sociology) asserts that organisational survival depends on both technical 
efficiency
21
 and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008).  Organisations gain and 
maintain legitimacy through demonstrating conformity to societal expectations, represented 
by regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements (Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995).  For 
example, Peng (2004) found that Chinese companies who appointed outside directors to their 
boards did not experience an improvement in return on equity.  Instead, they argue that it had 
become socially expected for Chinese companies to have a high proportion of outside 
directors.  However, organisations can resist institutional pressures by adopting structures that 
are ceremonial and decoupling their external reporting of conformity from their internal 
practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008).  For example, Kury 
(2007) argues that US companies use earnings management techniques to ensure that reported 
earnings meet securities analysts’ expectations, but in doing so, they are decoupling their 
reported earnings from what they perceive to be their actual earnings. 
 
                                                 
20
 Historical institutionalism is not reviewed because it has been rarely mentioned in the corporate governance 
literature. 
21
 There is no absolute or objective measure of technical efficiency because it is defined by prevailing beliefs, 
norms, rules and values (e.g. financial reporting laws and accounting standards) and these can change over 
time and vary between institutional settings.. 
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Drawing on neo-institutional sociology, Fiss (2008) highlights several significant themes in 
corporate governance research.  First, there continues to be an ideological battle between 
proponents of shareholder and stakeholder primacy, but shareholder primacy is dominant.  
Second, corporate governance mechanisms associated with shareholder value maximisation 
have been widely diffused but are also resisted.  He argues that diffusion is a function of the 
preferences and relative power of companies and their stakeholders, particularly shareholders 
and directors.  Third, diffusion cannot be characterised as companies mimicking each other.  
Instead, companies adapt governance practices to local conditions, although adaptation is 
influenced by cultural, political and technical concerns.  Fourth, there has been resistance to 
diffusion of governance practices in the form of decoupling and attempts by companies to 
change societal expectations (e.g. lobbying to change financial reporting requirements).  Fifth, 
research has focused on shareholders and managers, rather than other stakeholders.  It has 
been found that shareholders have varying interests. This implies that shareholder value 
maximisation is not a single corporate objective as its proponents had argued.  Sixth, there are 
varieties of capitalism throughout the world and these varieties are associated with different 
approaches to corporate governance, but there are also transnational institutional pressures 
that may facilitate a global convergence in corporate governance.  
 
Neo-institutional sociology asserts that institutional pressures facilitate the institutionalisation 
of institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Put differently, institutions are the product of 
organisations reproducing equivalent actions (e.g. structures and processes).  However, 
Phillips et al. (2004) argue that institutional theorists have lacked a credible explanation of the 
process of institutionalisation, describing the process as a ‘black box’ (also see Phillips, 2003; 
Phillips et al., 2006; and Phillips and Malhotra, 2008).  Opening the black box, they contend 
that institutions are socially constructed through the production and consumption of texts.  For 
example, texts enable directors to be known as executive, affiliated or independent.  They 
describe the process of institutionalisation as follows: First, actions can produce texts, both 
temporary (e.g. talk) and permanent (e.g. artefacts); Second, collections of texts that are 
highly-ordered produce discourses, which are collections of ideas with shared and durable 
meanings; Third, coherent discourses, supported by legitimate parties, will inform all parties 
what actions should be taken, leading to standardised actions; Fourth, institutions are created 
and sustained through the embedding of discourses in actions, i.e. ideas and actions become 
taken-for-granted. 
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In essence, Phillips et al. (2004) are advocating discursive institutionalism.  They argue that 
organisations and institutions are known and brought into being by discourses comprising of 
collections of texts that are supported by legitimate parties.  Texts are interconnected sets of 
ideas.  Change is understood through the production and consumption of texts and, ultimately, 
ideas.  For example, the idea of director independence has been disseminated by corporate 
governance codes, resulting in shareholders changing director appointments (Dalton and 
Dalton, 2005; Solomon, 2007).  Further, Phillips and Malhotra (2008) believe that this 
discursive shift in institutional theory is necessary to both enable institutions to be precisely 
defined and the process of institutionalisation to be rigorous studied.  They contend that 
institutions are comprised of cognitive elements only, i.e. ideas that are taken for granted.  
Cognitive institutions are self-reproducing and do not require sanctions because people cannot 
conceive of legitimate alternative ideas and courses of action.  On the other hand, so-called 
regulative and normative institutions, which lack taken-for-granted ideas, have to be 
continually reinforced to remain in existence and, therefore, are not institutions.  They 
conclude that discursive institutionalism can also shed light on the closely related concept of 
institutional logics (also see Green and Li, 2011). 
 
Institutional logics “are cultural beliefs and rules that shape the cognitions and behaviors of 
actors… [and] are socially shared, deeply held assumptions and values that form a framework 
for reasoning, provide criteria for legitimacy, and help organize time and space” (Dunn and 
Jones, 2010, p.114).  Put differently, institutional logics provide individuals with cognitive 
frameworks that they use to make sense of their social reality and guide their actions 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).
22
 There are institutional logics at 
different institutional levels from organisational subsystem to world-system.  Prior research 
has explained institutional change and isomorphism in terms of transitions between 
institutional logics (e.g. Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Recent 
research explains institutional diversity in terms of competing institutional logics, where no 
logic becomes dominant (e.g. Dunn and Jones, 2010; Reay and Hinings, 2009; van Gestel and 
                                                 
22
 The concept of institutional logic is comparable to the concept of Grand or Mega Discourse.  Alvesson and 
Karreman (2000, p.1133-1134) defined Grand Discourse as “an assembly of discourses, ordered and 
presented as an integrated frame” and Mega-Discourse as “an idea of a more or less universal connection of 
discourse material… [and] addresses more or less standardized ways of referring to/constituting a certain 
type of phenomenon”.  Both institutional logic and Grand or Mega Discourse rest on the premise that ideas 
can have durable meaning and through the use of language (i.e. production and consumption of texts) can 
shape organisational behaviour and bring organisational structures and processes into being (Phillips and 
Malhotra, 2008; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).   
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Hillebrand, 2011).  There are often competing institutional logics (e.g. sets of ideas on how to 
organise) in any given institutional setting and institutional change occurs as powerful 
stakeholders within that setting gain or lose support (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
 
There are often competing institutional logics within organisational fields (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991).  As socially-constructed sets of ideas, institutional logics contain unintended 
and deliberate ambiguities and contradictions (van Gestel and Hillebrand, 2011).  
Organisational actors can exploit this uncertainty to advance their own interests and/or 
legitimise new ideas and practices (Seo and Creed, 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).  
Institutional change occurs because institutional logics are built on contradictions and 
represent truces between powerful organisational actors (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).  
Truces also allow competing institutional logics to co-exist in organisational fields.  
Organisational actors, who are proponents of competing logics, may temporarily set aside 
their differences and work together towards mutual goals (Reay and Hinings, 2009).  Such 
temporary truces may result in societal actors (e.g. the State) building institutional structures 
to make temporary truces permanent and, ultimately, allow competing institutional logics to 
co-exist (Reay and Hinings, 2009).  However, support for one or another institutional logic is 
cyclical as truces between organisational actors are rarely permanent (Dunn and Jones, 2010).   
 
Institutional logics of corporate governance are assumptions and beliefs about how corporate 
governance should be practiced, which are “linked to higher-order societal logics of economic 
activity” (Zajac and Westphal, 2004, p.435).  Centred on organisational fields, there is a small 
but growing body of research on institutional logics of corporate governance (e.g. du Plessis, 
2008; Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010; Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  This 
research is closely tied to research on comparative corporate governance (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003, 2010) and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  Collectively, prior 
research has identified a number of institutional logics and these have been matched to 
specific countries.  Typically, researchers have argued that investor capitalism (or Investor 
Logic) is dominant in Anglo-American countries, while network capitalism (or Stakeholder 
Logic) is dominant in Asian and European countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, 2010).  
However, researchers have also pointed out that the dominant institutional logic can change 
over time (Zajac and Westphal, 2004) and while an institutional logic may be dominant in an 
organisational field, other institutional logics can still be active (Green et al., 2008; Lok, 
2010). 
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There is much similarity and diversity in how corporate governance is both conceptualised 
and practiced (see Section 2.2).  An institutional logics perspective asserts that this occurs 
because of there are complementary and competing institutional logics within and across 
multiple institutional levels.  For example, capitalism is the dominant way of organising at the 
world-system level, but there are varieties of capitalism at the societal level (Alfred and 
Friedland, 1985; Thornton et al., 2005).  Similarly, executive remuneration practices and 
processes appear to have become standardised (Murphy, 1999; also see Section 2.2.3), but 
there are differences between countries (Sanchez Marin, 2008).  For example, Japanese 
executives receive mainly fixed remuneration, the remuneration of UK executives is balanced 
between salary, short-term incentives and long-term incentives, and US executives receive 
mainly variable (equity-based) remuneration (Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010).  These 
differences are attributed to the varieties of capitalism.  However, there may be institutional 
logics at the societal, organisational field and organisational levels that are shaping these 
executive remuneration practices.  Thus, institutional logics of corporate governance are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
2.5. Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance 
Institutional logics are “the organizing principles for a field… [and] the basis of taken-for-
granted rules guiding behaviour of field-level actors” (Reay and Hinings, 2009, p.629). The 
dual nature of institutional logics provide individuals with cognitive frames that enable them 
to construct their social realities (i.e. positivist views of ‘what is’) and attempt to shape their 
social realities (i.e. normative views of ‘what should be’).  Further, Friedland and Alford 
(1991, p.253) note that “society is composed of multiple institutional logics which are 
available to individuals and organizations as bases for action.”  This implies that there are 
multiple institutional logics of corporate governance, providing sets of ideas or beliefs 
systems that enable and constrain both how corporate governance is practiced and how 
stakeholders interpret these practices (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Organisational fields are 
political landscapes, where the ability of individuals and organisations to mobilise 
institutional logics of corporate governance will influence how corporate governance is 
recommended to be (e.g. codes) and is practiced (Lok, 2010).  The remainder of this section 
reviews prior research on institutional logics of corporate governance.   
 
Chapter 2: Corporate Governance Theories and Research 
61 
Table 2.2 describes three institutional logics of corporate governance that have been identified 
by prior research, namely: Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and Stakeholder Logic.
23
  These 
institutional logics are consistent with several theories.  Corporate Logic is consistent with 
stewardship theory’s normative model of corporate governance, where executives, supported 
by directors, make decisions that will maximise shareholder value (Davis et al., 1997; Zajac 
and Westphal, 2004).  Investor Logic is consistent with agency theory’s normative model, 
where directors use incentives and controls to direct executives to make decisions that will 
maximise shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  
Stakeholder Logic is consistent with stakeholder theory’s normative model, where executives, 
supported by directors, make decisions that will maximise stakeholder value in the long-term 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; du Plessis, 2008).  These logics have different assumptions 
about what should be the corporate objective and how management behaves.  However, there 
is a missing logic as none of these Logics support stakeholder value maximisation while 
assuming directors and executives act as self-interested agents. 
 
                                                 
23
 These institutional logics are known by many different names. Corporate Logic is also known as Managerial 
Capitalism (Green et al., 2008) or Management Control Logic (Shipilov et al., 2010).  Investor Logic is 
known as Agency Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004), Investor Capitalism (Green et al., 2008), Board Reform 
Logic (Shipilov et al., 2010), and Logic of Shareholder Value Maximisation (Lok, 2010).  Stakeholder Logic 
is known is also known as Value Logic (du Plessis, 2008).  
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Table 2.2: Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance 
Criteria
1
 Corporate Logic
1
 Investor Logic
1
 Stakeholder Logic
2
 
Assumptions about: 
- Top managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The firm 
 
- Professionals with unique strategic 
knowledge that is required for 
efficient allocation of corporate 
resources; Stewards of their 
organizations. 
 
 
- An institution with unique core 
competencies 
 
- Relatively fungible agents of 
shareholders; Pursue strategies that 
advance personal interests at 
expense of shareholders 
 
 
 
- A nexus of contracts; legal fiction 
 
- Plurality of talents and motives; 
Management sets the normative tone 
of the corporation from the top; 
Management possesses uniquely 
integrated proprietary information 
relevant to the strategy and operation 
of the firm 
- Replaced state and church as the 
grand social institution of our time; 
Controls vast resources, crosses 
national borders, and affects every 
human life 
Concept of resource allocation Managerial capitalism: top management 
have primary responsibility for allocating 
resources to different businesses in the 
corporation 
Investor capitalism: shareholders can 
diversify better and more easily than 
firms 
Stakeholder Capitalism: 
- Asset-specificity to both financial 
and social capital 
- Credible commitments reduce 
mobility and switching 
Links to high-order cultural frames Norms of professional autonomy Logic of capitalist markets Non-severability of ethics and economics 
(separation thesis); equitable distribution 
amidst uncertainty 
Links to theories of organization Managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962) Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) 
Stakeholder theory 
Implications for governance practices: 
- Compensation 
 
 
- Allocation of cash flow 
 
- Use salary and other rewards to 
attract and retain scarce management 
talent 
- Retain and reinvest 
 
- Use incentives to align management 
and shareholder interests. 
 
- Redistribute to shareholders 
 
- Equity, i.e. meritocratic assessment 
of contribution determines reward 
 
- Reflects the value ordering 
supported by legitimate stakeholders 
Notes: 
1 These columns are verbatim from Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436) 
2 This column is verbatim from du Plessis (2008, p.794) 
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Table 2.3 presents a general framework of internal corporate governance.  Institutional logics 
can be derived from this framework.  There are two dimensions to this framework and each 
dimension has two possibilities.  First, the company’s corporate objective can be shareholder 
or stakeholder value maximisation (Smith, 2003; also see Section 2.2.2).  Second, the board 
as representatives of the shareholders or stakeholders can assume that the CEO and other 
executives will behave as agents or stewards (Davis et al., 1997; also see Section 2.2.3).  
These possibilities give rise to opposing approaches to the board’s structure and role as well 
as executive remuneration (see Section 2.2.5).  The board can be comprised of a majority of 
directors who are independent of the company or are knowledgeable about the company (e.g. 
current or former executives) (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  The directors can be 
representative of shareholders or stakeholders (White, 2006).  The board’s role can be control-
oriented or advice-oriented (Davis et al., 1997; Hung, 1998).  Executive remuneration can be 
mainly variable (e.g. control-oriented) or mainly fixed (e.g. trust-oriented) (Grundei, 2008).   
Performance measures, which may or may not be linked to remuneration, can be shareholder-
oriented (e.g. economic profit and total shareholder return) or stakeholder-oriented (e.g. a 
balanced scorecard) (Kaplan, 2009).  These possibilities give rise to four quadrants: 1. 
Investor Logic; 2. Political Logic; 3. Corporate Logic; and 4. Stakeholder Logic.  
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
64 
 
Table 2.3: A General Framework of Corporate Governance 
  Corporate Objective 
  Shareholder Value Maximisation Stakeholder Value Maximisation 
Behavioural 
Model of 
Management 
Agent (Self-
interested) 
Quadrant 1: Investor Logic 
Board of Directors:  
- Board structure: Independent 
directors that are nominated 
and elected by shareholders 
- Board’s role: Control and 
incentivise executives 
Executive Remuneration:  
- How much: Marginal 
productivity of executives  
- How: Mainly variable; Mix of 
cash, options and shares 
dependent on shareholder 
value (e.g. total shareholder 
return and economic profit) 
Quadrant 2: Political Logic 
Board of Directors:  
- Board structure: Independent 
directors that are nominated 
and elected by stakeholders 
- Board’s role: Control and 
incentivise executives 
Executive Remuneration:  
- How much: Marginal 
productivity of executives 
- How: Mainly variable; Cash 
dependent on stakeholder 
value (e.g. customer, 
employee and shareholder 
measures) 
Steward 
(Trustworthy) 
Quadrant 3: Corporate Logic 
Board of Directors:  
- Board structure: Executive 
directors (for knowledge) and 
non-executive directors (for 
business network)  
- Board’s role: Mentor and 
advise executives 
Executive Remuneration:  
- How much: Comparable to 
outside executives, 
proportional to inside 
executives, and fair to 
shareholders 
- How: Mainly fixed; Mix of 
cash (dependent on 
internal/financial measures) 
and shares (dependent on 
length of service) 
Quadrant 4: Stakeholder Logic 
Board of Directors:  
- Board structure: Executive and 
non-executive directors 
(possibly including 
stakeholder representatives) 
- Board’s role: Communicate 
with stakeholders and advise 
executives 
Executive Remuneration:  
- How much: Comparable to 
outside executives, 
proportional to inside 
executives, and fair to 
stakeholders 
- How: Mainly fixed; Cash 
dependent on stakeholder 
value 
 
In developing the general framework, a number of simplifying assumptions have been made.  
First, alternative corporate objectives are not incorporated into this framework because 
shareholder and stakeholder value maximisation are dominant in the literature (Freeman et al., 
2004; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  It may be that any of the non-shareholding stakeholders 
becomes the dominant stakeholder.  For example, employees are the dominant stakeholder in 
Swedish companies (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005).  Similarly, coalitions may develop 
between multiple but not all stakeholders.  For example, employees and investors are jointly-
dominant stakeholders in Chile and Malaysia (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005).  Further, it may 
be companies do not have clear-cut corporate objectives.  Coalitions may change over time.  
The popularity of alternative corporate objectives may rise and fall.  Companies may espouse 
one corporate objective, while practicing another corporate objective.  Thus, shareholder and 
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stakeholder value maximisation are theoretical corporate objectives.  However, the extent to 
which these or other corporate objectives are indicative of the beliefs of directors, executives 
and stakeholders has yet to be well-researched.  
 
Second, alternative behavioural models are not incorporated into this framework because the 
agent-steward dichotomy is dominant in the literature (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008).  It 
may be that executives are distributed along a behavioural continuum from pure agent to pure 
steward (Stevenson, 2004).  For example, there are degrees of agent-like behaviour as 
executives may focus on the short-term (i.e. opportunism), medium-term (i.e. self-interest) or 
long-term (enlightened self-interest) (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006).  Further, the agent-steward 
dichotomy is static, not dynamic.  It may be that the behaviour of executives can change over 
time from agent to steward, or vice-versa.  For example, Angwin et al. (2004) describe how a 
CEO’s behaviour changed from agent-like to steward-like during a hostile takeover.  Thus, 
agent and steward are theoretical behavioural types.  However, the extent to which these or 
other behavioural types are indicative of the beliefs of directors, executives and stakeholders 
has yet to be well-researched. 
 
Third, external corporate governance has been ignored.  It may be that markets, regulation or 
other external governance mechanisms are sufficient to ensure that executives act in the best 
interests of shareholders and/or non-shareholding stakeholders (Gillan, 2006).   
 
Fourth, internal corporate governance mechanisms included in the framework reflect the 
control-advice dichotomy that is dominant in the literature (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
It may be that non-executive directors can be both a judge of and an advisor to executives 
(Roberts et al., 2005; Westphal, 1999; also see Section 2.2.5). Moreover, alternative internal 
corporate governance mechanisms are ignored such as non-financial and intrinsic rewards (or 
socio-emotional rewards, Wiseman et al., 2012).  Incentive structures related to socio-
emotional rewards, although less formal, can be powerful mediators of executive behaviour 
(Frey, 2002; Wiseman et al., 2012).  Thus, control- and advice-oriented conceptions of 
internal corporate governance are theoretical.  However, the extent to which directors, 
executives and other stakeholder believe that these or other governance mechanisms are 
effective has yet to be well-researched.  The remainder of the section describes the four logics 
and discusses relevant prior research.  
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2.5.1. Political Logic 
Political Logic is partially derived from Hill and Jones’ (1992) stakeholder-agency theory. 
They assume that multiple stakeholders have legitimate claims on the company’s resources, 
which are managed by self-interested agents.  To resolve this extended agency problem, they 
argue that stakeholders can control executives through laws (and the threat of punishment for 
non-compliance), threat of exit (e.g. customers transacting with competitors) and voice (e.g. 
stakeholders using the media to make claims of unfair treatment by the company).  Others 
contend that executives will only consider stakeholders’ interests as separate ends (not a 
means to an end) if the board is comprised of stakeholder representatives (Hillman et al., 
2001; White, 2006).  Thus, Political Logic asserts that a coalition of stakeholders will appoint 
the board to govern the company in their interests.  The board will contract with executives at 
arm’s length and use performance-based remuneration to direct executives. Executive 
remuneration will be dependent on a range of measures that capture the interests of 
stakeholders (cf. Wiseman et al., 2012).  For example, a balanced scorecard can capture the 
interests of shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers and other stakeholders (Jensen, 
2001; Kaplan, 2009). 
 
Prior research has not studied the extent to which Political Logic is embedded in the beliefs 
systems of shareholders, customers, employees, and other stakeholders.  However, prior 
research has studied board composition from a stakeholder perspective.  Typically, boards are 
comprised of shareholder representatives, current or former executives, and, to a lesser extent, 
employee representatives (Solomon, 2007).  For example, Germany’s co-determination laws 
require employee representatives to be appointed to supervisory boards (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010).  Further, Hillman et al. (2001) found that S&P500 companies’ boards include 
shareholders (53%), current or former executives (27%), community representatives including 
academics and politicians (15%), suppliers (3%) and customers (2%).  They also found that 
stakeholder representation is not associated with improved stakeholder relations/performance, 
which implies stakeholder representatives are appointed for symbolic (not substantive) 
reasons.  Thus, stakeholder boards appear to be rare among listed companies because, 
perhaps, a coalition of stakeholders is difficult to form.
24
  It may be that stakeholder boards do 
not represent the interests of all stakeholders, but only powerful, salient stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). 
                                                 
24
 This is reminiscent of the principal-principal problem, where a majority shareholder controls a company in 
their interests and to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests (Young et al., 2008). 
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2.5.2. Stakeholder Logic 
Stakeholder Logic is derived from stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984).
25
 Stakeholder Logic assumes that the board will govern the company in the 
interests of all legitimate stakeholders and directors will act as stewards (Preston, 1998).  This 
means that the board does not need to be comprised of stakeholder representatives (cf. 
Political Logic).  Instead, the board will determine how to balance or prioritise the competing 
claims of stakeholders based on ethical and moral norms (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  To 
foster cooperation amongst stakeholders, the board will act as a mediator between 
stakeholders who have competing claims (Lan and Heracleous, 2010).  As executives are also 
assumed to be stewards, the board will be an advisor to (not controller of) executives, 
communicating stakeholders’ interests and advising on decision making (Davis et al., 1997).  
Further, executives will receive mainly fixed remuneration because they are motivated by 
intrinsic rewards (Davis et al., 1997).  Variable remuneration represents a sharing of profits 
between executives and stakeholders, rather than a control mechanism (Grundei, 2008).  
Thus, variable remuneration will be dependent on stakeholder-oriented performance 
measures.     
 
Prior research on international corporate governance and varieties of capitalism has found that 
Stakeholder Logic, supported by regulative and normative elements, is practiced by 
companies in Asia, Continental Europe and Scandinavia (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Morris 
et al., 2008).  Witt and Redding’s (2012) multi-country study of executives’ perceptions of the 
purpose of the firm confirms this generalisation.  Further, executive remuneration in total and 
the variable proportion are much lower in these countries compared to the US (Balkin, 2008; 
Fernandes et al., 2009; Filatotchev and Allcock, 2010), where Investor Logic is practiced by 
companies (Morris et al., 2008; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  However, there are competing 
institutional logics in most countries.  For example, there has been a shift towards Investor 
Logic in France (Lee and Yoo, 2008) and Germany (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006).  Chizema 
and Buck (2006) and Chizema (2010) found that German companies have been adopting 
American-style executive remuneration practices, although there is evidence that these 
                                                 
25
 There are multiple branches of stakeholder theory: Normative or Ethical (Freeman, 1984); Stakeholder-
Agency (Hill and Jones, 1992); Instrumental or Enlightened (Jones, 1995; Jensen, 2001); Positivist (Mitchell 
et al., 1997); and Convergent (Jones and Wicks, 1999).  Stakeholder Logic is derived from normative or 
ethical stakeholder theory, where directors and executives are assumed to account for the interests of 
legitimate stakeholders in making decisions.  However, it is problematic to define, both theoretical and 
practically, which stakeholders are or are not legitimate (cf. Mitchell et al., 1997). 
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practices are contested and not universally adopted.  Irrespective of Stakeholder Logic’s 
dominance (or lack thereof) in any given country, it is embedded in academic, business and 
political discourse (Parmar et al., 2010; Witt and Redding, 2012). 
 
2.5.3. Corporate Logic 
Corporate Logic is derived from managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962) and stewardship 
theory (Donaldson, 1990; Davis et al., 1997).  Chandler (1962) and Donaldson (1990) 
contend that the visible hand of management (directors and executives) with their specialised 
knowledge and skills can allocate resources more effectively than the invisible hand of the 
capital market.   Emphasis is placed on the norm of professional autonomy: Management are 
trustworthy professionals (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Corporate Logic asserts that the board 
will govern the company in the interests of shareholders. As directors and executives exhibit 
steward-like behaviour, the board will have an advisory role and executives will receive 
mainly fixed remuneration (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008).  The critical difference 
between Stakeholder Logic and Corporate Logic is that directors and executives are 
psychological owners; they have an affinity with shareholders, rather than non-shareholding 
stakeholders (Pierce et al., 2001, 2003).  To reinforce this, executives should be rewarded 
with options or shares that are conditional on length of service, rather than firm performance.   
 
Since the early 1990s in the UK and since the early 2000s in most countries, companies have 
either voluntarily or been required to increase the proportion of independent directors, 
increase the proportion of performance-based remuneration, increase disclosure of executive 
remuneration (see Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5).  There has also been increased shareholder 
activism (Solomon, 2007).  These trends are consistent with a shift from managerial 
capitalism to investor capitalism (Boyer, 2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).
26
  In particular, Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there was a transition 
from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in the US during the 1980s.  This is exemplified by 
Frydman and Saks (2010) findings that CEO pay in large US companies was relative flat from 
the late 1940s to late 1970s, rose steadily in the 1980s and then rose dramatically in the 1990s 
and 2000s.  Nowadays, Investor Logic is dominant in Anglo-American countries (Aguilera 
                                                 
26
 However, managerial capitalism has been equated with both Stakeholder Logic (Englander and Kaufman, 
2004; Galbraith, 1967) and Corporate Logic (Chandler, 1984; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  There is no 
empirical evidence on what were the beliefs of directors and executives during the so-called period of 
managerial capitalism in the US or other countries. Further research is required.  For example, a study of 
companies’ mission statements over time may or may not reveal a narrowing of focus from stakeholder value 
to shareholder value. 
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and Jackson, 2010).  This is consistent with Witt and Redding’s (2012) recent findings that 
US executives are shareholder-oriented. 
 
2.5.4. Investor Logic 
Investor Logic is derived from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).
27
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) argue that, “If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal.”  Investor Logic has a pessimistic view of both directors’ and 
executives’ motives.  Therefore, the board will only govern the company in the interests of 
shareholders if there is an efficient stock market, an active market for corporate control and 
institutional investors actively monitor the company (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004; Lok, 2010).  Further, the board should be comprised of a majority of 
independent directors in order to prevent executives from colluding with directors (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2004).  The board will be control-, not advice-oriented (Davis et al., 1997).  
Finally, executives should receive mainly variable remuneration dependent on economic 
profit and total shareholder return (Grundei, 2008; Holstrom and Kaplan, 2001).     
 
Investor Logic is dominant in Anglo-American countries as exemplified by corporate 
governance codes and the use of performance-based remuneration (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010; Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Solomon, 2007).  Englander and Kaufman (2004) and Zajac 
and Westphal (2004) argue that the mindset of US investors, politicians and others shifted 
from Corporate Logic in the 1970s to Investor Logic in the 1980s.  This was reflected in 
changing attitudes towards conglomerates: From their being ‘the engine of’ to their being ‘the 
problem with’ the American economy (Davis et al., 1994).  The takeovers movement in the 
1980s and institutional investor activism in the 1990s led to US companies becoming 
specialised rather than diversified (Holstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  
US executives were awarded ever-increasing grants of share options in the 1990s and 
restricted shares in the 2000s in order to ensure that shareholder value was maximised 
(Murphy, 2011).  However, it may be that US executives have used Investor Logic as a 
rhetoric to justify increasing levels of executive remuneration irrespective of changes in 
                                                 
27
 The origins of Investor Logic and agency theory go back to Adam Smith (1776, p.941), who argued that, “The 
directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.” 
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shareholder value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Boyer, 2005; Englander and Kaufman, 2004; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
 
2.5.5. Competing Institutional Logics in Organisational Fields 
This section discusses the institutional battle between institutional logics of corporate 
governance in a range of countries. 
 
2.5.5.1. United States of America  
The US has experienced a shift from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in the 1980s.  This is 
evidenced by the deinstitutionalisation of the conglomerate (Davis et al., 1994) and the wide 
diffusion of independent directors (Westphal and Zajac, 1997), long-term incentive plans 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 1995) and stock repurchase plans (Westphal 
and Zajac, 2001).  Upon firm adoption of stock repurchase plans, investors reactions have 
changed from negative in the 1970s to positive in the 1980s (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  
Further, investors react more favourably to US companies that use an agency theory language 
to justify the adoption of long-term incentive plans and stock repurchase plans (Westphal and 
Zajac, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  However, Corporate Logic is still embedded in the 
discourse and practices of US companies.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, US companies 
have also used human resources management language to justify the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans (Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004).  Similarly, in a series of 71 interviews with 
directors, lawyers and company secretaries from 1978 to 1998, Green et al. (2008) found that 
their justifications of takeovers and takeover defences were consistent with both Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
There is also evidence that the shift from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic has been at least 
partially symbolic.  Westphal and Zajac (1998, 2001) and Zajac and Westphal (2004) found 
that as US companies adopted long-term incentive plans and stock repurchase plans, an 
increasingly proportion was not implemented (i.e. no options were awarded to executives and 
no stock was repurchased).  They also found that irrespective of implementation, investors 
reacted favourably to adoption, particularly if justified using agency theory language (e.g. 
adoption will align the interests of executives with those of shareholders).  Further, Westphal 
and Graebner (2010, p.15) found that “…relatively negative stock analyst appraisals prompt 
corporate leaders to increase externally visible dimensions of board independence without 
actually increasing board control of management.”  They also found that executives were able 
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to persuade stock analysts as they subsequently gave positive appraisals of these companies.  
Overall, these findings indicate that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in 
the discourse and practices of US companies and executives can mobilise this discourse, both 
substantively and symbolically, to influence investor behaviour.  
 
2.5.5.2. Canada 
Similar to the UK’s Cadbury Report (1992), Canada’s Dey Report (1994) was produced 
because of poor corporate performance among large Canadian companies (Monks and 
Minow, 2004).  Consistent with Investor Logic, the Dey Report recommended that boards be 
comprised of a majority of independent directors.  Companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange have to comply with or explain why they did not comply with the Dey Report’s 
recommendations.  Following 12 interviews with directors, executives, institutional investors 
and policy makers as well as a review of 2,000 articles in the Canadian business press, 
Shipilov et al. (2010) found support for both Corporate Logic (or Management Controlled 
Board Logic) and Investor Logic (or Board Reform Logic).  They also studied the diffusion of 
the Dey Report recommendations, particularly board independence, and found that the 
recommendations diffused in two waves.  While the Dey Report triggered the first wave, the 
second wave occurred in 2002 following the issuance of the US’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This 
Act influenced Canadian companies because of the close economic ties between Canada and 
the US.  Overall, Shipilov et al. (2010) found that Investor Logic has become dominant in 
Canada. 
 
2.5.5.3. United Kingdom 
Following corporate scandals (e.g. Maxwell Communications in 1991) and the issuance of the 
Cadbury Report (1992), corporate governance has been a subject of intense public debate in 
the UK (Chambers and Weight, 2008).  This has led to the issuance of official reports and 
multiple editions of corporate governance codes (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Solomon, 
2007).  Lok (2010) argues that this is indicative of a shift from Corporate Logic to Investor 
Logic.  This shift in how corporate governance is conceptualised is exemplified by Pye’s 
(2000; 2001; 2002) longitudinal study of UK directors’ opinions on how to manage a large 
company.  There were few common themes among 46 directors interviewed from 1987 to 
1989, although decentralisation, diversification and divisionalisation were often mentioned.  
In contrast, when 25 of the 46 directors were re-interviewed in the 1998 to 2000 period, very 
strong themes emerged including strategic focus, shareholder value and corporate governance.  
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This change in themes is attributed to the influence of the official reports and codes as well as 
institutional investor activism. 
 
The corporate objective that is mandated in the UK’s Companies Act has also changed over 
time.  Historically, common law and the Companies Act 1948 and 1985 have required 
directors to act in the best interests of the company (Keay, 2010).  This is normally interpreted 
as meaning directors should act in the best interests of shareholders as long as the ability to 
repay debtholders is not jeopardised (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Keay, 2010).  The revised 
Companies Act 1985 added employees’ interests to the corporate objective, although 
shareholders and employees interests were not treated as equal under common law.
28
  
Following much public and political debate in the early 2000s, a philosophy of enlightened 
shareholder value was included in the revised Companies Act 2006 (Keay, 2010; Wen and 
Zhao, 2011).
29
  Notably, UK politicians used the phrase ‘enlightened shareholder value’ when 
discussing what should be the corporate objective in the Companies Act 2006 (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2007).  These changes represent a shift from Corporate Logic to Investor 
Logic because managerial discretion has been (at least in principle) reduced and shareholder 
value has been explicitly stated as the sole end, while non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests 
are merely means to this end.  
   
In light of these changes, Lok (2010) investigated how Investor Logic shaped the institutional 
identities of executives and fund managers (or institutional investors).  Note that Lok (2010, 
p.1320) identified two versions of Investor Logic:  Institutional investors are conceptualised 
as “owners/traders of capital” under Shareholder Value Maximisation (SVM) Logic while 
being “Activist long-term owners of the firm” under Enlightened Shareholder Value (ESV) 
Logic.  The former asserts that it is legitimate for fund managers to sell their shares at any 
point (e.g. when a company’s share price is very high or very low), while the latter asserts that 
fund managers are long-term investors and quasi-governors (e.g. monitor and, if necessary, 
                                                 
28
 The Companies Act 1985 (s.309(1)) states that, “The matters to which the directors of a company are to have 
regard in the performance of their functions include the interests of the company’s employees in general, as 
well as the interests of its members.”  Note that members are defined as shareholders.   
29
 The UK’s Companies Act 2006 (s.172(1)) states that, “A director of a company must act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— (a) the likely consequences of 
any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the 
company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment, (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a 
reputation for high standards of business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company.”  Note that members are defined as shareholders. 
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discipline management).  Following interviews with 20 executives and 18 fund managers, 
Lok (2010) found that support for ESV Logic was symbolic.  Both executives and fund 
managers subtly managed the discourse of ESV Logic, so that their traditional identities were 
preserved.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, executives portrayed themselves as stewards, 
rather than enlightened agents.  Consistent with SVM Logic, fund managers portrayed 
themselves as owners/traders (e.g. focused on the short-term performance of their funds, 
rather than the long-term).
30
  
 
2.5.5.4. Germany 
Traditionally, the German model of corporate governance has been conceptualised by 
Stakeholder Logic (Jackson and Moerke, 2005).
31
  During the mid-to-late 1990s, Investor 
Logic has been diffused among large German companies as they have adopted shareholder 
value maximisation as the espoused corporate objective, value-based management systems 
(e.g. Stern Stewart’s Economic Value AddedTM), executive share option plans, and 
international accounting standards (Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Tuschke and Sanders, 2003).  
During the early-to-late 2000s, German companies have continued adopting executive share 
option plans as well as making extensive remuneration disclosures (Chizema, 2008, 2010).  
Since the mid-1990s, several factors have contributed to the diffusion of Investor Logic 
including Daimler-Benz and Deutsche Bank adopting executive share option plans despite 
significant public outrage; decreasing ownership of German companies by German banks; 
increasing ownership of German companies by American companies and institutional 
investors; and changes in German regulations and listing rules (Chizema, 2008, 2010; Fiss 
and Zajac, 2004; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007).   
 
Stakeholder Logic and Investor Logic are competing for dominance in Germany.  The 
diffusion of Investor Logic has been contested, particularly the adoption of executive share 
option plans (Chizema, 2010; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007) and the adoption of new 
disclosures requirements for executive remuneration (Chizema, 2008).  Further, Investor 
Logic has been symbolically adopted by some German companies.  For example, Fiss and 
Zajac (2004) found that some companies adopting shareholder value maximisation as the 
                                                 
30
 This is consistent with Hendry et al.’s (2006) findings following interviews with executives from investment 
firms and large listed companies in the UK.  
31
 Note that German companies have two boards: a supervisory board and a management board.  This means that 
there is a clear separation of governance/reporting and management/strategy, unlike in Anglo-American 
companies.  Further, Germany’s Co-Determination Act 1976 requires companies to have employee 
representatives on their supervisory boards (Solomon, 2007). 
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espoused corporate objective did not implement related practices (as listed above).  Similarly, 
Stakeholder Logic has been symbolically adopted by some German companies.  For example, 
Fiss and Zajac (2006) found that some companies that implementing practices associated with 
Investor Logic had an espoused corporate objective of stakeholder value maximisation.  
However, it may be that German executives believe in Corporate Logic, rather than in 
Stakeholder Logic or Investor Logic.  For example, Witt and Redding (2012) found German 
executives to be production-oriented. That is, they believe, society is best served when 
companies satisfy market demand for products or services.   
 
2.5.5.5. Other Countries 
There is growing body of research on the varieties of capitalism and comparative (or 
international) corporate governance (for a review, see Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  In 
particularly, this research has investigated the extent to which the Anglo-American model (or 
Investor Logic) has colonised other countries.  Hansmann and Kraakman (2001, p.439) 
argued that the main driver of convergence in both corporate laws and corporate governance 
practices around the world has been believe in “shareholder-centred ideology [or Investor 
Logic]… among business, government and legal elites”.  However, Lee and Yoo (2008) 
suggest that the Global Financial Crisis may halt convergence because the Anglo-American 
model may be seen to have failed.  After reviewing recent research, Yoshikawa and Rasheed 
(2009, p.402) conclude that there is much diversity in corporate governance and “convergence 
seems to be more a matter of form than substance”.  But they also point out that capital, 
labour and product markets are drivers of convergence in corporate governance practices.   
 
Most prior research on convergence/divergence has studied corporate governance practices 
rather than discourse or institutional logics (again, see Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  For 
example, Chizema and Shinozawa (2012) studied the diffusion of practices, not discourse. 
Aside from the studies reviewed in this section, there have been few studies of institutional 
logics of corporate governance that have analysed discourse.  At this point, few comments 
about the diffusion of institutional logics in other countries can be made.  Unless discourse is 
studied, the diffusion of institutional logics in other countries will not be known.  The study of 
discourse is important because it can reveal whether practices have been substantively or 
symbolically adopted (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  As has been 
shown in this section, transitions between institutional logics in organisational fields do not 
occur simply.  There are always competing institutional logics with support that waxes and 
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wanes (Suddaby, 2010).  Only the study of discourse and practices can reveal these 
ambiguities and complexities within organisational fields. 
 
2.5.6. Gaps in Research  
Prior research has shown that Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and Stakeholder Logic are 
widely diffused discourses which influence how corporate governance is practiced.  In 
Canada, the UK and the US, Investor Logic is dominant, particularly in the discourse of the 
media and regulators, but Corporate Logic is still active in the discourse of directors and 
executives (Green et al., 2008; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Lok, 2010; Pye, 2000, 2001, 
2002; Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  In Germany, Stakeholder Logic and 
Investor Logic are competing for dominance, although Investor Logic has been rapidly 
gaining support (Chizema, 2008, 2010; Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Sanders and Tuschke, 
2007).  Collectively, these studies have shown evidence of a battle between institutional 
logics in written texts including corporate annual reports, media articles, corporate 
governance codes, listing rules and corporate laws.  Further, these studies have shown that 
this battle is multifaceted as directors, executives, investors, media and regulators have 
different beliefs and interests, and some companies are decoupling their discourse and 
practices.   
 
Prior research on the diffusion of institutional logics has been narrowly focused.  While 
corporate annual reports often exceed 100 pages, studies have only analysed statements on the 
corporate objective (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006) and justifications of long-term incentive 
plans and stock repurchase plans (Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004).  These studies have only 
studied two corporate objectives, shareholder and stakeholder value maximisation, and two 
justifications, agency theory language and human resource management language.  Further, a 
multitude of practices are described in corporate annual reports, but studies have been limited 
to value-based management systems, executive share option plans/long-term incentive plans 
and international accounting standards (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Sanders and Tuschke, 
2007) as well as stock repurchase plans (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  However, institutional 
logics of corporate governance have a broad range of implications for how corporate 
governance and executive remuneration are practiced (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).  Therefore, 
future research should examine these broader implications. 
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Possible avenues for future research are as follows. Lok (2010) argues that regulatory and 
normative pressures in the form of corporate laws, official reports and codes have a powerful 
influence on the diffusion of institutional logics.  Future research could examine the extent to 
which institutional logics have been diffused in a range of texts.  Particularly attention could 
be given to the timing of diffusion among the texts.  For example, institutional logics may 
diffuse from codes to corporate annual reports.  Further, multiple aspects of institutional 
logics could be studied.  For example, executive remuneration is comprised of salary, 
benefits, pension, short-term incentives and long-term incentives, and each of these elements 
are described and justified in corporate annual reports.  Future research could examine the 
extent to which institutional logics are deeply embedded in corporate annual reports.  
Particular attention could be given to the coupling/decoupling between practices and 
justifications. 
 
Prior research on the diffusion of institutional logics has also overlooked how and why 
institutional logics are institutionalised at the organisational-level.  Green et al. (2008), Lok 
(2010), Pye (2000, 2001, 2002), Shipilov et al. (2010) show that executives and directors do 
use language that is consistent with Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  However, the extent 
to which institutional logics are deeply embedded in the beliefs and decisions-making of 
organisational actors has not been studied.  By observing and/or interviewing directors, future 
research could examine how institutional logics influence decision-making in the boardroom.  
Particularly attention could be given to how and why decoupling occurs.  Further, 
observations and interviews should not be limited to directors.  There is a wide range of 
parties involved in corporate governance such as executives, institutional investors and 
regulators.  Understanding the opinions from this wide range would shed light on how 
competing institutional logics gain and loose support as well as how parties outside of 
companies interpret decoupling.  For example, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that 
investors reacted positively to adoption of stock repurchase plans irrespective of 
implementation, but it is not known why investors react positively to symbolic governance 
practices.   
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Cadbury (1992, p.2) observed, “It is, however, the continuing concern about standards of 
financial reporting and accountability, heightened by [corporate scandals] and the controversy 
over directors’ pay, which has kept corporate governance in the public eye.”  Regrettably, this 
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observation is still relevant today.  Corporate governance is a subject that has gained notoriety 
because of recurring accounting and corporate scandals (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; 
Cheffins, 2011).  The irrational exuberance of investors or stock market bubbles has also kept 
corporate governance in the public eye (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Gerding, 2006). The Dot-
com Bubble demonstrated that markets and regulations cannot discipline executives who are 
awarded bonuses for achieving quarterly earnings targets, particularly when share prices are 
overvalued (Jensen, 2005).  The Global Financial Crisis, precipitated by a US House Price 
Bubble, has reinforced this point and showed that worldwide corporate governance models 
offer no protection against investors’ and executives’ greed (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; 
Clarke, 2009, 2010).  In particular, the Anglo-American model of board independence and 
performance-based remuneration has been unable to harness the opportunistic behaviour of 
executives (Dalton and Dalton, 2005, 2011). 
 
Against this backdrop, some academics have been searching for the Holy Grail of corporate 
governance: A way of ensuring a positive relationship between executive remuneration and 
firm performance (Capezio et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  Empirical evidence has failed 
to validate the prescriptions of agency theory, stewardship theory and stakeholder theory 
(Devers et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 2000).  Continuing their search, academics have combined 
these theories in an effort to find a unified theory of corporate governance (e.g. Lubatkin et 
al., 2007; Wiseman et al., 2012).  However, the quest for the Holy Grail of corporate 
governance is both irrational and bad for practice.  It is irrational because not only are there 
too many variables to take into account but the variables are socially constructed and often 
poorly defined.  There are no absolute measures of executive remuneration or firm 
performance.  It is bad for practice because these theories can become self-activating.  
Ghoshal (2005) explains that as these theories are diffused in public discourse, the underlying 
assumptions (e.g. executives are opportunistic) become norms or socially expected.   
 
Drawing on discursive institutionalism, the quest by academics, investors, regulators and 
others to find a solution to corporate governance problems is interpreted as a battle between 
competing beliefs systems or institutional logics.  Three institutional logics are prominent in 
the academic and public discourse on corporate governance: Corporate Logic, Investor Logic 
and Stakeholder Logic.  In general, the empirical evidence indicates that there has been a 
transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in Canada, the US and the UK (Lok, 2010; 
Shipilov et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004) as well as a battle between Stakeholder 
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Logic and Investor Logic in Germany (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006).  However, Fiss and Zajac 
(2006) point out that this is an overgeneralisation because companies have both substantively 
and symbolically adopted institutional logics.  Further, Lok (2010, p.1305) found that 
executives and fund managers “can paradoxically accommodate and resist the practice and 
identity implications of new institutional logics at the same time.”  Thus, competing 
institutional logics inhabit organisational fields, despite any given institutional logic 
appearing to be dominant.  
 
There is small but growing body of research on the institutional logics of corporate 
governance.  Most research has studied the diffusion of institutional logics including both 
discourse and practices (e.g. Chizema, 2008, 2010; Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Shipilov et al., 
2010; Sanders and Tuschke, 2007; Zajac and Westphal, 1995, 2004).  While institutional 
logics of corporate governance have a range of implications, prior research has been narrowly 
focused.  In terms of executive remuneration, prior research has focused on the adoption of 
executive share option plans and justifications of these plans.  However, institutional logics of 
corporate governance have wider implications for executive remuneration than have been 
studied (see Table 2.3).  Drawing on the broader literature on executive remuneration, these 
implications are discussed in the next chapter (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.6).  Further, 
the process by which institutional logics of corporate governance are embedded in the 
discourse and practices of companies has not been studied.  Therefore, the next chapter also 
discusses how remuneration committees make decisions and how institutional logics may 
influence their decision-making (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5).   
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Chapter 3: Institutional Logics and Executive 
Remuneration  
 
3.1. Introduction  
Institutional logics of corporate governance are beliefs systems that make claims about what 
should be the corporate objective, how executives should behave and how internal corporate 
governance should be practiced (du Plessis, 2008; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Chapter 2 
identified four institutional logics, namely: Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, Political Logic 
and Stakeholder Logic.  There is a small but growing body of research that has studied the 
extent to which these logics have been diffused in several countries and influence how 
corporate governance is practiced (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5).  In terms of executive 
remuneration, prior research has focused on long-term incentive schemes and how companies 
justify the adoption of these schemes (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Zajac and Westphal, 1995; 
2004).  However, institutional logics have a broad range of implications for executive 
remuneration that have not been studied.  Therefore, this chapter reviews the broader 
literature on executive remuneration in order to understand how institutional logics may 
influence the remuneration committee’s decision-making.   
 
Bridging the macro-micro divide, this chapter discusses how institutional pressures at the 
organisational field and societal levels (i.e. the macro) are connected to the remuneration 
committee’s decision-making (i.e. the micro).  Institutional logics enable and constrain 
decision-making by defining what are and are not legitimate ideas and practices (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008).  Further, directors’ preferences and cognitive processes are not 
autonomous but embedded (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  For example, Ghoshal (2005) 
argued that the teaching of agency theory has changed how directors and others think and act.  
As institutional logics are diffused through the production and consumption of texts (Phillips 
and Malhotra, 2008), this chapter considers how texts (e.g. corporate governance codes and 
remuneration consultants’ reports) influence the decision-making of remuneration 
committees.  However, remuneration committees have much latitude in making decisions 
because there are competing institutional logics in any given organisational field, institutional 
logics are often ambiguous (i.e. lack internal consistency), and symbolic discourse and actions 
can confer legitimacy (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; also see Chapter 2, Section 2.4).   
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This chapter is organised as follows.  An overview of prior research that has studied how 
remuneration decisions are justified is presented in Section 2.  Particular attention is given to 
theories that have been examined in prior research.  Section 3 reviews the principles of 
executive remuneration that have been identified in prior research.  These principles (or 
rationales) provide directors and others with a basis for making, interpreting and justifying 
decisions.  As only Anglo-American countries have been studied, the principles are consistent 
with Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.
32
  Section 4 discusses a range of remuneration 
practices and what principles remuneration committees use to justify these practices.  This 
section also highlights ambiguities and tensions between some remuneration principles and 
practices.  These tensions exemplify that there are competing institutional logics in 
organisational fields that have alternative prescriptions for how and how much executives 
should be remunerated.  Section 5 discusses the process of remuneration decision-making.  
This section also explains why ambiguity and tension between remuneration principles may 
be tolerated.  Implications for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are discussed in Section 6.  
Concluding comments are made in Section 7. 
 
3.2. Prior Research on Executive Remuneration 
Agency theory has become the dominant theoretical framework for prior research on 
executive remuneration (Dalton et al., 2007).  To test agency theory’s hypotheses, many 
studies have examined the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance 
(for reviews see Core et al., 2003; Devers et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999).  Pay-performance sensitivity varies considerably between 
studies, although meta-analyses have identified general trends.  In a meta-analysis of 137 
studies, Tosi et al. (2000, p.329) found that “Changes in firm performance account for only 
4% of the variance in CEO pay…”  Also, in a meta-analysis of 75 studies, Rost and Osterloh 
(2009) found that pay-performance sensitivity has been declining over time.  In light of these 
results, academics have re-interpreted these results to manufacture support for agency theory.  
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that pay-performance sensitivity is weak because executives 
have too much power over boards and can set their own remuneration.  Alternatively, Nyberg 
et al. (2010) argue that prior research has measured the wrong variables.  They find evidence 
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 Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are not discussed in any detail in this Chapter because these Logics do 
not appear to be embedded in the discourse of Anglo-American countries (see Section 2.5.5). 
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of a positive relationship between CEO return (calculated as the change in equity value plus 
cash remuneration divided by initial equity value) and shareholder returns. 
 
In the present study, agency theory is interpreted as a dogma that is deeply embedded in 
academic and business discourse on executive remuneration (Ghoshal, 2005).  Agency theory 
is a dogma because academics can find support for agency theory irrespective of the empirical 
evidence.  For example, Abowd and Kaplan (1999, p.158) argue that there may not be a 
strong relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance because “stock 
returns have shareholder expectations imbedded in them”.  This flexibility in agency theory’s 
arguments has enabled its supporters to continue to propagate its prescriptions.  Further, Rost 
and Osterloh (2009) argue that agency theory’s prescription of pay-for-performance has 
become a managerial fashion.  It appears that agency theory has become institutionalised in 
both academic and business discourse.  Essentially, agency theory is a rationalised and refined 
version of Investor Logic.   While academics critique executives’ behaviour, they rarely 
critique the agency theory lens that they use to critique executives’ behaviour (cf. Ghoshal, 
2005; Lubatkin, 2005).  Similarly, Investor Logic is deeply embedded in business discourse 
(see chapter 2) and rarely critiqued in public discourse (cf. Cassidy, 23 September 2002; 
Madrick, 20 February 2003). 
 
This research investigates what institutional logics and theories are embedded in academic 
and business discourse on executive remuneration and how these influence how remuneration 
decisions are made and interpreted.  Essentially, it is recognised that institutional logics and 
theories have the power to influence individual and organisational behaviour (Alford and 
Friedland, 1985; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  There have been few studies that have taken 
this approach (cf. Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Drawing on the institutional logics identified in 
Chapter 2, prior research is reinterpreted in this chapter in order to understand how 
institutional logics influence how companies justify executive remuneration and how 
remuneration committees make decisions.  However, this is problematic because institutional 
logics and theories are ambiguous and flexible.  For example, Investor Logic/agency theory 
does not prescribe what proportion of executive remuneration should be contingent on firm 
performance or how firm performance should be measured.  Therefore, in reviewing prior 
research, particularly attention is given to the discourse of the researchers and their subjects 
(e.g. companies studied) because their beliefs influence how they interpret their social 
realities.   
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Table 3.1 presents an overview of prior research on executive remuneration that is relevant to 
the present study.  There are two types of prior research that are relevant: First, those that 
have studied justifications of executive remuneration in public discourse (e.g. corporate 
governance codes and corporate annual reports); Second, those that have investigated how 
remuneration decisions are made, interpreted and justified by companies and their 
stakeholders.  The latter research focuses on private discourse (e.g. opinions of directors, 
executives and remuneration consultants).  Public discourse has been studied using archival 
content analysis.  More often than not, a few remuneration principles (or justifications) are 
studied in a large sample of texts.  In contrast, private discourse has been studied using 
qualitative methods.  Typically, many aspects of executive remuneration (including multiple 
remuneration principles) are studied in a small sample of interviews with directors.  Notably, 
there have been a few studies using surveys.  Further, there are many theoretical lenses in 
prior research with agency and institutional theories being the most common.  Researchers 
have also used multiple theories to interpret their findings (e.g. Bender, 2004). There have 
also been a number of studies that have no explicit theoretical lens (e.g. Kovacevic, 2009; 
Wade et al., 1997). 
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Table 3.1: Theory Testing in Prior Research 
Prior Research Research Method 
Economics, Finance and Law Management Psychology Sociology 
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Public Discourse               
Zajac and Westphal (1995) Archival Content Analysis              
Wade et al. (1997)
1
 Archival Content Analysis              
Point and Tyson (2006) Archival Content Analysis              
Crombie et al. (2010) Archival Content Analysis              
Private Discourse               
Main (1993)
1
 Interviews              
St-Onge et al. (2001) Interviews              
Beer and Katz (2003)
1
 Survey              
Bender (2004)  Interviews              
Bender and Moir (2006) Interviews              
Bender (2007) Interviews              
Bender (2011) Interviews              
Perkins and Hendry (2005)
2
 Interviews              
Lawler and Finegold (2007)
1
 Survey              
Main et al. (2008) Interviews              
Ogden and Watson (2008) Interviews              
Ogden and Watson (2011) Interviews              
Kovacevic (2009)
 1
 Interviews              
Hermanson et al. (2011) Interviews              
Main et al. (2011) Interviews              
Pepper et al. (2012) Interviews and Survey              
Notes: 
1 No theories are explicitly tested in these studies. 
2 Perkins and Hendry (2005) examine whether agency theory-based arguments are embedded in the discourse of non-executive directors. 
3 Financial theory implies that the CEO should not hold a high percentage of their wealth in the company’s shares because the CEO will be pressured, particularly if the 
company’s share price is declining, to manipulate (or falsify) information released to the public and stock exchange.  
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Prior research on public discourse has studied the diffusion of Investor Logic (agency theory-
based language) and Corporate Logic (human resources management-based language) with 
respect to how executive remuneration is justified (Crombie et al., 2010; Point and Tyson, 
2006; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Drawing on institutional theory, these studies support the 
notion that institutional logics are diffused due to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures.  
As the manifestation of coercive and normative pressures, companies are compelled to adopt 
the recommendations in corporate governance codes.  Mimetic pressure is also exerted on 
companies as their peers adopt new ideas and practices.  Drawing on a symbolic management 
perspective,
33
 Point and Tyson (2006), Wade et al. (1997) and Zajac and Westphal (1995) 
found that remuneration principles (justifications or rationales) in corporate annual reports 
can be symbolic, rather than substantive.  Point and Tyson (2006, p.828) explain that, “the 
level of CEO compensation is less important than how firms communicate the rationales 
underlying their CEO compensation decisions.”  Further, Wade et al. (1997) and Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) found that the adoption of remuneration principles dependent on 
demographic, economic, ownership and political factors.   
 
Prior research on private discourse has studied how executives and directors make and justify 
remuneration decisions (e.g. Bender, 2004).  Prior to 2000, this kind of research was almost 
non-existent (except Main, 1993).  Motivated by corporate scandals and increasing academic 
and public scrutiny of executive remuneration, prior research has attempted to demystify 
boardroom decision-making and study the extent to which boardroom decision-making is 
consistent with academic theories.  Most studies have argued that the opinions of executives, 
directors and remuneration consultants fit with (or are indicative of) agency and institutional 
theories (e.g. Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008).  Further, these studies 
have generally found that how remuneration committees make decisions can be explained 
using multiple theories.  For example, Hermanson et al. (2011, p.40) concluded that, “the 
interviewees provided insights reflecting elements of four different theoretical perspectives 
[agency, institutional, managerial hegemony and resource dependence], highlighting the need 
to move beyond a simple agency theory view of corporate governance.”  However, these 
studies have been uncritical of the opinions of directors, executives and remuneration 
                                                 
33
 These studies do not relate the symbolic management perspective to any particularly theory, but it can be 
related to legitimacy and agency theories.  Legitimacy theory asserts that companies can gain/maintain their 
legitimacy through symbolic conformance with societal expectations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  Agency 
theory asserts that companies may use impression (symbolic) management to deceive investors about firm 
performance, and executives will exploit such deception to maximise their wealth (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). 
Chapter 3: Institutional Logics and Executive Remuneration 
85 
consultants.  Their opinions have been treated as factual and truthful.  Further, these studies 
have not sought the opinions of other stakeholders such as investors and regulators. 
 
No prior research has studied the effect of institutional logics on the decision-makin process 
of remuneration committees.  Given that Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and, to a lesser 
extent, Stakeholder Logic shape how corporate governance is regulated and practiced (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.5), it is probable that institutional logics also shape how executive 
remuneration is regulated and practiced.  For example, Zajac and Westphal (1995) show that 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence how long-term incentive plans are justified in 
US companies’ proxy statements.  It may be that institutional logics shape the thinking and 
decision-making of directors, executives and remuneration consultants because their 
preferences are embedded (not autonomous).
34
  Put differently, institutional logics define 
what people believe is both rational and appropriate (Cyert and March, 1992; March and 
Simon, 1993).  Reinterpreting prior research from an institutional logics perspective 
highlights that how directors make decisions is influenced by institutional logics.  Directors 
use agency theory-based language (or Investor Logic) to justify their decisions (Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005).  Additionally, directors “follow norms, rules of thumb and customary 
practices” to make decisions (Main et al., 2008, p.225).  In this chapter, it is argued that these 
norms (or remuneration principles) are mostly consistent with Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic.  
 
3.3. Principles of Executive Remuneration 
Remuneration principles are systems of belief and reasoning which individuals use to make, 
interpret and justify remuneration decisions.
35
  For example, ASX [Australian Stock 
Exchange] Corporate Governance Council’s (2003, p.51) main remuneration principle is, 
“Ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that 
its relationship to corporate and individual performance is defined.”  Remuneration principles 
are abstract and open to interpretation, but may be substantive (i.e. linked to specific 
                                                 
34
 For example, Lubatkin et al. (2007) argue that the preferences of investors, directors, executives and others are 
embedded (or institutionalised) because of background and formal institutions within society (e.g. national 
culture) and socialisation experiences (which occur from childhood onwards, e.g. at schools and in 
workplaces).  
35
 The term remuneration principle has not been formally defined in the inter-disciplinary literature on 
remuneration. However, there are a multitude of possible remuneration principles that have identified in prior 
research, although they are rarely labelled remuneration principles (e.g. St-Onge et al., 2001).  Remuneration 
principles often take the form of idioms such as pay-for-performance and pay competitively, and are also 
called: accounts, clichés, excuses, explanations, justifications, reasons, and rhetoric. 
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remuneration practices).  How individuals decide what is “sufficient and reasonable” can vary 
considerable.  This is shown in countless newspaper articles on CEO pay (Core et al., 2008).  
For example, Mason (6 March 2010) reported: 
“BP has defended a 40pc rise in its chief executive’s pay package to £4m as 
“balanced and fair”, despite a 45pc fall in profits… The decision risks angering 
BP’s shareholders, after almost 40pc of them voted against the company’s 
remuneration packages last year.”   
 
Remuneration principles constrain and enable remuneration decision-making by defining 
what are and are not legitimate actions, although remuneration principles are far less 
constraining than laws and rules. 
 
There is a small but growing body of research that has identified a range of remuneration 
principles that directors use to make and justify remuneration decisions (e.g. Bender, 2004; 
Crombie et al., 2010; St-Onge et al., 2001).
36
  In general terms, remuneration principles assert 
that competitive levels of remuneration are required to attract, motivate and retain talented 
executives, but their remuneration should also be dependent on individual and company 
performance as well as being fair to other employees and shareholders.  These remuneration 
principles assert that executive remuneration practices influence the behaviour of executives, 
which in turn influences organisational behaviour and outcomes.  Further, remuneration 
principles are simplified versions of theories of executive remuneration (see Chapter 2, Table 
2.1).  For example, Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that most companies justified the 
adoption of long-term incentive plans by claiming that the plans will align the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders, which is indicative of the agency principle (see below) 
and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Overall, directors believe that if 
remuneration principles are implemented, then value (however that is defined) will be 
maximised (Bender, 2004).  
 
Table 3.2 summarises the principles that are commonly found in codes (Crombie et al., 2010) 
and corporate annual reports (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995), and commonly opined by executives, directors and remuneration consultants (Beer and 
                                                 
36
 Prior research has rarely sought to identify remuneration principles that remuneration committees use to make, 
justify and interpret decisions (except Crombie et al., 2010).  In this chapter, remuneration principles have 
been retrospectively identified in prior research. 
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Katz, 2003; Bender, 2004, 2007, 2011; Hermanson et al., 2011; Kovacevic, 2009; Main, 
1993; Main et al., 2008, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; 
Pepper et al., 2012; St-Onge et al., 2001).  Included in Table 3.2 are definitions of the 
principles as well as a brief discussion of whether or not the principles are consistent with 
Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.
37
  Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436) only theorised 
one remuneration principle for each of the Logics: Corporate Logic implies that directors will 
“Use salary and other rewards to attract and retain scarce management talent”, while Investor 
Logic implies that directors will “Use incentives to align management and shareholder 
interests”.  However, it is shown that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are consistent 
with a range of remuneration principles and, therefore, have a much broader range of 
implications for executive remuneration than Zajac and Westphal (2004) had envisioned.   
 
                                                 
37
 Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are not discussed in Table 3.2 because stakeholder value is rarely 
mentioned in prior research.  Shareholder value maximisation is generally accepted as the corporate objective 
(e.g. Bender and Moir, 2006). 
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Table 3.2: Principles of Executive Remuneration 
Principles Definitions Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Agency The interests of executives diverge from those 
of shareholders, but can be aligned using 
performance-based remuneration. 
As Corporate Logic assumes that the interests 
of shareholders and executives do not diverge, 
it is incompatible with the agency principle. 
Investor Logic is synonymous with the agency 
principle as it assumes that the interests of 
shareholders and executives diverge.  
Conformance Executive remuneration practices should be 
consistent with best practice and (powerful and 
salient) stakeholders’ expectations. 
The conformance principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic, unless shareholders’ 
expectations vary from best practice or non-
shareholding stakeholders’ expectations. 
The conformance principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic, unless shareholders’ 
expectations vary from best practice or non-
shareholding stakeholders’ expectations. 
Fairness Executive remuneration should be equitable, 
fair and reasonable. Executive remuneration 
practices should account for vertical equity 
between executives and employees. 
The fairness principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic: To aid succession planning, 
employees (as future executives) should be 
rewarded proportionally to executives.  
The fairness principle is inconsistent with 
Investor Logic.  Remuneration should be based 
on executives’ (and employees’) individual 
contributions to shareholder value. 
Human resources To attract and retain talented executives, 
executive remuneration packages should be 
tailored to their preferences. 
Corporate Logic is synonymous with the human 
resources principle as it asserts that executives 
should be treated with respect and dignity. 
Investor Logic is incompatible with the human 
resources principle because it asserts that 
executives are replaceable (i.e. not talented) and 
malleable (i.e. incentives can programme 
executives to maximise shareholder value). 
Market Executives should be paid comparably to other 
executives in similar roles and with similar skill 
sets (i.e. horizontal equity).  
The market principle is consistent with 
Corporate Logic, as it promotes the equitable 
treatment of all executives. 
The market principle is inconsistent with 
Investor Logic, but how much other executives 
are paid is relevant information.
1
 
Motivation  Executive remuneration practices should be 
designed to maximise the effort of executives. 
The motivation principle is inconsistent with 
Corporate Logic because executives are 
assumed to be intrinsically motivated.  
The motivation principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic because executives are assumed 
to be extrinsically motivated. 
Pay-for-performance Executive remuneration should vary with firm 
performance. That is, executives’ remuneration 
should be ‘at-risk’ or only awarded if firm 
performance meets or exceeds expectations. 
The pay-for-performance principle is 
inconsistent with Corporate Logic, unless 
variable remuneration is conceptualised as a 
sharing of rewards (or profits) between 
shareholders and executives. 
The pay-for-performance principle is consistent 
with Investor Logic, particularly if variable pay 
is a large proportion of total remuneration.  This 
ensures that executives are only paid if they add 
shareholder value. 
Responsibility Remuneration should vary with the executives’ 
level of responsibility (or managerial 
discretion). 
If responsibility is equated to position in the 
organisational hierarchy, then the responsibility 
principle is consistent with Corporate Logic’s 
concern for horizontal and vertical equity. 
If responsibility is equated to an executive’s 
ability to influence firm performance, then the 
responsibility principle is consistent with 
Investor Logic (i.e. pay-for-performance).  
Note: 
1 Executive remuneration will be set between the market rate (the amount that comparable executives are paid) and executives’ individual contribution to shareholder 
value (see managerial labour market theories, Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  However, Crystal (1991) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive remuneration 
can be ratcheted upwards through the use of biased market comparisons.  Similarly, Hayes and Schaefer (2009) suggest that executive remuneration can be ratcheted 
upwards because boards of directors may believe that their executives are above average performers.  For these reasons, the market principle will be deemphasised. 
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Table 3.3 summarises what remuneration principles have been identified in prior research.  
However, Table 3.3 does not indicate the extent to which the remuneration principles have 
been diffused (or adopted) because prior research only studied a few principles (except 
Crombie et al., 2010 and St-Onge et al., 2001).  Prior research has studied two types of 
discourse: Public discourse, which refers to studies of codes and corporate annual reports; and 
private discourse, which refers to studies of the opinions of executives, directors of 
companies, remuneration consultants.  Further, prior research has found remuneration 
principles that are consistent with Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are deeply embedded 
in public and private discourse.  The main limitations of prior research are only companies in 
the UK and the US have been extensively surveyed, influential texts (e.g. laws, regulations 
and codes) have been rarely analysed, and the opinions of powerful stakeholders (e.g. 
regulators, investors and employees) have not been studied.  Next, prior research in relation to 
each remuneration principle and then the principles as a set is discussed.  
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Table 3.3: Presence of the Remuneration Principles in Organisational Discourse 
Studies Subject 
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 Public Discourse         
Zajac and Westphal 
(1995) 
Justifications of new long-term incentive plans in the proxy statements of 352 US 
listed companies (Forbes 500 or Fortune 500) from 1976 to 1990. 
        
Wade et al. (1997) Justifications of CEO remuneration in proxy statements of 266 US listed companies 
(S&P 500) from 1992. 
        
Point and Tyson (2006) Remuneration policies in 2002 annual reports of 23 listed companies in the banking 
and pharmaceutical/chemical industries from UK, France, Germany and Switzerland. 
        
Crombie et al. (2010) Recommendations in 18 US codes; and remuneration policies in 1998 and 2007 proxy 
statements of 50 largest (by market capitalisation) US listed companies. 
        
 Private Discourse         
Main (1993) Interviews with 24 executives and directors from UK listed companies.         
St-Onge et al. (2001) Interviews with 18 senior executives from Canadian listed companies.         
Beer and Katz (2003) Survey of 205 human resources executives from many countries who were studying at 
a US business school. 
        
Bender (2004, 2007, 
2011); Bender and Moir 
(2006) 
Interviews with 14 directors and 16 executives from UK listed companies (FTSE 100) 
and 5 remuneration consultants.         
Perkins and Hendry 
(2005) 
Interviews with 7 non-executive directors from UK listed companies (FTSE 100) and 
5 executive recruitment consultants. 
        
Lawler and Finegold 
(2007) 
Survey of 768 directors from large US listed companies.  Almost three-quarter of 
those surveyed are non-executive directors. 
        
Main et al. (2008) Interviews with 22 non-executive directors from UK listed and private companies.         
Ogden and Watson (2008, 
2011) 
Interviews with 11 non-executive directors and 7 executives from UK listed 
companies in the water utilities industry as well as 2 remuneration consultants. 
        
Kovacevic (2009) Interviews with 14 non-executive directors and 6 executives from AU listed 
companies as well as 2 remuneration consultants.  
        
Hermanson et al. (2011) Interviews with 17 non-executive directors from US listed companies.         
Main et al. (2011) Interviews with 15 non-executive directors from UK listed companies.         
Pepper et al. (2012) Interviews with 8 non-executive directors and 7 senior executives as well as survey of 
75 senior executives from UK listed companies (FTSE350). 
        
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The conformance principle states that executive remuneration practices should be consistent 
with best practice and stakeholders’ expectations (Main, 1993; St-Onge et al., 2001).  For 
example, Bender (2004, p.529) found that, “many participants related to the perceived need to 
use PRP [performance-related pay] because that was “best practice” and good corporate 
governance.”  Drawing on institutional and legitimacy theories (Suchman, 1995), the 
conformance principle highlights that stakeholders judge companies and will confer 
legitimacy only if companies meet their expectations.  Companies can manage their 
legitimacy by adopting executive remuneration practices that other companies use or are 
endorsed by powerful stakeholders (e.g. code issuers such as regulators or investors’ 
associations).  The conformance principle is not related to any particular institutional logic or 
executive remuneration practices because best practice and stakeholder expectations will vary 
between institutional settings.  However, prior research has linked the conformance principle 
to the use of remuneration consultants (Bender, 2011).  For example, Hermanson (2011, p.31) 
found that, “compensation committees follow marketplace norms and signal their 
commitment to best practices by hiring a consultant.”  Crombie et al. (2010) and Wade et al. 
(1997) found that remuneration consultants are widely used by US companies, indicating that 
the conformance principle may be widely diffused. 
 
The human resources principle refers to the ability of companies to attract and retain talented 
executives and, to do this, states that executives’ preferences should be taken into account in 
designing executive remuneration packages (Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Drawing on upper 
echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and Corporate Logic, the human resources 
principle “characterizes organizations as arenas for natural cooperation and rejects the 
assumption that employees in organizations act solely in self-interest” (Zajac and Westphal, 
1995, p.286).  Thus, the choice of executive remuneration practices dependents on executives’ 
preferences.  This means that companies will choose executive remuneration practices that 
other companies use, irrespective of perceived effectiveness (Beer and Katz, 2003; St-Onge et 
al., 2001).  This principle is widely diffused among US companies (Crombie et al., 2010; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  However, academics who believe executives are motivated by 
money above all other rewards have criticised the human resources principle.  For example, 
Bender (2004, p.720) wryly argues that, “for remuneration to “attract, retain and motivate”, 
then meeting market rates is a reasonable thing to do. The ever-increasing levels of pay could 
be seen as just a side-effect of this need to retain good people…” 
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The market principle states that the level of executive remuneration should be competitive.  
For example, Bender (2007, p.713) found that changes are made to executive remuneration 
packages because “there was generally just a desire to remain in line with “the market”.”  
Consistent with Corporate Logic and social comparison theory (O’Reilly et al., 1988), the 
market principle promotes horizontal equity among executives.  For example, Perkins and 
Hendry (2005, p.1460) found that, “some executives [are] ‘acutely aware of what the market 
is paying’. Equity sensibilities then come into play.”  However, the market principle is 
inconsistent with Investor Logic because remuneration committees should take into account 
executives’ contribution to shareholder value.  Further, some directors have argued that the 
market principle creates upward pressure on level of remuneration, irrespective of 
performance (Bender, 2004; Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 
2008).  Other directors also argue that the executive labour market is not efficient because 
executives are not directly comparable (e.g. different knowledge and skills) and executive 
turnover is relatively low (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Despite these criticisms, the market 
principle is widely diffused among US companies (Crombie et al., 2010). 
 
The fairness principle asserts that executive remuneration should be fair, equitable and 
reasonable.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, the fairness principle promotes vertical (or 
internal) equity between executives and employees.  This is desirable as employees are likely 
to be future executives.  Crombie et al. (2010) found that the fairness principle is widely 
diffused in US corporate governance codes, but not in US companies’ proxy statements.  
While the fairness principle is often mentioned by directors, it is not always defined in terms 
of vertical equity (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  For 
example, Bender (2004) found that directors had three definitions of fairness including fair to 
employees (i.e. vertical equity), fair to executives (i.e. horizontal equity) and fair to 
shareholders.  Similarly, Pepper et al. (2012) found that executives defined fairness in terms 
of horizontal equity (or the market principle).  Notably, prior research has not reported that 
the directors defined fairness as fair to all stakeholders.  This underscores that Stakeholder 
Logic is not embedded in discourse of executives and directors in Anglo-American 
companies.  
 
The responsibility principle contends that the level of executive remuneration should be 
related to the executive’s level of responsibility.  Drawing on structural theory (Simon, 1957), 
level of responsibility can be equated to the organisational hierarchy (i.e. supervisors are paid 
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more than subordinates).  Consistent with Corporate Logic, Simon (1957) argued that the 
ratio of supervisors-to-subordinates remuneration represents a social norm and employee 
turnover will increase if any particular firm’s ratio is lower than the social norm.  
Alternatively, the level of responsibility can be equated to managerial discretion (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987).  Consistent with Investor Logic, executives with greater discretion (or 
ability to influence firm performance) should be eligible to receive greater remuneration.  For 
example, St-Onge et al. (2001) found that executives believe that share options are an 
appropriate form of remuneration for those executives who have greater influence over the 
share price.  While Crombie et al. (2010) found that the responsibility principle is widely 
diffused among US companies, it is not known how remuneration committees interpret the 
responsibility principle (e.g. social norm or managerial discretion) because it has been not 
been studied in prior research of directors’ opinions.38   
 
The pay-for-performance principle is self-explanatory, but it may be adopted by the 
remuneration committee for multiple reasons.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, the pay-for-
performance principle may be a symbol of the partnership between investors and executives, 
where shareholders and executives share the rewards (or profits).  However, this interpretation 
is inconsistent with prior research.  Typically, the pay-for-performance principle is used as a 
discriminator between high-performing and low-performing executives.  This notion of 
meritocracy is consistent with Investor Logic.  Further, Wade et al. (1997) found that the pay-
for-performance principle can be used as a symbolic justification – signifying managerial 
opportunism – as companies define performance in different ways under different 
circumstances.  While the pay-for-performance principle is more widely diffused than other 
principles (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997), remuneration committees do not 
necessarily believe that linking executive remuneration to firm performance will result in 
better organisational outcomes.  Some directors are sceptical that performance-based 
remuneration motivates executives (Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008; also see below), whereas 
other directors point to practical problems in designing and calibrating short-term and long-
term incentives (Bender, 2007; Main et al., 2008, 2011; Hermanson et al., 2011).  For 
example, Hermanson et al. (2011) found that directors are willing to alter targets following 
the Global Financial Crisis because existing targets would not be achieved.   
 
                                                 
38
 Note that St-Onge et al. (2001) interviewed executives, rather than non-executives directors. 
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The motivation principle asserts that money motivates executives, although this statement 
oversimplifies the relationship.  Executives will alter their level of effort depending on the 
probability of attaining targets and the desirability of rewards (see expectancy theory, Lawler 
and Porter, 1968).  Directors do have doubts that money does motivate (Bender, 2004; Main 
et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  For example, Main et al. (2008, p.230) found that 
some directors “do not regard executives as being driven by such extrinsic rewards…”  On 
the other hand, other directors and executives believe that incentives can de-motivate, 
particularly if targets are not likely to be met (Bender, 2007; Main et al., 2008; Pepper et al., 
2012; St-Onge et al., 2001).  However, there may be a darker side to the use of the motivation 
principle.  In a survey of worldwide executives, Beer and Katz (2003, p.30) found: 
“The most important reason for instituting bonuses is that bonuses motivate. At 
the same time, executives believe that incentives only improve performance 
slightly, if at all... [Thus] executives use theories about motivation as rhetoric to 
justify their actions.”   
 
Overall, the motivation principle is widely diffused in US codes and proxy statements 
(Crombie et al., 2010), reinforcing that Investor Logic is also widely diffused. 
 
The agency principle states that incentives should be used to align the interests of executives 
with those of shareholders.  The assumption of diverging interests underlies Investor Logic.  
The agency principle is widely diffused in both codes and corporate annual reports (Crombie 
et al., 2010; Point and Tyson, 2006; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).
39
  
Generally, directors and executives believe that long-term incentives (e.g. share option plans) 
can be used to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders (Bender, 2004; 
Hermanson et al., 2011; St-Onge et al., 2001).  However, the agency principle has been 
questioned for several reasons.  First, shareholders do not necessarily have homogenous 
interests (Lok, 2010).  Second, Bender (2007) found that remuneration committees alter 
incentive schemes if they do not pay-out, destroying any alignment of interests.  Third, Main 
et al. (2008) found that remuneration committees want to align interests, but attempt to do so 
by mimicking other companies and conforming to regulators’ and investors’ guidelines.  They 
argued that isomorphism of practice “may lead them away from implementing remuneration 
arrangements that are in the best interest of long term shareholder value” (p.235).  
                                                 
39
 All of these studies investigated the US except Point and Tyson (2006).  However, their research was 
exploratory as they only studied 23 European companies. 
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Remuneration principles enable and constrain how remuneration committees make decisions.  
Remuneration committees are required to comply with or explain why they do not comply 
with the recommendations of codes.  These recommendations are based multiple 
remuneration principles (Crombie et al., 2010; Point and Tyson, 2006).  In this respect, 
regulative and normative elements act as a constraint on remuneration committees. For 
example, Point and Tyson (2006, p.827) found that “most [corporate annual] reports contain 
sections which ‘cut and paste’ from codes…”  Put differently, remuneration committees risk 
damaging organisational legitimacy if their decisions are not consistent with societal 
expectations (Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  On the other hand, 
remuneration committees can use remuneration principles to justify and legitimise most 
remuneration practices because remuneration principles are flexible and open to 
interpretation.  For example, the pay-for-performance principle does not define how pay and 
performance are to be measured.  Remuneration principles afford remuneration committees 
much discretion in decision-making.  This led Crystal (1991) to conclude that increases in 
CEO pay can be justified if firm performance is above or below expectations.
40
 
 
Remuneration committees also have to manage tensions between remuneration principles.  
All of the remuneration principles cannot be simultaneously enacted.  For example, 
remuneration committees cannot enact the fairness, market and pay-for-performance 
principles if there are different proportional changes in the market rate for executives, the 
market rate for employees and firm performance.  To manage these tensions, remuneration 
committees will have to make compromises or prioritise the remuneration principles.  
Empirical evidence indicates there is a significant tension between agency/pay-for-
performance principles and human resources/market principles (Hermanson et al., 2011; 
Main, 1993; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  This tension arises because there is 
also “a profound tension among the demands of shareholders, management, and other 
stakeholders” (Hermanson et al., 2011, p.2).  Similarly, Main (1993) and Main et al. (2008) 
found that remuneration committees have to ensure that their decisions satisfy both executives 
                                                 
40
 As a former remuneration consultant, Graef Crystal (1991, p.11) laments that, “I succumbed more than I 
should have to the two favourite siren songs of American CEOs. First, if your company has performed 
brilliantly, then you should pay your top people brilliantly.  However, if your company has performed poorly, 
you can’t afford to make people suffer very much, because they will simply leave and go elsewhere; in other 
words, you have to keep good people.  Simple logic, of course, mandates that there can be very few effective 
people at the top of a lousy-performing organization.  But simple logic was apparently not my forte.  As a 
result, I helped create the phenomenon we see today: huge and surging pay for good performance, and huge 
and surging pay for bad performance, too.” 
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and shareholders.  Interestingly, Ogden and Watson (2011) found that remuneration 
committees prioritise human resources/market principles ahead of other principles because 
directors believe that executives will go elsewhere if they are under-remunerated relative to 
their peers.   
 
There have been a few studies on the diffusion of remuneration principles.  Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) found that US companies were more likely justify the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans with the human resources principle when the CEO was powerful, firm 
performance was high or during the late 1970s; and with the agency principle when the board 
was powerful, firm performance was low or during the late 1980s.  Wade et al. (1997) found 
that US companies justified CEO pay with the pay-for-performance principle, but how 
performance was defined varied; and with the agency principle when ownership was widely 
dispersed.  Further, Point and Tyson (2006) found that many of the 23 European companies 
that were studied used the agency, human resources and pay-for-performance principles.  
They also found that the wording of companies’ remuneration reports had become 
standardised.  Similarly, Crombie et al. (2010) found that largest 50 US companies’ 
justifications of CEO pay become increasingly homogenous between 1998 and 2007.  In 
2007, almost all companies justified CEO pay with all of the remuneration principles, except 
the fairness and conformance principles (the latter was not studied).  They also found that 
codes included most remuneration principles.  
 
Prior research has found that all remuneration principles have been widely diffused in codes 
and corporate annual reports over time (Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997).  While Zajac 
and Westphal (1995) found that there was a transition in justification of long-term incentive 
plans from the human resources principle to the agency principle, Crombie et al. (2010) found 
that both of these principles and others were used to justify CEO pay in 2007.  Drawing on 
institutional theory, Crombie et al. (2010) and Point and Tyson (2006) argue that coercive and 
normative pressures, in the form of codes, have led to the diffusion of multiple remuneration 
principles.  They also contend that mimetic pressure will influence the adoption of 
remuneration principles.  However, prior research has been limited in the range of countries 
studied.  US companies have been studied in three of four papers reviewed (Crombie et al., 
2010; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995), while Point and Tyson’s (2006) study of 
23 European companies was exploratory.  Further research is required to ascertain if this 
diffusion of remuneration principles is a global trend.   
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Adding to the diffusion research, qualitative studies have found that remuneration principles 
influence how remuneration committees make, justify and interpret decisions (Bender, 2004, 
2007; Hermanson et al., 2011; Kovacevic, 2009; Main, 1993; Main et al, 2008, 2011; Perkins 
and Hendry, 2005; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011).  For example, Bender (2004) found that 
directors justify the adoption of performance-related remuneration with multiple remuneration 
principles.  To ensure that decisions are legitimate, particularly in the eyes of shareholders, 
directors use remuneration principles to make and justify their decisions and remuneration 
consultants to provide recommendations and endorse their decisions (Bender, 2004, 2007; 
Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005; Ogden and Watson, 
2008, 2011).  For example, Main et al. (2008, p.234) found that “[Remuneration] Committees 
seek legitimacy for their decisions by recourse to norms and rules of thumb…”  This search 
for legitimacy has both substantive and symbolic elements.  Remuneration committees use 
remuneration principles to rationally determine what decisions to make (Bender, 2004; 
Bender and Moir, 2006), but they also use remuneration principles to manage stakeholders’ 
impressions (Bender, 2011; Hermanson et al., 2011). 
 
Prior research has also shown that directors and executives question the rationality of the 
remuneration principles and are aware of inherent ambiguities (Beer and Katz, 2003; Bender, 
2004; Lawler and Finegold, 2007; Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  While 
directors may prioritise the market principle ahead of other principles (Ogden and Watson, 
2011), directors have acknowledged that the market is imperfect and executives are not 
necessarily interchangeable (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Executives have specialised skills 
and knowledge that cannot be easily replaced (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Also, companies 
cannot easily replace their executives with executives from competitors or other companies 
because they have unique cultures and strategies (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Further, 
directors admit that enacting the pay-for-performance principle is problematic (Bender, 2004).  
This is illustrated by Lawler and Finegold’s (2007) survey of 768 US directors.  They found 
that directors perceived CEO pay to be too high, but also agreed that CEO pay is based on 
individual and firm performance.  Further qualitative (interview-based) research is required to 
fully understand how remuneration committees make decisions and manage tensions between 
remuneration principles. 
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3.4. Executive Remuneration Practices 
There are two types of executive remuneration practices: Fixed and variable (relative to 
performance).  Fixed remuneration includes salary, benefits and pension (or superannuation) 
as well as recruitment, retention and severance payments.  These latter payments are often 
conditional on length of service (Chambers and Weight, 2008).  Variable remuneration 
includes short-term and long-term incentives, which are dependent on financial, non-financial 
and/or market-based performance (e.g. total shareholder return) (Chambers and Weight, 
2008).  The remuneration committee has to decide what remuneration practices to use, what 
performance measures to use, how to set targets for performance measures, the amount of 
potential remuneration if targets are met (e.g. multiple of salary), and the mix and level of 
fixed and variable remuneration.  Corporate Logic is consistent with executive remuneration 
packages that are weighted towards fixed remuneration and have flexible targets linked to 
multiple performance measures, while Investor Logic is consistent with executive 
remuneration packages that are weighted towards variable remuneration and have rigid targets 
linked to shareholder value (Zajac and Westphal, 2004; also see Section 3.6).
41
  Next, the 
discussion turns to what practices are common, how principles are tied to practices and how 
remuneration committees design executive remuneration packages. 
 
Table 3.4 highlights a range of executive remuneration practices and the relationship between 
principles and practices.  Remuneration committees face a vast array of alternatives in 
structuring executive remuneration packages.  This reflects that there is no one best way 
(Larcker and Tayan, 2011) and that executive remuneration is subject to managerial fads and 
fashions (Rost and Osterloh, 2009).  For example, the favoured long-term incentive plan 
amongst UK companies changed from share options to restricted shares that are contingent on 
relative performance in the mid-1990s (Buck et al., 2003).  However, there is much 
homogeneity amongst executive remuneration packages in companies around the world (Fay, 
2008; Murphy, 1999).  Salary, short-term incentives and long-term incentives are the main 
components of executive remuneration, and the maximum level of short-term and long-term 
incentives is tied to salary (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Murphy, 1999).  Earnings per share 
and total shareholder return are the favoured performance measures (Chambers and Weight, 
2008; Zakaria, 2011).  Absolute targets are preferred for short-term incentives, while relative 
targets are common for long-term incentives (Main et al., 2008; Pass, 2004; Zakaria, 2011).  
                                                 
41
 Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are rarely discussed in this chapter because these logics are not 
embedded in business and public discourse in Anglo-American countries (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).   
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Overall, these executive remuneration practices are justified using multiple remuneration 
principles, particularly the human resources, market and pay-for-performance principles. 
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Table 3.4: Remuneration Principles and Practices 
Range of Practices
1
 Principles and Practices
2
 
Base salaries and benefits 
- Level: Set relative to a peer group (e.g. median or upper quartile) 
- Peer group: Selected competitors, industry or stock exchange index  
The human resources, market, and responsibility principles guide remuneration 
committees in determining the level of base salary and benefits, but they have 
discretion in setting the peer group and exact level (e.g. 50
th
 or 75
th
 percentile). 
Pension or superannuation 
- Type of scheme: Defined benefit (e.g. percentage of salary upon retirement) or 
defined contribution 
- Alternatives: Higher salary or free shares 
The human resources and market principles guide remuneration committees in 
determining the level of pension, but they have discretion in choosing the scheme. 
Other: Recruitment, retention and severance  
- Type: Cash and/shares 
- Conditional: Length of service and/or performance 
The human resources and market principles guide remuneration committees in setting 
other remuneration (e.g. these schemes may be deemed necessary if there is a 
perceived shortage of executive talent). 
Short-term incentives  
- Level: Multiple of salary 
- Measures: Financial and/or non-financial; Internal and/or external 
- Target: Absolute and/or relative 
- Type: Cash and/or shares 
- Timing: Immediate and/or deferred 
The agency, human resources, motivation and pay-for-performance principles guide 
remuneration committees in designing and calibrating short-term incentives, but they 
have much discretion in deciding on the specifics. 
Long-term incentives 
- Level: Multiple of salary 
- Measures: Financial and/or non-financial; Internal and/or external 
- Target: Absolute and/ or relative 
- Testing: When awarded and/or at vesting 
- Type: Cash, options and/or shares3 
- Length of vesting period (e.g. 3-10 years) 
The agency, human resources, motivation and pay-for-performance principles guide 
remuneration committees in designing and calibrating long-term incentives, but they 
have much discretion in deciding on the specifics. 
Minimum shareholding requirements 
- Level: Multiple of salary 
Guided by the agency principle, remuneration committees may require executives to 
hold a portion of shares in order to align their interests with those of shareholders. 
Mix of fixed and variable  
- From mainly fixed to mainly variable 
Remuneration committees will vary the mix of remuneration depending on the 
emphasis placed on the pay-for-performance principle. 
Level of fixed, variable and total 
- Level: Set relative to a peer group (e.g. median or upper quartile) 
- Peer group: Selected competitors, industry or stock exchange index 
The fairness, human resources, market, pay-for-performance, and responsibility 
principles guide remuneration committees in setting the level of remuneration, but 
they have much discretion in choosing the peer group and exact level. 
Notes: 
1 These practices are based on the following sources: Anthony and Govindarajan (2007, Chapter 12); Chambers and Weight (2008, Chapter 5); Gomez-Mejia et al., 
(2010, Chapter 6); Larcker and Tayan (2011, Chapters 8 and 9); Murphy (1999). 
2 Remuneration committees may also influenced by the conformance principle (e.g. selecting practices that are consistent with market norms and best practice). 
3 Executives may purchase the options or shares at the market price or a discounted price.  They may also be given an interest-free loan to fund the purchase. 
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Base salaries and benefits are fixed remuneration.  The remuneration committee’s main 
considerations in setting the CEO’s base salary and benefits are comparability with peers or 
horizontal equity (Bender and Moir, 2006; Main, 1993), comparability with other executives 
in the firm or vertical equity (Main et al., 2011), and the CEO’s experience, performance and 
responsibilities (Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Executives normally receive increases in their 
base salaries if it is below the median level relative to peers because directors believe that 
executives will be de-motivated or quit if they feel underpaid relative to their peers (Bender, 
2007; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  This can result in executive base salaries being ratcheted 
upwards, particularly due to increased disclosure requirements and competition for executive 
talent (Kovacevic, 2009).  Further, remuneration committees gather data on base salaries paid 
by other companies from remuneration consultants and their professional network 
(Hermanson et al., 2011; Main 1993; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  The level of executive base 
salaries are justified or legitimised to shareholders and the public by using the market 
principle and appealing to the authority of remuneration consultants (Main, 1993; Wade et al., 
1997).  However, directors have criticised the quality of remuneration consultants’ data 
because it does not account for firm performance (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  
 
Pension or superannuation schemes are fixed, deferred remuneration.  Prior research on 
remuneration committees has not studied directors’ and executives’ views on pensions.42  But 
Main et al. (2008) comments that pension schemes are not often changed because 
remuneration committees want to avoid revisiting past decisions, which may require a 
shareholder vote.  However, the wider literature on executive remuneration does suggest that 
pensions do influence executive behaviour.  Bebchuk and Fried (2004) believe that executive 
pensions are not adequately disclosed and this allows boards to use pensions to increase 
executive remuneration without incurring shareholder outrage.  Indeed, the empirical 
evidence indicates that pensions are a very significant portion of executive remuneration 
(Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005).  In a study of large US companies, Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) found that as the CEO’s pension increased relative to the CEO’s shareholding, the 
firm’s risk declined.  As pensions are equivalent to unsecured debt, executives’ interests are 
aligned with those of unsecured debt-holders, which results in executives pursuing a low-risk 
strategy (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  Cadman and Vincent (2011) also found that pensions 
insure executives against risk and are not related to firm performance. 
                                                 
42
 For instance, Bender and Moir (2006, p.82) comment that, “in common with much other research in this 
field… little attention was paid to perks and pensions.” 
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Recruitment, retention and severance payments are normally fixed remuneration that 
companies use to attract and retain executives as well as reward long-serving executives, 
respectively.
43
  These payments have been controversial because of the amounts paid and the 
lack of performance conditions (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Crystal, 1991; Frydman and 
Jenter, 2010; Gerhart et al., 2009; Monks and Minow, 2004).
44
  Prior research on 
remuneration committees has given little attention to these payments, but some important 
insights have been made.  Essentially, directors believe that recruitment and retention 
payments negate high (or unplanned) executive turnover (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 
2011; Main et al., 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Directors also view long-term incentive 
plans as retention schemes (Pepper et al., 2012).
45
  Further, severance payments do concern 
directors.  They believe that the proportion of fixed remuneration (including severance 
payments) is too high and are less supportive of severance payments relative to other forms of 
remuneration (Lawler and Finegold, 2007).  While severance payments are negotiated 
between boards (and their lawyers) and exiting CEOs (and their lawyers), boards do want to 
ensure that severance payments are not excessive (relative to the market norm), are fair to 
shareholders and will not outrage the public (Hermanson et al., 2011). 
 
Short-term and long-term incentives are conditional on the achievement of targets, expressed 
as a range with a minimum and maximum (Murphy, 1999; Murphy and Jensen, 2011).  While 
incentives vary with performance within the range, incentives are zero below the minimum 
and capped above the maximum.  Short-term incentives are dependent on a range of 
performance measures including financial and non-financial; whereas, long-term incentives 
are dependent on earnings per share and total shareholder return (Zakaria, 2011).   In a recent 
study of UK companies, Zakaria (2011) found that earnings per share targets are set relative 
to inflation (change in the retail price index) and total shareholder returns are set relative to a 
group of peer companies.   Further, incentives may take the form of cash, options and/or 
shares.  Short-term incentives are paid in cash or shares, but executives may be required (or 
given the option) to defer part of their incentive for one or more years (Chambers and Weight, 
2008; Zakaria, 2011).  Long-term incentives are paid in options or shares, but do not vest for 
                                                 
43
 Recruitment and retention payments may be contingent on performance. 
44
 The controversy is reflected in the colloquialisms given to these payments: A recruitment payment is called a 
golden hello, a retention payment is called golden handcuffs and a severance payment is called a golden 
handshake (or a golden parachute, if a CEO is dismissed following a merger).  
45
 This results in conflict with the pay-for-performance principle as, for example, when remuneration committees 
re-price share options in order to retain executives, they are destroying the link with performance. 
Chapter 3: Institutional Logics and Executive Remuneration 
103 
three to five years and may be subject to additional targets upon vesting (Chambers and 
Weight, 2008; Zakaria, 2011). 
 
Prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has described how short-term 
incentives are determined.  Short-term incentives (or annual bonuses) are conditional on 
financial and non-financial targets that are linked to strategy (Bender, 2004; Main, 1993; 
Main et al., 2008).  Targets and performance measures are changed (or updated) if strategy or 
economic conditions change (Bender, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2011).  For example, ad hoc 
incentives were awarded because targets were missed due to the Global Financial Crisis 
(Hermanson et al., 2011).  Directors have commented on the difficulty in selecting 
performance measures and setting targets that are fair to executives and shareholders 
(Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2011).   Bender and Moir (2006) found that directors are 
reluctant to use performance measures that reflect corporate social responsibility (or non-
shareholding stakeholder) objectives.  This reinforces directors’ believe that investors are the 
most important stakeholder.  However, prior research has not discussed several critical issues 
in depth: First, the process of selecting performance measures and setting targets; second, 
awarding incentives as cash or shares and the deferral of awards (although Bender and Moir 
(2006) commented that deferral and matching of deferred awards are common); and third, 
claw-back provisions if future performance is very poor. 
 
Similarly, prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has described how long-term 
incentives are determined. Long-term incentives are conditional on earnings per share growth 
and relative total shareholder return (Bender and Moir, 2006; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and 
Watson, 2008, 2011).  The conformance and market principles and remuneration consultants’ 
advice influence the selection of performance measures and targets (Bender, 2007, 2011; 
Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Directors and executives have criticised relative 
performance measures because the targets are uncertain, particularly if the comparator group 
is comprised of few companies (Bender, 2007; Main et al., 2011; Pepper et al., 2012).  
Further, long-term incentives are paid as cash, options or shares and do not vest for at least 
three years (Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Directors argue that long-term incentives counteract 
myopic behaviour that is encouraged by short-term incentives (Bender 2004; Bender and 
Moir, 2006).  However, there is limited discussion of several critical issues: First, the length 
of vesting period (3-5 years is common); second, the use of loans to executives to buy options 
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or shares; third, a minimum shareholding requirement (cf. Bender, 2007); fourth, the 
proportion of the CEO’s wealth held in the company’s shares (cf. Bender and Moir, 2006). 
 
The mix and level of fixed and variable remuneration varies considerable between countries, 
although the mix is similar in Australia, New Zealand and UK (Mishel et al., 2007; Fernandes 
et al., 2009).  Prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has discussed how the 
mix and level of remuneration is determined.  The mix and level of remuneration is justified 
with multiple remuneration principles, particularly agency, human resources, market and pay-
for-performance (Bender and Moir, 2006; Ogden and Watson, 2011; Point and Tyson, 2006; 
Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Potential variable remuneration is expressed 
as a proportion of fixed remuneration (Bender, 2007; Bender and Moir, 2006; Ogden and 
Watson, 2008, 2011).  An increase in fixed remuneration causes an increase in potential 
variable remuneration (Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Also, remuneration committees tend to 
increase potential variable remuneration to alter the mix, rather than decreasing fixed 
remuneration (Bender, 2007).  Overall, remuneration committees believe that increasing 
remuneration is necessary to attract and retain executives, irrespective of firm performance 
(Bender, 2007; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  However, discussion of these issues in prior 
qualitative research has been limited. 
 
There has been surprisingly little research that has documented the executive remuneration 
practices that are used by companies.  Typically, executive remuneration practices are 
discussed in books (e.g. Chambers and Weight, 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), rather than 
journal articles.  Surveys of executive remuneration practices are limited to those published 
by remuneration consultants (e.g. Tower Perrins and Frederick W. Cook & Co).  Instead, 
most research has studied the relationship between the amount of executive remuneration and 
firm performance (Devers et al., 2007; Gerhart et al., 2009; Tosi et al., 2000).  However, to 
study how institutional logics are embedded in discourse and influence practice necessitates 
the documenting of both executive remuneration practices and justifications of these 
practices.  Several studies of corporate annual reports have shown that companies use a range 
of remuneration principles to justify executive remuneration practices (Crombie et al., 2010; 
Point and Tyson, 2006; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  But these studies have 
not examined how the range of executive remuneration practices are justified and if these 
justifications are coherent and logical as a whole.  Future research should investigate the 
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tensions between principles and practices, particularly in institutional settings with competing 
institutional logics. 
 
Similarly, prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has been limited to extensive 
descriptions of remuneration decision-making (e.g. Bender, 2004; Ogden and Watson, 2008).  
There have been few studies of how remuneration committees design executive remuneration 
practices (cf. Bender, 2004, 2007).  For example, Perkins and Hendry (2005, p.1450) claim 
that they intend to investigate how remuneration committees set the mix and level of 
remuneration, but they do not answer this research question.  Further, prior qualitative 
research has provided limited insight into how performance measures are selected and targets 
are set.  The main finding from prior qualitative research is that multiple remuneration 
principles influence how remuneration committees make decisions, but the human resources 
and market principles may be prioritised ahead of other principles (Bender, 2004, 2007; 
Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  However, how 
institutional logics influence how remuneration committees prioritise remuneration principles 
and design remuneration packages has not been studied.  Reinterpreting prior research 
suggests that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are engrained in the beliefs and actions of 
remuneration committees, but further research is still required. 
 
3.5. Remuneration Decision-Making 
In general terms, the remuneration committee has three decisions to make: How to remunerate 
the CEO; how much to remunerate the CEO; and how to report these decisions to 
stakeholders.  As aforementioned, remuneration principles set the framework in which the 
first two decisions are made.  There is a standard remuneration package that executives 
receive (see Table 3.4) and a standard process by which remuneration is decided (see below).  
While the remuneration committee still has much discretion in making these decisions, they 
have to cope with much uncertainty and competing interests between stakeholders (Main et 
al., 2008, 2011).  Reporting is another avenue by which the remuneration committee can 
create discretion.  Decision-making can be decoupled from reporting (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007).  Next, how the remuneration committee makes decisions in a complex and 
uncertain institutional environment is discussed.  Particular attention is given to how 
institutional logics may influence the remuneration committee’s decisions. 
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Figure 3.1 depicts the remuneration committee’s institutional environment.  There are many 
parties that influence how the remuneration committee makes decisions.  First, the 
remuneration committee’s decisions will be influenced by past decisions (i.e. path dependent) 
and societal expectations (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008), although 
these influences may be muted if stakeholders have competing interests (Main et al., 2011) or 
codes have non-specific guidelines (Ogden and Watson, 2008).  Second, the remuneration 
committee’s decision-making is influenced through their negotiation with the CEO (and other 
executives) in setting their contract and reviewing their performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004; Main et al., 2011).  Third, remuneration consultants provide data and advice to the 
remuneration committee which influences their decision-making (Bender, 2011; Ogden and 
Watson, 2011).  Fourth, how directors make decisions will also be influenced by their 
interactions with peers and others (Main et al., 2008; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  However, 
the remuneration committee can alter societal expectations through acts of resistance (e.g. 
non-disclosure of executive remuneration) (Chizema, 2008), institutional leadership (e.g. 
directors as writers of new codes) (Jones and Pollitt, 2004) and impression management (e.g. 
using rhetoric to legitimise remuneration practices in corporate annual reports) (Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan, 2007).  
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Figure 3.1: Remuneration Committee’s Institutional Environment 
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Remuneration committees decide how much to remunerate executives.  However, while 
directors believe that executive remuneration is excessive, they also believe that they cannot 
reduce executive remuneration because if they do not pay at the market rate then they risk 
losing talented executives (Hermanson et al., 2011; Lawler and Finegold, 2007; Ogden and 
Watson, 2011).  Directors also believe that executives are not interchangeable, which partially 
mitigates this risk (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Further, Bebchuk et al. (2002) argues that 
executive remuneration is increasing because executives have captured the pay setting 
process.  For example, in a study of the 1994 proxy statements of 576 large US companies, 
Vafeas (2000, p.362) found that, “Executive pay is primarily set by peer directors in similar 
firms, both active and retired.”  On the other hand, Ogden and Watson (2011) argue that ever-
increasing remuneration is not a result of managerial power, but directors’ belief in the human 
resources and market principles.  Directors also believe that the benefits of lower executive 
remuneration are outweighed by the costs of higher executive turnover and dissatisfied 
executives (Ogden and Watson, 2011). 
 
Remuneration committees use remuneration principles to design executive remuneration 
packages because they believe that the remuneration principles are rational and legitimate 
(Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  The quotes from directors in 
most studies illustrate that the remuneration principles are embedded in their thinking and 
discourse (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 
2011).  Further, studies have found that remuneration committees are concerned with 
legitimacy as they want to minimise criticism from stakeholders, particularly institutional 
investors (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; 2011).  Remuneration 
committees have to interpret societal expectations and decide what is and is not legitimate, 
but this can be problematic.  For example, Ogden and Watson (2008) found that remuneration 
committees had difficulty in designing long-term incentive plans that are legitimate because 
codes did not provide specific guidance (i.e. rules or templates).  This affords remuneration 
committees a degree of discretion, although a lack of specific guidance may result in mimetic 
isomorphism.  This is echoed by Hermanson et al. (2011, p.40): “there is strong pressure not 
to go beyond market norms or be out of step with peers.” 
 
Remuneration consultants and directors’ networks also influence how remuneration 
committees make decisions (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Remuneration consultants’ data 
informs remuneration committees of the market rates for executives (e.g. lower quartile, 
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median and upper-quartile relative to peers).  Remuneration committees receive data from 
multiple remuneration consultants to reduce the risk of biased data (Bender, 2011; Ogden and 
Watson, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).
46
  Remuneration consultants also offer advice to 
remuneration committees, particularly on recent trends in long-term incentive schemes 
(Bender, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2008).  Bender (2011, p.392) concludes that, 
“[remuneration consultants diffuse] current practice more widely and institutionalizing it as 
“best practice.””  Remuneration committees believe that using remuneration consultants is 
rational and will legitimise their decisions (Bender, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Further, 
remuneration committees also receive advice through their networks (e.g. professional and 
social ties).  This ensures that their decisions are consistent with their peers’ decisions 
(Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  This may reinforce remuneration consultants’ advice because 
there are few remuneration consultants and so it is likely that some of their peers are also 
advised by the same remuneration consultants (Bender, 2011).  
 
Prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has rarely discussed succession 
planning (e.g. hiring and firing the CEO).  Jensen et al. (2005) argues that the remuneration 
committee’s most important role is to negotiate the CEO’s employment contract because it 
sets the framework for executive remuneration.  Khurana (2002) contend that boards search 
for CEOs that are charismatic, but such individuals are also often narcissistic and expect to be 
paid well above the median in the market.  Jensen et al. (2005) believe that boards weaken 
their negotiating power by only negotiating the employment contract after they have decided 
which candidate they want as the CEO.  The negotiating power of boards is further weakened 
because candidates use talent agents to negotiate their employment contract (Jensen et al., 
2005; Khurana, 2002; Rajgopal et al., 2011).  From an Investor Logic perspective, recruitment 
payments and employment contracts that include guaranteed bonuses and high severance 
payments are a sign of excessive managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  While 
remuneration committees may or may not negotiate new CEOs’ employment contracts, 
succession planning has a significant bearing on how remuneration committees will make 
decisions (e.g. employment contracts can reduce their discretion).  Further research is required 
to understand this process. 
                                                 
46
 From a managerial power perspective, remuneration committees may choose the remuneration consultant that 
provides data indicating an increase in remuneration is required to meet the market rate (Bebchuck and Fried, 
2004).  In this respect, remuneration committees collaborate with (or are controlled by) executives.  
However, prior qualitative research on remuneration committees appears not to support this perspective, 
although this issue has not been extensively studied (Bender, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011; Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005). 
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The remuneration committee also evaluates the CEO’s performance on an annual basis, which 
may result in the CEO’s employment contract being revised and new incentive schemes being 
adopted (Bender, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2011).  The negotiation process may be 
simply/brief or complex/time-consuming and may include: CEO self-evaluation, formal 
meetings between chairman and CEO, formal meetings of the remuneration committee, 
advise from remuneration consultants and institutional investors (Bender, 2011; Hermanson et 
al., 2011; Main et al., 2011).  The remuneration principles set the framework in which 
performance reviews occur, particularly the human resources and market principles (Bender, 
2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  However, the process of reviewing the CEO’s performance 
is not objective because executives also negotiate with remuneration committees.  Executives 
use the fairness and market principles to argue that they should be paid comparably to other 
executives (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  From an Investor Logic perspective, Bebchuk and 
Fried (2004) warn that executives have too much power in this negotiation process because 
they can influence director appointments.  On the other hand, Ogden and Watson (2011) 
argue that executives do not unduly influence remuneration committees; it is the remuneration 
principles (i.e. prevailing social norms) that influences remuneration committees. 
 
There is often change in executive remuneration practices as existing schemes are modified, 
new schemes are adopted, and existing schemes are abandoned.  Remuneration committees 
use remuneration principles as a framework to determine what remuneration practices to 
adopt and as rhetoric to justify the adoption of remuneration practices (Bender, 2004; Zajac 
and Westphal, 1995).  Adopting remuneration practices that shareholders perceive to be 
legitimate is particularly important (Bender, 2004; Main, 1993; Ogden and Watson, 2008). 
Indeed, remuneration committees seek the approval of institutional investors over changes 
(Bender, 2011; Main et al., 2011).  Minor changes to remuneration practices are also made.  
Targets are often revised downwards because executives and directors believe existing targets 
are unrealistic (Hermanson et al., 2011).  Whether changes are major or minor, Bender (2007, 
p.709) found:  
“Reasons given for making changes included: increases due to being below-
market; changing performance-related schemes that did not pay out or paid less 
than expected; changes in the company’s culture or strategy; changes to senior 
personnel; and compliance with good practice in human resource management 
and in corporate governance.”   
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Overall, change is motivated by executives’ and directors’ perceptions of scheme efficacy, 
which is shaped by their interests, societal expectations and remuneration principles. 
 
Societal expectations become visible in codes.  These are produced by a range of powerful 
stakeholders such as directors’ associations, investors’ associations, regulators and stock 
exchanges (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  Prior research has assumed that codes 
influence how remuneration committees make decisions (e.g. Main, 2006).  Indeed, 
remuneration committees have a strong desire for their decisions to be perceived as legitimate 
(Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008). However, prior research has not 
acknowledged that directors rarely discuss codes (e.g. Bender and Moir, 2006; Main et al., 
2008).  Instead, directors talk of ‘best practice’ and ‘good corporate governance’, which may 
or may not relate to codes (Bender, 2004, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2011).  This may be 
because codes do not provide specific guidelines.  For example, Ogden and Watson (2008) 
found that the lack on guidance on designing long-term incentive schemes provided in codes 
frustrated remuneration committees.  Ascertaining the influence of codes on remuneration 
committees requires further research.  
 
Conforming to societal expectations involves not only complying with codes, but also 
appeasing stakeholders, particularly investors.  Indeed, remuneration committees are 
extremely concerned with institutional investors’ perceptions of their decisions (Bender, 
2011; Main et al., 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).   There are two forms of conformance: 
substantive and symbolic.  Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) found that investors react 
positively to both forms of conformance.  Thus, remuneration committees may be able to 
manage societal expectations, particularly if societal expectations conflict with executives’ 
expectations, by decoupling remuneration decision-making from remuneration reporting.  
Prior qualitative research has not investigated this possibility, although Hermanson et al. 
(2011) found that claims of remuneration consultants’ independence are partially symbolic 
because executives have some influence over their selection.  Instead, prior qualitative 
research has emphasised remuneration committees’ desire to substantively conform to societal 
expectations (Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2008, 2011).  
However, the process of preparing the remuneration disclosures and the remuneration 
committee’s role in this process has not been studied.  Future research should investigate 
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whether directors, executives or public relations consultants use impression management 
techniques in preparing remuneration disclosures. 
 
There has been friction between shareholders and boards, especially over how much 
executives have been paid (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Murphy, 2011).  Say on pay 
legislation has been introduced in a number of countries (e.g. Australia in 2004, UK in 2002 
and US in 2010).  This gives shareholders an advisory vote on the remuneration report 
(although Australia introduced a binding vote in 2011).  There is a small but growing body of 
research on the effects of say on pay legislation.  This research has found that boards modify 
executive remuneration practices following a significant negative vote, but such changes are 
muted (Conyon and Sadler, 2010; Poulsen et al., 2010).  Prior qualitative research on 
remuneration committees has rarely studied the impact of the advisory vote on remuneration 
decision-making.  However, Bender (2011) and Main et al. (2011) briefly comment that 
directors want to avoid a significant negative vote.  Potential embarrassment explains why 
directors are concerned with consulting shareholders, particularly institutional investors, and 
securing their support ahead of a vote at the annual general meeting.  This extends to all 
resolutions on which shareholders vote (Main et al., 2008).   
 
The media and academics also have a significant role in corporate governance.  For example, 
the US stock options backdating scandal in 2006.  Academics (e.g. David Yermack in 1997 
and Erick Lie in 2004) discovered that US companies were backdating share option grants so 
that share options appeared to be issued at the money, rather than in the money (Nowicki, 
2008).  The Wall Street Journal named the companies that had been backdating stock options 
(Nowicki, 2008).  During mid-to-late 2006, there was intense media scrutiny of companies 
involved in backdating stock options and, consequently, greater executive turnover in those 
companies (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011).  Other studies have also found that media scrutiny 
influences the decision-making of boards, regulators and investors (Dyck and Zingales, 2002; 
Gorman et al. 2009).  On the other hand, Core et al. (2008, p.1) found “little evidence that 
firms respond to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or 
increasing CEO turnover.”  Similarly, prior qualitative research on remuneration committees 
has rarely mentioned the media, although directors do not want to attract media scrutiny or 
negative publicity (Hermanson et al., 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Future research 
should investigate the extent to which actual and potential media scrutiny acts as a constraint 
on remuneration committees. 
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It is also likely that history will influence how remuneration committees make decisions.  
Drawing on resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), it is postulated that executives’ and directors’ past 
experiences significantly influence their decision-making.  Note that experience is a 
composite variable and includes educational, professional and personal experiences.  The 
management literature has found that experience significantly influences decision-making (for 
reviews, see Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 2007; Hillman et al., 2009).  For example, in a 
quantitative study of strategic decision-making in US companies, Westphal and Frederickson 
(2001, p.1132) found that, “Directors’ strategic preferences may be biased by their prior 
experiences”.  Prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has rarely studied the 
influence of experience on decision-making.  However, several studies have noted that 
directors made specific decisions because of their past experiences (Kovacevic, 2009; Ogden 
and Watson, 2008, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Further, to be selected as a director and 
serve on the remuneration committee, individuals must be judged by incumbent directors to 
have had certain experiences (Hermanson et al., 2011).  This increases the potential for group-
think in decision-making (Dorff, 2007; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  
 
Societal expectations also influence how remuneration committees make decisions, although 
the degree of influence can vary considerable (Bender, 2004, 2007, 2011; Hermanson et al., 
2011; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2008; 2011).  For example, Bender (2004, p.531) 
found that, “There was strong evidence that both coercive and mimetic isomorphism act to 
ensure that companies use PRP [performance-related pay].”  When making decisions, 
remuneration committees take into account a range of stakeholders’ interests (or, at least, their 
perception of stakeholders’ interests) including, from most to least important, executives, 
directors (from other companies), investors, regulators, media (or public opinion), employees 
and customers (Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2011).  Note that employees and 
customers are rarely mentioned in prior qualitative research on remuneration committees.  
Remuneration committees view their main role as balancing the competing interests of 
executives and shareholders (Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008, 2011; 
Ogden and Watson, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Thus, while societal expectations are 
comprised of the views of many stakeholders, only the views of executives, directors and 
investors strongly influence remuneration committees.   
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While prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has studied many aspects on 
decision-making, the extent to which institutional logics are embedded in societal 
expectations and influence remuneration decision-making have not been studied.  However, 
some inferences can be drawn from prior research.  There is an institutional battle between 
Investor Logic, Corporate Logic and, to a lesser extent, Stakeholder Logic in the US and UK 
(Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Consistent with both Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic, but not Stakeholder Logic, remuneration committees are primarily 
concerned with maximising shareholder value, rather than stakeholder value (Bender and 
Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2011).  Stakeholder value maximisation is not mentioned in 
any of the prior qualitative research.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, but not Investor Logic, 
remuneration committees portray executives as trustworthy professionals that are only 
partially motivated by financial rewards (Bender, 2004; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  
Essentially, the institutional battle is manifested in the tension between wanting to attract and 
retain talented executives and strictly maintaining performance-based remuneration.   
 
Institutional logics of corporate governance have been studied extensively (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5), but how these institutional logics influence remuneration principles, practices 
and processes has been scantly studied.  Corporate Logic is a natural fit with directors, who 
are former executives, and executives.  Directors and executives believe that they are worthy 
of professional autonomy and will manage the company in the best interests of shareholders 
(Lok, 2010; Witt and Redding, 2012).  Remuneration committees want to make decisions that 
are both fair to executives and shareholders (Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2011).  
However, directors and executives may not be collective-serving stewards, but self-serving 
agents.  They may use remuneration principles to justify how much they are paid (Beer and 
Katz, 2003; Wade et al., 1997) and certain remuneration practices (e.g. long-term incentives) 
to avoid investor scrutiny (Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Such actions are consistent with 
managerial power theory and Investor Logic.  However, Ogden and Watson (2011) argue that 
remuneration committees are not unduly influenced by executives, but are influenced by their 
belief in the human resources and market principles.  In any case, this reinforces that there 
may be an institutional battle between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, which is played 
out in the decision-making of remuneration committees. 
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3.6. Institutional Logics and Executive Remuneration  
There are four institutional logics of corporate governance, each of which has different 
prescriptions for the executive remuneration principles, practices and processes that 
companies should adopt.  Corporate Logic is consistent with the fairness, human resources 
and market principles, Investor Logic is consistent with the agency, motivation and pay-for-
performance principles, and both Logics are consistent with the conformance and 
responsibility principles (see Table 3.2).  It is likely that Political Logic and Stakeholder 
Logic are also consistent with the same remuneration principles as Investor Logic and 
Corporate Logic, respectively, except that the conformance principle – which emphasises 
stakeholders’ expectations – will be prioritised ahead of the other principles.  Further, 
Corporate Logic and Stakeholder Logic imply that executives should receive mainly fixed 
remuneration, whereas Investor Logic and Political Logic imply that executives should 
receive mainly variable remuneration (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).  The main distinction 
between Corporate Logic and Stakeholder Logic is that executives are assumed to believe that 
the greatest good for the greatest many can be attained if all companies pursue shareholder 
value maximisation, rather than stakeholder value maximisation (Davis et al., 1997; Preston, 
1998).  In contrast, the main distinction between Investor Logic and Political Logic is that the 
targets on which executives’ short- and long-term incentives depend are related to shareholder 
value, rather than stakeholder value.   
 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are deeply embedded in business discourse, rather than 
Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic.  Remuneration committees are concerned with 
stakeholders’ interests, but shareholders’ interests appear to be prioritised ahead of those of 
non-shareholding stakeholders (Bender, 2004; Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 
2011; Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Further, given that the most common 
performance measures are earnings per share and total shareholder return, performance 
measures are shareholder-oriented, rather than stakeholder-oriented (Bender and Moir, 2006; 
Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2011; Zakaria, 2011).  Prior research has also shown 
that multiple remuneration principles are widely diffused in corporate annual reports 
(Crombie et al., 2010; Wade et al., 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  This implies that both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are legitimate discourses: the institutional field is 
pluralistic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Alternatively, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
may be merging into a new logic.  However, there has been a trend towards Investor Logic as 
the proportion of performance-based remuneration has increased over time, bonus claw-back 
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provisions have been introduced, and shareholders vote on remuneration reports (Chambers 
and Weight, 2008; Wells, 2011).  Further research should investigate if these trends (i.e. a 
shift from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic) have influenced the mindset of directors and 
executives. 
 
Table 3.5 outlines the expected differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in 
terms of executive remuneration practices and the remuneration principles tied to those 
practices.  There has only been a single study on the implications that Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic have for executive remuneration practices. Zajac and Westphal (1995) found 
that the adoption of new long-term incentive schemes was justified with the human resources 
principle (Corporate Logic) and/or the agency principle (Investor Logic). However, they did 
not investigate whether the structure of these long-term incentive schemes varied depending 
on the justification provided.  Thus, prior research provides almost no guidance on how 
executive remuneration practices vary between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The 
expected differences detailed in Table 3.5 are drawn from agency and stewardship theories’ 
implications for executive remuneration practices (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008; Jensen 
et al., 2005), and the general framework of corporate governance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  
While executive remuneration practices consistent with Corporate Logic emphasise trust and 
professional autonomy, those consistent with Investor Logic emphasis control and direction 
(i.e. executive behaviour can be programmed).  Note that while differences between 
Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are not sketched here, some differences are noted in the 
discussion that follows. 
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Table 3.5: Executive Remuneration Principles and Practices – Revisited 
Components Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Fixed Remuneration   
1. Base salary and benefits Practice: Level is positioned at the median relative to peers, although 
may be constrained by the rate of change in employees’ salaries and 
wages.  However, it is inconsistent with Corporate Logic if the level 
is positioned above the median relative to peers.  
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Alternative practices:  
a. Level positioned at median (or below) relative to peers.  
b. Level is positioned at upper quartile relative to peers for 
executives deemed to be high performers.  If this occurs, base 
salary is another type of variable remuneration. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
2. Pension / 
Superannuation 
Scheme: Defined benefit, which offers executives certainty. 
Level: Median relative to peers. 
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Scheme: Defined contribution, which limits company liabilities. 
Level: Median (or below) relative to peers. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
3. One-off payments for 
recruitment, retention 
and severance 
Practice: Payments are conditional on continuous employment, and 
severance payments are unconditional.  None are conditional on 
performance, which demonstrates trust in executives.  
Justification: Human resources principle. 
Practice: Payments are conditional on performance targets. Note: 
Severance payments are inconsistent with Investor Logic because 
they are a sign of excessive executive power. 
Justification: Motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
Variable Remuneration   
4. Short-term incentives 
(Annual bonus) 
Performance measures: Financial and non-financial. Balanced 
scorecard preferred, but financial is the ultimate end. 
Incentive: Cash or shares paid immediately. Also, profit-sharing. 
Justification: Internal measures reflect ‘true’ firm performance; The 
Fairness principle for profit-sharing (including employees). 
Performance measures: Financial and non-financial, but financial are 
weighted higher.  Economic Value Added
TM
 preferred. 
Incentive: Cash or shares with a portion deferred for 1-3 years. 
Justification: Internal measures can be manipulated by executives; 
Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
5. Long-term incentives Schemes: Unconditional share options with a vesting period of 5-10 
years, or restricted shares that executives purchase using interest-free 
loans. 
Performance measures: But if conditional, financial (e.g. earnings per 
share) preferred, so that executives have a degree of control. 
Justification: Human resources principle. 
Schemes: Share options or restricted shares which are conditional on 
shareholder-oriented targets with a vesting period of 3-5 years. 
Performance measures: External (e.g. total shareholder return relative 
to competitors) preferred as executives cannot manipulate. 
Justification: Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
6. Minimum shareholding 
requirements 
Not required, but executives are not discouraged from owning shares. Practice: The value of the minimum shareholding is expressed as a 
percentage of base salary.  
Justification: Agency principle. 
Total Remuneration   
7. Mix of fixed and 
variable 
Desired mix: High proportion of fixed remuneration. 
Justification: Executives are trusted to act in the best interests of 
shareholders without the need to be coerced by incentives. 
Desired mix: High proportion of variable remuneration. 
Justification: Agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles. 
8. Level of fixed, variable 
and total 
Level is positioned at median relative to peers, although may be 
constrained by the rate of change in employees’ salaries and wages. 
Justification: Fairness, human resources and market principles. 
Level is positioned at lower-quartile/median/upper-quartile relative to 
peers with below-average/average/above-average firm performance. 
Justification: Pay-for-performance principle. 
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Fixed remuneration consists of salary, benefits, pension and other payments.  To reward 
executives for their commitment and loyalty to the company, their fixed remuneration will not 
vary wildly (e.g. a steady increase over time), and recruitment, retention and severance 
payments will only be conditional on length of service.  This is consistent with Corporate 
Logic because executives are assumed to act in the best interests of shareholders irrespective 
when there are no incentive schemes.  However, executives do not want to be treated as the 
shareholders’ slaves. They expect to be treated with respect and dignity and, therefore, expect 
to be remunerated at a level that is comparable to their peers (e.g. median), although this may 
be constrained by employees’ general wage increases.  This line of reasoning is inconsistent 
with Investor Logic.  Jensen and Murphy (1990b) and Jensen et al. (2005) argue that under 
such arrangements executives will reduce the variability in earnings (i.e. reduce risk of 
corporate failure) in order to protect their jobs.  Under Investor Logic, fixed remuneration is 
either reduced (e.g. base salaries are sufficient to cover executives’ living expenses only) or 
converted into variable remuneration (e.g. a portion of base salaries may be ‘at-risk’, and 
recruitments and retention payments are conditional on performance targets being met). 
 
Variable remuneration consists of short- and long-term incentive schemes. If executives act as 
stewards, then short- and long-term incentive schemes are not required (Davis et al., 1997; 
Grundei, 2008).  Further, if executives, who are stewards, receive mainly variable 
remuneration, then they may feel that they are not trusted, lose intrinsic motivation and, 
possibly, turn into agents (Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005).  Thus, short- and long-
term incentive schemes are inconsistent with Corporate Logic.  However, profit-sharing may 
be consistent with Corporate Logic if it is seen as a profit sharing mechanism, not a control 
mechanism.  This may also encourage cooperation between executives and employees 
(McGregor, 1960).  On the other hand, Investor Logic assumes that executives act as agents, 
so both short- and long-term incentive schemes are required to control and direct them.  It 
also assumes that executives make individual contributions to firm performance, which can be 
measured and valued (Jensen et al., 2005).  Those who met their performance targets are 
deemed ‘winners’, whereas other who do not are deemed ‘losers’ and deserving of 
punishment.  Further, variable remuneration arrangements must strike a balance between the 
near-future and distance-future (e.g. defer a portion of annual bonuses), so that executives are 
motivated to perform in the present without taking excessive risks (Jensen, 2005; Jensen et 
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al., 2005).  Moreover, executives must own shares, so that they think and act like an owner 
and have ‘skin in the game’ (Jensen et al., 2005).47  
 
There are a wide variety of performance measures on which short- and long-term incentives 
may depend including internal measures that may be financial or non-financial and external 
measures such Economic Value Added
TM
 and total shareholder return.  Note that Economic 
Value Added
TM
 is considered to be an external measure because the capital charge, which is 
deducted from profit, is based on the market’s (or debt- and equity-holders’) required rate of 
return (Stern et al., 1997).  Irrespective of whether performance measures are tied to 
incentives, executives still have to measure firm performance.  Under Corporate Logic, 
internal measures are preferred because executives are assumed to know how to allocate 
resources better than capital markets (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  A balance scorecard 
approach may be preferred because while it accounts for all aspects of firm performance, 
improving non-financial performance is believed to, ultimately, improve financial 
performance (Kaplan, 2009; Kaplan and Nagel, 2003).
48
  On the other hand, external 
measures are preferred if executives are assumed to be agents that are capable of manipulating 
internal measures (Jensen et al., 2005).  Investor Logic is consistent with short- and long-term 
incentives being dependent on external measures so that executives are programmed to 
maximise shareholder value over the long-term (Jensen, 2001; Stern et al., 1997). 
 
Consistent with Corporate Logic, executives should receive mainly fixed remuneration and 
their total remuneration should be comparable to other executives in similar roles, although it 
may be constrained by their employees’ working conditions (Davis et al., 1997; Grundei, 
2008; McGregor, 1960).  Remunerating executives at the upper quartile relative to their peers 
is inconsistent with Corporate Logic, unless employees are also remunerated at the upper 
quartile.  On the other hand, Investor Logic asserts that executive remuneration should vary 
with firm performance.  If executives are paid at the upper-quartile relative to their peers in 
the absence of superior performance, then this is a sign of managerial power (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2005).  However, prior research has rarely examined executive 
remuneration practices in the fine-grained detail that is outlined in Table 3.5.  It is not known 
                                                 
47
 Under Political Logic, executives would be paid in cash, not shares or share options. If they were, then 
executives may prioritise shareholders’ interests ahead of the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders. 
48
 A balanced scorecard approach is inconsistent with stakeholder value maximisation because shareholders are 
treated as the only end.  Under Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic, executives would have to achieve 
performance targets that are not necessarily correlated, but related to the interests of each group of 
stakeholders. 
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if there are two or more groups of companies: For example, some with practices consistent 
with Corporate Logic and others with practices consistent with Investor Logic.  Further 
research is required to understand how, if at all, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence 
how companies structure and justify their executive remuneration practices. 
 
As outlined in Section 3.5, the process of making remuneration decisions is complex and 
dynamic.  The remuneration committee’s decisions will be swayed to varying degrees by 
executives, investors, remuneration consultants, and others (see Figure 3.1).  Consistent with 
Corporate Logic, the remuneration committee will be a strategic advisor to executives and 
remuneration decisions will not be at arm’s length (Davis et al., 1997).  Similarly, 
remuneration consultants will provide advice to executives and the remuneration committee. 
The remuneration committee will not be overly concerned with codes because compliance 
with codes would impinge of their professional autonomy, but they would be concerned with 
shareholders’ and, to a lesser extent, the public’s perceptions of their decisions.  On the other 
hand, Investor Logic implies that the remuneration committee must be comprised of 
independent directors and transact with executives at arm’s length, and their remuneration 
consultants must not also provide advice to executives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen et 
al., 2005). Again, investors’ opinions will be influential.  However, further research is needed 
to ascertain how, if at all, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence how remuneration 
committees make and report remuneration decisions.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed prior qualitative research on remuneration committees.  Drawing 
on multiple theories, prior studies have explained how remuneration committees make and 
justify remuneration decisions.  Executive remuneration principles, practices and processes 
have become homogenous over time because of institutional pressures.  As is typical among 
prior qualitative research, Main et al. (2008, p.235) concludes that “efforts by remuneration 
committees to conform may lead them away from implementing remuneration arrangements 
that are in the best interest of long term shareholder value.”  Using performance-based 
remuneration to motivate executives to maximise shareholder value is portrayed as rational, 
while remunerating to attract and retain executives and conforming to societal expectations is 
portrayed as irrational.  Essentially, academics along with directors, investors and regulators 
have been seeking the Holy Grail of corporate governance.  However, the Holy Grail does not 
exist (see Chapter 2).  Instead, this chapter has shown that there are a myriad of ideas (e.g. 
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principles and practices) that are embedded in academic and business discourse, and 
remuneration committees draw on a range of ideas to make and justify remuneration 
decisions.  It has been argued that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic form a significant part 
of this myriad of ideas. 
 
This chapter also presents an institutional logics perspective on executive remuneration.  
While prior qualitative research on remuneration committees has not studied institutional 
logics per se, the empirical evidence implies that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
deeply embedded in business discourse.  Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are not 
embedded in business discourse because directors and executives have a strong emphasis on 
shareholders’ expectations, not stakeholders’ expectations.  Similarly, performance measures 
are related to profitability and are shareholder-oriented, rather than stakeholder-oriented.  This 
may be as most prior research has studied Anglo-American countries, rather than Asian or 
European countries.  There is an institutional battle between Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic in Anglo-American countries that is being played out in the decision-making of 
remuneration committees.  Further research is required to determine if Corporate Logic or 
Investor Logic is becoming dominant, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are merging into a 
new logic, or multiple institutional logics can co-exist because stakeholders in organisational 
fields tolerate ambiguity.  The latter may explain why remuneration committees have a 
significant degree of flexibility in making remuneration decisions. 
 
Many gaps in prior research have been identified in this chapter.  First, the diffusion of the 
remuneration principles has only been studied in US companies (Point and Tyson (2006) only 
studied 23 European companies).  Further studies of diffusion may show how institutional 
logics have diffused in non-US countries.  Second, prior qualitative research on research 
committees has focused on long-term incentive schemes.  Further research is required to 
understand how a range of other remuneration practices are justified.  Third, while 
Hermanson et al. (2011) highlight a tension between human resources/market principles and 
agency/pay-for-performance principles, it is not know how such tensions influence the design 
of executive remuneration practices.  Further research is required on how remuneration 
committees prioritise remuneration principles and the resulting implications for remuneration 
practices.  Fourth, remuneration committees are subject to multiple institutional pressures, but 
how different (e.g. competing, or relatively strong or weak) pressures influence their decision-
making is not known.  Fifth, the symbolic nature of remuneration principles, practices and 
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processes is not well understood.  Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that symbolism is 
indicative of managerial power.  But this may not be the case.  Thus, the next chapter outlines 
how some of these gaps in knowledge were investigated.   
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes and justifies the research objective, questions, methodology and 
methods.  The diffusion and institutionalisation of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in the 
discourse on executive remuneration is studied.  Bridging the macro-micro divide (Alvesson 
and Karreman, 2000), how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic shape this discourse at the 
levels of the organisation and organisational field are studied.  At the level of the 
organisation, prior research suggests that institutional logics shape how boards of directors 
make decisions (e.g. Green et al., 2008).  This relationship is examined in the context of 
executive remuneration.  At the level of the organisational field, prior research suggests that 
organisations respond to institutional pressures and there can be a transition in institutional 
logics if institutional pressures are strong and homogenous (Scott, 2008; Thornton et al., 
2005).  For example, Point and Tyson (2006) postulated that codes shape companies’ 
remuneration disclosure.  Thus, consideration is given to the interplay between code issuers 
and companies, and how codes may act as coercive and normative pressures that influence 
how boards of directors and remuneration committees make and report remuneration 
decisions.  
 
An interpretive methodology is adopted.  The discourse on executive remuneration is 
multifaceted (e.g. principles, practices and processes) and diverse as this discourse is 
produced by many parties (e.g. code issuers and companies).  There are two common 
approaches to studying this discourse in prior research: First, a few remuneration principles 
and practices are studied across a large sample of companies (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 1995); 
and second, the talk of a small sample of directors and consultants is analysed (e.g. Bender, 
2004).  To bridge the macro-micro divide, multiple research methods are used to collect and 
scrutinise the discourse on executive remuneration.  First, content analysis is used to study 
multiple remuneration principles in a large sample of codes and corporate annual reports.  
Second, discourse analysis is used to explore many aspects of the discourse on executive 
remuneration in a small sample of codes and corporate annual reports.  Third, following 
interviews with executives, directors, consultants and code issuers, a discourse analysis is 
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used to understand how remuneration committees of NZ listed companies make and report 
remuneration decisions. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  The research objective and questions 
are presented in Section 2.  This includes a discussion of the gaps in prior literature that is 
reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, and then justification of the three research questions that are 
addressed.  Section 3 discusses the research’s paradigmatic assumptions.  Drawing on 
constructivism and interpretive structuralism, qualitative methods are adopted to tackle the 
research questions.  Section 4 discusses how Research Question 1 is addressed.  
Remuneration principles and several other variables in a sample of codes and corporate 
annual reports are studied in order to show how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have 
been diffused over time.  Section 5 outlines that an exploratory discourse analysis is used to 
investigate Research Question 2.  This research method is adopted so that the complexities 
and nuances of codes and corporate annual reports can be closely studied.  Using data from 
interviews with executives, directors and others, how a qualitative research method is 
employed to address Research Question 3 is explained in Section 6.  Concluding comments 
are made in Section 7. 
 
4.2. Research Objective and Questions 
This research investigates how ideas influence behaviour.
49
  Individuals are assumed to be 
social actors who use discourse (or symbols)  to create and interpret their social reality (Guba 
and Lincoln, 2005; Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  There are many discourses – highly-ordered 
sets of ideas that have durable meaning – which influence how individuals, organisations and 
societies behave (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Phillips and Hardy, 2002).  The discourses 
examined are institutional logics of corporate governance: specifically, Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic.  Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic are not studied because these logics 
are theoretically underdeveloped and not likely to be present in the corporate governance 
discourses of Anglo-Saxon countries (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  Given that Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic have opposing implications for corporate governance, there are four 
possibilities: No Logic, Corporate Logic only, Investor Logic only or both Logics.  The latter 
is possible because one or both Logics may be symbolic, there may be a high tolerance for 
ambiguity (due to weak institutional pressures), or these Logics may have merged to form a 
                                                 
49
 How people’s emotions and instincts (e.g. evolved traits) influence their behaviour is not studied.   
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new logic.  Consideration is given to these possibilities in the context of Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  
 
Few studies have investigated how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the 
discourse on corporate governance.
50
  There have been four significant studies.  First, Zajac 
and Westphal (1995) showed that there was a transition in the 1980s from Corporate Logic to 
Investor Logic in terms of how US companies justified the adoption of long-term incentive 
plans.  Second, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found further evidence of a transition as US 
investors’ reacted increasingly favourably to the adoption stock repurchase plans, particularly 
when justified with the agency principle (Investor Logic).  However, Zajac and Westphal 
(2004) argue that Investor Logic may have been weakened following the corporate scandals at 
Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s.  They contend that this may result in either another 
transition in institutional logics or an organisational field that is pluralistic, where multiple 
institutional logics are legitimate.  This argument has yet to be studied.  Further, the main 
limitation of Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) is that they only studied the proxy statements 
of US companies (i.e. public discourse).  Long-term incentive plans and stock repurchase 
plans may be justified differently in the boardrooms (i.e. private discourse). 
 
Third, Green et al. (2008) found that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were embedded in 
the justifications of both takeovers and takeover defences that directors of US companies used 
in the boardroom from 1978 and 1998.  This evidence casts doubt on Zajac and Westphal 
(1995, 2004) notion of a transition between institutional logics. It also illustrates that 
discourse is complex and dynamic: Directors’ arguments were rarely consistent with only 
Corporate Logic or Investor Logic.  Fourth, Lok (2010) found that while UK executives 
supported the Financial Reporting Council’s (2010) The UK Corporate Governance Code in 
which Investor Logic is embedded, Corporate Logic was strongly embedded in their 
narratives on their role in corporate governance (i.e. their institutional identity).  Again, this 
highlights that discourse is complex.  Therefore, both private and public discourses are 
studied.  This will enable differences in how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
embedded in public and private discourse to be documented and explained.  However, only 
the discourse on executive remuneration is studied in order to make this research practically 
manageable, although this is still a broad topic (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6).   
                                                 
50
 The discourse on executive remuneration is a sub-set of this discourse. 
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Table 4.1 categorises the discourse on corporate governance.  There are two types of 
discourse: Public and private; and there are two types of entity: Companies and other parties 
(e.g. stakeholders of companies).  All entities are both producers and consumers of talk and 
texts.  This results in four quadrants and there are two sources of discourse within each 
quadrant: Talk and texts.  Most prior research that is reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 have 
studied discourse in only one quadrant.  Prior research that has studied multiple quadrants 
includes Crombie et al. (2010), who studied the public discourse of US companies and US 
code issuers (e.g. regulators), and Lok (2010), who studied the public discourse of UK code 
issuers and the media, and the private discourse of UK executives and UK institutional 
investors.  While research on a single quadrant can describe how institutional logics are 
embedded in discourse, research on multiple quadrants can explain institutional effects by 
revealing the connections (and disconnections) between quadrants.  For example, Lok (2010) 
showed how UK executives shape their institutional identities to resist institutional pressures.  
This finding highlights the relationship between Quadrants 2 and 3.  In this research, all four 
quadrants are studied, although Quadrant 4 receives much less attention because of limited 
access to some parties (see Section 4.6). 
 
Table 4.1: Discourse on Corporate Governance 
  Type of Discourse 
  Public Private 
Type of 
Entity 
Companies (e.g. 
Executives and 
Directors) 
Quadrant 1 
Talk: Annual general meetings; and 
meetings with analysts, investors and 
media. 
Texts: Corporate annual reports, 
marketing, and press releases. 
Quadrant 2 
Talk: Board meetings, social meetings 
(e.g. with directors of other 
companies), and meetings with 
consultants. 
Texts: Board meeting papers 
Other Parties 
(e.g. Consultants, 
Investors, Media, 
Regulators and 
Professional 
Associations.) 
Quadrant 3 
Talk: Questions at annual general 
meetings and interviews in the media.  
Texts: Codes of practice; academic, 
business and news articles; and laws 
and regulations. 
Quadrant 4 
Talk: Political negotiation between 
stakeholders and either boards or 
other stakeholders. 
Texts: Consultants’ reports, and letters 
to lobby boards or other stakeholders. 
 
The present study investigates how codes influence how companies (i.e. boards and 
remuneration committees) make and report remuneration decisions.  It builds on the following 
studies.  In an exploratory study of 23 European companies, Point and Tyson (2006, p.827) 
found that, “most [corporate annual] reports contain sections which ‘cut and paste’ from 
codes… to show good corporate governance.”  They argue that codes act as coercive and 
normative pressure on companies, and as an increasing proportion of companies adopt codes’ 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology and Methods 
127 
recommendations, mimetic pressure is also generated.  Further, Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra’s (2009) review of prior research highlighted that most companies do comply with 
codes’ recommendations.  In the UK, companies are required to comply with The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (formerly, the Combined Code) or explain why they do not 
comply, but there is little guidance provided on what constitutes an acceptable explanation of 
non-compliance.  Unsurprisingly, UK companies provide uninformative explanations of non-
compliance (Arcot et al., 2010; Pass, 2006).  This shows that coercive and normative pressure 
can be resisted through decoupling or symbolic management practices.      
 
Enrione et al. (2006) argue that corporate scandals motivate regulators and others to produce 
codes to quell public and investor outrage.  Regulators and others also produce codes to 
enhance their own or their country’s legitimacy (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004, 2009; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  However, the effect of codes on how corporate governance is 
practiced and reported has rarely been studied.  It is likely that there is a two-way relationship 
between issuers of codes (Quadrants 3 and 4) and companies (Quadrants 1 and 2).  Codes’ 
recommendations may be a reflection of directors’ experience and perceptions of best 
practice.  For example, UK code issuers are chaired by high-profile directors (Jones and 
Pollitt, 2004).  Also, codes’ recommendations may not require companies to make substantive 
changes, particularly if companies are successful in their lobbying of code issuers.  Prior 
research has rarely investigated the political nature of code production. However, Jones and 
Pollitt (2004) highlight that code issuers are lobbied by many parties (e.g. government, 
investors, directors, professions, etc), but the relative influence of these parties on codes’ 
recommendations has not been studied.   
 
The research examines the diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in discourse on 
executive remuneration and how both Logics influence remuneration decision-making and 
reporting.  In doing so, discourse on executive remuneration in each of the quadrants and, to 
some extent, the relationships between the quadrants is studied.  There are many types of talk 
and texts in each quadrant, but the research is limited to: Corporate annual reports in Quadrant 
1; Directors’ and executives’ perceptions in Quadrant 2; Codes in Quadrant 3; and Code 
issuers’ and remuneration consultants’ perceptions in Quadrant 4.  These types of talk and 
texts are chosen because they are the most significant with respect to understanding how 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in remuneration principle, practices and 
processes (see Chapter 3, Table 3.3 and Section 3.6).  Further, codes and corporate annual 
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reports are chosen because these texts are publicly visible, and code issuers and companies 
express their institutional identities through these texts (Lok, 2010).  However, public 
discourse may be symbolic or decoupled from private discourse.  For example, Investor Logic 
may be embedded in remuneration disclosures, but Corporate Logic may be embedded in 
boardroom discussions of executive remuneration.  The main limitation is that private 
discourse cannot easily be observed.  Interviews with directors, executives, remuneration 
consultants and code issuers are used as a surrogate (this point is discussed further in Section 
4.6).   
 
Anglo-Saxon (or Commonwealth) countries are studied.
51
  The United Kingdom
52
 (UK) is 
chosen because of the local and international significance of UK codes.  Enrione et al. (2006) 
argued that the UK’s Cadbury Report (1992) had become the blueprint for other codes around 
the world.  Cadbury has also had a significant influence on academic writing on corporate 
governance (Durisin and Puzon, 2009).  Further, successive UK codes have been produced in 
response to corporate scandals (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Pollitt and Jones, 2004; 
Solomon, 2007). These codes emphasise board independence, board oversight of management 
(through auditing and internal controls) and incentives for executives (Chambers and Weight, 
2008; Solomon, 2007).  The UK Government also changed corporate law in response to 
corporate scandals: The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 required listed 
companies to produce a detailed remuneration report and hold a non-binding shareholder vote 
on the remuneration report at the annual general meeting; and the Companies Act 2006 
expanded directors’ duties and specified that the corporate objective should be enlightened 
shareholder value (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5.3).  This is arguable indicative of a shift away 
from Corporate Logic towards Investor Logic, but it may also be indicative of a merging of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (Lok, 2010).  Thus, UK regulatory and corporate 
behaviour from the late-1980s onwards is an opportune site for research on Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic. 
 
Australia (AU) is chosen because of the similarity between AU and the UK (Hill, 2005, 
2008).  Corporate scandals (particularly, HIH Insurance and One.Tel in 2001) have motivated 
                                                 
51
 America is not selected because it is the site for most prior research on institutional logics of corporate 
governance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  Thus, there is less to be learnt from further study of America. 
52
 The UK is not a country, but a union of countries including England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
However, the UK is treated as a country because of the close economic and political ties between countries in 
the union and the London Stock Exchange is the main stock exchange for all countries in the union.  
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the production of codes and changes to corporate laws: The Corporations Act 2001 requires 
companies to produce a remuneration report and the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 expanded remuneration 
disclosure requirements and requires listed companies to hold a non-binding shareholder vote 
on the remuneration report; and the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council (ASXCGC) first issued a code in 2003.  ASXCGC’s code replicated many aspects of 
the UK’s Financial Reporting Council’s Combined Code.  For example, listed companies 
have to comply or explain why they do not comply.  Further, both the UK and AU have 
associations of institutional investors that produce codes (e.g. UK’s Association of British 
Insurers and AU’s Investment and Financial Services Association).  This illustrates that the 
UK and AU experienced a similar sequence of events: Corporate scandals are followed by 
changes in corporate law and the issuing of codes.  This is indicative of a shift away from 
Corporate Logic towards Investor Logic.  However, while the UK’s first official code was 
introduced in 1992, AU’s first official code was introduced in 2003.  Thus, AU regulatory and 
corporate behaviour from the late-1990s onwards is an opportune site for research on 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
New Zealand (NZ) is chosen because it is markedly different to AU and the UK, despite 
historically close economic and cultural ties.  The Companies Act 1993 has few disclosure 
requirements: Listed companies have to disclose directors’ remuneration and the number of 
employees who are paid $100,000 or more in $10,000 bands.  The NZX’s (NZ Stock 
Exchange’s) listing rules (1994; 1999; 2003; 2004; 2009) do not require listed companies to 
produce a remuneration report.  The Securities Commission’s code (2004b) is voluntary.  
Thus, NZ’s regulatory requirements are significant lower than those in AU and the UK.  A 
significant explanatory factor is that there have been few corporate scandals in NZ that have 
put the public spotlight on executive remuneration in listed companies.
53
  There is also no 
institutional investors’ association in NZ that has issued a code, although the NZ 
Shareholders’ Association issued a discussion document on CEO pay in 2004.  Thus, in the 
absence of shareholder-centric reforms (e.g. voting on remuneration reports), it is expected 
that Corporate Logic will be embedded in the NZ discourse on executive remuneration to a 
greater extent than in AU and UK discourse.  Therefore, NZ’s inclusion serves as a case study 
                                                 
53
 There have corporate scandals in NZ, but, unlike in AU and the UK, NZ corporate scandals have not resulted 
in any official inquiries, changes in remuneration disclosure requirements or codes being produced.  NZ’s 
institutional setting with respect to executive remuneration is discussed further in Chapter 7, Section 7.2. 
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of how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence remuneration decisions and reporting in 
the near-absence of coercive and normative pressures. 
 
A subjective approach to the study of institutional logics is taken.  Most prior research on 
institutional logics has had a positivist methodology, where the effects of institutional logics 
on corporate governance practices (including executive remuneration) and firm performance 
have been studied (e.g. Shipilov et al., 2010; Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995).  Some prior research on institutional logics has had an interpretive methodology, 
where researchers have studied how institutional logics construct various organisational 
actors’ social realities (e.g. Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010).  Institutional logics are considered 
to be objective by the former and inter-subjective by the latter.  It is argued that institutional 
logics are inter-subjective because institutional logics are constructed by both the producer 
and consumer of discourse (i.e. institutional logics exist in their collective minds).  Given the 
inter-subjective nature of institutional logics, their definition and effects are not necessarily 
stable between institutional settings and over time.  Therefore, to study institutional logics 
requires consideration of how discourse is produced and consumed, so that the researcher 
accounts for how institutional settings (e.g. culture) may alter how organisational actors 
construct their social realities (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Phillips et al., 2004).  
 
The embedding of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in the discourse on executive 
remuneration in the UK, AU and NZ is also studied.  Most prior research on institutional 
logics has had a micro or organisational perspective and has examined the antecedents and 
effects of US companies adopting institutional logics (e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 1998, 2001; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995; 2004).  In contrast, prior research on institutional logics has rarely 
taken a macro or organisational field perspective.  In an exploratory study of 23 European 
companies, Point and Tyson (2006) found that coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
influence corporate reporting.  Similarly, Crombie et al. (2010) found that there had been 
institutional isomorphism in the US because both codes and proxy statements had a shared 
language for justifying executive remuneration, which had become increasingly homogenous 
over time.  Therefore, the present study adds knowledge to the institutional logics perspective 
by investigating the following research question:
54
 
                                                 
54
 Originally, this research also sought to investigate the process of institutionalisation.  This is embodied in the 
following research question: By what process have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic become embedded in 
AU, NZ and UK organisational texts? It was expected that jolts (e.g. corporate scandals) result in public 
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1. To what extent have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic become embedded in AU, 
NZ and UK organisational texts with respect to executive remuneration?  
 
The main limitation of studying a large sample of organisational texts is that few features of 
those texts can be studied.  Prior research on institutional logics has used the human resources 
principle as a measure of Corporate Logic and the agency principle as a measure of Investor 
Logic (Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  This research method is 
adopted in order to address Research Question 1 (see Section 4.4.3).  However, this 
reductionist approach ignores the complexities and nuances of organisational texts.  This 
limitation is overcome by examining multiple features of a small sample of organisational 
texts.  In doing so, institutional logics that are legitimate in AU, NZ and the UK are studied.  
It is expected that there will be multiple and, possibly, competing institutional logics that are 
embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration in any given organisational text (Zajac 
and Westphal, 2004).  For example, St-Onge et al. (2001) found that Canadian executives 
used multiple ideas (or theories) to justify the adoption of executive share option plans.  
Therefore, the following research question is explored: 
 
2. How, if at all, have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influenced how executive 
remuneration has been conceptualised in AU, NZ and UK organisational texts?  
 
While Research Questions 1 and 2 examine public discourse on executive remuneration, 
Research Question 3 examines private discourse on executive remuneration.  Most prior 
qualitative research on remuneration committees has studied UK companies (see Chapter 3, 
Table 3.3).  Due to my geographic location, gaining access to NZ directors, executives and 
                                                                                                                                                        
outrage, which result in new codes and regulations being produced, and this results in companies adopting 
codes’ recommendations (Enrione et al., 2006).  This process may result in institutional change if the 
institutional logic(s) that are embedded in new codes and regulations are different to those embedded in the 
existing discourse of companies. This research question was not able to be addressed for three reasons.  First, 
obtaining pre-2000 corporate annual reports is difficult.  This means that it is near-impossible to pinpoint 
which companies first adopted the remuneration principles in their annual reports and then trace the diffusion 
of the remuneration principles over time (note: remuneration principles are used as indicators of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic as per Section 4.4.3; also see Chapter 3, Table 3.2).  Second, it is likely that 
directors use the remuneration principles to make remuneration decisions, but do not necessarily report what 
remuneration principles they use (as pre-2000 corporate annual reports contain limited disclosure on 
executive remuneration).  Third, how code issuers produce codes cannot be easily studied.  For example, 
code issuers receive hundreds of submissions from interested parties (e.g. directors and investors), but how 
they evaluate and weight this evidence is unknown.  Nonetheless, the process of institutionalisation is 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
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others is easier than organisational actors from other countries.  Studying NZ companies and 
code issuers is also opportune because NZ has a markedly different institutional setting to the 
UK and other countries (see above).  Further, while prior qualitative research on remuneration 
committees has used multiple theories to interpret their findings (particularly agency and 
institutional theories), an institutional logics perspective has not been adopted by any of these 
prior studies (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2).  As discussed in Chapter 3, there are tensions 
between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic that have been indirectly highlighted by these 
prior studies.  For example, Main (1993) and Main et al. (2008) showed that remuneration 
committees use the market principle to manage the conflicting demands of executives and 
shareholders.  By adopting an institutional logics perspective, these tensions are directly 
investigated.  Therefore, the following research question is examined: 
 
3. How, if at all, do Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence the thinking and 
decision-making of NZ organisational actors with respect to executive remuneration? 
 
4.3. Research Methodology  
The research methodology that has been adopted draws on constructivism (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994) and interpretive structuralism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Phillips and Di 
Domenico, 2009).  This is a unique research methodology compared to prior research on 
executive remuneration that is reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3.  Most common is a post-
positivist research methodology, where empirical testing of hypotheses results in statistical 
relationships between variables that are claimed to mirror reality (Lee, 1991; Saunders et al., 
2009).  In contrast, institutional logics are argued to be socially constructed and inter-
subjective: Institutional logics only exist in the collective minds of individuals.  This means 
that knowledge about institutional logics is local and temporary.  However, Kakkuri-Knuuttila 
et al. (2008) remind interpretive researchers that subjective constructs (e.g. organisational 
culture) are brought into being through objective processes (e.g. Government intervention) 
and have objective effects (e.g. changes in accounting systems).  They argue that interpretive 
research is a mix of subjective and objective approaches to inquiry.  Drawing on their 
naturalistic methodology, the findings show (i.e. causal reasoning) how institutional logics 
affect remuneration decisions and reporting and, to some degree, how institutional logics are 
diffused and institutionalised. 
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Table 4.2 presents the paradigmatic assumptions of the research.  The first column lists eight 
different assumptions.  These are defined in the second column.  A range of possible 
assumptions (or choices) are listed in the third column.  The choices made in this research are 
listed in the fourth column.  Essentially, a subjective approach to inquiry has been taken 
because the research investigates on how ideas (i.e. institutional logics) influence behaviour 
(i.e. remuneration decisions and reporting).  People are conceptualised as social actors, who 
create and use symbols (discourse) to construct their social realities.  While the existence of a 
physical reality is not denied, the findings are constructed and represent the researcher’s view 
of social reality.  Essentially, the findings represent an interpretation or reconstruction of how 
the social realities of AU, NZ and UK organisations have changed over time.  While the 
traditional scientific method is not followed (e.g. hypotheses are not tested), the research is 
scientistic in nature because descriptions and explanations are sought (Stablein, 1988).  The 
findings are interpreted through the lens of an institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 
2005), discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010) and an institutional neo-institutional 
sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), but this interpretation is not definitive.  Given these 
paradigmatic assumptions, qualitative research methods are employed to investigate the 
research questions (see Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6).
55
  
 
                                                 
55
 Content analysis is used to investigate Research Question 1 (see Section 4.4). While Bryman and Bell (2003) 
classify content analysis as a quantitative method (as words are counted and, hence, quantified), Silverman 
(2006) argues that content analysis can be used by qualitative researchers if the findings are contextualised 
and not treated as objective.  Silverman’s advice was followed. 
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Table 4.2: Paradigmatic Assumptions of This Research 
Assumptions Definition Choices This Research 
Approaches to 
inquiry 
An approach to inquiry is the way 
in which the researcher thinks 
about research (Lundberg and 
Young, 2005)  
Objective – Subjective (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980) 
Subjective 
Human nature Human nature is the qualities and 
behaviours that humans have in 
common (Lundberg and Young, 
2005) 
Responding mechanisms – 
Transcendental beings (Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980) 
Social actors 
Ontology Ontology is the theory of the nature 
of reality (Lundberg and Young, 
2005) 
Concrete structure – Projection of 
human imagination (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980) 
Symbolic 
discourse 
Epistemology Epistemology is the “theory of 
knowledge especially with regards 
to its methods and validation” 
(Deverson and Kennedy, 2005 
p.360) 
Non-falsified hypotheses / 
Probably true findings, or 
Reconstructions / Created 
findings (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994) 
Reconstructions / 
Created findings  
Ideology Ideology is “the system of ideas at 
the basis of an [academic] theory” 
(Deverson and Kennedy, 2005, 
p.540) 
Scientistic; humanistic; 
managerial; or critical (Stablein, 
1988)  
Scientistic 
Schools of 
thought 
Schools of thought are “a 
theoretical-methodological 
community” (Lundberg and 
Young, 2005, p.152) 
Rationality / Simon; Integration / 
Parsons; Market / Williamson; 
Power / Weber; Knowledge / 
Foucault; Justice / Habermas 
(Reed, 1996) 
Neo-institutional 
sociology / 
DiMaggio, 
Meyer, Powell 
and Scott 
Paradigm “A paradigm is a fundamental 
image of the subject matter within 
a science…” (Ritzer, 1980, p.189) 
Functionalist, Interpretive or 
Radical (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979); Modernism or Post-
modernism (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994)  
Interpretive and 
constructivism 
Methodology Methodology is “a body of 
methods used in a particular branch 
of [science]” (Deverson and 
Kennedy, 2005, p.708) 
Quantitative – Qualitative 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980) 
Qualitative 
 
Researchers that have studied institutional theory and/or corporate governance have employed 
a variety of research methods (David and Bitektine, 2009; Durisin and Puzone, 2009; Fiss, 
2008).  There are two common research methods amongst prior research that were reviewed 
in Chapters 2 and 3: Archival research (e.g. data are collected from corporate annual reports) 
and case/field studies (e.g. data are collected from interviews with directors and executives).  
In both cases, researchers often use content analysis to make sense of the data.  However, 
Nelson Phillips and his colleagues have criticised this approach because how institutions are 
bought into being has been ignored in favour of studying the effects of institutions on 
organisations and organisational fields (Phillips, 2003; Phillips et al., 2004, 2006; Phillips and 
Di Domenico, 2009). Instead, they argue that discourse analysis can contribute to an 
understanding of how institutions arise because of the central role texts have in constructing 
and reinforcing institutions.  To summarise, researchers can gain an understanding of a few 
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variables in a large sample of texts using content analysis, or many variables (institutional and 
organisational phenomena) in a small sample of texts using discourse analysis (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003; Silverman, 2006).  Given the research questions, both content and discourse 
analysis are employed to gain an understanding of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
4.4. Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 is concerned with the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic are embedded in organisational texts.  This research question was inspired by Zajac and 
Westphal (1995; 2004) and St-Onge et al. (2001): They showed that companies use many 
different ideas to justify the adoption of long-term incentive plans.  Also, this research 
question was developed from a pilot study of a range of codes and corporate annual reports 
(see Section 4.4.1).  As Research Question 1 asks ‘to what extent’, a large sample of 
organisational texts are sampled (see Section 4.4.2).  To detect the presence of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic in these texts, the remuneration principles found in codes and 
corporate annual reports are studied (see Section 4.4.3).  While the data collected are analysed 
using statistical techniques (see Section 4.4.4), qualitative examples from the sample of 
organisational texts are used to ground the interpretation of the statistics.   
 
4.4.1. A Pilot Study  
The pilot study’s objective was to identify remuneration principles that are common to codes 
and corporate annual reports.
56
  A multi-staged pilot study was conducted to fulfil this 
objective.  First, many codes and corporate annual reports were read to identify as many 
remuneration principles as possible.  During this process, detailed notes were made including 
quotes from the texts that illustrated the various remuneration principles.  My supervisors and 
I discussed these notes at length, resulting in a condensed list of remuneration principles.  
Second, a range of texts (two codes and ten corporate annual reports from AU, NZ and UK, 
published between 1998 and 2007) were purposively selected based on the public visibility 
(or prominence) of the code issuers and companies.
57
  The presence of the remuneration 
principles in these texts was ascertained through multiple, close readings of the texts.  This 
process resulted in a coding procedure for detecting the incidence of remuneration principles.  
                                                 
56
 This is analogous to purposive (heterogeneous) sampling.  The purpose of this is “to collect data to describe 
and explain the key themes that can be observed” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.239).  Similarly, this is analogous 
to theoretical sampling in grounded theory (Goulding, 2009). 
57
 Journal articles and textbooks on corporate governance were used to identify which code issuers were most 
public visible (or prominent).  Further, the ten companies selected included the largest companies by market 
capitalisation and companies that had their executive remuneration practice scrutinised in the media. 
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Again, my supervisors and I discussed the preliminary data.  These discussions solidified the 
choice of remuneration principles to be studied and texts to be sampled (see Sections 4.4.2 
and 4.4.3).  Finally, other features of the texts were also noted (see Sections 4.4.3 and 4.5.2). 
 
4.4.2. Sample of Texts 
Two types of organisational texts are sampled: Codes and corporate annual reports.  The 
sample of codes is discussed first.  Three types of codes are sampled: Official reports, binding 
codes and non-binding codes.  Note that official reports are often the forerunner of codes.  
There are many organisations that issue (or produce) codes including stock exchanges, stock 
exchange regulators, directors’ associations and investors’ association.  Binding codes 
represent coercive pressure, while non-binding codes represent normative pressure.  For 
example, Main (2006) found that in the UK non-binding codes influence how companies 
made remuneration decisions.  Initially, all corporate governance documents that were 
produced to influence companies were collected from websites and university libraries.  This 
initial sample included 116 texts including 60 from the UK, 30 from AU and 26 from NZ, 
which were issued between 1985 and 2010.  Texts that did not include recommendations on 
executive remuneration were excluded.  Non-codes were also excluded.
58
  The final sample 
includes 68 texts including 28 from the UK, 24 from AU and 16 from NZ, which were issued 
between 1992 and 2010. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the sample of codes in chronological order.
59
  The codes are produced by a 
range of organisations including stock exchanges, stock exchange regulators, directors’ 
associations and investors’ associations.  Many codes are endorsed by multiple organisations 
                                                 
58
 Non-codes include laws, discussion documents, consultation documents and submission documents.  First, 
laws are excluded because laws do not include specific recommendations on how and how much executives 
should be remunerated; laws include recommendations on disclosure.  Second, discussion documents are 
produced by directors’ associations, accountancy firms and others to provoke debate on contemporary issues.  
Discussion documents are excluded because these texts rarely include specific recommendations on 
executive remuneration.  Third, consultation documents are produced by code issuers and are the forerunner 
to official reports and codes.  Code issuers invite submissions from the public on their consultation 
documents, discuss the submissions and then produce official reports and codes.  Consultation documents are 
excluded because these texts do not include specific recommendations on executive remuneration and are 
superseded by the resulting official reports and codes.  Fourth, submission documents are produced by a wide 
range of individuals and organisations in response to consultation documents.  Only a small fraction of all 
submission documents were collected.  Submission documents are a rich source of data.  For example, there 
were 141 submissions on David Walker’s (2009) A Review of Corporate Governance in UK banks and Other 
Financial Industry Entities.  Submission documents are excluded because these texts are not likely to have 
any influence on companies. 
59
 Table 4.3 includes 69 texts.  However, there is one code included in the sample was not able to be collected: 
Australian Council of Super Investor’s (2003) Governance Guidelines.   
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and some codes are produced by multiple organisations.  There are multiple editions of many 
codes (e.g. the UK’s Combined Code has five editions).60  Further, stock exchanges’ listing 
rules are mainly excluded.  The UK’s London Stock Exchange’s listing rules are not included 
in the sample because the codes included in the Cadbury and Greenbury reports were annexed 
by the London Stock Exchange.  Companies had to comply with these codes or explain why 
they do not comply.  Inclusion would have resulted in double counting of the codes.  
Similarly, Australian Stock Exchange’s listing rules are not included in the sample because 
the ASXCGC’s (2003, 2007, 2010) codes were part of the listing rules.  In contrast, New 
Zealand Stock Exchange’s listing rules are included because its provisions related to 
executive remuneration are not included in a separate code. 
   
                                                 
60
 Appendix E details of authorship and stated reasons for producing the codes.  This information is not relevant 
to Research Question 1, but is relevant to understanding the process of institutionalisation, which is discussed 
in Chapter 8. 
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Table 4.3: Sample of Codes and Official Reports 
Year United Kingdom Australia New Zealand 
1991  R: Bosch  
1992 R: Cadbury   
1993 C-NB: ABI (Association of British 
Insurers) 
R: Bosch 
R: Hilmer 
 
1994 C-NB: UKSA (UK Shareholders’ 
Association) 
 C-B: NZSE (New Zealand Stock 
Exchange) 
1995 R: Greenbury R: Bosch 
C-NB: AIMA (Australian 
Investment Managers’ 
Association) 
 
1996 C-NB: ABI    
1997  C-NB: IFSA (Investment and 
Financial Services Association; 
formerly, AIMA) 
 
1998 R: Hampel  
C-B: London Stock Exchange 
R: Hilmer  
1999 C-NB: ABI 
C-NB: ABI  
C-NB: Hermes 
C-NB: IFSA C-B: NZSE  
2000  C-NB: AICD (Australian Institute of 
Company Directors), IFSA and 
ASA (Australian Shareholders’ 
Association)  
 
2001 C-NB: AUTIF (Association of Unit 
Trusts and Investment Funds) 
  
2002 C-NB: ABI 
C-NB: Hermes 
C-NB: Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee 
C-NB: IFSA  
2003 R: Higgs 
R: Trade and Industry Commission 
C-B: FRC (Financial Reporting 
Council) and FSA (Financial 
Services Authority) 
C-NB: Hermes 
C-B: ASXCGC (Australian Stock 
Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council) 
C-NB: AICD 
C-NB: ACSI (Australian Council of 
Super Investors) 
R: NZICA (NZ Institute of 
Chartered Accountants) 
C-B: NZX (New Zealand Exchange; 
formerly, NZSE) 
C-NB: Minter Ellison (Minter 
Ellison Rudd Watts) 
2004  C-NB: ASA  
C-NB: ASA  
C-NB: IFSA  
R: Securities Commission 
R: NZSA (NZ Shareholders’ 
Association) 
C-B: NZX  
2005 C-NB: ABI   C-B: NZX 
C-B: Institute of Directors in NZ 
2006 C-B: FRC 
C-NB: Hermes 
 C-NB: Securities Commission 
2007 C-NB: ABI 
C-NB: ICSA 
C-NB: NAPF 
C-B: ASXCGC 
C-NB: AICD and ASA 
C-NB: IFSA 
C-NB: IFSA 
 
2008 C-B: FRC  
C-NB: Hermes 
  
2009 R: Walker R: Productivity Commission 
C-B: APRA (Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority) 
C-NB: ACSI  
C-NB: IFSA  
C-B: NZX 
C-NB: Minter Ellison 
 
2010 C-B: FRC  C-B: ASXCGC C-B: NZX  
C-B: Institute of Directors in NZ 
C-NB: Securities Commission 
Note: Full references for the sampled codes can be found in Appendix A. 
Key: R = Official report; C-NB = Non-binding code; C-B: Binding code. 
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The sample of companies was purposefully selected.  It includes the 50 largest companies in 
terms of market capitalisation that were listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) on 31 December 1998 and 2007, as well as the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE; also known as FTSE) on 31 December 1989, 1998 and 2007.
61
  
The largest 50 companies were selected because corporate governance as a subject focuses on 
large publicly listed companies that have widely held shareholdings.  Also, the largest 50 
companies are the most publicly visible and the most likely to voluntarily disclose 
information on executive remuneration.
62
  Thus, the largest 50 companies are an opportune 
sample in the study of remuneration disclosure.  Further, 1989, 1998 and 2007 are selected in 
order to study the effect of the corporate scandals and the 2001-2002 Dot-Com Bubble on the 
embedding of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in remuneration disclosure.
63
  More years 
are not selected because it is both costly and time-consuming to collect older corporate annual 
reports that are not found on companies’ websites and it is time-consuming to manually 
collect data from corporate annual reports.
64
 
 
Table 4.4 presents the samples of corporate annual reports.  The annual reports for the 50 
largest companies across three counties and two-three time periods were gathered.
65
  In total, 
there are 414 corporate annual reports from 221 publicly listed companies.  There are two 
samples: Top 50 and Continuous.
66
  Many corporate annual reports are included in both 
samples. First, the Top 50 sample was selected to show how remuneration reporting had 
changed over time amongst the largest 50 companies.  Second, the Continuous sample was 
selected to show how remuneration reporting had changed over time amongst the same 
companies (e.g. UK’s Cadbury Schweppes Plc in 1989, 1998 and 2007).  There are more 
companies in the 1989/1998 Continuous sample than the 2007 Continuous sample because 
                                                 
61
 Market capitalisation information was obtained from newspapers (The Times, London; The Australian; 
National Business Review, New Zealand) and the websites of stock exchanges (www.ftse.co.uk; 
www.asx.com; www.nzx.com). 
62
 Mandatory disclosure on executive remuneration beyond listing the number of employees’ earning above a 
specified amount is a recent development in most countries.  As aforementioned, there is minimal mandatory 
disclosure for NZ companies. 
63
 As aforementioned (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4 and Chapter 4, Section 4.2), corporate scandals and financial 
crises have resulted in new laws and codes being produced. Investor Logic appears to be embedded in the 
discourse of these texts, e.g. shareholders’ voting on remuneration reports. 
64
 In particular, AU and NZ corporate annual reports from pre-1998 are not collected because a preliminary 
reading of a number of older corporate annual reports revealed that these texts did not include any narrative 
disclosure on executive remuneration. 
65
 Electronic or hard copies were obtained from the companies’ websites, Global Reports (www.global-
reports.com), NZX Deep Archive Service and university libraries (including University of Canterbury, 
University of Sydney and Strathclyde University). 
66
 The lists of companies included in the samples can be found in Appendix B. 
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many companies merged between periods and all of the pre-merger companies are included in 
the 1989/1998 Continuous sample.  For example, Astra AB (Sweden) merged with Zeneca 
Plc (UK) in 1999 to form AstraZeneca Plc (UK).  Not collected are the 2007 corporate annual 
reports for companies that were in the 1989/1998 Top 50 sample, but were not in the 2007 
Top 50 sample. 
 
Table 4.4: Sample of Corporate Annual Reports 
Year 
United Kingdom Australia New Zealand Total 
number 
of  
annual 
reports 
Top 
50
1
 
Continuous 
(1989)
2
 
Continuous 
(1998)
3
 
Top 50
1
 Continuous
3
 Top 50
1
 Continuous
3
 
1989 50 48(21)
4
 - - - - - 71 
1998 50 - 65(25) 50(49) 48(14) 50(44)  45(18) 200 
2007 50 46(0) 49(0) 50(48) 46(0) 50(45) 40(0) 143 
Total 150 94(21) 104(25) 100(97) 94(14) 100(89) 90(18) 414
5
 
Notes 
1 The Top 50 refers to the largest 50 publicly listed companies by market capitalisation on the last trading day 
of the year on the London Stock Exchange (UK), Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and New Zealand Stock 
Exchange (NZX). 
2 Continuous (1989) refers to the matched sample.  Annual reports were collected for only those companies 
that were continuously listed from 1989 to 2007 and were in the Top 50 in 2007.  For those companies that 
were a product of a merger, annual reports from pre-merger publicly listed companies were also collected. 
3 Continuous (1998) in the UK and Continuous in AU and NZ refers to matched samples.  Annual reports 
were collected for only those companies that were continuously listed from 1998 to 2007 and were in the 
Top 50 in 2007.  For those companies that were a product of a merger, annual reports from pre-merger 
publicly listed companies were also collected. 
4 The bracketed number refers to the number of corporate annual reports that are not included in the Top 50. 
5 All corporate annual reports included in the sample were collected.  Thus, there is no missing data. Appendix 
B contains a list of the companies included in the sample. 
 
4.4.3. Variables 
Remuneration principles are used as proxies for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The 
fairness, human resources, market principles are consistent with Corporate Logic, whereas the 
agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles are consistent with Investor Logic 
(see Chapter 3, Table 3.2).
67
  Corporate Logic assumes that executives are trustworthy and 
will act in the best interests of shareholders in the absence of controls such as monetary 
incentives.  This does not imply that executives will work without pay.  Instead, executives 
have to be remunerated fairly relative to other employees (fairness principle) and other 
executives (market principle) in order to be attracted to and retained in a company (human 
resources principle).  In contrast, Investor Logic assumes that executives are opportunistic and 
will not act in the best interests of shareholders without controls.  This implies that the effort 
                                                 
67
 Conformance and responsibility principles are not studied because these principles are consistent with both 
Logics (i.e. these principles do not discriminate between institutional logics).   
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of executives will be sub-optimal or misdirected in the absence of performance-based 
remuneration (motivation and pay-for-performance principles) and equity-based incentives 
are required to align executives’ interests with those of shareholders (agency principle).68  
Thus, these six remuneration principles are studied because they are predominantly consistent 
with either Corporate Logic or Investor Logic, not both.
69
  
 
Table 4.5 presents the coding procedure for the six remuneration principles including 
definitions, keywords and examples.
70
  For all of the sampled texts, the presence or absence of 
the six remuneration principles was recorded.  To be recorded as present, the relevant text in 
the codes and corporate annual reports had to be (1) related to the most senior executive (i.e. 
Executive Chairman, Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer),
71
 rather than non-
executive directors, other executives or employees; and (2) worded in a manner consistent 
with the spirit of the remuneration principle, while including at least one of the keywords.
72
  
Further, the entire text was scanned to detect to the presence or absence of the remuneration 
principles.  Scanning was a two-stage process.  First, selected sections of the sampled texts 
were read: Normally, codes have one section on remuneration and corporate annual reports 
have a remuneration report.   Second, the remainder of the sampled texts were scanned for 
other passages on remuneration.  For example, remuneration is occasionally discussed in the 
Chairman’s statement in corporate annual reports.  This scanning involved electronic keyword 
searches for electronic documents (e.g. Portable Document Format files)
73
 and visual searches 
(e.g. skim reading) for hardcopy documents.   
                                                 
68
 Also, the level of executive remuneration is set relative to each executive’s contribution to firm performance 
(the pay-for-performance principle).  This form of meritocracy is consistent with Investor Logic. 
69
 There is theoretical and empirical support for associating the fairness, human resources and market principles 
with Corporate Logic and the agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles with Investor Logic: 
Davis et al.’s (1997) and Grundei’s (2008) comparisons of stewardship theory (or Corporate Logic) and 
agency theory (or Investor Logic); Zajac and Westphal’s (1995; 2004) research on Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic; St-Onge et al.’s (2001) research on the ideas/theories used to justify the adoption of stock 
option plans; and prior qualitative research on remuneration committees (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3). 
70
 Further examples are contained in Appendix C. 
71
 The pilot study revealed that some companies have different remuneration principles for different positions 
(e.g. there are different remuneration policies for the CEO and other executives).  To be consistent in the 
comparison between companies, only remuneration policies that related to the most senior executive (e.g. 
CEO) were studied.  Also, prior research focuses on CEOs, rather than all executives.  However, this is a 
limitation as the use of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic could vary with different positions in companies.   
72
 There were many instances where codes or corporate annual reports included phrases that were similar to a 
particular remuneration principle, but did not use the keywords.  These were recorded as a possible incidence 
of a remuneration principle.  Upon reviewing these instances, some revisions of the definitions and keywords 
occurred, which enabled these instances to be definitively coded as either present or absent. 
73
 When keywords were found in electronic searches of texts, the surrounding sentences were read to detect the 
presence of the remuneration principles.  
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Table 4.5: Coding Procedure for Remuneration Principles 
Remuneration 
Principles 
Definition and Keywords Examples from Corporate Annual Reports and Codes 
Agency Definition: Remuneration practices should be 
designed to align the interests of the CEO with those 
of the shareholders. 
Keywords: (1) Align, Alignment, Link or Share; (2) 
Interests or Rewards, (3) CEO, Executive or 
Director; and (4) Shareholders or Unitholders  
Corporate Annual Report: “The Board believes that the Scheme fulfils an important role in 
creating an alignment of interests between the Company’s key executives and its shareholders, 
through incentivising those key executives to grow the value of the Company.” (Mainfreight, 
NZ, 2007, p.63) 
Code: “A key concern should be to ensure, through the remuneration system, that Directors 
share the interest of shareholders in making the company successful.” (Greenbury, UK, 1995, 
para.6.16) 
Fairness Definition: The CEO’s remuneration or remuneration 
practices should be fair. 
Keywords: Equitable, Fair, Reasonable, or Not 
Excessive 
Corporate Annual Report: “For 2007, the Committee is looking at ways of operating the existing 
remuneration framework in line with the following key principles: …and • reward performance 
on a fair and equitable basis.” (Sainsbury, UK, 2007, p.37) 
Code: “Shareholders require that the remuneration of directors should be both fair and 
competitive.” (Cadbury, UK, 1992, p.31) 
Human Resources Definition: The level of CEO remuneration should be 
sufficient to, or the remuneration practices should be 
designed to: attract and retain a skilled and 
experienced individual.   
Keywords: Attract, Retain, Select, Secure or Recruit 
Corporate Annual Report: “The Scheme also assists the Company to attract, motivate and 
retain key executives in an environment where such executives are in high demand.” 
(Mainfreight, NZ, 2007, p.63) 
Code: “Boards and remuneration committees must have flexibility to offer the packages required 
to attract, retain and motivate people of the calibre and experience they need to make their 
companies successful” (Greenbury, UK, 1995, para.6.5) 
Market Definition: The CEO’s remuneration should be 
competitive or comparable to their peers.  
Keywords: Competitive, Market, Comparable or 
Peers  
Corporate Annual Report: “Executive Directors’ salaries are reviewed each year by the 
Committee and adjusted to reflect the performance and the competitiveness of salaries relative 
to the market.” (British Aerospace, UK, 1998, p.34) 
Code: “…remuneration committees need to consider carefully a range of issues such as… the 
positioning of their company relative to other companies” (Greenbury, UK, 1995, p.35) 
Motivation Definition: The company’s remuneration policy or 
practices should be designed to motivate the CEO.  
Keywords: Motivate, Encourage or Incentivise 
Corporate Annual Report: “The remuneration policy of the Company aims to: … • motivate 
directors to achieve challenging performance levels” (Associated British Food, UK, 2007, p.40) 
Code: “Remuneration for directors should be set at levels designed to attract, motivate and retain 
the best people available.” (New Zealand Institute of Directors, NZ, 2005, para.3.13) 
Pay-for-
Performance 
Definition: The CEO’s remuneration should be 
related to corporate performance. 
Keywords: (1) Compensation, Incentives, Pay or 
Remuneration; (2) Firm, Company or Corporate,  
Performance; (3) At Risk, Linked, Related, or 
Variable 
Corporate Annual Report: “Options issued under the Plan are linked to the longer term 
performance of the Company and are only exercisable following the satisfaction of performance 
hurdles that are designed to maximise shareholder wealth.” (Santos, AU, 1998, p.40) 
Code: “A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as 
to link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (Financial Reporting Council, UK, 
2006, para.B.1) 
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Manual coding of the remuneration principles is subjective because each remuneration 
principle can be phrased in a multitude of ways.  To ensure that the coding was robust, several 
tests of inter-coder and intra-coder reliability were performed.
74
  In each case, Cohen’s Kappa 
was calculated to test for inter-coder and intra-coder reliability, where a Cohen’s Kappa of 
0.61 or higher equates to substantial agreement between coders (Cohen, 1988; Fleiss, 1981; 
Krippendorff, 2004).  First, two post-graduate students were hired in late 2007 to code a sub-
sample of 20 corporate annual reports to ensure that there was limited coder bias.  There was 
substantial agreement between their and my coding of these texts with Cohen’s Kappa of 0.68 
and 0.80.  Second, this test was repeated with two different post-graduate students in late 
2009. There was substantial agreement between their and my coding of the sub-sample of 
texts with Cohen’s Kappa of 0.66 and 0.69.  Third, I recoded this sub-sample of texts in mid-
2010.  There was substantial agreement between my original coding and recoding of the sub-
sample of texts with Cohen’s Kappa of 0.95.   
 
The coding procedure is robust (i.e. a layperson that repeated the coding of the sampled texts 
would produce similar results) for the following reasons.  First, tests of inter-coder and intra-
coder reliability showed that there was substantial agreement between coders (see above).  
Second, the post-graduate students who were coders did not adhere to the coding procedure.  
Instead, they were overly conservative in their approach to coding.  When the post-graduate 
students read sentences in the corporate annual reports that were similar but not identical to 
the examples in the coding procedure, they did not code these sentences as indicative of the 
remuneration principles.  This resulted in a consistently lower rate of detection than mine.  
Pre-coding, the post-graduate students had been told that the coding procedure includes a 
range of keywords for each remuneration principle to ensure that differently worded 
remuneration principles are still detected in texts.  They thought that these instructions were 
not entirely clear because this was their first experience in coding and they did not want to 
over-report the incidence of the remuneration principles.  Post-coding, the post-graduate 
students agreed that they had under-reported the incidence of the remuneration principles. 
 
Data were also collected on why companies may adopt remuneration principles (i.e. 
antecedents).  First, industry data were collected because companies in industries that have 
                                                 
74
 Note that the sampled codes and corporate annual reports were acquired over a period of two and a half years 
(from October 2007 to April 2010), and coding occurred throughout this period.  During the early stages of 
coding, several significant changes to the coding procedure were made and this meant that all of the data 
previously gathered had to be checked to ensure consistency with the revised coding procedure.  
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relatively high CEO pay (e.g. banking and financial services) may adopt remuneration 
principles to defend their legitimacy to a greater extent than others.
75
  Second, firm size data 
(including market capitalisation, net and total assets, and revenue) were collected because 
relatively large companies may face greater pressure from stakeholders to provide 
remuneration disclosure and, therefore, are more likely to use remuneration principles.  Third, 
firm performance data (including return on assets, return on equity and total shareholder 
return) were collected because poor performing firms are more likely to adopt remuneration 
principles to defend their legitimacy (Zajac and Westphal, 1995).
76
  Fourth, data on 
companies’ stock exchange listings were collected because companies listed on multiple stock 
exchanges will be subject to greater institutional pressures (e.g. multiple codes) than those 
listed on one stock exchange and, therefore, are more likely to use remuneration principles 
found in codes.  However, correlation and regression analyses revealed few statistically 
significant relationships.  This may be due to the size of the sample and limited number of 
years studied.  Aside from data on companies with single and multiple stock exchange 
listings, these results are not reported in Chapter 5.
77
   
 
Data were not collected on corporate governance and executive remuneration (aside from the 
remuneration principles).  The antecedents and effects of the presence of remuneration 
principles in corporate annual reports (or proxy statements) have been studied in prior 
quantitative research.  Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that CEO pay did not vary when the 
adoption of long-term incentive plans were justified with either the agency or human 
resources principle.  They also found that the choice of remuneration principle was dependent 
on CEO power and firm performance.  In contrast, Wade et al. (1997) found that US 
companies are more likely to use the agency and pay-for-performance principles to justify 
CEO pay when the CEO is highly paid in terms of base salary and annual bonus, but not long-
term incentives.  However, these relationships are not studied.  The pilot study revealed that 
                                                 
75
 The Times (London, UK) classifies companies listed on the London Stock Exchange into 16 industries 
including: Banking and Finance; Investment Companies; Construction and Property; Consumer Goods; 
Engineering; Health; Industrials; Leisure; Media; Natural Resources; Professional and Support Services; 
Retailing; Technology; Telecoms; Transport; Utilities.  The sampled companies were classified according to 
the industry in which they generate the most revenue.  This is a limitation as companies that operated in 
multiple industries were classified as belonging to only one industry. 
76
 Firm performance data were collected from corporate annual reports, newspapers (UK’s The Times, AU’s The 
Australian and NZ’s National Business Review) and electronic databases (Datex and NZX’s Deep Archive).  
Firm performance data were only collected for the preceding financial year.  This is a limitation because 
companies may not change their usage of remuneration principles until the year after relatively low firm 
performance. For example, Zajac and Westphal (1995) studied firm performance over multiple years and 
found a relationship between firm performance and disclosure of certain remuneration principles. 
77
 Some of this statistical analysis was published in Crombie (2009).  This is reproduced in Appendix D. 
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CEOs in UK, AU and NZ companies have comparable remuneration packages, which have 
not significantly changed over time.
78
  The research questions were crafted so that a 
quantitative research method was not required.
79
  
 
Data were not collected on the corporate objective and human behaviour.  Chapter 2 presents 
a general framework for corporate governance that has two dimensions: Corporate objective 
(shareholder value and stakeholder value) and behavioural model of executives (agent and 
steward).  This results in four quadrants or institutional logics.  Data could be collected on 
these dimensions from codes and corporate annual reports in order to determine an 
organisation’s position.  Code issuers do recommend a corporate objective and companies do 
describe their corporate objective (e.g. mission statement).  However, it is problematic to 
determine the assumptions of coder issuers and companies regarding how executives behave.  
Some inferences can be derived from codes and corporate annual reports.  For example, the 
assumption of executives as agents would be consistent with code issuers recommending or 
companies declaring that boards act as monitors of (not advisors to) executives.  These data 
have not been collected because the value of these data only became apparent in the later 
stages of the research.  This limitation is partially mitigated as the next phase of this research 
collected some data from codes and corporate annual reports on the corporate objective and 
human behaviour (see Section 4.5). 
 
Although not directly related to Research Question 1, other data were also collected from the 
sampled texts in order to gain insight into the process of institutional change (see Appendix 
E).  Jolts (e.g. corporate scandals) can bring about institutional change (Enrione et al., 2006; 
Greenwood et al., 2002).  To explore this possibility, the rationales that codes provided for 
why the code was produced were collected and categorised as follows: jolts (e.g. corporate 
scandals), inspired by other texts, scheduled revision of code, and/or other reasons.  Further, 
institutional change occurs if institutional entrepreneurs are powerful and have the support of 
                                                 
78
 While the level of CEO remuneration has significantly increased over time in many countries including the 
UK, AU and NZ (Fernandes et al., 2009; Mishel et al., 2007), the structure of CEO pay does not appear to 
vary between countries and over time.  The standard package includes salary, short-term incentives and long-
term incentives (see Chapter 3, Table 3.4 and Chapter 6, Section 6.2).  However, there may have been 
changes in the mix between fixed and variable pay as well as changes in the types of incentive schemes 
adopted (e.g. cash, shares or share options).  This is a limitation that both the level and structure of CEO pay 
has not been quantified, although the structure of CEO pay is studied qualitatively in Chapter 6. 
79
 Note that it is also impractical to study changes over time in the level and structure of CEO pay in AU and NZ 
because there were minimal remuneration disclosure requirements prior to the early 2000s.  There would 
have been much missing data.  
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others within the organisational field (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood et al., 2002).  Codes 
supported by powerful entities (e.g. Government) or produced by directors
80
 may have greater 
influence on corporate reporting than codes produced by others.  To explore this possibility, 
data on the range of entities issuing the codes and the code authors’ affiliations were also 
collected.
81
  Finally, notes were made on the process by which the codes were produced in 
order to gain insight into the influence of lobbying and the closeness between code issuers 
and companies.
82
   
 
4.4.4. Data Analysis 
To address Research Question 1, the incidence of six remuneration principles was tracked in 
codes and corporate annual reports over time.  These findings are predominantly descriptive 
statistics and presented in tables or as graphs in Chapter 5.  First, how codes changed across 
editions is studied. Second, differences in means between companies’ incidence of 
remuneration principles in 1998 and 2007 are calculated.  Statistically significant differences 
are highlighted.  Third, the influence of codes (as coercive and normative pressure) on 
companies is examined, although the findings are limited as the sample includes only two or 
three years of corporate annual reports.  Fourth, using the remuneration principles as proxies 
for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, the diffusion of institutional logics in codes and 
corporate annual reports is also studied.  The code issuers and companies that did and did not 
change their usage of remuneration principles over time are identified for further analysis (see 
Section 4.5.3).  Overall, these descriptive statistics show how remuneration principles and 
                                                 
80
 For example, FRC’s The UK Corporate Governance Code is a product of official reports by high-profile 
directors including Sir Adrian Cadbury, Sir Richard Greenbury, Ronnie Hampel, Derek Higgs and David 
Walker. 
81
 Code issuers were categorised as follows: Stock Exchange; Stock Exchange Regulator; Government 
Department; Directors’ Association; Executives’ Association; Professional Association (e.g. Accountants or 
Lawyers); Fund Managers’ Association; Financial Services Association (e.g. Insurance); Investors’ 
Association Employees’ Association; Business Association; Academic (e.g. University); Other.   
 Authors’ affiliations were categorised as follows: Stock Exchange; Stock Exchange Regulator; Government 
Department; Directors’ Association; Executives’ Association; Professional Association; Fund Managers’ 
Association; Financial Services Association; Investors’ Association; Employees’ Association; Business 
Association; Academic; Professional Firm (e.g. Accountancy or Law Firm); Consultants (e.g. Recruitment or 
Remuneration Consultancy); Director of Publicly Listed Company; Executive of Publicly Listed Company; 
Other. 
82
 Data were not collected on the identities of those individuals and organisations that lobbied the code issuers.  
For example, code issuers often interviewed experts on corporate governance (e.g. directors and their 
advisors) and called for public submissions on the issues at hand.  This identity information is publicly 
available for some, but not all of the sampled codes.  This information was not collected and coded because it 
would have been too time-consuming.  For example, there were 141 submissions made on Walker (2009) 
alone.  Also, submissions made to code issuers were not analysed.  This is a limitation because code issuers 
may not treat all submissions equally.  For example, submissions by directors and their advisors may be more 
influential than others’ submissions. 
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institutional logics have diffused over time in the UK, AU and NZ.  Differences between 
countries are also highlighted. 
 
4.5. Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 concerns how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the 
discourse on executive remuneration of code issuers and companies.  A sample of codes and 
corporate annual reports is selected in order to study this discourse.  These texts are 
investigated in two different ways (or two stages).  First, a discourse analysis of executive 
remuneration practices within the discourse is conducted to demonstrate the differences 
between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Second, a discourse analysis of code issuers 
and companies is carried out to reveal exemplars of Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and both 
Logics.  These approaches are forms of purposive sampling (Saunders et al., 2009).  Using 
such approaches to examine the discourse on executive remuneration is novel and, therefore, 
exploratory.  Why this is appropriate is explained next.   
 
4.5.1. Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is “the structured and systematic study of collections of interrelated texts, 
the processes of their production, dissemination and consumption, and their effects on the 
context in which they occur” (Phillips and Di Domenico, 2009, italics in original, p.551).  
Bridging the macro-micro divide, discourse analysis generates insight into how texts are 
constructed to persuade readers (the micro) and how texts construct social reality (the macro).  
Alvesson and Karreman (2000) explain that there are multiple types of discourse from macro 
to micro and from autonomous to determinant (i.e. discourse that is coupled to action). 
Discourse analysis as a research method can be adapted to study one or multiple aspects of 
discourse.  Further, Phillips and Hardy (2002) argue that the researcher’s paradigmatic 
assumptions vary with the focus of their discourse analysis.  Researchers who have a micro 
focus (e.g. language use in texts) will draw on linguistics, while researchers who have a 
macro focus (e.g. texts in context) will draw on interpretive or critical methodology.  While 
critical approaches tend to examine power and politics (e.g. how texts can legitimise those 
with power), interpretive approaches tend to investigate the construction of social reality (e.g. 
how texts create shared understandings). 
 
Using discourse analysis as a research method for analysing texts is fraught with difficulty. 
While discourse analysis has been described as both theory and method, it can appear to be 
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nothing at all to researchers who have not heard of it before.  Unlike other research methods, 
there are multiple versions of discourse analysis, each of which has not precisely defined 
(Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Phillips and Di Domenico, 2009).  For instance, Phillips and 
Hardy (2002) identify four types: Interpretive structuralism, critical discourse analysis, social 
linguistic analysis and critical linguistic analysis.  Most prominent in organisational studies is 
critical discourse analysis, although there are many varieties (Alvesson and Karreman, 2011; 
Wodak and Meyer, 2009).  Further, there are almost no studies of discourse that have a 
methodology of interpretive structuralism.  Similarly, there are almost no studies on corporate 
governance or executive remuneration that have utilised any variety of discourse analysis.
83
  
Thus, discourse analysis as a method and prior research that has utilised discourse analysis 
offers no formula or guide for carrying out research on the discourse on executive 
remuneration.
84
  Phillips and Hardy (2002, p.74) confirm that “researchers need to develop an 
approach that makes sense in light of their particular study”.   
 
Drawing on interpretive structuralism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), a discourse analysis is used 
to understand the discourse on executive remuneration in different institutional settings.  
Essentially, the present study investigates how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic shape how 
code issuers and companies construct their social reality with respect to executive 
remuneration.
85
  Code issuers and companies may draw on one or both Logics to legitimise 
their recommendations and practices, respectively.  For example, shareholder value 
maximisation – which is part of both logics – has become the corporate objective that is 
legitimate, at least for US companies (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Sundaram and Inkpen, 
2004a).  However, legitimacy is an ethereal construct.  For example, Deephouse and Suchman 
(2008, p.50) define organisational legitimacy as “the degree of cultural support for an 
organisation”.  What is illegitimate is easier to define than what is legitimate: organisations 
that are sanctioned (e.g. fined) following an economic, environment, legal or social crisis are 
said to be illegitimate or losing their legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  The main 
                                                 
83
 Of the studies that were found, all had a critical methodology.  This methodology is incompatible with this 
research’s methodology (see Section 4.3).  However, Craig and Amernic’s (2004) research method was 
found to be instructive.  They studied Enron’s discourse and showed how capitalism is defended within this 
discourse.  Their method involved a line-by-line analysis of two texts.  
84
 This is a contentious point as there are many books on discourse analysis (e.g. Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; 
Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Titscher et al., 2000), but these books do not provide a formula or guide.  In 
contrast, there are many formulas or guides for carrying out content analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
85
 In this context, companies are equated to boards of directors and remuneration committees.  Executive 
remuneration is not determined by the company as a whole, but by the board of directors and remuneration 
committee. 
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limitation of this phase is that the legitimacy of companies’ executive remuneration policies 
and practices are not directly examined.
86
  
 
4.5.2. A Pilot Study 
Following Phillips and Hardy’s (2002) advice, a pilot study of the discourse on executive 
remuneration was undertaken in order to: First, come to terms with discourse analysis as a 
method and interpretive structuralism as a methodology; and second, understand how 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration 
(see Appendix F).  The sample included one recent code and one 2007 annual report from the 
UK, AU and NZ (six texts in total).  The most influential codes were selected (i.e. produced 
by the local regulator). Corporate annual reports that included the median number of the 
remuneration principles for each country in 2007 were randomly selected.  Based on the 
general framework of corporate governance developed in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.3), eight 
aspects of corporate governance and executive remuneration were studied.
87
  For each aspect, 
the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were consistent with code issuers’ 
recommendations and companies’ policies and practices were examined.  The findings 
showed that while the discourse is multifaceted and highly nuanced, the discourse is strongly 
consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Thus, discourse analysis can be 
used to generate insight from an institutional logics perspective.  
 
4.5.3. Sample of Texts 
Table 4.6 details the sub-sample of codes and corporate annual reports that were purposively 
selected from the full sample (as per Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  The sub-sample includes 55 codes 
(1991-2010) produced by four UK code issuers, six AU code issuers and four NZ code 
issuers, as well as 75 corporate annual reports (1989 for UK only, 1998 and 2007) produced 
by eleven UK companies, nine AU companies and thirteen NZ companies.  While the size of 
the sub-sample is small relative to the size of samples in prior research (e.g. Zajac and 
Westphal, 1995), it is large relative to prior research that uses discourse analysis (e.g. Craig 
                                                 
86
 Financial performance may be used as a proxy for organisational legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008).  
For example, a loss of legitimacy may be signalled by a decline in a company’s share price relative to other 
companies in the same industry.  However, low performance by itself does not necessarily equate to low 
legitimacy.  Deephouse and Suchman (2008) point out that financial performance is only one part of 
organisational legitimacy. 
87
 Including human behaviour, corporate objective, independence of the board of directors, role of the board of 
directors (particularly non-executive directors), role of the remuneration committee, remuneration policies 
and practices for non-executive directors, remuneration policies and practices for executives, and 
performance measures for evaluating executives.  
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and Amernic, 2004).  The sub-sample size was purposely selected in order to: First, reveal the 
variation of executive remuneration policies and practices within the full sample (Saunders et 
al., 2009); and second, understand how code issuers’ recommendations and companies’ 
remuneration policies and practices changed over time. Codes issuers that produced multiple 
codes over time were selected.  Companies were selected from the continuous sample (see 
Table 4.4).  Further explanation of how the texts were selected is given below. 
 
Table 4.6: Sub-sample of Codes and Corporate Annual Reports 
Countries Codes Corporate Annual Reports 
 # of Codes # of Code Issuers # of Annual Reports 
(Year) 
# of Companies 
UK 22 4 10 (1989) 
10 (1998) 
11 (2007) 
10 
10 
11 
AU 19 6 9 (1998) 
9 (2007) 
9 
9 
NZ 14 4 13 (1998) 
13 (2007) 
13 
13 
Total 55 14 75 33 
 
Table 4.7 lists the sample of codes.
88
  One aim of the content analysis (as described in Section 
4.4) is to show how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have diffused in codes over time.  
Note that the remuneration principles are indicators of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  
The findings, at least in terms of the incidence of remuneration principles, reveal that there 
had not been a lot of change in the codes over time.  Code issuers’ initial recommendations 
with respect to executive remuneration appear to be unchanged in subsequent editions of their 
codes.  As the remuneration principles in this instance do not reveal much variation between 
the codes, all of the codes were sampled.  This helps to ensure that most of the variation is 
captured.   
 
                                                 
88
 Table 4.7 is a reproduction of Table 5.6 from Chapter 5.  Note that the content analysis was completed before 
the discourse analysis was started. 
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Table 4.7: Sub-sample of Codes 
Change in 
Institutional Logic 
UK AU NZ 
No Change    
Neither Logic  Bosch’s Corporate Practices and Conduct 
(Bosch) (1991; 1993; 1995) 
 
Investor Logic  Hilmer’s Strictly Boardroom (Hilmer) (1993; 
1998) 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts (MERW) (2003; 2009) 
Both Logics Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Combined 
Code (1998, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) 
 
Investment and Financial Services Association 
(IFSA; formerly, Australian Investment 
Managers’ Association, AIMA) (1995; 1997; 
1999; 2000; 2002; 2004; 2007a, b; 2009)
2
 
Australian Institute of Company Directors 
(AICD) (2000; 2003; 2007)
 2
 
Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate 
Governance Council (ASXCGC) (2003; 
2007; 2010) 
Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA) 
(2000; 2004a,b; 2007)
 2
 
Securities Commission (SecCom) (2004b; 2006; 
2010) 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand (IODNZ) 
(2005; 2010) 
Change    
From Both Logics 
to Investor Logic 
Official reports (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 
1995; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003; Walker, 
2009)
 1
 
  
Oscillating 
between Investor 
Logic and Both 
Logics 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) (1993; 
1996; 1999a,b; 2002; 2005; 2007) 
Hermes Investment Management Limited 
(Hermes) (1999; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2008) 
  
Oscillating 
between no Logic 
and Investor Logic 
  New Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX) 
(1994; 1999; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010) 
Notes: 
1 All of the official reports except Walker (2009) include both Logics. While Walker’s (2009) recommendations are based on Investor Logic, FRC’s Combined Code 
(which includes both Logics) is also endorsed. 
2 The 2000 and 2007 editions of these codes are jointly issued by IFSA, AICD and ASA. 
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Table 4.8 lists the sample of corporate annual reports.
89
  One aim of the content analysis (as 
described in Section 4.4) is to show how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have diffused in 
corporate annual reports over time.  The findings, at least in terms of the incidence of 
remuneration principles, revealed that there had been a range of changes in the corporate 
annual reports over time.  The most frequent change was from no Logic to both Logics.  For 
most companies, once a remuneration principle is adopted in their annual report, it is rarely 
dropped in their subsequent annual reports. This is particularly significant between there is a 
gap of nine years between the annual reports that were studied.  To help ensure that the 
variation within the no change and change categories was captured, two companies were 
randomly selected from each category.
90
  Note that UK companies selected in the first time 
period (1989 to 1998) were traced through into the second time period (1998 to 2007).  This 
meant that 10 UK companies were studied over 18 years. 
 
                                                 
89
 Table 4.8 is a partial reproduction of Table 5.10 from Chapter 5. 
90
 Note that the selection was often forced because there were only one or two companies in many categories. 
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Table 4.8: Sub-sample of Companies 
Change in Institutional Logic UK 1989 to 1998 UK 1998 to 2007 AU 1998 to 2007 NZ 1998 to 2007 
No. Sample No. Sample No. Sample No. Sample 
No Change         
Corporate Logic   1 7. Antofagasta     
Investor Logic       2 20. Air New Zealand 
21. Property for Industry 
Both Logics 2 1. Legal and General 
2. Pearson 
45 9. British American 
Tobacco 
10. Unilever 
28 12. Bluescope Steel 
13. Qantas 
5 22. Guinness Peat Group 
23. Westpac Banking 
Corporation
1
 
Neither Logic       7 24. EBOS Group 
25. Steel and Tube 
From Corporate Logic to…         
Both Logics 3 3. Sainsbury J 
4. Tesco 
1 8. Associated British 
Foods 
5 14. QBE Insurance 
15. Westfield 
Holdings 
  
From Investor Logic to…         
Corporate Logic       1 26. BIL International 
Both Logics 2 5. Cadbury 
6. Standard Chartered 
1 11. Xstrata 3 16. Newcrest 
Mining 
17. Telstra 
Corporation 
4 27. Sky Network 
28. Telecom Corporation of 
N.Z. 
From No Logic to…         
Corporate Logic 2 7. Antofagasta 
8. Associated British 
Foods 
    1 29. Tourism Holdings 
Investor Logic       5 30. Hellaby Holdings 
31. Michael Hill International 
Both Logics 29 9. British America 
Tobacco 
10. Unilever 
  10 18. Brambles 
19. Toll Holdings 
14 32. Fisher and Paykel 
Healthcare 
33. The Warehouse 
No. of Companies 38  48  46  39  
Note 
1 The five companies (except Guinness Peat Group) in the ‘No Change – Both Logics’ had their primary listing on the ASX in AU.  With the addition of Westpac Banking 
Corporation, there are nine AU companies in the sub-sample. 
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However, the sub-sampled codes and corporate annual reports do not contain the maximum 
variation of recommendations and practices with respect to executive remuneration.  As the 
content analysis was carried out, extensive notes were made on the executive remuneration 
policies and practices that were recommended by code issuers and adopted by companies (see 
Section 4.4.1).  After making further notes on the sub-sample of codes and corporate annual 
reports, some differences between the full sample and the sub-sample emerged.  Drawing on 
the notes from the content analysis, additional examples are presented in Chapter 6.  These 
examples are noted as being from the full sample, not the sub-sample.  However, the general 
tenor of the codes and corporate annual reports in the sub-sample is consistent with that of the 
full sample. 
 
4.5.4. Stage 1: A Discourse Analysis of Executive Remuneration Practices 
Stage 1’s objective is to uncover the range of executive remuneration practices that are 
recommended by codes issuers and adopted by companies, and then to explore how, if at all, 
Corporate Logic and Investor are embedded in the range of executive remuneration practices.  
Discourse analysis is used to understand multiple aspects of the discourse.  The variables and 
data analysis are discussed next. 
 
4.5.4.1. Variables 
Table 4.9 details the investigative procedure used to collect data from the sub-sample of codes 
and corporate annual reports.  Executive remuneration practices are comprised of practices 
related to fixed remuneration, variable remuneration and total remuneration.  This is based on 
the remuneration literature (see Chapter 3, Table 3.4).  Essentially, notes were made on what 
code issuers recommended and how they justified their recommendations, and on what 
companies practiced and how they justified their practices.  Further, notes were made on the 
corporate objective, general features of the texts, endogenous (or organisational) factors and 
exogenous (or environmental) factors.  These notes generated some insight into the code 
issuers and companies as well as the personalities of the people governing these entities, 
which proved useful in Stage 2 (see Section 4.5.6). Overall, the notes were brief for the most 
texts, but were quite extensive for AU and UK 2007 corporate annual reports. 
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Table 4.9: Investigative Procedure for Executive Remuneration Practices 
Variables Investigative Procedure for Codes Investigative Procedure for Corporate Annual Reports  
Fixed Remuneration   
1. Base salary and 
benefits 
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: Level, 
comparator group, and conditions. 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Level, 
comparator group, and conditions. 
2. Pension / 
Superannuation  
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: 
Scheme (e.g. defined benefit or contribution), level and conditions. 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Scheme, 
level and conditions. 
3. Payments for 
recruitment, 
retention and 
severance 
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: 
Schemes, level, and conditions (e.g. continuous employment or 
performance. 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Schemes, 
level, and conditions. 
Variable Remuneration   
4. Short-term 
incentives (or 
annual bonus) 
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: 
Schemes (one or multiple), performance measures, targets, level, 
payment and conditions of deferred portion. 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Schemes 
(one or multiple), performance measures, targets, level, payment and 
conditions of deferred portion. 
5. Long-term 
incentives 
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: 
Schemes, performance measures, targets, level, payment, vesting 
period, and other aspects (e.g. interest-free loans). 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Schemes, 
performance measures, targets, level, payment, vesting period, and 
other aspects. 
6. Minimum 
shareholding 
requirements 
For the following, what is recommended and how is it justified: Level 
and method (e.g. short-term incentive payments must be used to acquire 
minimum shareholding). 
For the following, what is practiced and how is it justified: Level and 
method. 
Total Remuneration   
7. Mix of fixed and 
variable 
What is recommended as the desired mix of fixed and variable 
remuneration? Why? 
What is stated as the desired mix of fixed and variable remuneration? 
How is the desired mix justified? 
8. Level of fixed, 
variable and total 
What recommendations are given regarding the whole remuneration 
package? How are these recommendations justified? 
How, if at all, is the whole remuneration package assessed? How is the 
whole remuneration package justified? 
Corporate Objective What is the recommended corporate objective? Why? What is the stated corporate objective? How, if at all, is it justified? 
Features of Text Do any of the code’s recommendations appear to be symbolic? Why? Do any of the company’s practices appear to be symbolic? Why? 
Endogenous Factors  What type of entity is the code issuer? Who are the members of the 
code issuer? What might be the agenda of the coder issuer? 
Who are the members of the board and management? Do they own 
shares? Have they been a party to corporate scandals or code issuers? 
Exogenous Factors Why was the code issuer established? What motivated the code to be 
produced (e.g. response to corporate scandal)? 
Has the company had negative publicity on executive remuneration 
(e.g. negative shareholder vote)? 
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4.5.4.2. Data Analysis 
There were two phases to the data analysis.  First, the range of recommend and adopted 
practices and the range of justifications of the practices found in the sub-sample of codes and 
corporate annual reports by country and time period was ascertained.  This purposive 
sampling was used to “collect data to describe and explain the key themes that can be 
observed” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.239).  This enables possible trends to be detected and 
analysed further.  As expected, the range was limited because code issuers’ recommendations 
are non-specific and companies’ remuneration disclosures are minimal, particularly on why 
certain practices are adopted.
91
  However, some AU companies in 2007, some UK companies 
in 1998 and most UK companies in 2007 disclosed a lot of specific information on executive 
remuneration.  As a result, the examples provided in Chapter 6 are drawn mainly from these 
companies.
92
  Second and more importantly, the various recommendations and practices were 
categorised as being consistent with no Logic, Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, Stakeholder 
Logic or some other Logic.  The theoretical underpinnings of the institutional logics were 
used to guide this categorisation (see Chapter 2, Tables 2.2 and 2.3; Chapter 3, Tables 3.2 and 
3.5).  Most recommendations and practices appear to be consistent with Corporate Logic 
and/or Investor Logic. 
 
There are several limitations to this discourse analysis. First and most significantly, non-
financial (intrinsic and extrinsic) rewards are ignored because there is almost no discussion of 
these rewards in codes and corporate annual reports.  For example, a company may appear to 
have a humble executive remuneration policy, but they may reward their executives using 
other rewards such as corporate jets, chauffeured limousines, extravagant offices, etc.  This is 
a significant limitation because the critical difference between Corporate Logic and Investor 
concerns how executives are assumed to behave.  Second, the findings cannot be generalised 
to the population.  Third, the examples could have been selected in a biased or haphazard 
manner, although the pilot study demonstrates that the discourse on executive remuneration 
has been studied thoroughly and systematically (see Section 4.5.2).  However, it is recognised 
                                                 
91
 A notable exception is the UK’s Greenbury (1995) report on directors’ remuneration. This text is very 
different to the other codes in the sub-sample because it includes detailed and specific recommendations.  
However, Chapter 6 does not include many examples from Greenbury (1995) because it is an outlier relative 
to the other codes. 
92
 When there were no examples of a particular recommendation or practice amongst the sub-sample of codes 
and corporate annual reports, examples from the full sample were used.  These examples are noted in Chapter 
6 as being from the full sample, not the sub-sample. 
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that most examples in Chapter 6 are from AU and UK corporate annual reports in 2007.  
Overall, these limitations highlight that this discourse analysis is exploratory. 
 
4.5.5. Stage 2: A Discourse Analysis of Exemplars of Institutional Logics 
Stage 2’s objective is to identify exemplars of Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, Both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, Stakeholder Logic and no Logic from the sub-sample of 
codes and corporate annual reports.
93
  Essentially, this approach is an example of maximum 
variation sampling (Saunders et al., 2009).  The aim was to identify at least one code and one 
corporate annual report from UK, AU and NZ in which one of the institutional logics is 
strongly embedded.  However, for some institutional logics, few codes or corporate annual 
reports were identified.  This stage of the discourse analysis is reflective in that I drew on my 
cumulative knowledge and experience (e.g. all of the notes from the preceding content and 
discourse analyses) to decide whether each of the sub-sample of codes and corporate annual 
reports were exemplars or not.  To decide if an institutional logic was strongly embedded in a 
code or corporate annual report required careful consideration of all of the data that had 
previously been collected.  Some factors that were influential: Ownership structure of 
companies,
94
 corporate governance,
95
 the tenor of the remuneration policy, emphasis on 
performance-based remuneration, and lack of recommendation on or use of relative total 
shareholder return as a performance measure.
96
  The process of matching companies to 
institutional logics is subjective because there are no particular features of companies that are 
definitive indicators of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, although it was guided by prior 
research on institutional logics (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3 and Chapter 3, Table 3.5). 
 
There are several limitations of this discourse analysis.  First, the proportion of code issuers 
and companies in which each of the institutional logics is strongly embedded is unknown.  
                                                 
93
 While data were collected for the content analysis, it was observed that a few companies espoused stakeholder 
value maximisation as the corporate objective.  Stakeholder Logic is studied to ascertain whether or not there 
are any code issuers or companies whose discourse was not consistent with Corporate Logic and/or Investor 
Logic.  Political Logic was also considered, but none of the code issuers and companies studied had 
discourse that was consistent with it.  
94
 Directors or executives are more likely to behave as stewards if they founded the company or are a member of 
the founder’s family (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
95
 Corporate Logic (and stewardship theory) implies that the board of directors should be comprised of mainly 
executive directors and have an executive chairperson (Davis, et al., 1997; Grundei, 2008). Investor Logic 
has opposing implications. 
96
 Typically, long-term incentives are dependent on relative targets for earnings per share and total shareholder 
returns (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Murphy, 1999; Zakaria, 2011).  However, Corporate Logic is 
consistent with absolute targets for internal performance measures, while Investor Logic is consistent with 
relative targets for external performance measures (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6).  Thus, particular attention is 
given to the performance measures that companies use. 
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The findings are exploratory and cannot be used to generalise to the population.  Second, 
there may be researcher bias in selecting and analysing the exemplar codes and corporate 
annual reports.  Within Chapter 6, the descriptions of each code issuer’s recommendations 
and each company’s practices were necessarily simplified.  Different researchers may 
disagree on the extent to which each of the institutional logics is strongly embedded in the 
codes and corporate annual reports because they may perceive different features of the texts to 
be important.  As the discourse analysis was necessarily exploratory, readers should be 
cautious in considering the robustness of the findings.    However, this approach is necessarily 
exploratory because there has been scant prior research that has studied how institutional 
logics are embedded in codes and corporate annual reports.   
 
4.6. Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 concerns how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence how 
remuneration decisions are made in the boardroom.  Prior research from an institutional logics 
perspective has not examined the similarities and differences between public discourse (e.g. 
remuneration policies in corporate annual reports) and private discourse (e.g. how 
remuneration committees make decisions).  Thus, the connections between public and private 
discourse on executive remuneration are examined.  Additionally, this research differs from 
prior qualitative research on remuneration committees because it employs an institutional 
logics perspective (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2).  To address Research Question 3, interviews 
with organisational actors were conducted.  There were several stages to this approach.  First, 
a pilot study was conducted to gain an understanding of how remuneration committees in NZ 
listed companies make decisions and, hence, to refine the interview questions (see Section 
4.6.1).  Second, a potential list of interviewees were identified and then invited to participate 
in the research (see Section 4.6.2).  The sample of interviewees included executives, non-
executive directors, remuneration consultants and code issuers.  Third, the interviews were 
semi-structured and the interview questions were tailored to the interviewees’ experiences 
(see Section 4.6.3). Fourth, the interview transcripts were themed and analysed (see Section 
4.6.4).   
 
4.6.1. A Pilot Study 
A pilot study was carried out to gain an understanding of how remuneration decisions for NZ 
companies may be similar or different to AU and UK companies; to develop and refine 
interview questions that are relevant to both the interviewees and this research; and to refine 
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my interviewing skills.  A number of academics, directors and consultants were consulted.  
This occurred on both a formal and informal basis.  Notes were made during and after these 
discussions.  Occasionally, these discussions were electronically recorded with the consent of 
the other party.  My supervisors and I discussed summary notes from these consultations on 
many occasions.  The pilot study revealed the following: First, NZ companies are not 
particularly different from companies in other countries.  However, the remuneration 
committees in NZ companies have a conservative approach to remuneration decisions (e.g. 
the level of variable and total remuneration is lower than similar companies in other 
countries).  This may be an indicator of Corporate Logic.  Second, remuneration consultants, 
by providing data and advice, may influence remuneration decisions in the boardroom to a 
greater extent than code issuers.   
 
4.6.2. Sample of Interviewees 
The sample of interviewees was purposively, not randomly selected (Neuman, 2006; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  To gain an understanding of how remuneration decisions are made in 
NZ companies, the interviewees needed to include executives and non-executive directors of 
listed companies, consultants to listed companies, and representatives of code issuers.  Given 
the emphasis on remuneration decisions, most interviewees needed to be non-executive 
directors who are members of remuneration committees.  The number of interviewees was not 
predetermined.  Instead, the approach was to keep interviewing additional organisational 
actors until strong themes emerged from the data, (i.e. coalescing opinions among many 
interviewees) (Neuman, 2006; Saunders et al., 2009).
97
  Several approaches were taken to 
identify potential interviewees: First, ideal interviewees (e.g. directors who have held many 
directorships) were identified and contacted via letter, email and/or telephone; second, my 
supervisors and I used our personal contacts to find relevant interviewees; and third, 
interviewees asked other potential interviewees, on my behalf, if they would be willing to be 
interviewed.
98
  The latter two approaches had a very high success rate in gaining access to 
interviewees.   
 
Prior to contacting potential interviewees, approval from the University of Canterbury’s 
Human Ethics Committee was obtained to carry out this phase of the research (see Appendix 
                                                 
97
 This approach is consistent with a constructivist and interpretive methodology (Lundberg and Young, 2005). 
98
 This approach is known as snowball sampling and is appropriate because the population is easily identifiable 
(e.g. code issuers and listed companies in the public eye) (Saunders et al., 2009). 
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G).  For the potential interviewees that were contacted via letter or email, they were sent: an 
information sheet, a list of interview topics, a consent form, and a researcher agreement form 
(see Appendix H).  Interviewees that were contacted via telephone were only sent these 
documents if they expressed interest in participating in the research.  The information sheet 
outlined the research objectives, the time commitment involved for interviewees, the use of an 
electronic device to record interviews and the promise of confidentiality.  In terms of the 
latter, interviewees are not explicitly identified. Direct quotes (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9) have 
been censored so that the interviewees cannot be inadvertently identified. The interviewees 
were assigned pseudonyms (Director A, Executive A, Consultant A and Code Issuer A).  The 
list of topics to be discussed was based on the prior literature (see Chapters 2 and 3) and 
developed from the pilot study (see Section 4.6.3).  Note that there were different interview 
questions for different types of interviewees.  Before each interview began, interviewees 
signed the consent form, or interviewees gave verbal consent for telephone or Skype 
interviews.  Similarly, each interviewee was given a signed copy of the researcher agreement 
or I gave a verbal promise to the interviewees in telephone and Skype interviews. 
 
Table 4.10 outlines the sample of interviewees.  33 individuals were interviewed including 5 
executives, 16 non-executive directors, 6 remuneration consultants, 1 recruitment consultant, 
and 5 representatives of code issuers.  Several interviewees could be included in multiple 
categories, as of the 16 non-executives directors, 9 are former executives, 2 are consultants, 
and 2 are representatives of code issuers.  The executives and non-executives directors 
represented 38 companies that are or were listed on the New Zealand Exchange (NZX).  The 
non-executive directors have held on average 3 directorships in NZX listed companies as well 
as directorships in Australian listed companies, NZ private companies, NZ charities and NZ 
Government-owned entities. The consultants represented 4 consulting firms.  The 
representatives of code issuers represent 3 code issuers.  Thus, the interviewees are relevant 
because they are representative NZ listed companies and related parties (i.e. consultants and 
code issuers).  The interviews lasted 42.5 hours in total or 77 minutes on average.  I 
transcribed all of the interviews, which equalled 264,699 words in total or 8,021 words on 
average. 
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Table 4.10: Sample of Interviewees 
 Executives Non-executive 
Directors 
Consultants Representatives 
of Code Issuers 
Total 
# of interviewees 5 16 7 5 33 
# of males  5 13 4 4 26 
# of females 0 3 3 1 7 
 
4.6.3. Data Collection 
To address Research Question 3, the interviews were designed to collect data on the 
interviewees’ beliefs and experiences with respect to corporate governance and executive 
remuneration; and the context in which the interviewees formed their beliefs and had their 
experiences.  This is a qualitative approach as the data are narratives, rather than numbers.  
There are three types of interviews: Structured, semi-structured and unstructured.  Structured 
(or standardised) interviews were not used because the researcher (or interviewer) is not able 
to pose unplanned questions to the interviewees and the interviewees’ responses are reduced 
to brief answers or numbers (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009).  That is, the 
context of the interviewees’ responses is lost.  Unstructured interviews were not used because 
the researcher is reliant on the interviewees’ responses to guide the interview and, therefore, 
the same topics may not be covered in each interview (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et 
al., 2009).  Using semi-structured interviews was most appropriate as there were general and 
specific topics to be discussed during the interviews (Hermanson et al., 2011).  This involved 
asking all interviewees the same general questions, and then asking each interviewee specific 
but unplanned questions, depending on their responses to the general questions.
99
  
 
Table 4.11 outlines the topics that were covered by the general questions.  Each type of 
interviewee was asked the same general questions, but each type had slightly different general 
questions. For example, only representatives of code issuers were asked about how codes are 
produced.  The general questions were derived from prior qualitative research on 
remuneration committees (e.g. Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008) and the pilot study (see 
Section 4.6.1).  The general questions covered a range of topics including interviewees’ 
background, remuneration principles, remuneration practices, remuneration processes, 
stakeholders’ influence on and interest in remuneration decisions, and disclosure, regulations, 
and codes.  The unplanned questions also covered these topics, but were tailored to the 
interviewees’ responses.  Many general and unplanned questions had a dual nature as 
                                                 
99
 Hermanson et al. (2011, p.40) urge, “Future researchers are strongly encouraged to ask broad questions early 
in the interview that allow the interviewees to delve deeply into the issues.” 
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interviewees were asked what they have experienced (descriptive) and what they think should 
happen (normative).  Almost all of the interviews concluded with a discussion of the 
remuneration principles that are studied (see Table 4.5).  Each remuneration principle was 
described to the interviewees and then they were asked if they thought that the remuneration 
principle should be adhered to.   
 
Table 4.11: Interview Topics 
Interview Topics 
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Interviewees background (e.g. education and work experience)     
Executive remuneration: policies and practices      
Remuneration principles     
Remuneration committees and their decision-making processes     
Remuneration consultants: Data and advise     
Remuneration disclosure: Regulatory requirements     
Remuneration disclosure: Preparing the annual report     
External interest in remuneration (e.g. questions at the annual general meeting)     
Codes of practice: Process of producing     
Codes of practice: Impact on remuneration decisions and disclosure     
Public debate on remuneration (e.g. newspaper articles)     
 
The interviews were conducted between February and July 2010, and each interview involved 
the interviewee and me, except for one interview that involved two consultants and me.  One-
on-one interviews were preferred so that the interviewees were able to speak without being 
influenced or interrupted by another interviewee and feel confident that the interview would 
remain confidential.  23 interviews were held in-person, 9 over the telephone and 1 via Skype.  
In-person and Skype interviews were preferred over telephone interviews because the 
researcher can build a rapport with the interviewees and monitor their body language 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009).  However, the quality of the interviews did 
not appear to vary between interview formats.  Further, all of the interviews were recorded 
using an electronic device.  Given that executive remuneration is a sensitive research topic, 
recording the interviewees may have inhibited their responses (Bryman and Bell, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2009).  Main et al. (2008) expressed similar concerns, but noted that recording 
interviews is common for qualitative research on remuneration committees.  The main 
advantage of recording interviews is that it enables the researcher to ask relevant follow-up 
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questions (as their concentrate is not broken by taking notes) and ensures interviewees are 
accurately quoted.   
 
There are two limitations of the sampling and data collection procedures.  First, the 
interviewees may not be representative of population and their responses may have been 
selective (e.g. interviewees may not have mentioned incidences that they thought reflected 
poorly on themselves, their organisations and their professions).  While many potential 
interviewees declined the invitation to participate in the research, the sample of interviewees 
appears to be representative given the number of organisations covered (see Section 4.6.2).  
Also, some interviewees appeared to mentally edit their responses to the interview questions 
or respond in a way that did not answer the questions.  However, most interviewees appeared 
to be open and frank about their experiences and opinions.  Second, semi-structured 
interviews involve much interaction between the researcher and interviewees.  This can led to 
reflexivity, where the researcher biases the interviewees’ responses (e.g. the interviewees tell 
the researcher what they think the researcher wants to hear) (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Cassell, 
2009).  However, it was common for the interviewees to correct factual errors that they 
thought I made and express strong disagreement with some of my opinions.  Thus, researcher 
bias is less likely because the interviewees occupy roles (e.g. directorships) that require them 
to be strong-minded.  
 
4.6.4. Data Analysis 
To gain an understanding of the discourse of the NZ organisational actors, the interview 
transcripts were analysed in three different ways.  First, common and uncommon themes that 
emerged from the interviews were identified.  Notes were made on significant themes 
emerging from each interview and then these themes were compared across the interviews.  
Second, the extent to which each interviewee’s beliefs and experiences were consistent with 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic was considered.  This involved summarising each 
interviewee’s opinion of how they think executives should behave, what remuneration 
principles should be adhered to, and what should be best practice for executive remuneration.  
Third, the themes from prior research on executive remuneration (see Chapter 3) were used to 
identify other possible themes in the interview transcripts.  Overall, the main themes 
identified were: Corporate objective, the behavioural model of executives, influence of 
stakeholders (including code issuers and their codes), remuneration principles, remuneration 
practices and remuneration processes.  These themes correspond to Chapter 7’s sub-headings.     
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Chapter 7 addresses Research Question 3 by analysing interviewees’ opinions and 
experiences.  A background on executive remuneration in NZ is presented first.  In preparing 
the background, information from multiple sources were collected and analysed including 
academic journal articles on executive remuneration in NZ, several books, and, more 
importantly, newspaper articles published between 1989 and 2010 (obtained from the Factiva 
database).  The background provides context to the findings.  The remainder of Chapter 7 
includes many quotes from the interviewees, grouped by main themes (see above).  Note that 
the quotes are heavily edited to ensure anonymity of the interviewees and to improve 
readability.  Further, most quotes presented in Chapter 7 are attributed to directors and 
executives, rather than consultants and code issuers.  This is because code issuers are not as 
influential as had been expected (e.g. some directors had not read the NZ codes) and 
consultants can only provide limited insight into how remuneration committees make and 
report most remuneration decisions.
100
 
 
The findings represent my interpretation (or reconstruction) of the interviewees’ beliefs and 
experiences (see Chapter 7).  Given that an interpretive or constructivist methodology was 
adopted, the multiple voices of the interviewees have been distilled to create an account of 
social reality that gives preference to an institutional logics perspective (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005).  Particular attention is also given to the substantive and symbolic nature of 
remuneration decision-making and disclosure.  The findings do not mirror a physical reality, 
but generate insight into the interviewees’ social reality (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; Lundberg 
and Young, 2005).  The findings represent the collective voice of the interviewees, as 
expressed in the interviews. In presenting the findings, multiple quotes are given on each 
topic/issue where a claim of representation is made.  This ensures that the findings are 
transparent and can be evaluated (or critiqued) by others.  However, these representations 
cannot be generalised to the population (Saunders et al., 2009).  Instead, the findings generate 
understanding and explanation of how institutional logics shape the discourse on executive 
remuneration in the context of some NZ listed companies.   
 
                                                 
100
 Preliminary findings were published in Crombie (2010).  This is reproduced in Appendix I. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
The research investigates Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) claim that there has been an ongoing 
institutional battle between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  This has been played out in 
the discourses on long-term incentive plans (Zajac and Westphal, 1995), stock repurchase 
plans (Zajac and Westphal, 2004), and takeovers/takeover defences (Green et al., 2008).  The 
discourse on executive remuneration is studied.  First, a content analysis of codes and 
corporate annual reports is used to reveal how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have 
diffused over time in the UK, AU and NZ.  Second, discourse analysis of codes and corporate 
annual reports from the UK, AU and NZ is used to explore how Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic shape the discourse on executive remuneration.  Some insights into the substantive and 
symbolic nature of this discourse can also be uncovered.  Third, qualitative interviews are 
used to collect data on how remuneration decisions are made and reported in NZ only.  Unlike 
prior qualitative research on remuneration committees, these data are interpreted from an 
institutional logics perspective.   
 
The research “tries to explore the ways in which the socially produced ideas and objects that 
populate the world are created and maintained” (Phillips, 2003, p.222).  A key strength of this 
research is that multiple aspects of the discourse on executive remuneration are studied using 
multiple research methods.  Consistent with an interpretive and constructivist methodology, 
this enables a coalescing view of social reality to be reconstructed (Guba and Lincoln, 2005; 
Lundberg and Young, 2005).   However, one weakness of the research is that many aspects of 
this discourse are not studied.  First, only six remuneration principles are coded.  Other 
variables such as corporate objective, corporate governance principles and practices, non-
executive directors’ remuneration principles and practices, and executive remuneration 
practices are not coded from the full sample.  Second, the discourse analysis focused on 
illustrating the heterogeneity in the sub-sample of texts.  Third, organisational actors from AU 
and the UK are not interviewed.  Due to these limitations, the research is exploratory.  
However, plenty of opportunities for future research are unlocked. 
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Chapter 5: The Diffusion of Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses Research Question 1: To what extent have Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic become embedded in AU, NZ and UK organisational texts with respect to 
executive remuneration?  There are several remuneration principles that are indicators of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2).  Corporate Logic is consistent 
with the human resources, market and fairness principles; whereas, Investor Logic is 
consistent with the agency, pay-for-performance and motivation principles.  Further, the 
organisational texts that are studied include codes and corporate annual reports (see Chapter 
4, Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  Codes often include recommendations on executive remuneration and 
publicly listed companies are encouraged or required to comply with these recommendations.  
Corporate annual reports include remuneration policies and practices.  Remuneration 
principles are found within this discourse on executive remuneration (see Chapter 3, Table 
3.3).  Thus, this chapter investigates the incidence of remuneration principles and, 
consequently, institutional logics in codes and corporate annual reports. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The incidence of remuneration principles and 
institutional logics in codes and corporate annual reports from AU, NZ and the UK are 
analysed in Sections 2 and 3, respectively.  Particular attention is given to codes that have 
multiple editions and companies that have been continuously listed in the period studied.  The 
variability within the sample of organisational texts is highlighted.  The analysis also 
examines if remuneration principles have become taken-for-granted; it is expected that once a 
remuneration principle is adopted, it will not be discarded later.  Further, how the incidence of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic has changed over time in each country is studied.  It is 
expected that the findings will be similar to Zajac and Westphal (2004), who found that 
during the late 1980s US companies transitioned from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic.  In 
Section 4, the pattern of diffusion of the remuneration principles and institutional logics is 
described and then compared to Zajac and Westphal (2004).  Finally, concluding comments 
are made in Section 5. 
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5.2. Corporate Governance Codes of Practice 
This section presents descriptive statistics on the incidence of remuneration principles and 
institutional logics in codes from AU, NZ and UK. In total, 68 codes that were issued from 
1991 to 2010 are studied including 28 codes from the UK, 24 codes from AU and 16 codes 
from NZ.  Few codes were issued prior to the late-1990s in any of these countries, but many 
codes have been issued since including multiple editions.  The sampled codes all include 
principles
101
 and/or recommendations on executive remuneration for publicly listed 
companies.  There is an increasing incidence of remuneration principles in the sampled codes, 
although some codes such as AU’s Bosch reports (1991, 1993, 1995) and NZX’s Listing 
Rules (1994, 1999, 2003) include no remuneration principles.  Using remuneration principles 
as indicators of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, the findings show that both Logics are 
embedded in most codes. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the incidence of remuneration principles in codes.  The sampled codes are 
split into three time periods: 1992-1997; 1998-2006; and 2007-2010.
102
  The average number 
of remuneration principles present in codes has remained consistent over time in the UK and 
increased over time in AU, particularly from 1991 to 2006.  While the average initially 
increased in NZ codes (from 1992 to 2006), the average slightly decreased in NZ codes in 
recent years.  Typically, four or five remuneration principles are present in AU and UK codes, 
but only one or two remuneration principles are present in NZ codes.  Aside from the general 
increase in incidence of remuneration principles, there are no discernable patterns of change 
between countries and over time.  This is due to the small size of the sample.  However, the 
incidence of the fairness and market principles is lower than the other remuneration principles 
in most codes. This may indicate that Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate Logic in the 
codes. 
 
 
                                                 
101
 The use of the term ‘principles’ should not be confused with the six remuneration principles studied here. 
Codes are structured as follows: (1) Main principle, (2) Supporting principles or policies and (3) 
Recommendations that are based on the preceding principles.  For example, one of the Securities 
Commission’s (NZ, 2004b, p.2) principles is, “The remuneration of directors and executives should be 
transparent, fair, and reasonable.”  Note that the six remuneration principles studied here may be embedded 
in (or form part of) codes’ principles and/or recommendations. 
102
 The three time periods are chosen to facilitate comparison with the corporate annual reports.  The sample 
includes corporate annual reports from 1989 (UK only), 1998 and 2007.  Splitting the codes into three time 
periods will show the incidence of the remuneration principles and institutional logics prior to the corporate 
annual reports being issued.  This will partially evidence the extent to which codes influence corporate 
annual reports.   
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 168 
Table 5.1: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Codes of Practice 
Remuneration Principles UK: 
1992-
1997 
UK: 
1998-
2006 
UK: 
2007-
2010 
AU: 
1991-
1997 
AU: 
1998-
2006 
AU: 
2007-
2010 
NZ: 
1992-
1997 
NZ: 
1998-
2006 
NZ: 
2007-
2010 
Human Resources 2 10 5 2 7 8  3 1 
Market 3 7 3 1 5 6  2 1 
Fairness 3 6 4 1 5 7  5 2 
Agency 4 11 5 2 8 6  3 1 
Pay-for-performance 5 13 6 2 7 8  7 4 
Motivation 3 9 6 3 7 8  3 1 
No. of codes of practice 5 14 7 6 9 9 1 10 5 
Average (out of 6) 4.00 4.00 4.14 1.83 4.33 4.78 0.00 2.30 2.00 
Median (out of 6) 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.50 4.00 5.00 0.00 1.50 1.00 
 
There has been a proportional increase in incidence of most remuneration principles in codes 
over time.  The human resources, motivation and pay-for-performance principles have been 
strongly present in most codes, except for the human resources and motivation principles in 
NZ 2007-2010 codes.  Often the human resources and motivation principles are inseparable: 
Codes commonly state that remuneration practices can ‘attract, motivate and retain’ 
executives.  The agency principle has often been present in most codes, but there has been a 
decrease in incidence in NZ between 1998-2006 and 2007-2010.  The market and fairness 
principles have also been found in most codes, albeit to a lesser extent than the other 
remuneration principles.  The incidence of fairness principle has declined in NZ between 
1998-2006 and 2007-2010.  Overall, Table 5.1 indicates that remuneration principles have 
been widely diffused in codes in the UK and AU, and partially diffused in codes in NZ. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the incidence of remuneration principles in UK codes that have multiple 
editions.  This includes codes produced by the ABI (Association of British Insurers), the 
Financial Reporting Council, Hermes (Hermes Pension Fund Management Ltd) and official 
inquires.
103
  While there is a general increase in the incidence of remuneration principles, 
there are a few changes between editions of codes.  The principles and recommendations in 
codes typically cover a broad range of issues rather than being focused on only executive 
remuneration.  Only the Greenbury (1995) report focuses on directors’ remuneration.  Most of 
Greenbury’s principles and recommendations on remuneration are adopted in the Financial 
Reporting Council’s Combined Code, and these were not changed between editions until 
                                                 
103
 The official inquiries included Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998), Higgs (2003) and Walker 
(2009).  Only the official inquiries that included some investigation of executive remuneration are sampled.  
While the official inquiries were instigated by a variety of parties (e.g. Cadbury was instigated by the London 
Stock Exchange and the UK accounting profession, whereas Walker was instigated by the UK’s Prime 
Minister), each subsequent official inquiry refers to previous official inquires.  Also, the official inquiries are 
commonly grouped together (e.g. Jones and Pollitt, 2004; Solomon, 2008; Tricker, 2009).  
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2010.  Curiously, the agency principle is dropped in the 2010 edition of the Combined Code 
(renamed, the UK Corporate Governance Code).  On the whole, the incidence of 
remuneration principles varies between editions of codes because some codes (or some 
editions of codes) focus on executive remuneration (e.g. Greenbury), while other codes have 
limited discussion of executive remuneration (e.g. Hermes).   
 
Figure 5.1: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in the UK’s Codes  
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the incidence of remuneration principles in AU codes that have multiple 
editions.
104
  There has been much stability as there are no changes in the codes of Bosch, 
Hilmer, and the ASX Corporate Governance Council (ASXCGC).  However, there has been 
change in the codes of the Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA; formerly, 
Australian Investment Managers’ Association, AIMA), Australian Institute of Company 
Directors (AICD) and Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA).  As with UK codes, the 
principles and recommendations in AU codes cover a broad range of issues.  The number of 
remuneration principles present is related to the emphasis placed on remuneration; codes that 
                                                 
104
 The Productivity Commission (2009) report is also displayed in Figure 5.2 because it is dedicated solely to 
director and executive remuneration.   
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are general in nature or short in length use fewer remuneration principles. Further, codes that 
are issued by multiple organisations include more remuneration principles than other codes, 
such as the Executive Share and Option Scheme Guidelines (2000) and Executive Equity Plan 
Guidelines (2007) jointly issued by IFSA, AICD and ASA. 
 
Figure 5.2: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in AU’s Codes  
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the incidence of remuneration principles in NZ codes that have multiple 
editions.
105
  There has been much stability as there are no changes in the codes of the Institute 
of Directors in New Zealand and MinterEllison (an Australasian-based law firm).  The NZX’s 
listing rules do not contain remuneration principles, but their Corporate Governance Code 
does include the pay-for-performance principle. This code has not changed over time with 
respect to executive remuneration.  Further, there is only one edition of the Securities 
Commission’s Code; the other two data points relate to reports issued by the Securities 
Commission on companies’ voluntary compliance with its Code.  There are fewer 
remuneration principles in the second report because it does not repeat the code’s principles, 
                                                 
105
 The NZSA (New Zealand Shareholders’ Association) (2004) discussion document is also displayed in Figure 
5.3 because it is dedicated solely to executive remuneration.  
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while the first report does.  Similar to AU and UK codes, NZ codes that contain limited 
discussion of executive remuneration use fewer remuneration principles.  Note that the code 
with the most discussion of executive remuneration is the NZSA (2004). 
 
Figure 5.3: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in NZ’s Codes  
 
 
Table 5.2 shows the incidence of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in codes.
106
  Both 
Logics are present in most codes (UK: 81%; AU: 79%; NZ: 44%) followed by Investor Logic 
only (UK: 19%; AU: 8%; NZ: 25%) and no Logic (UK: 0%; AU: 13%; NZ: 31%).  None of 
the codes include Corporate Logic only.  The presence of both Logics has become stronger 
over time in AU and UK codes, whereas recent NZ codes still furnish instances in which no 
Logic is included or only Investor Logic is included.  As shown in the lower half of Table 5.2, 
there is often a balance between both Logics (UK: 48%; AU: 58%; NZ: 86%), followed by 
Investor Logic being stronger than Corporate Logic (UK: 33%; AU: 26%; NZ: 14%) and 
Corporate Logic being stronger than Investor Logic (UK: 19%; AU: 16%; NZ: 0%). On the 
                                                 
106
 Corporate Logic is assumed to be present in a code if one or more of the following remuneration principles 
are present: The human resources, market and fairness principles; whereas Investor Logic is assumed to be 
present in a code if one or more of the following remuneration principles are present: The agency, pay-for-
performance and motivation principles.  These assumptions are appropriate because the remuneration 
principles are closely tied to various institutional logics (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2).  
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whole, Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate Logic because codes are often produced in 
response to jolts such as corporate scandals (see Section 5.4). 
 
Table 5.2: Incidence of Institutional Logics in Codes  
Institutional Logic UK: 
1992-
1997 
UK: 
1998-
2006 
UK: 
2007-
2010 
AU: 
1991-
1997 
AU: 
1998-
2006 
AU: 
2007-
2010 
NZ: 
1992-
1997 
NZ: 
1998-
2006 
NZ: 
2007-
2010 
Neither Logic    3   1 3 1 
Corporate Logic
1
          
Investor Logic
2
 1 4  1 1   2 2 
Both Logics 4 10 7 2 8 9  5 2 
No. of codes of practice 5 14 7 6 9 9 1 10 5 
Both Logics
3
 
Corporate Logic stronger 
than Investor Logic 
1 1 2 1 1 1    
Investor Logic stronger 
than Corporate Logic 
2 3 2 1 3 1  1  
Both Logics are equal in 
strength 
1 6 3  4 7  4 2 
Notes: 
1 Corporate Logic is measured by the presence of one or more of the following remuneration principles in 
a code: Human Resources, Market and Fairness.  If remuneration principles related to Investor Logic 
are also present in a code, then both Logics are present. 
2 Investor Logic is measured by the presence of one or more of the following remuneration principles in a 
code: Agency, Pay-for-performance and Motivation.There are six remuneration principles in total, with 
three related to both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  If there is an imbalance of remuneration 
principles related to these logics, then one Logic is stronger (or more dominant) than the other logic.  
For example, if a code includes the Human Resources, Market and Pay-for-performance principles, then 
Corporate Logic is stronger than Investor Logic.  There are three possibilities when both Logics are 
present in a code: Corporate Logic stronger than Investor Logic; Investor Logic stronger than Corporate 
Logic; or both Logics are equal in strength. 
 
Table 5.3 shows how the incidence of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in codes changes 
between editions.  The first half of Table 5.3 shows most codes include Investor Logic only or 
both Logics and this does not change between editions.  This indicates that there is relative 
stability in the incidence of both Logics in codes.  The second half of Table 5.3 shows that the 
codes that have changed between editions have oscillated between Investor Logic and both 
Logics in the UK, and between no Logic and Investor Logic in NZ.  However, the oscillation 
in the NZX’s codes is misleading because the bulk of discussion on executive remuneration is 
contained in their Corporate Governance Code, not the Listing Rules.  There is no change in 
the NZX’s Corporate Governance Code over time with respect to executive remuneration.  
This means that there is stability in the incidence of Investor Logic in the NZX’s codes.  
Similarly, there has been no change in AU codes.  Thus, Investor Logic is present in most 
codes.  Also, recommendations on executive remuneration included in the first edition of a 
code are rarely changed in subsequent editions. 
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Table 5.3: Change in Incidence of Institutional Logics in Codes  
Change in 
Institutional Logic 
UK AU NZ 
No Change    
Neither Logic  Bosch’s Corporate Practices and Conduct 
(Bosch) (1991; 1993; 1995) 
 
Investor Logic  Hilmer’s Strictly Boardroom (Hilmer) (1993; 
1998) 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts (MERW) (2003; 2009) 
Both Logics Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Combined 
Code (1998, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010) 
 
Investment and Financial Services Association 
(IFSA; formerly, Australian Investment 
Managers’ Association, AIMA) (1995; 1997; 
1999; 2000; 2002; 2004; 2007a, b; 2009)
2
 
Australian Institute of Company Directors 
(AICD) (2000; 2003; 2007)
 2
 
Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate 
Governance Council (ASXCGC) (2003; 
2007; 2010) 
Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA) 
(2000; 2004a,b; 2007)
 2
 
Securities Commission (SecCom) (2004b; 2006; 
2010) 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand (IODNZ) 
(2005; 2010) 
Change    
From Both Logics 
to Investor Logic 
Official reports (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 
1995; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003; Walker, 
2009)
 1
 
  
Oscillating 
between Investor 
Logic and Both 
Logics 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) (1993; 
1996; 1999a,b; 2002; 2005; 2007) 
Hermes Investment Management Limited 
(Hermes) (1999; 2002; 2003; 2006; 2008) 
  
Oscillating 
between no Logic 
and Investor Logic 
  New Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX) 
(1994; 1999; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2010) 
Notes: 
1 All of the official reports except Walker (2009) include both Logics. While Walker’s (2009) recommendations are based on Investor Logic, FRC’s Combined Code 
(which includes both Logics) is also endorsed. 
2 The 2000 and 2007 editions of these codes are jointly issued by IFSA, AICD and ASA. 
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The content analysis of the codes shows that the incidence of the remuneration principles has 
increased over time in the UK, AU and NZ.  In general, once a remuneration principle is 
included in the first edition of a code, it will remain in the subsequent editions of the code.  
While all of the remuneration principles are present in most codes, there is a lower incidence 
of the market and fairness principles than the other remuneration principles in the codes.  The 
fairness and market principles are the most likely to be dropped or added between editions of 
codes.  As aforementioned, different remuneration principles are used as an indicator of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The findings indicate that Investor Logic has been 
deeply embedded in the first edition of most codes.  Corporate Logic is also embedded in 
many of the codes, but only in combination with Investor Logic. 
 
5.3. Corporate Annual Reports 
This section presents descriptive statistics on the incidence of remuneration principles and 
institutional logics in corporate annual reports from AU, NZ and the UK.  Two samples of 
corporate annual reports are studied.  The first sample includes 350 corporate annual reports 
that were published in 1989 (UK only), 1998 and 2007 by the largest 50 publicly listed 
companies in the UK, AU and NZ.
107
  The second sample includes 382 corporate annual 
reports that were published in 1989 (UK only), 1998 and 2007 by the largest publicly listed 
companies that were continuously listed.
108
  While the sampled corporate annual reports 
included varying amounts of disclosure on executive remuneration, there is an increasing 
incidence of remuneration principles.  Using remuneration principles as indicators of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, the findings show that both Logics are present in most 
corporate annual reports. 
 
Based on the first sample, Table 5.4 shows the incidence of remuneration principles in annual 
reports of the largest 50 publicly listed companies in the UK, AU and NZ.  The median usage 
of the six remuneration principles increased from zero in 1989 to five in 1998 in the UK, from 
two in 1998 to five in 2007 in AU, and from zero in 1998 to two in 2007 in NZ.  These 
findings indicate that there has been an unambiguous increase in the incidence of all six 
                                                 
107
 Largest is measured by market capitalisation on 31 December (or thereabouts).  Only UK companies’ 1989 
annual reports are sampled because AU and NZ companies’ 1989 annual reports are near impossible to 
obtain and regulations at the time did not require AU and NZ companies to disclose any information about 
executive remuneration.  See Chapter 4, Table 4.4 for further details. 
108
 The histories of the largest 50 publicly listed companies from 2007 were traced back to 1998 for AU and NZ 
companies and to 1989 for UK companies.  The sample only includes those companies that are continuously 
listed during these periods, although some companies changed as a result of mergers and acquisitions.  Thus, 
this is a matched or paired sample.  See Chapter 4, Table 4.4 for further details. 
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remuneration principles over time. By 2007 in the UK and AU, five out of six remuneration 
principles are present in at least 86% of the corporate annual reports.  In contrast, by 2007 in 
NZ, only the human resources and pay-for-performance principles are present in more than 
50% of the corporate annual reports. 
 
Table 5.4: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies  
Remuneration Principles UK: 
1989 
UK: 
1998 
UK: 
2007 
AU: 
1998 
AU: 
2007 
NZ: 
1998 
NZ: 
2007 
Human Resources 4 45 48 27 46 6 27 
Market 3 46 50 29 50 6 19 
Fairness 3 7 18  33  11 
Agency 1 34 44 11 45 3 16 
Pay-for-performance 4 48 48 28 50 11 33 
Motivation 8 42 45 18 40 3 16 
No. of companies 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Average (out of 6) 0.46 4.44 5.06 2.26 5.28 0.58 2.44 
Median (out of 6) 0.00 5.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 0.00 2.00 
 
While these findings do not pinpoint when the increase in incidence of the remuneration 
principles occurred, the change probably occurred after the issuance of Greenbury’s (1995) 
Report on Director’s Remuneration in the UK and ASXCGC’s (2003) Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in AU.  Both codes were 
incorporated into the listing rules of each country’s stock exchange and companies had to 
report their compliance with these codes or explain why they did not comply.  Also, these 
codes included many remuneration principles.  It is likely that companies copied the language 
of the codes in drafting their remuneration reports.
109
  In contrast, there are few remuneration 
disclosure requirements in NZ, which explains why the increase in incidence of remuneration 
principles in the annual reports of NZ companies has been much less dramatic than in the UK 
and AU (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and Chapter 7, Section 7.2). 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, the incidence of the human resources, market and fairness principles 
have all increased over time in the annual reports of UK, AU and NZ companies.  
Collectively, these remuneration principles claim that executives are talented and should be 
remunerated at levels comparable to other executives.  While the increase is comparable and 
                                                 
109
 For example, after the Greenbury (1995) Report was issued, a reporter for the Financial Times, Jim Kelly 
commented that, “Greenbury requires a statement of remuneration policy and E&Y found that the dreaded 
accountants’ disease – known as “boilerplate” – had taken hold. Time and time again, companies’ rewards 
policy was designed to “attract, retain and motivate”, a phrase hijacked from the Greenbury report itself” 
(Kelly, 4 July 1996).   
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to near saturation for the human resources and market principles, the increase has been much 
lower for the fairness principle.  The incidence of the fairness principle in AU annual reports 
is much higher than UK and NZ annual reports because one of ASXCGC’s (2003, p.11) 
principles is to “Remunerate fairly and responsibly” and this phrase is repeated in many AU 
corporate annual reports.  However, this usage of the fairness principle is shallow because 
fairness is not defined in ASXCGC (2003) or in most AU corporate annual reports. 
 
As also shown in Table 5.4, the incidence of the agency, pay-for-performance and motivation 
principles have all increased over time in the annual reports of UK, AU and NZ companies.  
Collectively, these remuneration principles indicate that in the absence of financial incentives, 
executives would not be motivated and their interests would not be aligned with those of 
shareholders.  In the UK and AU, these remuneration principles are found in almost all 2007 
corporate annual reports.  The pay-for-performance principle is present in the annual reports 
of many NZ companies, but the agency and motivation principles are not.  NZ companies 
disclose few details about the CEO’s remuneration package and, consequently, use fewer 
remuneration principles because the mandatory disclosure requirements are minimal, unless 
the CEO is also a director.  
 
Table 5.5 shows the total number of remuneration principles in annual reports of UK, AU and 
NZ companies.  A dramatic change from 1989 to 1998 in the UK and from 1998 to 2007 in 
AU is apparent as most companies began using multiple remuneration principles.  By 2007, 
there are few UK and AU companies that use less than four remuneration principles.  The 
change amongst NZ companies is considerable from 1998 to 2007, but muted in comparison 
to that in the UK and AU.  By 2007, most NZ companies use a range of remuneration 
principles, but there are still eight that use no remuneration principles at all.  While UK and 
AU companies have clearly transitioned from very low to very high usage of the six 
remuneration principles, NZ companies may still be in the process of doing so. 
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Table 5.5: Number of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of Largest 50 
Publicly Listed Companies 
Number of 
Remuneration principles 
UK: 
1989 
UK: 
1998 
UK: 
2007 
AU: 
1998 
AU: 
2007 
NZ: 
1998 
NZ: 
2007 
0 37 0 0 13 0 37 8 
1 6 0 0 5 0 6 11 
2 4 2 1 9 0 1 8 
3 3 6 0 6 2 4 9 
4 0 15 8 13 6 1 6 
5 0 22 27 4 18 1 4 
6 0 5 14 0 24 0 4 
No. of companies 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
 
The findings presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 examine possible reasons why remuneration 
principles have become widely diffused by 2007.  First, institutional pressure is considered.  
To demonstrate compliance with codes, companies will adopt remuneration principles that are 
found in codes (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3).  Companies that are listed on stock exchanges in 
multiple countries will be subject to greater institutional pressure than companies that are 
listed on one stock exchange because each jurisdiction has a different set of mandatory and 
voluntary codes.  Second, the change in composition of the sample is considered.  The largest 
50 companies vary considerably between time periods.  The largest 50 companies in 2007 
may also have used many remuneration principles in 1998 or 1989.  Thus, the incidence of the 
remunerations principles in the sample of continuously publicly listed companies is examined 
(see Section 5.3.2.). This will show the extent to which the incidence of the remuneration 
principles changes over time for each company. 
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Table 5.6: Influence of the Number of Stock Exchange Listings on the Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of the 
Largest 50 Publicly Listed Companies 
Remuneration Principles UK: 1998 UK: 2007 AU: 1998 AU: 2007 NZ: 1998 NZ: 2007 
 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 
Human Resources 20 25  10 38  11 16  27 19  1 5 * 9 18 * 
Market 20 26  10 40  11 18  31 19  2 4 * 2 17 * 
Fairness 1 6 * 2 16 * 0 0  21 12  0 0  3 8 * 
Agency 13 21  8 36  3 8  27 18  0 3 * 7 9  
Pay-for-performance 21 27  10 38  9 19  31 19  1 10 * 16 17 * 
Motivation 19 23  10 35 * 10 8 * 24 16  0 3 * 4 12 * 
No. of Companies 22 28  10 40  20 30  31 19  34 16  29 21  
Average (out of 6) 4.27 4.57  5.00 5.08  2.20 2.30  5.19 5.42  0.12 1.56 * 1.41 3.86 * 
Median (out of 6) 4.50 5.00  5.00 5.00  2.00 2.00  5.00 5.00  0.00 1.00 * 1.00 4.00 * 
Note:  Based on the first sample, the table reports the incidence of remuneration principles in the annual reports of the largest 50 companies.  These companies are divided 
into two groups: A ‘1’ refers to companies that are listed on only one stock exchange; and a ‘2+’ refers to companies that are listed on multiple stock exchanges.  Using an 
independent sample test (t-test), the difference between means of companies listed on one and multiple stock exchanges is calculated.  A ‘*’ in the Significance (‘Sig.’) 
column indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in means at the 95% confidence level (p < 0.05).  The t-statistics are not reported in the table. 
 
Table 5.7: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Annual Reports of the Largest Continuously Publicly Listed Companies 
Remuneration Principles UK: From 1989 to 1998 UK: From 1998 to 2007 AU: From 1998 to 2007 NZ: From 1998 to 2007 
 1989 1998 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 
Human Resources 3 31 * 40 46  23 43 * 5 23 * 
Market 1 36 * 45 48  26 46 * 4 16 * 
Fairness 3 7  8 18 * 0 29 * 0 9 * 
Agency 0 25 * 31 42 * 10 40 * 5 14 * 
Pay-for-performance 2 35 * 44 46  27 46 * 12 27 * 
Motivation 3 28 * 38 43  16 37 * 4 13 * 
No. of Companies 38 38  48 48  46 46  39 39  
Average (out of 6) 0.33 4.26 * 4.29 5.06  2.22 5.24 * 0.77 2.62 * 
Median (out of 6) 0.00 5.00 * 5.00 5.00  2.00 5.00 * 0.00 3.00 * 
Note:  The results reported in the table are based on a sub-sample of companies from the second sample.  Only those companies that did not merge with or acquire any other 
publicly listed companies during the period studied are included in this sub-sample.  This yields a matched or paired sample.  The table reports the incidence of remuneration 
principles in the annual reports of the largest continuously listed companies.  Using an independent sample test (t-test), the difference between means of companies from 
different time periods is calculated.  A ‘*’ in the Significance (‘Sig.’) column indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in means at the 95% confidence level 
(p < 0.05).  The t-statistics are not reported in the table. 
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Table 5.6 shows the extent to which the number of stock exchange listings influences the 
incidence of remuneration principles in the annual reports of companies.  There are few 
statistically significant differences between UK and AU companies that are listed on one or 
multiple stock exchanges.  As there are many UK and AU codes that contain many 
remuneration principles, it is likely that codes from other jurisdictions will not add to 
institutional pressure in each country.  In contrast, there are many statistically significant 
differences between NZ companies that are listed on one or multiple stock exchanges.  There 
are statistically significant differences between the two groups across most remuneration 
principles in both 1998 and 2007.  These findings show that those NZ companies that are also 
listed on the ASX or LSE adopt statistically significantly more remuneration principles than 
those that are only listed on the NZX. 
 
Based on the second sample,
110
 Table 5.7 shows that the median usage of remuneration 
principles in the annual reports of continuously listed companies increased from zero to five 
in UK companies between 1989 and 1998, from two to five in AU companies between 1998 
and 2007, and from zero to three in NZ companies between 1998 and 2007.  By 2007, most 
UK and AU companies use all remuneration principles except for the fairness principle, while 
many NZ companies use several remuneration principles.  Consistent with previous findings 
in this chapter, the human resources, market and pay-for-performance principles are the most 
widely diffused amongst UK, AU and NZ companies.  Therefore, the change in composition 
of the sample of the largest 50 companies over time is not related to the change in incidence 
of the remuneration principles. 
 
Table 5.8 shows the number of remuneration principles dropped or added between time 
periods in annual reports of the continuously listed companies.
111
  This indicates that 
remuneration principles have been added by most companies, but dropped by few companies 
over time.  The most likely remuneration principles to be dropped in all countries are the 
motivation and agency principles.  All remuneration principles have been added by many AU 
and NZ companies between 1998 and 2007.  Further, all remuneration principles (except 
fairness principle) have been added by many UK companies between 1989 and 1998, whereas 
                                                 
110
 The results reported are based on a sub-sample of companies from the second sample.  Only those companies 
that did not merge with or acquire any other publicly listed companies during the period studied are included 
in this sub-sample.  This yields a matched or paired sample, which enables direct comparisons between 
companies to be made.   
111
 The results reported are based on a sub-sample of companies from the second sample.  Refer to Footnote 108.  
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 180 
agency and fairness have been added by a quarter of UK companies between 1998 and 
2007.
112
  Overall, these findings show that once adopted, remuneration principles are rarely 
dropped by companies. 
 
Table 5.8: Number of Remuneration Principles Dropped or Added between Time 
Periods in Annual Reports of the Largest Continuously Publicly Listed Companies 
Change UK: From 1989 
to 1998 
UK: From 1998 
to 2007 
AU: From 1998 
to 2007 
NZ: From 1998 to 
2007 
Dropped     
Human Resources 0 1 1 0 
Market 0 0 0 0 
Fairness 3 2 0 0 
Agency 0 3 2 2 
Pay-for-performance 0 1 0 1 
Motivation 1 3 3 2 
No. of companies that 
dropped one or more 
4 (11%) 10 (21%) 4 (9%) 2 (5%) 
Average no. of 
remuneration principles 
dropped per company 
1.00 1.00 1.50 2.50 
Added     
Human Resources 28 7 21 18 
Market 35 3 20 12 
Fairness 7 12 29 9 
Agency 25 14 32 11 
Pay-for-performance 33 3 19 16 
Motivation 26 8 24 11 
No. of companies that 
added one or more 
38 (100%) 27 (56%) 44 (96%) 29 (74%) 
Average no. of 
remuneration principles 
added per company 
4.05 1.74 3.30 2.66 
Total no. of companies 38 48 46 39 
Note:  The results reported in the table are based on a sub-sample of companies from the second sample.  Only 
those companies that did not merge with or acquire any other publicly listed companies during the period studied 
are included in this sub-sample.  This yields a matched or paired sample.   
 
Using remuneration principles as indicators of institutional logics, Table 5.9 shows the 
incidence of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in annual reports of the largest 50 
companies.  The first half of Table 5.9 shows that no Logic is present in annual reports of 
74% of UK companies in 1989, 26% of AU companies in 1998 and 74% of NZ companies in 
1998.  By 2007, institutional logics are present in annual reports of 98% of UK companies, 
100% of AU companies and 54% of NZ companies.  Corporate Logic only and Investor Logic 
                                                 
112
 For UK companies, the average number of remuneration principles added per company is 4.05 from 1989 to 
1998 and 1.74 from 1998 to 2007.  There is a significant decrease because most UK companies in 1998 
already used all or almost all of the remuneration principles.  
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only are rarely present in annual reports of companies in all time periods, except that Investor 
Logic only is present in annual reports of 24% of NZ companies in 2007.   
 
The relative strength of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic when both Logics are present in 
corporate annual reports is analysed in the second half of Table 5.9.  The findings indicate 
that there is often a balance between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, i.e. an equal 
number of remuneration principles related to both Logics are present in corporate annual 
reports.  Amongst UK and AU companies, a balance of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is 
as likely as Investor Logic being stronger than Corporate Logic.  Amongst NZ companies, all 
three possibilities are equally likely.  On the whole, Corporate Logic being stronger than 
Investor Logic does not occur as frequently amongst all companies over time.  Therefore, 
consistent with the findings from the codes, Investor Logic is deeply embedded in corporate 
annual reports, while Corporate Logic is often only embedded in combination with Investor 
Logic. 
 
Table 5.9: Incidence of Institutional Logics in Annual Reports of Largest 50 Publicly 
Listed Companies  
Institutional Logic UK: 
1989 
UK: 
1998 
UK: 
2007 
AU: 
1998 
AU: 
2007 
NZ: 
1998 
NZ: 
2007 
Neither Logic 37   13  37 8 
Corporate Logic
1
 4  1 4  2 3 
Investor Logic
2
 6   2  6 12 
Both Logics 3 50 49 31 50 5 27 
No. of companies 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Both Logics
3
 
Corporate Logic stronger 
than Investor Logic 
1 2 3 4 8 2 8 
Investor Logic stronger 
than Corporate Logic 
2 27 25 7 14 2 9 
Equal strength of 
Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic 
 21 21 20 28 1 10 
Notes: 
1 Corporate Logic is measured by the presence of one or more of the following remuneration principles in 
a company’s annual report: Human Resources, Market and Fairness.  If remuneration principles related 
to Investor Logic are also present in a company’s annual report, then both Logics are present. 
2 Investor Logic is measured by the presence of one or more of the following remuneration principles in a 
company’s annual report: Agency, Pay-for-performance and Motivation. 
3 There are six remuneration principles in total, with three related to both Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic.  If there is an imbalance of remuneration principles related to these Logics, then one Logic is 
stronger (or more dominant) than the other Logic.  For example, if a company’s annual report includes 
the Human Resources, Market and Pay-for-performance principles, then Corporate Logic is stronger 
than Investor Logic.  There are three possibilities when both Logics are present in a company’s annual 
report: Corporate Logic stronger than Investor Logic; Investor Logic stronger than Corporate Logic; or 
equal strength of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
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Table 5.10 shows the change in incidence of institutional logics in annual reports of the 
largest continuously listed companies.  Most of the change that has occurred has been from no 
Logic to both Logics.  There are several anomalous examples of Corporate Logic only: 
Associated British Foods (UK) and Antofagasta (UK) changed from no Logic in 1989 to 
Corporate Logic only in 1998, and Antofagasta remained classified as Corporate Logic only 
in 2007; Tourism Holdings (NZ) changed from no Logic in 1998 to Corporate Logic only in 
2007; and BIL International (NZ) changed from Investor Logic only in 1998 to Corporate 
Logic only in 2007.  There are also several NZ companies that use Investor Logic only in 
2007.  These examples are discussed in Chapter 6.  Further, companies that used both Logics 
in an earlier time period continued to use both Logics in latter timer periods.  As a result, 
there was no change amongst many AU and UK companies.  Overall, both Logics have been 
embedded in most annual reports of AU, NZ and UK companies by 2007. 
 
Table 5.10: Change in Incidence of Institutional Logics in Annual Reports of Largest 
Continuously Publicly Listed Companies 
Change in Institutional Logic UK: From 1989 
to 1998 
UK: From 1998 
to 2007 
AU: From 1998 
to 2007 
NZ: From 1998 
to 2007 
No Change     
Neither Logic    7 (18%) 
Corporate Logic  1 (2%)   
Investor Logic    2 (3%) 
Both Logics 2 (5%) 45 (94%) 28 (61%) 5 (13%) 
From Corporate Logic to…     
Both Logics 3 (8%) 1 (2%) 5 (11%)  
From Investor Logic to…     
Corporate Logic    1 (3%) 
Both Logics 2 (5%) 1 (2%) 3 (7%) 4 (11%) 
From No Logic to…     
Corporate Logic 2 (5%)   1 (3%) 
Investor Logic    5 (13%) 
Both Logics 29 (76%)  10 (22%) 14 (36%) 
No. of Companies 38 (100%) 48 (100%) 46 (100%) 39 (100%) 
Note:  The results reported in the table are based on a sub-sample of companies from the second sample.  Only 
those companies that did not merge with or acquire any other publicly listed companies during the period studied 
are included in this sub-sample.  This yields a matched or paired sample.   
 
The content analysis of the two samples of corporate annual reports shows that the incidence 
of the remuneration principles has increased over time in the UK, AU and NZ.  In general, 
once a remuneration principle is included in a corporate annual report, it will remain in the 
subsequent corporate annual reports.  The human resources, pay-for-performance and 
motivation principles are present in almost all corporate annual reports, whereas the market, 
agency and motivation principles are present in most corporate annual reports.  As 
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aforementioned, different remuneration principles are used as an indicator of Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic.  The findings indicate that Investor Logic has been deeply embedded in 
most corporate annual reports, particularly in 2007.  Corporate logic is also embedded in 
many of corporate annual reports, but often only in combination with Investor Logic. 
 
5.4. Diffusion of the Remuneration Principles and Institutional Logics 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the incidence of remuneration principles in codes and corporate annual 
reports from the UK, AU and NZ.  There is greater average incidence of remuneration 
principles in codes issued prior to 1998 than in 1998 corporate annual reports.  This supports 
the proposition that companies respond to institutional pressures by adopting remuneration 
principles found in codes. Companies do this to demonstrate conformance with societal 
expectations.  By 2007, the incidence of remuneration principles in corporate annual reports 
exceeded that in codes.  An increased incidence of remuneration principles has been most 
pronounced in the UK between 1989 and 1998, in AU and NZ between 1998 and 2007.  
However, the average incidence of remuneration principles in NZ lags behind the average 
incidence in the UK and AU because there are relatively few NZ codes and most have been 
issued more recently.  Overall, the remuneration principles have been very widely diffused in 
the UK and AU, but only partially diffused in NZ. 
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Figure 5.4: Incidence of Remuneration Principles in Codes and Corporate Annual 
Reports from the UK, AU and NZ between 1989 and 2010 
 
 
There are four possibilities: No Logic, Corporate Logic only, Investor Logic only, and both 
Logics (see Chapter 2).  The findings presented in this chapter indicate that there has been a 
transition from no Logic to both Logics between 1989 and 2007.  The transition occurred in 
the UK by 1998 and in AU by 2007.  A transition has also occurred in NZ, but to a much 
lesser extent than in the UK and AU.    It may be that both Logics do not become widely 
diffused in NZ.  Further, the findings also indicate that Investor Logic is more deeply 
embedded than Corporate Logic in codes and corporate annual reports. In this respect, the 
findings are partially consistent with Zajac and Westphal (2004), although there is no 
transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic.  However, the findings presented in this 
chapter do not indicate why both Logics have become embedded in codes and corporate 
annual reports.   
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5.5. Conclusion 
All remuneration principles are widely diffused in codes and corporate annual reports from 
the UK, AU and NZ, but the level of diffusion is much lower in NZ than in the UK and AU.  
The incidence of the human resources and pay-for-performance principles is the highest in 
codes and corporate annual reports, followed by the market, agency and motivation 
principles.  The fairness principle has the lowest incidence, particularly in corporate annual 
reports.  This indicates that the version of Corporate Logic embedded in most codes and 
corporate annual reports is less concerned with vertical equity (i.e. fairness to employees) and 
more concerned with horizontal equity (i.e. fairness to executives) when deciding executive 
remuneration.  The findings also indicate that Investor Logic is deeply embedded in most 
codes and corporate annual reports. 
 
How both Logics are able to co-exist in organisational texts is problematic given that 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing implications for corporate governance and 
executive remuneration (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3 and Chapter 3, Tables 3.2 and 3.5).  It may 
be that one or both Logics are used symbolically in organisational texts.  This would resolve 
the tension between the Logics as only one or no Logic would be driving the underlying 
organisational behaviour. Alternatively, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic may have 
merged into a new logic.  This may be possible as the fairness principle is deemphasised.  
However, there may be inherent tension in this new Logic, particularly if how much other 
executives are being paid is changing at a different rate to firm performance.  Thus, Chapter 6 
investigates in greater depth how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in codes 
and corporate annual reports. 
 
This chapter also studied the timing of diffusion.  In the UK, diffusion occurred between 1989 
and 1998 with the Greenbury (1995) report being the likely catalyst for change.  In AU, 
diffusion occurred between 1998 and 2007 with the ASXCGC’s (2003) code being the likely 
catalyst for change, although diffusion was well underway before 2003.  In NZ, there does not 
appear to have been any code that has been a catalyst for change, which explains why the 
remuneration principles are not as widely diffused.  But NZ companies listed on multiple 
stock exchanges have experienced greater diffusion.  However, these findings provide only 
limited insight into the process of diffusion that has occurred in the UK, AU and NZ.  The 
process by which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become embedded in 
organisational texts is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6: Institutional Logics and Discourse on 
Executive Remuneration   
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses Research Question 2: How, if at all, have Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic influenced how executive remuneration has been conceptualised in AU, NZ 
and UK organisational texts?  The discourse analysis reveals that both Logics were embedded 
in the discourse because the remuneration principles (except the fairness principle) were tied 
to various executive remuneration practices.  Both Logics were able to co-exist in the 
discourse because Corporate Logic had been weakened (as the fairness principle was almost 
never tied to any executive remuneration practices).  Further, there was a standard 
remuneration package for executives that became increasingly complex and more heavily 
justified over time.  Code issuers and companies argued that executives were capable of 
maximising shareholder value, but only if boards of director implemented short- and long-
term incentive schemes to control and direct them.  Simpler packages and alternative 
justifications no longer appeared to be legitimate.  This is consistent with Investor Logic 
being stronger than Corporate Logic.  However, the complexity in the discourse also meant 
that almost any executive remuneration practice could be justified, particularly if the 
justifications were symbolic. 
 
While Chapter 5’s findings are based on a content analysis of a large sample of codes and 
corporate annual reports, Chapter 6’s findings are based on a discourse analysis of a small 
sample of texts (a sub-sample of the large sample).
113
  Drawing on interpretive structuralism 
(Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Phillips and Di Domenico, 2009), the discourse on executive 
remuneration is explored in two ways.  First, the range of executive remuneration practices 
contained within the sub-sample is studied in Section 2.  Examples from codes and corporate 
annual reports are presented to illustrate the differences between Corporate Logic and 
                                                 
113
 The sub-sample was purposefully chosen based on Chapter 5’s findings.  It includes 55 codes produced 
between 1991 and 2010 by four UK code issuers, six AU code issuers and four NZ code issuers, as well as 
75 corporate annual reports produced in 1989, 1998 and 2007 by eleven UK companies, nine AU companies 
and thirteen NZ companies.  However, the sub-sample contained a narrower range of executive remuneration 
practices than in the full sample.  Thus, some examples in this chapter are drawn from the full sample, not the 
sub-sample.  All examples from outside of the sub-sample are noted as such in the footnotes.  Further 
explanation is provided in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. 
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Investor Logic.
114
  Particular attention is given to the different ways in which each practice 
was justified and the context in which the discourse was produced.  Second, codes and 
corporate annual reports that are exemplars of Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, and both 
Logics are identified and studied in Section 3.  Again, particular attention is given to the 
context in which these texts were produced.  This illustrates how each of the Logics can be 
embedded in a single text.  It also shows that Corporate Logic and alternative Logics were 
rarely embedded in the discourse.  Concluding comments are made in Section 5. 
 
6.2. The Discourse on Executive Remuneration  
Executive remuneration practices that were recommended by code issuers or adopted by 
companies are discussed in this section.  This will shed light on how Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic were embedded in and able to co-exist in the discourse on executive 
remuneration.
115
  There was a standard remuneration package for executives, comprising 
fixed and variable elements.  It is described in the next sub-section.  This is followed by a 
discussion of each component including salaries and benefits, pension (or superannuation), 
one-off payments for recruitment, retention and severance, short-term incentives (or annual 
bonuses), long-term incentives, minimum shareholding requirements, the mix of fixed and 
variable remuneration, and the level of remuneration. 
 
6.2.1. The Standard Remuneration Package for Executives 
There is a standard remuneration package for executives in most industrialised countries (see 
Chapter 3, Table 3.4).  This standard remuneration package was often recommended in codes 
or described in corporate annual reports.  As a case in point, Qantas’ (AU, 2007) executive 
remuneration package included base salary, benefits, superannuation, retention payments, 
short-term incentives and long-term incentives.  Table 6.1 reproduces Qantas’ Reward 
Framework.
116
  It describes the standard executive package including the criteria (e.g. 
performance measures) on which each component of the package was based.  A striking 
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 As remuneration disclosure requirements were minimal in NZ, AU (prior to 2001), and the UK (prior to 
1996), most of the examples on companies are drawn from UK 1998 and 2007 annual reports and AU 2007 
annual reports.  Further, there are far fewer examples from codes than corporate annual reports because most 
codes included few specific recommendations on executive remuneration. 
115
 A pilot study was carried out in order to develop and refine this approach to discourse analysis.  Essentially, 
the pilot study showed that both Logics are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration.  This 
enables (not constrains) companies: They are able to justify and legitimise almost any executive 
remuneration practice.  The findings from the pilot study are presented in Appendix F.   
116
 There were similar executive remuneration frameworks amongst the 2007 annual reports of the other 
companies in the sample (see, for example, British American Tobacco, UK, 2007, p.60; Legal & General 
Group, UK. 2007, p.51; Newcrest Mining, AU, 2007, p.56; Telstra, AU, 2007, p.87). 
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feature of Qantas’ Rewards Framework is a full sentence was used to justify their retention 
plan, but not the other components.  This is indicative of a weakening of Corporate Logic as 
unconditional components of remuneration were perceived as less legitimate.   
 
Table 6.1: Qantas’ Reward Framework 
(Source: Qantas, AU, Annual Report 2007, p.59) 
Fixed Annual Remuneration Set with reference to role, market and experience 
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
  
P
la
n
 
Performance Cash Plan Short-term Group Financial Target 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
E
q
u
it
y
 P
la
n
 
Performance 
Share Plan 
Medium-term 
Balanced Scorecard Target 
Customer Operational People Financial 
Performance 
Rights Plan 
Long-term Total Shareholder Return 
Retention Plan 
Targeted incentives and retention arrangements for a 
small number of key Executives, based on the 
Board’s assessment of market conditions and the 
commercial needs of Qantas. 
Other benefits, such as concessionary travel and salary 
sacrifice arrangements (e.g. for motor vehicles and 
superannuation) 
Reflect industry and market practice 
 
Qantas’ (AU, 2007, p.59, italics added) remuneration policy was coupled with their Rewards 
Framework and is reproduced below:  
“Qantas needs to be able to attract, retain and appropriately reward a capable 
Executive team… Qantas’ philosophy for the remuneration of its Executives is to 
align their earnings with their duties and responsibilities and to pay for 
performance… [T]he Remuneration Committee seeks advice from a range of 
independent external specialists. The guiding principles... are that: appropriate 
market benchmarks are reviewed in setting all elements of reward; differentiation 
to recognise performance is involved in all pay increases, both fixed and ‘at risk’; 
‘at risk’ pay decisions are based on a formal performance management system; 
and longer-term rewards align the interests of Executives with shareholders and 
support a culture of employee share ownership. Overall, the mix of the 
remuneration program reflects market practice but is tailored to the specific 
circumstances of Qantas. The importance of a stable and talented senior Executive 
team has always been a priority for Qantas… To ensure the continuity of a 
successful team, Qantas has made awards under the Retention Plan.” 
 
As is typical, the agency, human resources, market and pay-for-performance principles were 
embedded in Qantas’ remuneration policy.  Their policy illustrated that executives were only 
capable of maximising shareholder value if the remuneration practices were designed 
appropriately.  However, their policy also illustrated that Qantas was subject to market forces. 
In other words, the standard remuneration package was imposed upon Qantas by the market.  
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Again, the retention plan was justified.  Overall, Qantas’ remuneration policy and Rewards 
Framework were consistent with both Logics, although the fairness principle was absent. 
 
Pearson’s (UK) had also adopted the standard remuneration package for executives.  Their 
remuneration framework is presented in Table 6.2.  Curiously, Pearson’s remuneration 
framework did not include all of the elements included in their executives’ remuneration 
packages.  The missing elements were other benefits, pensions and the retention plan. For 
example, elsewhere in their annual report they (2007, p.40) state, “Restricted stock may be 
granted without performance conditions to satisfy recruitment and retention objectives.”  All 
of the remuneration principles (except the fairness principle) were included in Pearson’s 
remuneration policy and were tied to various elements of their package for executives.  As 
with Qantas, Pearson’s conceptualised its executives as only capable of maximising 
shareholder value if the remuneration practices were designed appropriately.  Overall, both 
Logics were embedded in Pearson’s remuneration policy, although Investor Logic was 
stronger than Corporate Logic. 
 
Table 6.2: Pearson’s Main Elements of Remuneration 
(Source: Pearson, UK, Annual Report and Accounts 2007, p.36) 
Total remuneration is made up of fixed and performance-linked elements, with each element supporting different 
objectives. 
Element Objective Performance 
period 
Performance conditions 
Base 
salary 
Reflects competitive market 
level, role and individual 
contribution 
Not 
applicable 
Normally reviewed annually taking  into 
account the remuneration of directors and 
executives in similar positions in comparable 
companies, individual performance and levels 
of pay and pay increases throughout the 
company 
Annual 
incentives 
Motivates achievement of 
annual strategic goals 
One year Subject to achievement of targets for sales, 
earnings per share or profit, working capital 
and cash 
Bonus 
share 
matching 
Encourages executive directors 
and other senior executives to 
acquire and hold Pearson shares. 
Aligns executives and 
shareholders’ interests 
Three years Subject to achievement of target for earnings 
per share growth 
Long-term 
incentives 
Drives long-term earnings and 
share price growth and value 
creation. Aligns executives’ and 
shareholders’ interests 
Three years Subject to achievement of targets for relative 
total shareholder return, return on invested 
capital and earnings per share growth 
 
In the remainder of this section, the variation within the sub-sample is illustrated.  This 
analysis reveals that there was limited variation from the standard remuneration package, 
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although some companies do have abnormal executive remuneration practices.  For example, 
Associated British Foods (UK, 1998) explicitly stated that executives did not receive 
performance-based remuneration. 
 
6.2.2. Salaries and Benefits 
Salaries and benefits are forms of fixed remuneration and are paid in cash.  The market 
principle provides the underlying rationale for setting the level of salaries and benefits.  For 
example, ABI (UK, 2005, p.5) stated that, “When setting salary levels Remuneration 
Committees should take into consideration the requirements of the market, bearing in mind 
competitive forces…”  Three decisions must be made to set the level: the basis of comparison 
(e.g. job evaluation systems), the composition of the comparator group, and the position 
relative to the comparator group (e.g. lower quartile, median or upper-quartile).
117
  While 
most codes offered limited guidance on these decisions, a few codes pointed out that 
positioning salaries above the median has the result of increasing the median over time (e.g. 
Greenbury, UK, 1995).  Until recent changes in remuneration disclosure requirements, many 
UK and AU companies did not disclose their decisions, except to say that executives’ salaries 
were competitive in the market.  It is likely that a competitive position means median or 
above, not below median.  For example, Tesco (UK, 1998, p.10) stated: 
“The base salary, contract periods, benefits… of executive directors and other 
senior executives, are normally reviewed annually by the Committee, having 
regard to competitive market practice supported by two external, independent 
surveys.” 
 
Most companies positioned salaries and benefits at the median relative to the comparator 
group.  For instance, Qantas (AU, 2007, p.60) stated that “FAR [fixed annual remuneration] is 
reviewed annually and reflects a middle-of-the-market approach, as compared to similar 
comparative roles within Australia…”  Most companies argued that a median position was 
fair to executives, which is consistent with Corporate Logic.  In contrast, some companies 
positioned salaries at the upper quartile and justified this position with the pay-for-
performance principle.  For example, Cadbury Schweppes (UK, 2007, p.60) stated that, 
“Basic salary between median and upper quartile of the Company’s comparator group and at 
upper quartile for consistently strong or outstanding individual performance…”  Linking 
salary to performance is consistent with Investor Logic.  However, a few companies offered 
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 Only the last of these decisions is relevant to this research as the position of salaries illustrates the difference 
between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (see Chapter 3, Table 3.5). 
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weak rationales for positioning salaries above the median.  For example, BlueScope Steel 
(AU, 2007, p.48) stated that “Market data is obtained from external sources to establish 
appropriate guidelines for positions, with the goal to pay slightly above median.”  
Interestingly, no companies in the sub-sample positioned base salary below the median.  This 
may result in the median being ratcheted upwards over time.  For example, BG Group (UK, 
2007, p.63)
118
 stated:  
“Executive Director salaries are between the median and upper quartile for this 
comparator group. The Committee believes this positioning is appropriate given 
the significantly higher total reward levels at other international oil and gas 
companies with which BG Group competes for talent.”   
 
There is a flaw in this reasoning because BG Group’s competitors could easily match their 
positioning for base salary, which will result in an ever-increasing median.   
 
Investor Logic, exemplified by the pay-for-performance principle, was so deeply embedded in 
the remuneration practices of some companies that salaries become partially variable, 
although this practice was rare.  For example at Newcrest Mining, executives’ salaries were 
equally split between fixed and variable (“salary at risk”) components.  Newcrest Mining 
(AU, 2007, p.56) invoked the pay-for-performance principle to justify salary at risk (“SaR”):  
“SaR is an annual performance dependent cash payment determined by personal 
and company performance relative to target performance. Above-target 
performance leads to an above-target payment, and below-target performance to a 
below-target payment”.   
 
Further, Newcrest Mining’s (AU, 2007, p.57) also had a policy of positioning salary above 
the median:  
“[T]o position fixed remuneration plus SaR (at target performance) at around the 
75th percentile of Fixed Remuneration plus performance bonuses paid, measured 
by a comparator group of companies…”   
 
Essentially, executives were compensated for having half of their salaries at risk with an 
upper-quartile position. 
 
Consistent with Corporate Logic, the market principle and, occasionally, the fairness principle 
were invoked by UK companies in justifying executives’ salaries.  However, there is a tension 
between the market and fairness principles when market rates for executives and employees 
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change at different rates.  As a case in point, Sainsbury J (UK, 2007, p.38) increased the base 
salary of its chief executive at the same rate as employees’ salaries/wages in 2005 and 2006 
(3.7% and 3.6%, respectively), but “re-aligned” the Chief Executive’s salary with the market 
median in 2007 (which was an increase of 17%).  This decision was justified as follows 
(2007, p.38):  
“Since his appointment in March 2004, the Chief Executive has received pay 
increases in line with colleagues… However a recent salary review showed that 
his base pay had fallen significantly behind market median levels. The 
Remuneration Committee strongly believes that it is in the interests of 
shareholders to re-align his base salary with market competitive levels.”   
 
Prioritising the market principle (i.e. horizontal equity) ahead of the fairness principle (i.e. 
vertical equity) indicates that executives are motivated by extrinsic rewards and that 
Corporate Logic may be weak or symbolic.   
 
6.2.3. Pension/Superannuation 
Pension (or superannuation) schemes are not conditional on performance and are, therefore, 
classified as fixed remuneration.  There was almost no guidance on pension schemes in the 
sub-sample of codes, although the Financial Reporting Council (UK, 2006, p.21) 
recommended that, “only basic salary should be pensionable.”  Most codes required pension 
schemes to be disclosed.  Similarly, corporate annual reports included limited disclosure.  
Most companies justified fixed remuneration (including pensions) with the human resources 
and market principles, but rarely did they provide a separate justification of pension schemes. 
Some companies do use the market principle to justify pension schemes.  For example, Aviva 
(UK, 2007, p.97) asserted that, “The UK ASPS [Aviva Staff Pension Scheme] provides a 
competitive post-retirement package.”119   
 
Further, there are two types of pension schemes: Defined benefit and defined contribution.  
Consistent with Corporate Logic, defined benefit pension schemes reward executives for their 
loyalty and commitment to the company.  For example, Associated British Foods (UK, 2007, 
p.42) appealed to “best practice standards” to justify their defined benefit scheme:  
“The Remuneration committee aims to ensure that retirement benefits are in line 
with best practice standards adopted by major companies in continental Europe 
and the UK. In accordance with this policy, executive directors are covered by 
final salary, defined benefit arrangements.”   
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In effect, this justification is the conformance principle.  However, defined benefit schemes 
appear to have become less common.  On the other hand, defined contribution pension 
schemes are consistent with Investor Logic because executives face more uncertainty as their 
pension payments are susceptible to changing economic conditions.  As a case in point, 
Brambles (AU, 2007, p.58) explained why defined benefit schemes were undesirable: 
“Some retirement benefits are delivered under defined benefit plans. The Board 
considers that defined benefit pension plans have the potential to create an 
unreasonable financial burden on the Group. No new members will therefore be 
admitted to such plans, save in exceptional circumstances.”   
 
Some companies do not have pension schemes.  Also, there were rare instances of companies 
justifying their pension schemes with the pay-for-performance principle.  For example, 
British Sky Broadcasting (UK, 2007, p.44) stated that the pensions are: “Set below market 
norms, to reflect higher proportion of performance pay.”120  This practice is consistent with 
Investor Logic because executives must achieve performance targets to receive remuneration 
at the median or above level.   
 
6.2.4. Other Fixed Remuneration 
Other fixed remuneration includes recruitment, retention and severance (or golden parachute) 
payments.  There was almost no guidance on these types of fixed remuneration in the sub-
sample of codes, although most codes required such obligations to be disclosed.  A notable 
exception was the Trade and Industry Committee’s (UK, 2003) official inquiry into severance 
payments.
121
  This official inquiry was motivated by several high-profile cases of so-called 
rewards for failure.  For example, Lord Simpson, CEO of Marconi, was awarded a £2 million 
pay and pension package despite a 90 percent fall in Marconi’s share price (Wintour, 19 
October 2001).  The Trade and Industry Committee (UK, 2003, p.5) concluded, “It would 
appear that executives have been rewarded not only for success but for failure as well.”  
Investor Logic was embedded in the Trade and Industry Committee’s (2003, p.12) criticism 
of the severance payments that some high-profile executives had received:  
“If the targets upon which bonuses are based are set at a sufficiently challenging 
level, and an executive is being removed for underperformance, we cannot see 
how significant performance-related elements of the remuneration package can 
legitimately be included in the severance package.”   
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Recruitment, retention and severance payments that are not conditional on performance are 
consistent with Corporate Logic, unless shareholders consider the level of such payments to 
be excessive.  Some companies offered recruitment payments to executives, and some of 
these were not conditional on performance (e.g. Pearson, UK, 2007, p.40).  Others were 
conditional on performance.  As a case in point, Newcrest Mining (AU, 2007, p.65) awarded 
their new CEO a recruitment payment that was conditional on performance:  
“[The CEO] was offered a sign on award of 165,000 Performance Rights… as an 
incentive to join the Company. The performance hurdle for those Rights was the 
achievement of initial performance objectives determined in advance by the 
Board.”   
 
Further, retention payments may be conditional on performance or continuous employment.  
Some companies justified retention payments that were only conditional on continuous 
employment as exceptional or abnormal.  For instance, Royal Dutch Shell (UK, 2007, p.97)
122
 
stated: 
“…it is planned to make RSP [Restricted Share Plan] awards to the three 
Executive Directors who are not retiring over the next year, to enhance retention 
ahead of the forthcoming Board successions. The RSP awards have no 
performance conditions and will vest in 2011, subject to the Executive Directors 
continuous employment.”   
 
Moreover, a few companies’ retention schemes were an integral part of their standard 
remuneration package.  As a case in point, Wesfarmers (AU, 2007, p.130)
123
 explained:  
“Senior Executives are entitled to a retention incentive/service payment which 
accrues over the first five years of their employment contract and is payable on 
termination. This incentive is important to the retention strategy for key 
executives.” 
 
Finally, others did offer severance (or early termination) payments, and were typically 
equivalent to 12-18 months of fixed or total remuneration.  For example, Newcrest Mining’s 
(AU, 2007, p.64) CEO could receive one year’s total remuneration if the board terminated his 
employment contract. 
 
6.2.5. Short-term Incentives 
Short-term incentives attempt to programme the behaviour of executives by offering financial 
incentives if targets are met.  This is consistent with Investor Logic.  Codes offer limited 
                                                 
122
 Note that Royal Dutch Shell (UK, 2007) is included in the full sample, not the sub-sample. 
123
 Note that Wesfarmers (AU, 2007) is included in the full sample, not the sub-sample. 
Chapter 6: Institutional Logics and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
195 
specific guidance on short-term incentives because they are principles-based.  For example, 
ASXCGC (AU, 2007, p.36) recommended that, “Incentive schemes should be designed 
around appropriate performance benchmarks that measure relative performance…”  Similarly, 
ABI (UK, 2002, p.5) encouraged that “Annual bonuses, normally payable in cash… should be 
related to performance. Both individual and corporate performance targets are relevant…”  
Notably, some codes recommended that targets should be challenging or stretching.  For 
example, the Financial Reporting Council (UK, 2003, p.21) suggested that, “…performance 
conditions should be relevant, stretching and designed to enhance shareholder value. Upper 
limits should be set and disclosed.” However, many codes offered no recommendation on 
how targets should be set.  Therefore, it is not surprising that short-term incentives vary 
considerably between companies with some having multiple schemes. However, there was 
much commonality including a mix of financial and non-financial performance measures, 
performance measured over a single year, a mix of absolute and relative performance targets, 
awards paid in cash and shares, and the level expressed as a percentage of base salary.   
 
It is difficult to determine how many companies do not use short-term incentives because of 
limited disclosure requirements in NZ, AU (prior to 2004) and the UK (prior to 1995).  In a 
rare example, Associated British Foods (UK, 1998, p.24) all but rejected short-term 
incentives: “Performance related bonuses are not given, other than in exceptional 
circumstances…”  Further, there was variability between remuneration packages of 
executives in the same company.  For instance, Antofagasta (UK, 2007, p.71) did not award 
annual bonuses to the executive chairman, but they did award annual bonuses to other senior 
executives:  
“…performance related pay measures did not apply to Board members… The 
Board considers this appropriate given its predominantly Non-Executive 
composition and the role of the only Executive Director, who is a member of the 
controlling family, as Chairman of the Board. Performance related bonuses are 
paid to senior management in the Group based on a combination of personal, 
divisional and Group performance…” 
 
Not having short-term incentives for all executives would be consistent with Corporate Logic, 
but such a practice was almost unheard of among publicly listed companies (aside from 
Associated British Foods, UK, 1998).  
  
Most companies had a range of short-term incentive schemes.  These may be applicable for 
the Chief Executive, executive directors, executives and/or employees.  In terms of the latter, 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 196 
some companies had profit sharing schemes in which all employees participated.  For 
example, Tesco (UK, 1998, p.11) had a profit-sharing scheme: 
“The Group operates an approved employee profit-sharing scheme for the benefit 
of all employees, including executive directors, with over two years’ service with 
the Group at its year end. Shares in the company are allocated to participants in 
the scheme on a pro rata basis to base salary earned up to Inland Revenue 
approved limits.” 
 
This is consistent with Corporate Logic in that incentives become a means for sharing profit 
between shareholders and employees, rather than a means for controlling employees.  
However, for all companies that used profit-sharing schemes, they were but one scheme 
among many schemes.  Thus, both Logics were embedded in the discourse. 
 
Companies used a range of different performance measures as part of their short-term 
incentive schemes including financial, non-financial and market-based measures.  Consistent 
with Investor Logic or Corporate Logic, some companies used only performance measures 
that were profit- oriented.  For example, British American Tobacco’s (UK, 2007, p.60) short-
term incentives were dependent on “five common measures: underlying operating profit, 
market share of key players, Global Drive Brand volume, net revenue and cash flow”.  These 
measures were equally weighted.  Consistent with Corporate Logic or possibly Stakeholder 
Logic, other companies used a range of financial and non-financial performance measures.  
As a case in point, BlueScope Steel’s (AU, 2007, p.48) short-term incentives were dependent 
on the following:  
“[1] Shareholder Value Delivery… including Net Profit After Tax, Cash Flow, 
and Earnings Before Interest and Tax… [2] Zero Harm… including Lost Time 
Injury Frequency Rates, Medically Treated Injury Frequency Rates and 
environmental measures. [3] Business Excellence… [including] delivery 
performance, days of inventory and quality measures. [4] Strategy – 
implementation of specific longer-term strategic initiatives.” 
 
However, BlueScope Steel’s (AU, 2007, p.48) short-term incentive scheme was consistent 
with Corporate Logic, not Stakeholder Logic, because “Shareholder Value Delivery” received 
a much higher weighting than other performance measures:  
“At the senior executive level, 60% of the STI award is based on 
financial/shareholder value measures with 40% based on KPI metrics. For other 
participants, 50% of the STI award is based on financial/shareholder value 
measures and 50% is based on KPI metrics.” 
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Some UK and AU companies had short-term incentives that were weighted towards financial 
performance, rather than non-financial performance.  This is consistent with shareholder value 
maximisation, rather than stakeholder value maximisation.  However, the performance 
measures tended to be internal (accounting-based), rather external (market-based).  This 
suggests that Corporate Logic was stronger than Investor Logic, although many companies 
also had long-term incentives that were tied to total shareholder return (see Section 6.2.6). 
 
There was a target for each performance measure which had to be met for bonuses to be 
awarded.  Each performance measure had a range of targets: the minimum, expected (or on-
target) and maximum (or stretch) value.  No bonus was awarded below the minimum value, 
the bonus increased proportionally to actual performance between the minimum value and 
maximum value, and the bonus was capped if actual performance exceeded the maximum 
value.  These values were usually expressed as a percentage of base salary.  For instance, 
Telstra Corporation (AU, 2007, pp.91-92) disclosed that if the minimum, expected and 
maximum value were met, then 25%, 50% and 100%, respectively, of the maximum bonus 
would be awarded, where the maximum bonus ranges from 120% to 200% of fixed 
remuneration depending on the senior executive’s role.  It appears that the percentages in 
many UK companies had increased over time.
124
  For example, Standard Chartered’s (UK) 
maximum value as a percentage of base salary increased from 150% in 1998 (p.34) to 200% 
in 2007 (p.75).  Similarly, Tesco’s (UK) maximum value as a percentage of base salary 
increased from 37.5% in 1998 (p.11) to 150% in 2007 (p.29).  These practices were consistent 
with Investor Logic because of the implicit assumption in target setting that the executive’s 
effort is directly related to firm performance.   
 
Short-term incentives were normally paid in cash immediately after the executive’s 
performance had been evaluated and the target had been deemed to be met.  However, short-
term incentives might also be paid as restricted shares or share options and a portion of the 
award might be deferred.  In some companies, if executives chose to defer a portion of the 
award, then an additional award would be made (this is known as ‘matching’).  Codes offer 
limited guidance on these practices.  While most AU and NZ companies had simple short-
term incentive schemes, most UK and some AU companies (particularly in 2007) had 
complex short-term incentive schemes including the use of deferral and matching.  For 
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example, Sainsbury J’s (UK, 2007, p.38) scheme requires 25% of the CEO’s annual bonus to 
be paid in shares that are restricted for three years, but this portion of the bonus could be 
tripled if a relative total-shareholder-return target was met in three years.  Similarly, Telstra 
(AU, 2007, p.96) disclosed:  
“…the senior executives are required to receive 25% of their actual STI payment 
in Telstra shares… [and the plan also] requires the CEO to take 50% of the total 
actual value of his STI in the form of Telstra deferred shares.”  
 
The practice of deferring a portion of short-term incentives may be justified with the agency 
and/or human resources principles. For instance, Cadbury Schweppes (UK, 2007, p.62) used 
the agency principle to justify deferral:  
“The BSRP [Bonus Share Retention Plan] is available to a group of approximately 
115 senior executives including the executive Directors and aims to encourage 
participants to reinvest their AIP [Annual Incentive Plan] award into the 
Company’s shares thereby more closely aligning the interests of management and 
shareowners.” 
 
In contrast, Westfield Holdings (AU, 2007, p.101) used the human resources principle to 
justify deferral:  
“…the Executive Deferred Award Plan (“EDA Plan”) and the Partnership 
Incentive Plan (“PIP Plan”)… are an important part of the package used by the 
Group to attract, incentivise and retain executives.” 
 
They (AU, 2007, p.103) further justified the EDA plan: 
“In granting these awards, the sole objective of the Group is retention of key 
executives for an extended period.” 
 
However, some companies justified their short-term incentive schemes with other 
remuneration principles.  As a case in point, Sky Network Television (NZ, 2007, p.70) used 
the fairness and pay-for-performance principles to justify their short-term incentive scheme, 
which includes a portion that was deferred: 
“SKY has policies in place to ensure that it remunerates fairly and responsibly. 
All executives and employees receive a portion of their salary based on individual 
and company-wide performance. The executive incentive scheme is based on the 
concept of economic value added… Bonuses are “banked”, with 33% of the bank 
being paid out each year. The scheme promotes employee loyalty while ensuring 
that the cost of the scheme is proportionate to SKY’s level of economic return.” 
 
Interestingly, Sky Network Television’s justification emphasised “employee loyalty” 
which is reminiscent of Corporate Logic, but their performance measure was Economic 
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Value Added
TM
 which is associated with Investor Logic.  Overall, the above examples 
illustrate that the same remuneration practice can be justified using different 
remuneration practices and, consequently, different institutional logics. 
 
6.2.6. Long-term Incentives  
Long-term incentive schemes are justified with the agency and/or human resources principles 
by codes issuers and companies.  Consistent with Investor Logic, long-term incentives are 
often conceptualised as a means for aligning executives’ interests with those of shareholders.  
The IFSA (AU, 2004, p.29) recommendations are typical among code issuers: 
“Share and share option schemes can be an important element of well designed 
remuneration packages. The granting of a right to equity participation, subject to 
appropriate performance hurdles, assists in aligning the interests of executives and 
shareholders. While the alignment of interests is important, shareholders need 
adequate disclosure to ensure that the schemes are appropriately designed. Equity 
participation should not involve the provision by the company of non-recourse 
loans.” 
 
However, while stock exchanges and stock exchange regulators recommend that executives 
receive long-term incentives in the form of shares or share options, they do not use the agency 
or human resources principles as a justification.
125
  Instead, these code issuers emphasised the 
pay-for-performance principle.  For instance, ASXCGC’s (2007, p.36) recommended:  
“Appropriately designed equity-based remuneration, including stock options, can 
be an effective form of remuneration when linked to performance objectives or 
hurdles. Equity-based remuneration has limitations and can contribute to ‘short-
termism’ on the part of senior executives.” 
 
There is much guidance in codes on long-term incentives relative to other aspects of executive 
remuneration.  This is because of high-profile instances of rewards for failure, where 
executives were perceived to have received unjustifiable levels of remuneration, particularly 
grants of shares or share options (AU: IFSA, 2002; Productivity Commission, 2009; and UK: 
Greenbury, 1995; Trade and Industry Committee, 2003).  Code issuers were concerned that 
executive remuneration had not been tied to long-term firm performance.  This is reflected in 
their recommended performance measures.  For example, IFSA (AU, 2007, p.8) explained: 
“[Possible performance measures] …include return on funds employed, adjusted 
earnings per share or total shareholder return. Whatever measures are adopted by 
companies, they should be capable of providing appropriate remuneration 
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outcomes in periods of both positive and negative economic and market 
conditions… Ultimately, the performance measures… should encourage 
materially improved executive performance on an ongoing basis…” 
 
Generally, code issuers’ recommendations were consistent with Investor Logic, particularly as 
total shareholder return is often recommended.  However, code issuers did not provide a lot of 
specific guidance on target setting, the level of award, type of payment (cash or shares), and 
vesting period.  Crucially, most code issuers did not discuss the difference between awarded 
and realised remuneration.  Companies are required to disclose the estimated value of long-
term incentives when awarded to executives, but executives may never realise this value if 
targets are not met.  This can led to a perception of rewards for failure, when executives are 
awarded long-term incentives when firm performance has declined.  However, executive will 
only realise value if firm performance improves.  Further, most code issuers did not discuss 
whether or not long-term incentives represent executives being rewarded for luck or their 
contribution to performance.
126
  Consistent with Investor Logic, most code issuers seem to 
assume that changes in firm performance are attributable to executives’ efforts.  This is 
illustrated by the Securities Commission (NZ, 2004b, p.18): 
“If a part of executive directors’ remuneration is related to entity performance 
over time, their efforts are more likely to be focused on making a contribution to 
future investor returns rather than only on short term gains. Such remuneration 
may include shares or options.” 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising then that UK directors perceive codes to offer no substantive 
guidance on how to design long-term incentives for executives (Ogden and Watson, 2008). 
 
Almost all companies had long-term incentive schemes.  There was a wide variation in the 
form of companies’ schemes, but the substance of the schemes was comparable (see below).  
Companies used a variety of remuneration principles to justify their long-term incentive 
schemes.  As a case in point, Fisher & Paykel Healthcare (NZ, 2007, pp.30-31) justifies their 
share option plan using both the human resources and agency principles:  
“The remuneration policy for senior management is designed to attract, motivate 
and retain high quality employees who will enable the Company to achieve its 
short and long term objectives. The policy includes providing performance 
incentives which allow executives to share in the long term success of the 
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 A notable exception is the Productivity Commission’s (AU, 2009, p.xxvi) inquiry on Executive Remuneration 
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Company and share option plans intended to encourage the retention of senior 
management and increase the commonality between the interests of management 
and shareholders.” 
 
The most striking aspect of Fisher & Paykel Healthcare’s remuneration policy is the phrase 
“… which allow executives to share in the long term success of the Company”.  This suggests 
that executives did not control firm performance.  Instead, profits were shared between 
shareholders and executives.  This conceptualisation of long-term incentives is consistent with 
Corporate Logic. 
 
However, most companies emphasise the agency principle over other remuneration principles 
when justifying their long-term incentive schemes.  For instance, Telecom (NZ, 2007, p.89) 
had many remuneration principles in their remuneration policy, but only repeats the agency 
principle when justifying their two long-term incentive schemes:  
“Telecom also operates equity or non-cash based long-term incentive (LTI) 
schemes… These are designed to ensure there is an appropriate balance between 
short, medium and longer-term performance objectives and to align senior 
management with shareholder interests… Telecom’s LTI programme has two 
types of equity-based schemes, the Share Option Scheme and a Restricted Share 
Scheme (RSS).” 
 
As with short-term incentives, these examples illustrate that long-term incentives can be 
justified using Corporate Logic only, Investor Logic only or both Logics. 
 
Long-term incentive schemes that AU, UK, and, to a lesser extent, NZ companies adopted 
were very complex, and this complexity increased over time.  This was compounded by most 
companies adopting multiple schemes.  The range of schemes included share options, 
restricted shares and phantom shares.
127
  A few companies also had schemes that allowed 
executives to purchase shares using interest-free or low-interest loans (e.g. QBE Insurance, 
AU, 1998, 2007).  Further, long-term incentives were usually dependent on one, two or three 
performance measures including, but not limited to, earnings per share, return on capital 
employed and total shareholder return.  Some targets were absolute (e.g. a hurdle), while 
others were relative.  Most AU and UK companies in 2007 had relative targets for total 
shareholder return (relative to a peer group such as FTSE100 companies).  The schemes were 
                                                 
127
 For phantom shares, executives are entitled to receive a cash award based on a certain number of the 
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often conditional on both award and exercise, although early schemes (in 1989 and 1998) did 
not have exercise (or vesting) conditions.  Amongst AU and UK companies, the levels of 
awards were expressed as percentage of executives’ base salary.  Most NZ companies did not 
explain how the levels of awards were determined.  Similar to short-term incentives, the 
targets were tied to the levels (e.g. minimum, expected and maximum).   
 
To illustrate the range of practices described above, several companies’ long-term incentive 
schemes are discussed below. 
 
As with most UK companies in 1989, Standard Chartered (UK, 1989) provided few details of 
their executive remuneration practices.  They (UK, 1989, p.39) disclosed that they had a 
“profit sharing scheme”, “executive share option scheme” and “saving related share option 
scheme”.  No performance conditions were disclosed.  The executive share options vesting 
period was three to ten years. Further, some UK companies in 1989 paid long-term incentives 
in cash.  For example, Grand Metropolitan (1989, p.46)
128
 described:  
“A share price related cash bonus scheme is in operation which allows selected 
employees… to benefit from upward movements in the price of the company’s 
shares over a period of between 6 and 10 years.  The scheme is designed to 
encourage senior executives to align their long-term career aspirations with the 
long-term interests of the group.”   
 
It also appears that the vesting period of long-term incentive schemes had decreased over time 
with a three to five year vesting period being common in 1998 and 2007. 
 
Tesco (UK, 1998) had three long-term incentive schemes. First, a restricted share scheme:  
“Long-term share bonuses are awarded annually, based on improvements in 
earnings per share, achievement of strategic corporate goals and comparative 
performance against peer companies including total shareholder return. The 
maximum long-term bonus is 25% of salary. Shares awarded have to be held for a 
period of four years, conditional upon continuous service with the company. The 
share equivalent of dividends which would have been paid on the shares is added 
to the award during the deferral period.” (p.11) 
 
By 2007, the performance measure had changed from total shareholder return to return on 
capital employed, an additional return on capital employed target on exercise was added and 
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the maximum award increased to 150% of base salary (Tesco, 2007, p.29).
129
  Similar 
schemes are common among AU and UK companies.  It also appears that most companies 
had increased the maximum award over time.   
 
Second, an executive share option scheme:  
“Executive options granted since 1995 may be exercised only subject to the 
achievement of performance criteria related to growth in earnings per share, in 
accordance with ABI guidelines.” (Tesco, UK, 1998, p.12)  
 
This scheme changed over time. In 1984, the share options were issued at a discount of 15% 
and vested between three and five years after being awarded.  In 1994, there was no discount 
and the vesting period was changed to between one and seven years.  While the level of the 
award was not disclosed in 1998, the maximum award was 200% of salary in 2007.  Earnings 
per share was the only performance measure throughout the period studied.  Third, a savings 
related share option scheme.  The awards under this scheme were immaterial relative to the 
other schemes.   
 
In 1998, Legal & General Group (UK) had several long-term incentives schemes, justified 
with the agency and pay-for-performance principles.  In terms of their executive share option 
scheme, share options had a vesting period of three to ten years subject to a total shareholder 
return target being met.  The target is a multi-year rolling median and relative: “Legal & 
General Total Shareholder Return (TSR) will have to exceed the median TSR for the FTSE 
100 for a period of at least three years” (1998, p.38).  In 2007, Legal & General Group (UK, 
2007, p.41) still had this scheme in place, although the target had become more complex: 
“Awards of nil cost shares made annually, with vesting conditional on relative 
total shareholder return (TSR) measured over the three subsequent years… The 
awards will vest in full if Legal & General is ranked at or above the twentieth 
percentile. One quarter of awards will vest if TSR is at median. No awards vest 
below median.” 
 
They also disclosed that, “Executive directors normally receive annual grants of 200% of 
salary” (2007, p.41).    
 
The preceding examples are indicative of Investor Logic because of the emphasis placed on 
the agency principle and the use of targets (e.g. on award and on exercise) to control 
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executives.  However, there is a range of performance measures adopted by companies.  Some 
companies use accounting (or internal) measures of performance, whereas others use market 
(or external) measures of performance.  Investor Logic is inconsistent with the use of 
accounting measures of performance because executives can manipulate such measures and 
there may be differences between accounting and market performance (e.g. a company’s 
earnings may rise, but its share price may fall).   
 
Investor Logic was the legitimate discourse.  If Investor Logic was not embedded in 
companies’ annual reports, then they risked damaging their legitimacy.  As a case in point, 
Westfield Holdings (AU, 2007) explain in great detail why they did not use total shareholder 
return as a performance measure.  Their explanation was a defence against potential criticism 
because the implication of rejecting total shareholder return as a performance measures is that 
the market (i.e. investors as a collective) cannot accurately assess firm performance.  Thus, 
Westfield Holdings challenged the cornerstone of Investor Logic.  They (AU, 2007, p.102) 
justified their decision as follows: 
“As in previous years, the Remuneration Committee has considered, and taken 
advice regarding, the implementation of a hurdle based on measurement of total 
return to shareholders (“TRS”)… compared to an identified peer group. The 
Committee ultimately rejected the use of a TRS based hurdle primarily due to 
unwillingness on the part of the Board and the Committee to determine executive 
rewards by reference to movements in the price of Westfield Group securities. 
Although the Westfield Group… has a well established record of delivering 
increases in share price over time, the philosophy of the Group has been, and 
remains, that this record of success is a product of sound operating performance 
and strategic decision making and that the focus of the executive team should 
remain on the underlying business and not on the price of the Group’s securities. 
The Group’s view remains that… performance hurdles should focus on the 
fundamentals of the Group’s business and on the performance of the executive 
team in meeting the operational, development and corporate targets which the 
Group sets for itself. The Committee is of the view that if the management team 
maintains its intensive focus on these fundamentals, security holders will be 
rewarded, over time, by superior market performance.” 
 
This is also illustrated by Wesfarmers (AU, 2007).
130
  They did not use total shareholder 
return as a performance measure.  Instead, Wesfarmers awarded long-term incentives to 
executive directors using a unique performance measure called “Total Value Return”, which 
was based on net cash flow from shareholders plus the change in value of shareholders’ 
equity (calculated as average shareholders’ equity multiplied by the ratio of actual return on 
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equity over target return on equity).  They (AU, 2007, p.128) justified “Total Value Return” 
as follows:  
“For a shareholder, Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) is considered to be the best 
performance measure over the period of investment. TSR is influenced by 
external market factors in addition to internal performance. For this reason, 
Wesfarmers rewards Executive Directors… on the long term growth of the 
economic value of the company. A reward model [based on Total Value Return]... 
rewards the Executive Directors for the achievement of long term increases in 
shareholder wealth.”   
 
This implies that Wesfarmers’ board did not believe that TSR and Total Value Return were 
highly correlated.  Otherwise, if they had believed that these performance measures were 
highly correlated, then there would have been no reason to use Total Value Return.  This 
defence of “Total Value Return” illustrates how deeply Investor Logic was embedded in the 
discourse. 
 
On the whole, while the design of long-term incentive schemes had changed over time, most 
companies’ schemes were consistent with Investor Logic because their schemes were 
conditional on targets being met.  Unconditional schemes had fallen out of favour.  This is 
consistent with a weakening of Corporate Logic and a strengthening of Investor Logic over 
time.  However, Corporate Logic was still embedded in the discourse because schemes were 
justified with the human resources principle and dependent on accounting measures of 
performance. 
 
6.2.7. Minimum Shareholding Requirements  
Having minimum shareholding requirements for executives were not recommended by most 
code issuers and were not adopted by most companies.  However, minimum shareholding 
requirements were encouraged by the ABI (UK, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007), and adopted by 
some UK companies.  Executives were usually required to set aside a portion of their salaries 
and/or annual bonuses to acquire shares.  Minimum shareholding requirements were often 
specified as a percentage of salary.  For example, Cadbury Schweppes (UK, 2007, p.62) 
states: 
“…the share ownership guidelines that we apply …are at the top end of such 
requirements in the FTSE 100, with executive Directors expected to meet a share 
ownership requirement set at four times base salary and a range for all senior 
executive in the business from one to three times salary, depending on their level 
of seniority.” 
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There were few cases of AU and NZ companies having minimum shareholding requirements.  
A rare exception was Fletcher Building (NZ, 2007, p.49).
131
 They required their CEO to use 
at least 50% of his variable remuneration to build up over time a minimum shareholding of at 
least 50% of his fixed remuneration.  
 
The agency principle is used to justify minimum shareholding requirements. For example, 
Unilever (UK, 2007, p.51) stated:  
“Executive Directors are required to demonstrate a significant personal 
shareholding commitment to Unilever. Within five years of appointment, they are 
expected to hold shares worth 150% of their annual base salary. This reinforces 
the link between the executives and other shareholders.” 
 
Unlike other incentive schemes, minimum shareholding requirements have downside risk for 
executives because they cannot lower their shareholding below the minimum (unless their 
employment ceases) and if share prices fall, then executives have to acquire more shares to 
maintain their shareholding.  Forcing executives to acquire shares is consistent with Investor 
Logic, not Corporate Logic.  However, some companies partially negate this downside risk by 
requiring executives to hold a minimum number of shares.  For example, Standard Chartered 
(UK, 2007, p.77) stated: 
“The Group operates a shareholding guideline policy which aims to align the 
interests of executives with shareholders by ensuring that they build up a 
significant equity stake in the Company... The current guideline levels are as 
follows: Group CEO at least 100,000 shares…” 
   
Further, minimum shareholding requirements may be symbolic because the minimum is set 
very low, or executives are granted enough shares (via long-term incentive schemes) to ensure 
that they never have to forfeit a portion of their salaries or annual bonuses to acquire shares.  
However, minimum shareholding requirements may be substantive in that they act as a 
(potential) punishment, rather than a reward.  For example, Tesco (UK, 2007, p.30) stated: 
“Executive Directors are normally expected to build and maintain a shareholding 
with a value at least equal to their basic salary. New appointees will typically be 
allowed around three years to establish this shareholding. Full participation in the 
PSP [performance share plan] is conditional upon this.” 
 
Again, this appears to be consistent with Investor Logic, not Corporate Logic. 
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6.2.8. Mix of Fixed and Variable Remuneration 
There was no precise mix of fixed and variable remuneration that was recommended by codes 
issuers or desired by companies.
132
  Many codes include no guidance on what mix is 
appropriate or how to decide what is the appropriate mix.  For example, the ASXCGC (AU 
2003, p.55) simply observed that “Most executive remuneration packages will involve a 
balance between fixed and incentive pay”, but did not define “balance”.  Similarly, the 
Securities Commission (NZ, 2004b, p.17) recommended, “Executive (including executive 
director) remuneration packages should include an element that is dependent on entity and 
individual performance”, but did not define “an element”.  Further, first edition of the 
Combined Code (London Stock Exchange, UK, 1998, p.3) recommends that, “A proportion of 
executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and 
individual performance”, but did not define “a proportion”.  The second edition of the 
Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council, UK, 2003, p.12) added the word “significant” 
to their recommendation (“A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration…”).  
On the whole, codes offer no specific guidance on the mix of fixed and variable remuneration. 
 
Most companies only disclosed their actual mix of fixed and variable remuneration for 
executives.  For instance, QBE Insurance (AU, 2007) indicated that the actual mix for the 
CEO was 32% (2006: 31%) for base salary, 43% (2006: 42%) for short-term incentives and 
25% (2006: 27%) for long-term incentives.  The conformance principle was used to justify 
the actual mix: “Consistent with market practice, the mix of total remuneration and reward is 
dependent on the level of seniority of the executive” (2007, p.63).  Some AU and UK 
companies in 2007 did disclosure the desired mix.  As a case in point, Standard Chartered 
(UK, 2007, p.74) indicates that the desired mix for executive directors is weighted towards 
variable remuneration: Desired mix was 34% for base salary, 43% for bonus and 23% for 
long-term incentives, while the actual mix was 23% for base salary, 42% for bonus and 35% 
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 In terms of companies, the desired (not actual) mix of fixed and variable remuneration discriminates between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  A desired mix of high fixed and low variable remuneration is consistent 
with Corporate Logic. An actual mix of high fixed and low variable remuneration is less informative.  For 
example, this may be consistent with Investor Logic if variable remuneration is low because executives did 
not meet their targets.  However, the longitudinal change in actual mix is also informative.  The longitudinal 
trend has been an increase in the proportion of variable remuneration among AU and UK companies 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, UK, 2005, 2010; Productivity Commission, AU, 2009; Shields et al., AU, 2003).  
No longitudinal data are available on NZ companies, although newspapers report a similar (but weaker) 
change in mix (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2).  These trends are consistent with a transition from Corporate 
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(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  Note that the actual mix reported in the sub-sample of corporate annual reports 
was not quantitatively studied. 
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for long-term incentives.  Further, some companies had a strong emphasis on variable 
remuneration. For example, Unilever (UK, 2007, p.51) stated, “The Committee decided not to 
increase the salaries in 2007 in order to place more emphasis on performance related pay and 
less on fixed pay.”  Overall, the desired mix tends to be weighted towards variable 
remuneration, which is consistent with Investor Logic. 
 
6.2.9. Level of Fixed, Variable and Total Remuneration 
Most code issuers did not provide specific recommendations on how companies should 
determine the level of fixed, variable and total remuneration.  However, most companies did 
describe and justify how the level of each component of remuneration was determined, but 
they did not discuss how they positioned the level of total remuneration.  For example, Legal 
& General (UK, 2007, pp.51-52) disclosed that the CEO’s salary was positioned “at around 
the mid-market level relative to the FTSE 100”, short-term incentives had an expected value 
of 75% of salary and a maximum value of 125% of salary, and long-term incentives had an 
expected and maximum value of 200% of salary.  This remuneration policy was typical 
amongst AU and UK companies, where variable remuneration was tied to fixed remuneration.  
NZ companies provided insufficient remuneration disclosure for any inference to be made.  
The standard remuneration package for executives is inconsistent with Corporate Logic, 
where executives are conceptualised as stewards (e.g. intrinsic motivation is greater than 
extrinsic motivation).  On the other hand, it is consistent with Investor Logic, where 
executives are conceptualised as agents (e.g. extrinsic motivation is greater than intrinsic 
motivation). 
 
There appears to be a fundamental flaw in the standard remuneration package as the market 
principle overrides the other remuneration principles because most companies positioned the 
level of total remuneration at the median or above.  This flaw is known as the ratchet effect 
(or the Lake Wobegon effect).  Greenbury (1995, p.37) was the first of many code issuers to 
point out this flaw:  
“Companies should not pay above average levels regardless of performance. They 
should also beware of basing remuneration levels on a skewed comparator group 
so as to justify higher remuneration levels.  If companies generally pursue such 
policies, the effect will simply be to ratchet up the general level of executive 
remuneration.” 
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However, few companies had remuneration policies that prevented them from contributing to 
an upward ratchet of the level of executive remuneration.  A rare exception was BSkyB (UK, 
2007).
 133
  They (2007, p.44) stated that, “Pay is very competitive if BSkyB’s stretching 
targets are delivered, but if these targets are not met, the ‘guaranteed’ elements of pay are 
below market norms.”  According to Corporate Logic, the fairness principle should act as a 
counterweight to the human resources and market principles (cf. the UK’s Sainsbury J’s 
decision to increase their CEO’s base salary, Section 6.2.2).  Accounting for employees’ 
working conditions should prevent above-average increases in executive remuneration.  This 
was explained by Greenbury (1995, p.35): 
“Paying over the odds, on the other hand, is incompatible with the fiduciary duty 
of Directors to act in the company’s best interests… It can cause resentment 
among staff and damage the company’s reputation.” 
 
Few companies had the fairness principle built into their remuneration policies and practices.  
A possible exception was Legal & General Group (UK, 2007, p.49), who explained how the 
fairness principle was enacted:  
“Management work in partnership with the trade union, Unite, to ensure our pay 
policies and practices are free from unfair bias. This is monitored by an annual 
equal pay audit.” 
 
Thus, the version of Corporate Logic embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration 
might be symbolic.  Alternatively, Corporate Logic might have become weakened because it 
had been combined with Investor Logic.  Certainly, the standard remuneration package was 
consistent with Investor Logic.  Given that the agency, human resources, market and pay-for-
performance principles were widely diffused (see Chapter 5) and strongly tied to 
remuneration practices (see above), Corporate Logic and Investor Logic might have merged 
into a new logic.  This possibility is explored further in the next section. 
 
6.3. Exemplars of Institutional Logics 
The discourse on executive remuneration that code issuers and companies produced in their 
codes and annual reports, respectively, might be consistent with Corporate Logic only, 
Investor Logic only, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, another Logic (e.g. 
Stakeholder Logic) or no Logic.  These five possibilities are discussed in this section, 
although most exemplars of institutional logics that are presented in this section are 
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companies, not code issuers.  This is because code issuers’ recommendations were either too 
brief or too non-specific for a strong conclusion to be made.  The context in which the 
discourse was produced is taken into account in order to classify code issuers and companies 
into one of the five possibilities.  For companies, particular attention is given to their 
ownership structure, board structure and stated corporate objective (e.g. mission statement).  
However, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can be embedded in the discourse on executive 
remuneration to varying degrees as has been shown in the previous section.  Some aspects of 
the discourse can be symbolic (e.g. the fairness principle was often not tied to any 
remuneration practices).  These complexities are also considered. 
 
The corporate objective that is recommended by code issuers and stated by companies in all 
of codes and corporate annual reports in the sub-sample was studied.  Almost all codes had 
shareholder value maximisation as the recommended corporate objective.  Most remaining 
codes had no recommended corporate objective.  Three texts produced by the Securities 
Commission (NZ, 2004b, 2006, 2010) had stakeholder value maximisation as the 
recommended corporate objective, but, unlike all other codes in the sub-sample, their code 
was applicable to all types of organisations, not just listed companies.  Further, most 
companies stated that their corporate objective was either profit maximisation or shareholder 
value maximisation.  Only a few companies stated that their corporate objective was 
stakeholder value maximisation.  However, these companies often repeated their corporate 
objective and each repeat was slightly different.  For example, The Warehouse (NZ, 2007, 
p.1) stated, “The primary objective of the board is to build long-term shareholder value with 
due regard to other stakeholder interests.” And they (2007, p.77) also stated, “The Warehouse 
aims to manage its business in a way that will produce positive outcomes for all stakeholders 
including the public, our customers, team members, suppliers and our shareholders.”  The 
former is consistent with enlightened shareholder value maximisation, while the latter is 
consistent with stakeholder value maximisation.   
 
Shareholder value maximisation was dominant because stakeholder value maximisation was 
perceived, at least by some code issuers, as impractical.  This was illustrated by Hampel 
(1998, p.12):  
“…the directors as a board are responsible for relations with stakeholders; but 
they are accountable to the shareholders. This is not simply a technical point.  
From a practical point of view, to redefine the directors’ responsibilities in terms 
of the stakeholders would mean identifying all the various stakeholder groups; 
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and deciding the nature and extent of the directors’ responsibility to each. The 
result would be that the directors were not effectively accountable to anyone since 
there would be no clear yard stick for judging their performance. This is a recipe 
neither for good governance nor for corporate success.” 
 
6.3.1. Stakeholder Logic 
Stakeholder Logic was (lightly) embedded in the discourse of some code issuers and 
companies (e.g. The Warehouse, NZ, 1998, 2007).
134
  However, code issuers did not 
recommend stakeholder value maximisation as the corporate objective and did not mention 
non-shareholding stakeholders in relation to executive remuneration (e.g. performance 
measures were not recommended to be stakeholder-oriented).  Instead, non-shareholding 
stakeholders were marginalised relative to shareholders.  For example, the ASXCGC’s (AU, 
2003, p.11) tenth principle was “Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders”.  
Similarly, the Securities Commission (NZ, 2004b, p.2) ninth principle was, “The board 
should respect the interests of stakeholders within the context of the entity’s ownership type 
and its fundamental purpose.”  In contrast, the Financial Reporting Council (2003, 2006, 
2008, and 2010) did not mention stakeholders, communities, customers, employees (except in 
relate to director independence), suppliers, or society.  On the whole, while some code issuers 
did encourage boards to consider the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders, the interests 
of shareholders were prioritised, particularly in relation to executive remuneration. 
 
A number of companies’ stated corporate objectives were consistent with Stakeholder Logic, 
but these companies’ executive remuneration practices were not consistent with Stakeholder 
Logic.  For example, Unilever’s (UK) corporate objectives in 1998 (Annual Review, p.ii) and 
in 2007 (Annual Report and Accounts, p.2) were consistent with stakeholder value 
maximisation: 
“Our long-term success requires a total commitment to… working together 
effectively… To succeed also requires, we believe, the highest standards of 
corporate behaviour towards everyone we work with, the communities we touch, 
and the environment on which we have an impact. This is our road to sustainable, 
profitable growth, creating long-term value for our shareholders, our people, and 
our business partners.” (Unilever, UK, 2007, p.2) 
 
However, Unilever’s (UK) remuneration package for executives in 1998 (Annual Accounts, 
pp.29-37) and in 2007 (Annual Report and Accounts, pp.49-61) were consistent with 
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shareholder value maximisation.  For both short- and long-term incentives, their targets in 
1998 were based on earnings per share and unspecified individual targets and in 2007 were 
based on revenue growth, Economic Value Added
TM
, free cash flows, total shareholder return 
and unspecified individual targets.   
 
Westpac Banking Corporation’s (Westpac, AU) corporate objective in 1998 (p.6) was 
consistent with enlightened shareholder value maximisation, where communities and 
customers were conceptualised as the means to the end of shareholder value:
135
 
“As part of our determination to position Westpac around higher quality, lower 
risk earnings streams, we have moved to a stronger community and customer 
focus. We see the development of deeper, multiple product relationships with our 
customers as critical to building longer term shareholder value. We are confident 
that our customer focus will prove to be correct in the longer term.” 
 
By 2007, Westpac’s corporate objective (p.10) was consistent with stakeholder value 
maximisation as each stakeholder was treated as a separate end: 
“In realising our strategy, we are therefore seeking to continuously improve or 
maintain a leading position in: employee commitment; customer satisfaction and 
advocacy; shareholder returns; and corporate responsibility ratings.”   
 
However, this corporate objective might have been symbolic because shareholder value was 
emphasised throughout their 2007 annual report.  For example, the text on the cover page read 
(2007, p.i): “Westpac 2007 Annual Report… Yesterday… The Real Return for 
Shareholders… Strong earnings, solid returns and a confident outlook…”  Moreover, 
Westpac’s remuneration package for executives in 1998 (pp.81-82) and in 2007 (pp.40-44) 
were consistent with shareholder value maximisation.  While targets were not disclosed in 
1998, their 2007 targets for short-term incentives were based on Economic Value Added
TM
 
and a range of financial and non-financial measures.  With respect to targets for short-term 
incentives, Westpac (AU, 2007, p.40) explains that non-shareholding stakeholders are a 
means to the end of shareholder value:  
“Other financial and non-financial performance measures are established for each 
executive, including measures of business efficiency and risk management, 
customer satisfaction, employee commitment and corporate responsibility. These 
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measures offer insight into current corporate health and are drivers of future 
sustainable shareholder value.” 
 
Westpac’s 2007 targets for long-term incentives were based on relative total shareholder 
return.  Thus, Unilever’s (UK) and Westpac’s (NZ) versions of Stakeholder Logic appear to 
have been symbolic, not substantive.  No exemplars of Stakeholder Logic that was 
substantive were identified. 
 
6.3.2. Corporate Logic 
There are few exemplars of Corporate Logic in the sub-sample of codes and corporate annual 
reports.  The human resources and market principles were widely diffused and tied the 
recommendations of code issuers and the remuneration practices of companies, but the 
fairness principle was not as widely diffused and rarely tied to recommendations and 
practices.  This means that the theoretical version of Corporate Logic (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.3) is different to the practiced version of Corporate Logic.   
 
No exemplars of Corporate Logic amongst the sub-sample of codes were identified.  In all of 
the codes, either Investor Logic or both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were deeply 
embedded in not only their recommendations on executive remuneration, but also their 
recommendations on corporate governance.  This is illustrated in Table 6.3.  Of those codes 
that had recommendations on corporate governance, they recommended that the board should 
be comprised of a balance of executive and non-executive directors or a majority of non-
executive directors, and that the remuneration committee should be comprised of a majority 
of non-executive directors or only non-executive directors.  Further, these codes 
recommended that non-executive directors should be independent (e.g. not former executives 
and have minimal shareholdings).  Such recommendations are consistent with Investor Logic, 
not Corporate Logic. 
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Table 6.3: Code Issuers’ Recommendations on the Composition of Boards and 
Remuneration Committees 
Type of Texts 
(No. of texts) 
Board Composition Remuneration Committee Composition 
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UK Codes         
Pre-1998 (4) 3 (75%) 1 (25%)   1 (25%)  1 (25%) 2 (50%) 
1998 to 2006 (13) 5 (38%) 5 (38%) 3 (23%)  3 (23%)  4 (31%) 6 (46%) 
Post-2006 (5) 2 (40%) 3 (60%)   1 (20%)  3 (60%) 1 (20%) 
AU Codes         
Pre-1998 (6)   6 (100%)  2 (33%)  4 (67%)  
1998 to 2006 (9) 4 (44%)  5 (56%)  3 (33%)  6 (67%)  
Post-2006 (6) 3 (50%)  3 (50%)    6 (100%)  
NZ Codes         
Pre-1998 (1) 1 (100%)    1 (100%)    
1998 to 2006 (8) 3 (38%) 1 (13%) 4 (50%)  5 (63%)  2 (25%) 1 (13%) 
Post-2006 (5) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 3 (60%)  4 (80%)   1 (20%) 
Key: ED = Executive Director; NED = Non-executive Director. NEDs may be affiliated or independent. 
  
Only one exemplar of Corporate Logic amongst the sub-sample of corporate annual reports 
was identified.  There were many instances of companies that justified their executive 
remuneration practices with only the human resources and/or market principles, but most of 
these companies also provided minimal remuneration disclosure.  For example, Tourism 
Holdings (NZ, 2007, p.19) disclosed their remuneration policy, but not the criteria that they 
used to award annual bonuses and share options to executives: 
“[Our remuneration policy is] …designed to make sure that: • The senior 
employees of the company are appropriately rewarded for excellent achievement 
and performance • THL [Tourism Holdings Limited] is able to attract and retain 
high performing people whose skills and attributes are well matched to THL’s 
requirements…” 
 
This meant that these companies could not be classified as being exemplars of Corporate 
Logic.  Of the companies that were considered to be possibly exemplars of Corporate Logic, 
most had their company’s founder (or a member of his/her family) as either the CEO or a 
director.  However, all of these companies had adopted the standard remuneration package for 
executives, except for Associated British Foods (UK).
136
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 For example, Antofagasta (UK, 2007) had an executive chairman who was the son of the founder that did not 
receive any variable remuneration, but other executives did receive variable remuneration (see Section 6.2.6). 
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Associated British Foods (UK) was an exemplar of Corporate Logic in 1998 for several 
reasons.
137
  First, while the corporate objective was not explicitly stated, the chairman’s report 
had a strong emphasis on profit and dividends (Associated British Foods, UK, 1998, pp.2-4). 
Second, the company was led by an executive chairman, who was the son of the company’s 
founder.  He had been in the role since 1978.  Also, he chaired a charitable trust, the Garfield 
Weston Foundation, which owned a controlling interest in an investment company, which in 
turn owned a majority shareholding in Associated British Foods.  The significant point was 
that the charitable trust, established by his father, supports many humanitarian causes.  Thus, 
the executive chairman appeared to be a steward (not an agent).  Third, the Board was 
comprised of five executive directors and three non-executive directors, but one non-
executive director was the chairman’s brother.  Fourth, the executive chairman chaired the 
remuneration committee, despite this practice not being recommended by the LSE listing 
rules.  Associated British Foods (UK, 1998, p.24) did not justify their decision:  
“[T]he Stock Exchange Listing Rules… recommended that these committees 
[audit and remuneration committees] be comprised of non executive directors 
with no executive representation. The Board… does not accept this 
recommendation as it considers that Mr Garry H Weston, Executive Chairman, 
should serve on both committees.”   
 
Therefore, the executive chairman can set his own pay.  This represents a conflict of interest, 
which would be exploited by an agent.  However, this is not problematic if the executive 
chairman, as argued, was a steward.  Fifth, the company’s (UK, 1998, p.24) remuneration 
policy emphasised the market principle and all but ruled out annual bonuses:  
“Remuneration levels are set by reference to individual performance, experience 
and market conditions with a view to providing a package which is appropriate for 
the responsibilities involved. Performance related bonuses are not given, other 
than in exceptional circumstances” 
 
Sixth, executives were awarded share options that were “not subject to specified performance 
criteria” (p.21).   
 
By 2007, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were embedded in Associated British 
Foods’ (UK) discourse.  The main changes from 1998 to 2007 were as follows.  First, the 
company’s board and remuneration committee became dominated by independent non-
executive directors with two executive directors (George Weston, who was CEO) and eight 
                                                 
137
 Associated British Foods’ (UK) 1989 annual report could not be classified as an exemplar of any Logic 
because it included almost no remuneration disclosure. 
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non-executive directors (including Galen Weston).  Second, the company’s remuneration 
policy (2007, p.40) included multiple remuneration principles.  Also included in the 
company’s 2007 remuneration policy (2007, p.40) was their rationale for increasing the 
proportion of variable remuneration: 
“Following a detailed review of the total remuneration package of executive 
directors and other senior executives in 2006, it was agreed that a substantial 
element of executive compensation should be ‘at risk’ in order to reward and drive 
increased performance, reflect the market trend and to align better the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders. The proportion of variable pay to fixed pay 
has increased over the past few years and now stands at around 2:1 for executive 
directors.” (p.40) 
 
This highlights a strengthening of Investor Logic relative to Corporate Logic.  However, 
while the market principle was not part of their 2007 remuneration policy, the market 
principle was embedded in their executive remuneration practices.  Base salary was set at the 
median relative to the company’s peers, and the value annual bonuses and long-term 
incentives awarded to executives are expressed as a percentage of base salary.  Thus, 
Corporate Logic was still embedded in the company’s discourse.   
 
Third, Associated British Foods (UK, 2007) had adopted the standard remuneration package 
for executives.  In 2000, an additional executive share option plan was adopted in which the 
vesting period was reduced from five to three years and performance conditions were 
introduced (with targets based on return on capital employed and earnings per share).  In 
2006, a review of the executive directors’ remuneration packages led to a substantial increase 
in the proportion of variable remuneration (as noted above).  This strengthening of Investor 
Logic was inconsistent with the Weston family ethos (exemplified by their continued 
involvement with the Garfield Weston Foundation).  After all, the ownership arrangements 
had not changed with the charitable trust remaining in control and the founder’s son was a 
director and his grandson was the CEO.  Also, Associated British Foods’ profitability had 
been increasing over time with no net losses.  There was no reason aside from institutional 
pressures (e.g. changing norms) for Investor Logic to become embedded in the company’s 
discourse.   
 
However, Corporate Logic was still embedded in Associated British Foods’ (UK) 2007 
annual report.  For instance, it included a “Corporate Citizenship” report in their 2007 annual 
report, which demonstrated the company’s concern for the welfare of its employees, 
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customers, shareholders, suppliers and others (pp.24-27).  These factors are reminiscent of 
stewardship theory’s argument that the founder and his/her family are stewards of the 
company (Davis et al., 1997; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  It is likely that the Weston family 
perceived the company as an extension of themselves; they were both the psychological and 
financial owners for the company (Hernandez, 2012).  Further, the company’s (2007, p.24) 
corporate objective was still profit-oriented: “Our aim is to concentrate our energies and 
expertise to achieve strong, sustainable leadership positions in markets that offer potential for 
profitable growth.”  While profit maximisation is different to shareholder value maximisation, 
it has been traditionally considered to be beneficial for shareholders.  This is suggestive of 
Corporate Logic or managerial capitalism (Chandler, 1962, 1984; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
6.3.3. Investor Logic 
As aforementioned, all codes’ recommendations are consistent with either Investor Logic only 
or both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (see Section 6.3.2).  Four codes, Hilmer (AU, 
1993, 1998), MinterEllison (NZ, 2003, 2009), and NZX (2003, 2004, 2010) were identified as 
likely to have recommendations that are consistent with Investor Logic only (see Chapter 5, 
Table 5.3).  Hilmer’s codes were lengthy texts that included much discussion on corporate 
governance but not much on executive remuneration. There was a strong emphasis on 
maximising shareholder value.  The agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles 
were also present.  Hilmer (AU, 1993, p.75) was supportive of financial incentives for 
executives:   
“The incentive should be tied to the long-run performance goals of the firm, and 
while the amount paid should depend on performance, executives should not have 
schemes so structured that the downside penalizes executives to the extent that 
executives will be more risk-averse than shareholders would like them to be.” 
 
However, Hilmer (AU, 1998) warned that many incentive schemes had become too complex 
and will led to a mismatch of interests between executives and shareholders.  Further, Hilmer 
(AU, 1993, 1998) criticised conventional wisdom that non-executive directors, who are 
independent, can hold executives to account.  Thus, both Logics are embedded in the 
discourse, although Investor Logic is stronger. 
 
MinterEllison (NZ, 2003, 2009), an Australasian law firm, produced two editions of their 
Corporate Governance White Paper.  There were few changes between editions.  
MinterEllison’s codes were lengthy texts that included much discussion on corporate 
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governance but not much on executive remuneration.  Only the pay-for-performance principle 
was present in both editions.  They recommended that executives receive an even mix of fixed 
and variable remuneration because fixed remuneration only can led to complacency, while 
variable remuneration only can led to a short-term focus.  Interestingly, they did not argue 
that long-term incentives are required to encourage a long-term focus.  This line of reasoning 
is similar to Frey and Osterloh’s (2005) argument that executives should receive mainly fixed 
remuneration to prevent a short-term focus.  Further, they were critical of independent 
directors being seen as a cure for poor corporate performance, but did acknowledge that they 
had a role in the boardroom.  These latter two arguments are consistent with Corporate Logic.  
Thus, both Logics are embedded in the discourse, although Investor Logic is stronger.  
 
NZX (NZ Stock Exchange, formerly NZSE) had produced a number of codes including four 
editions of the Listing Rules (1994; 1999; 2003; 2009), two editions of the Corporate 
Governance Best Practice Code (2004; 2010), and a policy statement on Directors’ 
Remuneration Packages (2005).  Only the pay-for-performance principle was included in 
three of these codes.  It relates to the following recommendation found in NZX (2003, 2004, 
2010, para.2.7):  
“Directors are encouraged to take a portion of their remuneration under a 
performance-based Equity Security compensation plan… [which] plan should not 
vest until at least after two years after the grant… Alternatively (or in addition), 
Directors are encouraged to invest a portion of their cash Directors’ remuneration 
in purchasing the Issuer’s Equity Securities.” 
 
However, the NZX’s remaining discussion on remuneration concerned disclosure, rather than 
executive remuneration practices.  They briefly discussed the process that a remuneration 
committee should follow and set out minimum disclosure requirements.  Further, NZX’s 
Listing Rules and Corporate Governance Best Practice Code did require independent 
directors on the board, but not on the remuneration committee.  Overall, the NZX’s discussion 
on corporate governance and remuneration are consistent with Investor Logic only, although 
this conclusion is tentative given the brevity of their discussion. 
 
As shown in Section 6.2, most codes’ recommendations are consistent with Investor Logic.  
In particular, some codes produced by the ABI (UK) and Hermes (UK) are exemplars of 
Investor Logic because they are representatives of investors.  As a case in point, ABI (1999a, 
p.2) had a strong emphasis on shareholder value and performance-based remuneration: 
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“It is now widely recognised that alignment with the shareholder interest is best 
achieved through the vesting of awards under share incentive schemes being 
conditional on satisfaction of performance criteria which demonstrate the 
achievement of demanding and stretching financial performance through the 
incentivisation period. The greater the level of potential reward to individual 
participants the more stretching and demanding the performance conditions 
should be.” 
 
Similarly, Hermes (UK, 2003, p.7) emphasised on shareholder value and performance-based 
remuneration: 
“The compensation of directors and senior management must be aligned with the 
interests of shareholders… The performance bonus should be earned only if there 
is outperformance by reference to key performance indicators and by comparing 
corporate performance with industry benchmarks.” 
 
Some of ABI’s and Hermes’ codes, particularly the lengthy ones, included remuneration 
principles and recommendations that were consistent with Corporate Logic.  For example, 
some of the ABI’s (UK, 2002) recommendations were partially based on the human resources 
and market principles, although their recommendations also strongly emphasised 
performance-based remuneration: 
“Shareholders recognise that… through their remuneration strategy, companies 
recruit, retain and incentivise individuals to create shareholder value… 
Remuneration policy should aim to establish a clear link between reward and 
performance.” (p.1) 
 
“When setting salary levels Remuneration Committees should take into 
consideration the requirements of the market… A policy of setting salary levels 
below the comparator group median can provide more scope for increasing the 
amount of variable performance based pay and incentive scheme participation…” 
(p.5) 
 
Interestingly, ABI (UK, 2002, p.3) also states that “Remuneration Committees should have 
regard to pay and conditions elsewhere in the company.” This is reminiscent of the fairness 
principle. 
 
Overall, Investor Logic is stronger than Corporate Logic in not only the ABI’s and Hermes’ 
codes, but most codes.  However, definitive classifications for most codes are not possible 
because most were principles-based and included non-specific recommendations on executive 
remuneration.   
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Several exemplars of Investor Logic amongst the sub-sample of corporate annual reports were 
identified.  There were a number of instances of companies that justified their executive 
remuneration practices with only the agency, motivation and/or pay-for-performance 
principles, but most of these companies also provided minimal remuneration disclosure.  For 
instance, Michael Hill International (NZ, 2007, pp.14-15) provided only a brief overview of 
their executive remuneration practices: 
“The function of the Remuneration sub-committee is to determine the Chief 
Executive’s and Senior Management’s remuneration… [T]he subcommittee 
operates independently of Senior Management… and obtains independent advice 
on… the remuneration packages… The committee has continued to structure 
Senior Management bonuses around a return on capital employed basis, to 
emphasise efficient use of capital.” 
 
This meant that these companies could not be classified as being exemplars of Investor Logic.  
On the other hand, some companies’ remuneration disclosures were sufficient for 
classifications to be made.  Many companies that were possible exemplars of Investor Logic 
had executive remuneration practices that were partially (or weakly) consistent with 
Corporate Logic.  This may be because as remuneration disclosures increase in length, the 
probability of adopting the human resources and market principles (or other aspects of 
Corporate Logic) increases.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the companies identified as 
exemplars of Investor Logic only were from the 1998 sample.  Three exemplars of Investor 
Logic, CGU (UK, 1998), Macquarie Bank (AU, 1998) and Brierley Investments (NZ, 1998), 
are discussed next.   
 
Investor Logic only is embedded in CGU’s (UK, 1998) discourse for the following reasons.138  
First, CGU’s (1998, p.17) corporate objective was shareholder value maximisation: “CGU has 
a clear focus on creating shareholder value”.  Second, CGU’s board had a majority of 
independent directors: It was comprised of five executive directors and eight independent 
non-executive directors (including the Chairman).  Third, while CGU’s remuneration policy 
included all six remuneration principles, they had a stronger emphasis on agency, motivation 
and pay-for-performance principles than most other companies.  For example, CGU (UK, 
1998, p.32) advocated meritocracy:  
“The Group’s remuneration policies are aimed at… ensuring that senior 
executives… are rewarded fairly for their respective individual contributions to 
the Group’s performance.”   
                                                 
138
 CGU (UK, 1998) was selected from the full sample, not the sub-sample.  CGU was selected because of its 
very strong emphasis on pay-for-performance as it had six incentive schemes. 
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Note that the use of word “fairly” here is a bit of a red herring.  Fourth, executives’ base 
salaries were performance-related.  They (1998, p.32) stated:  
“[S]alaries are aligned with the upper quartile for comparable positions, subject to 
the directors being assessed as fully competent… [which takes] into account 
experience, performance and personal targets achieved, and requires evidence of 
superior performance over a sustained period.”  
 
Fifth, executives’ were eligible to participate in two short-term incentive schemes (a cash 
bonus plan and a deferred share bonus plan) and four long-term incentives (executive share 
option scheme, savings-related share option scheme, integration cash bonus scheme, and 
integration restricted share scheme).
139
  Targets for the cash bonus plan were, in part, based 
on Economic Value Added
TM
.  Targets for the executive share option scheme were based on 
relative total shareholder return (CGU, 1998, p.33). Thus, CGU’s remuneration committee 
appears to have believed that incentive schemes can control (or programme the behaviour of) 
executives.  On the whole, CGU’s governance and remuneration practices were consistent 
with Investor Logic.   
 
Macquarie Bank (AU, 1998) represents an exemplar of Investor Logic only for several 
reasons.
140
  First, the company’s (1998, p.42) corporate objective was “to maximise 
shareholder wealth”.  Second, the company had a strong emphasis on rewarding individual 
performance or meritocracy.  They (1998, p.2) stated:  
“Macquarie seeks to recruit the best people… [but] advancement and 
remuneration are based solely on merit… While the basis of advancement and 
remuneration is individual merit, this is not inconsistent with teamwork; indeed, 
the best performing individuals are those are team players.”  
 
Third, the executive chairman’s and managing director’s joint statement argued that the 
company’s remuneration scheme gave employees’ downside risk and was tied to 
shareholders’ returns.  They (1998, p.4) stated:  
“Employment costs continue to be the Bank’s major expense. These costs include 
a significant performance component that is linked to overall profitability. The 
remuneration system at Macquarie Bank helps to provide consistent returns to 
shareholders. Employees absorb much of any volatility of the Bank’s financial 
performance. This system differs markedly from the practice of the United States’ 
                                                 
139
 The ‘integration’ schemes award executives for achieving operational and cost-savings targets following the 
merger of Commercial Union and General Accident to form CGU in mid-1998. 
140
 Macquarie Bank (AU, 1998) was selected from the full sample, not the sub-sample.  It was selected because 
of its very strong emphasis on pay-for-performance. 
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investment banks where historically shareholders absorbed most of the volatility 
of earnings, not employees.”   
 
Further, they (1998, p.10) argued: 
“Our remuneration system is heavily performance-oriented; all staff are eligible 
for share options. The Board regards the remuneration system as a key driver of 
the Bank’s success.”   
 
This line of reasoning was unique among the companies’ sampled and represents a strong 
belief in the pay-for-performance principle.  However, the case for Macquarie Bank (AU) as 
an exemplar of Investor Logic is weakened for two reasons.  First, there was limited 
disclosure on executive remuneration in the company’s annual report.  While Macquarie Bank 
appeared to have a standard remuneration package for executives, there was no disclosure of 
the targets and performance measures on which short- and long-term incentive were 
dependent.  Second, the independence of the board and remuneration committee was 
questionable because the board was comprised of three executive directors (including an 
executive chairman, who was one of the company’s founders) and six non-executive directors 
(including a major shareholder), and the remuneration committee was chaired by the 
executive chairman.   
 
Brierley Investments (NZ, 1998) represents an exemplar of Investor Logic only because of the 
new chairman’s statement in the annual report.  The company’s directors faced a major 
legitimacy crisis prior to the release of its 1998 annual report.  In 1998, Brierley Investments’ 
share price was NZ$1.22 on 5 January, NZ$0.34 on 25 September after reporting a NZ$904 
million loss, and NZ$0.43 on 31 December.  In the history of NZ listed companies, BIL’s 
$904 million loss is second only to Air New Zealand’s $1,425 million loss in 2001.  Further, 
the old chairman and CEO had been demised in late April.  The news of the old CEO’s NZ$4 
million redundancy payment accelerated the decline in Brierley Investments’ share price 
(Parker, 9 May 1998).  Facing NZ’s largest ever corporate loss at the time, the release of 
Brierley Investments’ 1998 annual report was the board of directors’ last chance to present a 
credible recovery plan to shareholders.  At the beginning of the annual report, the new 
chairman drew on Investor Logic to craft his recovery plan.  The third page of Brierley 
Investments’ (NZ, 1998, p.1) annual report outlined the recovery plan (in a very large bold 
font):  
“Shareholders can expect to see a BIL [Brierley Investments Limited] in the 
future with improved corporate governance, clear lines of authority between the 
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Board and management, executive remuneration inextricably linked to our 
performance and an investment strategy” 
 
In the body of the new chairman’s statement, he described a number of proposed changes 
including a new incentive scheme and new corporate governance structure (i.e. majority 
independent directors).  The agency principle was used to justify the adoption of Economic 
Value Added
TM
 as a performance measure:  
“To ensure a congruence of shareholder and management interests, it is the 
Board’s intention to introduce Economic Value Added (EVA) performance 
measurement principles. BIL retained EVA specialists Stern Stewart & Co to 
advise it on an incentivisation scheme that aligns executive remuneration with 
shareholder returns” (p.6) 
 
He argued that this would be beneficial for shareholders because management “will share in 
the downside” (p.6), although management not receiving a bonus is not the same as 
shareholders’ losing their capital: 
“To encourage management to achieve returns in excess of the risk-adjusted 
growth rate, incentive compensation will be linked directly to the management 
team’s achievement of wealth creation targets. If management fails to create 
wealth for shareholders, it will share in the downside.” (p.6)   
 
Reflecting on the proposed change, the new chairman’s penultimate sentence of his statement 
was: “Management and shareholder interests will be aligned, with management remunerated 
relative to the wealth it creates for our shareholders” (p.14).  The new chairman’s statement 
was followed by another full page quote (in a very large bold font): “Ultimately it is 
performance that shareholders demand, and the Board is intensely aware of the need to 
deliver” (p.15).  The new chairman had also announced his intention to resign at the 1998 
annual general meeting.  Certainly the new chairman’s rhetoric was consistent with Investor 
Logic only.  However, as Brierley Investments (NZ) disclosed few other details of their 
executive remuneration practices in any of its previous or subsequent annual reports, a 
definitive conclusion cannot be drawn.  Further, judging the success of Brierley Investments’ 
1998 annual report in defending the directors’ legitimacy is subjective.  Three non-executive 
directors were not re-elected at the 1998 annual general meeting, but the company continued 
to operate.   
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6.3.4. Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
As has been shown in Section 6.2, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were embedded 
in the discourse of code issuers and companies.  The remuneration principles (except the 
fairness principle) were widely diffused in the sub-sample of codes and corporate annual 
reports.  The remuneration principles were tied to various executive remuneration practices.  
Further, the standard remuneration package for executives was recommended by most code 
issuers and adopted by most companies.  However, Investor Logic was stronger than 
Corporate Logic.  For code issuers, their recommendations focused on short- and long-term 
incentive schemes.  For example, the Financial Reporting Council’s (UK, 2003, 2006, 2008, 
2010) code included an appendix on designing performance-related remuneration schemes.  
This is not surprising as several code issuers were representatives of investors (e.g. UK: ABI 
and Hermes; AU: Australian Shareholders’ Association and IFSA).  For companies, the 
fairness principle was not tied to their executive remuneration practices and there was much 
emphasis on short- and long-term incentive schemes for executives.  Most companies 
conceptualised executives as being motivated by extrinsic rewards (cf. Associated British 
Foods, UK, 1998).   
 
6.3.5. No Logics 
In contrast to both Logics, there were no exemplars of codes or corporate annual reports in 
which no Logic was embedded.  Certainly, there were many codes and corporate annual 
reports in the sub-sample which included very few words on executive remuneration.  For 
example, Bosch (AU, 1991, 1993, 1995) discussed corporate governance in much detail and 
the third edition (58 pages) was almost three times longer than the first edition (22 pages), but 
there was scant discussion of executive remuneration.
141
  Similarly, NZX’s (NZ, 1994, 1999, 
2003, 2009) listing rules did not discuss executive remuneration in any depth (see Section 
6.3.3).  Most UK 1989 annual reports, AU 1998 annual reports, and NZ 1998 and 2007 
annual reports included scant narrative disclosure on executive remuneration.  However, most 
corporate annual reports included enough disclosure to infer that executives received the 
standard remuneration package (e.g. salary, pension, short-term incentives and long-term 
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 Bosch (AU, 1991, 1993, 1995) recommended that non-executive directors “to act in the interests of the 
general body of shareholders rather than any sectional interest” (1991, p.5).  Bosch also recommended that 
independent non-executive directors should determine executive remuneration, and executive remuneration 
should be fully disclosed to shareholders.  While Bosch did not include any remuneration principles, it also 
did not include any alternative principles.   
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incentives).  For example, Brambles Industries (AU, 1998, p.25) did not disclose its 
remuneration policy but did state:  
“The remuneration of the Chief Executive, Finance Director and the three regional 
Managing Directors is reviewed annually by the non-executive members of the 
Board in the light of Brambles’ performance and advice from independent 
international remuneration consultants.”  
 
Further, they (1998, p.65) stated that, “Total remuneration, include[s] salary, bonus, 
superannuation, retirement payments and other benefits…” and that executive directors 
participated in the employee share option plan.   
 
Some companies had even less remuneration disclosure.  For instance, EBOS (NZ, 2007, 
p.25) mentions that the CEO’s remuneration package includes “Salary [and a] performance 
bonus and other emoluments”.  No alternative remuneration principles were identified, 
although many companies did justify their remuneration policies by citing the use of 
remuneration consultants.  On the whole, there appears to be no alternative Logics. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were embedded, to varying degrees, in the 
discourse on executive remuneration of code issuers and companies.  There was a standard 
remuneration package for executives that has become increasingly complex over time, but 
was always justified with multiple remuneration principles.  While there was variation in 
code’s recommendations and companies’ practices, it was a case of variation in form, not 
substance.  The standard package had become taken-for-granted.  Further, both Logics were 
able to co-exist in the discourse because Corporate Logic was weak or symbolic (the fairness 
principle was not tied to executive remuneration practices).  Also illustrating that both Logics 
were embedded in the discourse, there were few exemplars of codes and corporate annual 
reports that were entirely consistent with Corporate Logic only or Investor Logic only.  
However, there was still tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The human 
resources/market principles may conflict with agency/pay-for-performance principle if the 
change in the median level of remuneration changes at a different rate to firm performance.  
This tension was not addressed by code issuers and companies.         
 
The main similarity between codes and corporate annual reports was that most of the narrative 
on executive remuneration was concerned with short- and long-term incentives.  The main 
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difference was that codes’ recommendations were non-specific and brief, whereas companies’ 
descriptions were high nuanced and lengthy (particularly in AU and UK 2007 annual reports).  
Further, the main similarity between AU, NZ and UK organisational texts was that they had a 
common language for conceptualising executive remuneration with a strong emphasis on 
performance-based remuneration.  The main difference was that AU and UK texts had much 
lengthier narratives on executive remuneration (except UK 1989 annual reports and AU 1998 
annual reports) than NZ texts.  In addition, the main similarity between the oldest and most 
recent organisational texts was that, once again, there was a common language.  More recent 
texts appeared to be developed from (or built on) older texts. For codes, there were no major 
differences.  For companies, the main trend was that their executive remuneration practices 
began increasingly complex over time.  By 2007, most AU and UK companies had adopted 
multiple short- and long-term incentive schemes and there were no companies left that 
rejected performance-based remuneration (e.g. Associated British Foods, UK, 1998).  Thus, 
while Investor Logic and Corporate Logic co-exist in organisational texts, Investor Logic is 
stronger than Corporate Logic. 
 
The substantive and symbolic nature of the code issuers’ recommendations and companies’ 
practices was not discussed in any depth in the chapter.  It appears that the remuneration 
principles (except the fairness principle) represent code issuers’ and companies’ shared 
understanding of executive remuneration.  However, whether or not code issuers’ and 
companies’ public discourse was decoupled from their private discourse is not unknown.  
There were two examples of corporate annual reports, Brierley Investments (NZ, 1998) and 
Westpac (AU, 1998), where the companies attempted to obviously influence the readers’ 
impression of the companies.  This is reminiscent of Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990, p.177) 
“overacting actor[s]… [that] overstate claims to legitimacy or overreact to faults.”  Certainly, 
all of the codes and corporate annual reports were meticulously crafted texts that were 
designed to persuade readers of the rationality and legitimacy of their recommendations and 
practices, respectively.  Therefore, the next chapter presents an analysis of the private 
discourse on executive remuneration, and then Chapter 8 discusses the extent to which 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are substantively or symbolically embedded in the public 
and private discourse. 
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Chapter 7: Remuneration Decision-Making in the 
Boardroom 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter addresses Research Question 3: How, if at all, do Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic influence the thinking and decision-making of NZ organisational actors with respect to 
executive remuneration?  Multiple aspects of remuneration decision-making in the 
boardrooms of New Zealand (NZ) companies that are listed on the NZX (or NZ Stock 
Exchange) are investigated.  Particular attention is given to the Remuneration Committee 
(RemCo).  In doing this, interviews with 5 executives, 16 non-executive directors, 7 
remuneration consultants and 5 code issuers were conducted.  The findings from these 
interviews are reported in this chapter.  Interviewees’ names are not disclosed and, therefore, 
the quotes presented have been heavily edited.  Quotes are presented in italics.  While all of 
the interviewees’ transcripts were analysed, most of the quotes presented are attributed to 
non-executive directors (who are the decision-makers) and executives (who are the subject of 
those decisions).
142
  Drawing on Chapter 5’s findings, it had been conjectured that code 
issuers, or at least the codes they produce, would have a significant influence on how 
remuneration decisions are made and reported.  However, code issuers are rarely quoted 
because they are not as influential as had been expected (see Chapter 4, Section 4.6.4).     
 
The chapter is organised as follows. A background on executive remuneration in NZ is 
presented in the Section 2.  Drawing on newspaper articles on executive remuneration, this 
section provides context for the chapter’s findings.  Presented in Sections 3 and 4 are the 
interviewees’ perceptions of what should be the corporate objective and how executives 
behave, respectively.  Inferences are made about what institutional logics of corporate 
governance are most likely to shape remuneration decision-making in NZ companies.  Section 
5 examines how various parties influence remuneration decision-making including directors’ 
network and competitors, recruitment and remuneration consultants, investors and analysts, 
                                                 
142
 Executives refer to Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers, who may also be executive 
directors; whereas Directors refers to Non-executive Directors.  Code issuers refer to representatives of 
entities that have produced at least one code, and Consultants refer to recruitment and remuneration 
consultants.  Further, passages in this chapter that refer to ‘Executives’, ‘Directors’, ‘Code issuers’ and 
‘Consultants’ with a capital ‘E’, ‘D’, ‘C’ and ‘C’ respectively, denote the interviewees. 
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regulators and code issuers, media, and employees, customers and suppliers.  Remuneration 
principles are discussed both individually and as a set in Section 6.  Remuneration practices 
that are both used and endorsed by non-executive directors are described in Section 7. 
Remuneration processes are considered in Section 8.  Also discussed in Sections 6, 7 and 8 is 
the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in remuneration 
principles, practices and processes.  Concluding comments are made in the final section. 
 
7.2. Background on Executive Remuneration in New Zealand 
Executive remuneration in NZ has been a newsworthy topic for the following reasons.  First, 
due to the Companies Act 1993’s disclosure requirements, CEO pay has made headlines since 
the mid-1990s (e.g. “Salary disclosure jumps the gun – Steel and Tube Holdings”, 20 October 
1995, “Telecom top man’s salary package tops $1 million”, 21 June 1996).  Second, CEOs 
are among the highest paid individuals (Atkinson and Leigh, 2005).  Third, CEO pay tends to 
increase faster than average worker pay (Roberts, 2005).  Fourth, New Zealand’s egalitarian 
culture conflicts with a significant differential between CEO pay and average worker pay 
(“Public Envy No. 1”, 30 September 1996; “Paying for performance”, 7 October 2006).  
Fifth, a few CEOs have received multi-million dollar severance payments or ‘golden 
parachutes’ (“CEO remuneration – who gets what”, 13 November 2002).  Sixth, due to the 
international trend for executives to receive an ever-increasing proportion of performance-
based or at-risk remuneration (“Accountability now part of executive package”, 10 October 
1990; “Performance pay need highlighted”, 2 June 1997; “Pay for performance”, 4 April 
2003).  Seventh, CEO pay often does not appear to be related to firm performance (Bennett, 
18 August 2000; “Performance must be basis of chiefs’ pay”, 19 February 2008; “Executive 
pay out of control”, 13 May 2009).  However, executive remuneration is less controversial in 
NZ than in other countries such as Australia (AU), the UK and the US.
143
 
 
                                                 
143
 As shown in Chapter 5, there are few corporate governance codes in NZ compared to AU and the UK.  
Further, to assess the media’s interest in executive remuneration (as a proxy for the public’s interest), 
newspaper articles on executive remuneration are counted.  Data were collected from the Factiva database. 
The search included the following keywords: (Director or Executive or CEO) and (remuneration or 
compensation or pay) and (salary or salaries or incentive or bonus or share options or stock options).  The 
average number of newspaper articles on executive remuneration per year were as  follows:  
Newspaper 1986-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 Average (Total) 
NZ: NZ Herald 1 4 10 6 (150) 
AU: Sydney Morning Herald 4 9 18 12 (289) 
UK: The Times (London) 20 51 65 51 (1232) 
US: The New York Times 6 18 41 26 (612) 
 These results show growing media interest in executive remuneration, but there is much less media interest in 
NZ compared to other countries.   
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Executive remuneration packages for executives are broadly homogenous amongst publicly 
listed companies in most countries (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).  The standard package 
includes salary and benefits, pension, short-term incentives and long-term incentives (see 
Chapter 3, Table 3.4). The key differences between CEO pay in NZ and other countries are 
NZ CEOs receive lower proportions of variable remuneration (Bryan et al., 2006; Fernandes 
et al., 2009); and NZ CEOs receive lower absolute and relative levels of total remuneration 
(Fernandes et al., 2009; Michel et al., 2008).  Thus, NZ companies have a conservative 
approach to performance-based remuneration relative to their international counterparts, 
despite repeated claims that NZ companies are following international trends (“New Zealand 
Firms embrace incentive rewards”, 26 June 1990; “NZ lags well behind US on performance 
pay for CEOs”, 15 September 1995; Bennett, 18 August 2000; “NZ now attracting more 
executives than losing them - report”, 15 September 2003; “Performance-based pay for 
executives works”, 11 April 2009).144  For example, the National Business Review (“NZ lags 
well behind US on performance pay for CEOs”, 15 September 1995) reported that, “…the 
base salary of chief executives in New Zealand represents 88% of total remuneration 
compared with… only 25% in the US”; and then the NZ Herald (“Performance-based pay for 
executives works”, 11 April 2009) reported that, “In the US it is common for up to 60 per cent 
of a remuneration package to be linked to performance. In New Zealand that is closer to 15 
per cent.”   
 
There is a small body of research on CEO pay in NZ listed companies.  In a study of 73 
companies from 1994 to 1998, Elayan et al. (2003) found a significant positive relationship 
between CEO pay and firm size, but not firm performance.  Similarly, Andjelkovic et al. 
(2002) found a significant positive relationship between CEO pay and firm size, but not firm 
performance, in a study of 49 companies in 1997.
145
  In contrast, Gunasekaragea and 
Wilkinson (2002) found a significant positive relationship between CEO pay and both firm 
performance and size in a study of 36 companies from 1998 to 2000.
146
  Further, in a sample 
                                                 
144
 There are signs that the trend towards performance-based remuneration may be slowing amongst NZ listed 
companies.  For example, the NZ Herald (“More chief executives refusing performance pay deals”, 24 March 
2005) reported that, “More chief executives refusing performance pay deals… Recruitment company 
Sheffield's chief executive survey found about 60 per cent of chief executives now have a performance 
component to their pay packages, down from 69 per cent last year.” 
145
 However, Andjelkovic et al. (2002) also found that a significant relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance amongst companies who voluntarily disclosed information on executive remuneration prior to 
the introduction of mandatory disclosure.  
146
 Gunasekarage and Wilkinson (2002) measured CEO pay as cash remuneration plus the change in the value of 
the CEO’s shareholding, and measured firm performance using total shareholder return (previous three years, 
previous year and current year) and Tobin’s Q (current year). This leads to a problem of endogeneity because 
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of 473 firm-years from 1997 to 2002 (approximately 79 companies), Roberts (2005) found 
that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance is low but has increased over time.
147
  
Finally, in a study of 112 companies from 2001 to 2005, Jiang et al. (2009) found a 
significantly positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, but only if 
ownership concentration was low.  These findings are consistent with international research 
on CEO pay (see Chapters 2 and 3) in that those companies using performance-based 
remuneration do not produce superior shareholder returns to those companies that do not.  
 
Despite the lack of empirical support, the NZ media expressed a belief that CEO pay should 
be related to firm performance (McBride, 26 June 1992; “Performance pay need highlighted”, 
2 June 1997; “CEO remuneration – who gets what”, 13 November 2002; “Executive pay out 
of control”, 13 May 2009).  Many of the headlines in NZ newspapers concern CEOs who are 
paid more than one million dollars, particularly following the introduction of the Companies 
Act 1993’s disclosure requirements (“Telecom top man’s salary package tops $1 million”, 21 
June 1996; “Fletcher boss confirms $1.08m annual salary”, 26 September 1996); and CEOs 
that have supposedly been rewarded for failure, e.g. golden parachutes (“CEO remuneration – 
who gets what”, 13 November 2002; Fox, 12 July 2003).148  More recently, Paul Reynolds’ 
salary and bonus of $5 million at Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd attracted much media 
attention, particularly as Telecom’s share price had significantly declined at the time 
(“Telecom boss Reynold’s total pay package tops $5m”, 25 August 2009;  “Air NZ chief exec 
incentive payment $1.24m”, 25 August 2009).149  Such examples of media interest in CEO 
pay are typical in many countries around the world (Core et al., 2008; Dyck and Zingales, 
                                                                                                                                                        
the measurement of both CEO pay and firm performance includes the change in share price for (part of) the 
same period. 
147
 Roberts (2005) also found that CEO pay is also increasing at a faster rate than increases in shareholder returns 
and average worker pay, and that listed companies with powerful CEOs had lower CEO pay to firm 
performance sensitivity, where powerful CEOs are Chairman of the Board and/or a member of the 
Remuneration Committee.  In contrast, Boyle and Roberts (2012) found that CEOs who are members of the 
Remuneration Committee received lower annual increments in pay than those who are not in an expanded 
sample of 114 listed companies from 1998 to 2005. 
148
 For example, $4 million for Paul Collins at Brierley Investments Ltd (Parker, 9 May 1998); $2.5 million for 
Paul Anthony at Contact Energy Ltd (”Contact confirms CEO Anthony paid golden $2.5 million bonus”, 30 
November 1999); $2.2 million for James Boonzaier at Tower Ltd (“CEO remuneration – who gets what”, 13 
November 2002); $4.2 million for Gary Toomey at Air NZ Ltd (Van den Bergh, 5 September 2002); and 
$1.8 million for Theresa Gattung at Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd (“Richer than ever before executive pay 
survey”, 22 March 2008). 
149
 Surprisingly, in NZ corporate history, the most significant remuneration scandal concerns directors’ fees, not 
CEO pay. Contact Energy Ltd (or Contact) had planned to double their directors’ fees to $1.5 million. At the 
2008 Annual General Meeting (or AGM), angry shareholders (many of whom were customers) told directors 
that they had their “snouts in the trough”. As a result, directors’ fees were not doubled, but Contact’s 
reputation had already been damaged and they lost 41,000 customers in the following months (“A billion 
thanks for top chief executive”, 15 Aug 2009). 
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2002).  However, the representativeness of the NZ media’s views is questionable as many 
articles are based on interviews with remuneration consultants and the NZ Shareholders’ 
Association.
150
  There also appears to be a tendency for the NZ media to sensationalise CEO 
pay.
151
  
 
Since 1993, NZ Regulators have not changed the remuneration disclosure requirements, 
despite the media’s headlines and some CEOs being supposedly rewarded for failure.  The 
Companies Act 1955 and 1993 requires listed companies to seek shareholders’ approval for 
directors’ remuneration and schemes that issue shares, options or rights to employees.  Also, 
the Companies Act 1993 requires listed companies to disclose how much each director is paid 
and the number of employees who earn more than $100,000 in bands of $10,000.  Listed 
companies did not have to begin disclosing until 1997, although some were early disclosers 
(Andjelkovic et al., 2002).  Further, listed companies are also jointly regulated by the FMA 
(Financial Markets Authority, formerly, Securities Commission) and the NZX (formerly, 
NZSE or NZ Stock Exchange).  The FMA/Securities Commission and NZX has never 
required listed companies to disclose any additional information on remuneration, although 
the NZX (2004, p.2) does require that “Every Issuer [i.e. Listed Company] should have a 
formal and transparent method to recommend Director remuneration packages to 
shareholders.”152  Certainly, NZ has fewer disclosure requirements on remuneration than 
other Anglo-American and European countries. It may be that NZ Regulators believe that 
additional disclosure or shareholder approval requirements would not result in improved pay-
performance sensitivity.  However, Schoenemann (2006) argues that NZ Regulators should 
adopt the Australian model (e.g. an advisory vote on the remuneration report) to improve pay-
performance sensitivity.  
 
Several NZ organisations (‘Code Issuers’) have produced codes that include principles and 
recommendations on executive remuneration (Institute of Directors in NZ, 2005; Minter 
                                                 
150
 Most of the newspaper articles cited in this section include comments from remuneration consultants.  Many 
post-2001 newspaper articles cited in this section include comments from the NZ Shareholders’ Association. 
151
 For example: “Three Executives’ Pay Tops $1 Million Mark”, Kennedy, 10 May 1996; “FCL [Fletcher 
Challenge Ltd] Defends Chief’s Million Dollar Wage”, 26 September 1996; “Telecom Pays Deane $1.93m”, 
19 September 2000; “Failed CEOs’ earnings the highest”, 13 November 2002; “Casino’s $3.7m boss eyes 
glory days”, Drinnan, 19 December 2007; “Telecom’s $5 Million Man”, Drinnan, 25 August 2009; and “Air 
NZ chief exec incentive payment $1.24m, 28 August 2009. 
152
 However, the NZX introduced a new listing rule on 1 December 2002: “The annual report of an Issuer shall 
contain… a statement of any corporate governance policies, practice and processes, adopted or followed by 
the Issuer” (NZSE, 2002, p.10-9).  This listing rule encourages listed companies to increase their 
remuneration disclosure, although it is non-specific in what should be disclosed. 
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Ellison, 2003; NZX, 2004; Securities Commission, 2004b) as well as official reports that 
include some discussion on executive remuneration (Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
NZ, 2003; NZ Shareholders’ Association, 2004).  NZ codes and official reports are similar to 
international codes and official reports (see Chapter 5), although NZ codes and official reports 
include less discussion and few principles and recommendations on executive remuneration.  
Also, compliance with NZ codes is voluntary.
153
  Some NZ listed companies are listed on 
more than one stock exchange and, therefore, may be required by other stock exchanges’ 
listing rules to disclose additional information on executive remuneration.
154
  The extent to 
which NZ listed companies comply with NZ codes (and international codes) has rarely been 
studied.
155
  However, evidence presented by Bhuiyan and Salma (2011), Reddy (2010) and 
Teh (2009) indicates that NZ codes have influenced NZ listed companies’ decision to adopt a 
remuneration committee, and compliance results in improved firm performance, although the 
authors acknowledge that these effects are small.  Further, Chapter 5 shows that NZ codes and 
corporate annual reports have a shared language on executive remuneration. 
 
Collectively, Chapters 5 and 6 and this section highlight what is and is not part of NZ public 
discourses on executive remuneration.
156
  Corporate Logic appears to be embedded in these 
discourses because NZ Regulators trust directors and executives to a greater extent than their 
international counterparts (as evidenced by NZ’s minimal disclosure requirements on 
executive remuneration that have not changed since 1993); and NZ Listed Companies have a 
                                                 
153
 Listed companies do have to comply with the NZX’s (2004) Corporate Governance Best Practice Code, but 
its requirements for executive remuneration are not mandatory: For example, NZX (2004, p.2, emphasis 
added) states that, “Directors are encouraged to take a portion of their remuneration under a performance-
based Equity Security compensation plan…” 
154
 Of the largest NZ Listed Companies, many are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and a few are 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  While these companies often disclose additional information 
about executive remuneration, they can avoid additional disclosure requirements because companies that are 
not headquartered in Australia or the UK do not have to comply with Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 or 
the UK’s Companies Act 2006 (i.e. they do not have to produce a remuneration report) and are exempt from 
most of the ASX’s and LSE’s listing rules.  Also, companies can choose not to comply with the ASX’s and 
LSE’s codes because these codes have ‘comply or explain’ approaches. 
155
 There have been three studies of NZ codes.  First, in a study of 90 companies in 2003 and 2007, Teh (2009) 
found that, following the issuance of NZX (2004), companies who formed a remuneration committee had a 
higher return on assets in 2007 compared to 2003.  Second, in a study of approximately 100 companies from 
1999 to 2007, Reddy (2010) found that, following the issuance of Securities Commission (2004b), of the 
companies that complied, smaller (larger) companies experienced a decrease (increase) in firm performance. 
Third, in a study of 70 companies from 2000 to 2007, Bhuiyan and Salma (2011) found that NZX’s (2004) 
and Securities Commission’s (2004b) codes pressured companies into establishing a remuneration 
committee.   
156
 There may be multiple discourses on executive remuneration in the sense that directors, executives, investors, 
media, regulators, etc. have different perceptions of executive remuneration which may or may not be 
coalescing and intersecting (e.g. investors and directors may have a shared discourse because they 
communicate with each other on a regular basis). 
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conservative approach to executive remuneration relative to their international counterparts 
(i.e. less use of performance-based remuneration and a lower proportion of variable 
remuneration).  For example, a remuneration consultant commented that, “Money is not the 
best way to motivate… New Zealand organisations have had mixed success in implementing 
incentive schemes” (“Paying for performance”, 7 October 2006).  Investor Logic also appears 
to be embedded in these discourses because investors believe that executives can influence 
firm performance and expect that executive remuneration will vary with shareholder returns 
(Chiu and Monin, 2003); and the language of pay-for-performance is found in newspaper 
articles (see above), codes and corporate annual reports (see Chapters 5 and 6).  Therefore, it 
is expected that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic will be embedded in the private 
discourse of executives, non-executive directors, remuneration consultants and code 
issuers.
157
   
 
7.3. Corporate Objective 
The corporate objectives that Executives and Directors
158
 believe should be (normative) and 
are (descriptive) pursued are discussed in this section.
159
  Recall that shareholder value 
maximisation
160
 is consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic; whereas, 
stakeholder value maximisation is consistent with Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic (see 
Chapter 2).  Further, there are other possible corporate objectives: Revenue and/or profit 
growth, gain and maintain organisational prestige,
161
 or realise an intended corporate strategy.  
Generally, Executives’ and Directors’ perceptions of the corporate objective tend to map onto 
                                                 
157
 Interviews with these parties are used as a proxy for private discourse because it is not possible to gain access 
to these parties’ private worlds (e.g. board meetings). Further, there may be symbolic aspects of Corporate 
Logic and/or Investor Logic (i.e. private discourse may be decoupled from public discourse). Substantive and 
symbolic aspects of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are discussed in several of the remaining sections in 
this chapter.  Finally, both Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are not expected to be embedded in private 
discourse on executive remuneration because of the near absence of non-shareholding stakeholders in the 
public discourse (e.g. newspaper articles, codes and corporate annual reports). 
158
 Executives refer to Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers, who may also be executive 
directors; whereas Directors refers to Non-executive Directors.  Further, passages in this chapter that refer to 
‘Executives’ and ‘Directors’ with a capital ‘E’ and ‘D’, respectively, denote the interviewees.  
159
 Code Issuers and Consultants expressed a similar range of views to those of Executives and Directors. 
However, Code Issuer B commented that, “…business will not exist unless it gives return to its shareholders 
and unless it gives value to its customers.” This perspective is partially consistent with stakeholder value 
maximisation because these two stakeholders are seen as separate ends, but other stakeholders are still 
excluded as separate ends. 
160
 Shareholder value maximisation may also be enlightened in that non-shareholding stakeholders are 
conceptualised as a means to an end (Jensen, 2001; Lok, 2010; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  In this 
respect, companies cannot take advantage of non-shareholding stakeholders in the short-term to maximise 
shareholder value in the long-term, but they still do not intend to maximise non-shareholding stakeholder 
value in the long-term. 
161
 Prestige is a function of legitimacy, reputation and status (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
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two corporate objectives: Growth and shareholder value maximisation.  For example, Director 
L believes that the corporate objective is: “Good shareholder growth… and that comprises… 
share price growth and dividend growth.”  Of course, corporate strategy is an integral part of 
realising these corporate objectives.  To illustrate, Executive B described how the company’s 
plans (i.e. corporate strategy) and remuneration schemes are focused on shareholder value.  
Further, stakeholder value maximisation is seldom advanced as the corporate objective.  
Indeed, Executives and Directors rarely mentioned non-shareholding stakeholders during the 
interviews. 
 
Many of the Directors and Executives indicated that their ideal and intended corporate 
objective is growth, although there are multiple definitions of growth including revenue, 
profit, dividends and/or share price growth.  For instance, Executive A stated that “…the 
intentions… [are:] business [or revenue] will be doubled and the profit will be doubled.”  
These growth objectives are incorporated into companies’ strategic (or multi-year) and 
business (or annual) plans, and targets that are linked to executives’ short-term and long-term 
incentives.  Summarising the rationale for doing this, Director L explained: 
“[T]he theory is: when you’re [executives are] taking your short-term decisions 
you won’t compromise… where the company might be in three to five years time 
because otherwise you might compromise the value of your shares. So it’s how 
you get a balance in executives’ minds [using] the different components of 
remuneration… [This will ensure that] you’ve got sustainable growth of 
earnings.” 
 
However, Directors and Executives have different perceptions of the relationship between 
short-term and long-term growth.  While some Directors argued for a balance between short-
term (this year) and long-term (3-5 years) results, Executives were focused on short-term 
results.  Executive E detailed the relationship between short-term and long-term results: 
“[Y]ou are literally clock reset every Monday morning, so unless you sell more 
this week… then you are not going to get your targets. So, what that drives is an 
obsession with growth all the time, which is not unhealthy… You can say it is 
quite short-term focused, but in that business… it’s just that little bit every day 
[that] creates this longer term momentum.” 
 
Similarly, Executive A believed that remuneration schemes and share markets reinforce this 
focus on short-term results: 
“There’s no question: Most employees are driven by the short-term scheme. They 
are very focused on their short-term results. You have to! In our world, if you 
missed a year’s [forecast] results, [then] the share market is highly critical. And 
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everyone says companies are too short-term focused, [but] the shareholders make 
us that way and quite rightly so! I’m all in favour, I’m not critical at all… the 
long-term is just a whole bunch of short-terms.” 
 
Executives and Directors also expressed that the corporate objective is shareholder value 
maximisation.  For example, Director G stated that, “…what the board actually [does] is to 
create and sustain shareholder wealth.”  While shareholder value maximisation is 
conceptually different to growth, Executives and Directors tended to define shareholder value 
maximisation in terms of growing earnings per share, dividends and, ultimately, the share 
price.  Further, Executives and Directors also described that long-term incentives are geared 
towards shareholder value.  Having a shareholding means that executives and shareholders 
have common interests, i.e. they share risks and returns.
162
  To illustrate, Director K explained 
why executives received share options, “We felt that… driving shareholder value over time 
was going to be a shared effort and we wanted to ensure that our key employees feel they 
have skin in the game.” Further, Directors believed that shareholder value maximisation 
involves a long-term, not short-term focus.  As a case in point, Director K avowed, “You are 
trying to align the reward regime… with the lift over time in shareholder value. It’s not just 
quarter-by-quarter, but over time lifting value.”  However, as explained above, Executives 
and Directors had different perceptions of how the short-term and long-term are 
interrelated.
163
  
 
Executives and Directors did not believe that stakeholder value maximisation should be or is 
the corporate objective.  As illustrated by Director B, who affirmed what is and is not the 
corporate objective:  
“[A] focus on what does deliver value to shareholders, which is share price 
growth and income stream from dividends… And I don’t yet buy the notion that 
the [non-shareholding] stakeholders have the same stake in the company as the 
owners…”   
 
                                                 
162
 However, executives and shareholders are not likely to have the same interests because shareholders can 
diversify their investment portfolios, while executives have most of their wealth tied to one company.  Also, 
all shareholders may not have the same interests because of varying investment time horizons and risk 
preferences (Hendry et al., 2006; Lok, 2010).  
163
 For example, Executive E claimed executives in a particular company had a focus on increasing the share 
price in the short-term (or on an annual basis): “I mean that whole business was driven around hitting 
targets, bouncing up share price growth with bottom line performance… Everything is timed down to days 
when announcements are made… to maximise profitability and to maximise the impact it [i.e. 
announcements] have on the market. You can sit back and say, ‘Is it right or is it wrong?’ In most cases, it’s 
just pretty damn good management [particularly] if the aim is to make shareholders as much money as it 
possibly can.” 
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However, non-shareholding stakeholders’ interests are considered when Executives and 
Directors make decisions.  Director G cited the example of Contact losing thousands of 
customers following a proposed increase in directors’ fees (see footnote 149) as a reason why 
boards should account for non-shareholding stakeholders: “We take account of all our 
stakeholders. We would be silly not to. So you listen to them… [but] whether it changes what 
you do, it might…”  Further, Executives and Directors believed that companies do not exist 
solely for the benefit of shareholders.  Director O argued that, “[For] most Chief Executives… 
the first objective is the business, but most of them would want to grow the business in a way 
that is useful to the wider communities in which they operate.”  
 
While Executives and Directors did not deny the importance of non-shareholding 
stakeholders (e.g. customers and employees) to companies, they perceive non-shareholding 
stakeholders as the means to the end of shareholder value.  Some Executives and Directors 
mentioned performance measures that are related to relationships with customers (e.g. brand 
recognition, customer satisfaction and market share) and employees (e.g. employee 
satisfaction, health and safety, leadership and organisational culture).  This is because they 
believe that satisfying non-shareholding stakeholders will result in improved financial 
performance.  However, most Executives and Directors described that financial performance 
measures were the main determinant of short-term and long-term incentives.  Common 
financial performance measures included revenue, profit, cash flow, return on capital, 
economic value added, earnings per share and total shareholder return.  As a case in point, 
Director N, who also emphasised shareholder value maximisation as the corporate objective, 
maintained: 
“Typically you would be looking at things like profit… market share… cash flow 
[and] product development… You may think it’s important to acquire or sell a 
business… you can take that into account. There’s got to be numbers [that] reflect 
the key drivers of the business and what you want people to work on.” 
 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, but not Stakeholder Logic and Political Logic are 
consistent with Executives’ and Directors’ views.  This is because there is a strong consensus 
among Executives and Directors that the corporate objective should be and is shareholder 
value maximisation.  Emphasising this point, Director J declared, “I’m driven as a board 
director of a conventional commercial enterprise by [shareholder] value maximisation; that is 
not the same as profit maximisation.”  During the interviews, Executives and Directors rarely 
mentioned non-shareholding stakeholders.  Further, support for shareholder value 
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maximisation is reflected in Executives and Directors choice of performance measures (as 
above) and rationales for using incentive schemes (see Section 7.6).  However, there are 
varied opinions among Executives and Directors concerning how to practice shareholder 
value maximisation.  Many performance measures were mentioned.  This is illustrated by 
Director A, who asserted, “I don’t really believe in market-based returns… [It is] outside the 
chief executives’ [control and]… depends on market factors… [I prefer] something… more 
objective like earnings per share.”  Also, many time frames were mentioned. As noted above, 
Executives have a short-term focus relative to Directors.  This variability in how shareholder 
value maximisation is implemented highlights that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
may be embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration.
164
   
 
7.4. Behavioural Models of Executives 
Behavioural models of executives are discussed in this section.  Recall that executives are 
characterised as self-interested agents under Investor Logic and trustworthy stewards under 
Corporate Logic (see Chapter 2).  Agents are extrinsically motivated, while stewards are 
intrinsically motivated.  This is a simplistic view of human behaviour.  It may be that people 
are both extrinsically and intrinsically motivated, where some are more extrinsically or 
intrinsically motivated than others (Furnham, 2005).  In other words, there may be a 
continuum of motivational profiles from pure agent to pure steward, and people are 
distributed in some manner along this continuum.  This is illustrated by Director B, who 
wryly remarked, “[S]ome people aren’t motivated by money and some people are. They [the 
former] are some that are most difficult CEOs… they keep giving the money back.”  Further, 
people may lose intrinsic motivation as the level of potential extrinsic rewards (e.g. monetary 
incentives) increases (Frey, 1997; Frey and Osterloh, 2005).  This means that motivation is 
not a simple product of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  However, such a conceptualisation 
is inconsistent with the opinions of interviewees.  Instead, interviewees conceptualised 
executives as being motivated by multiple factors including money, status, (personal and 
company) reputation, challenge, enjoyment and intellectual curiosity.   
 
Executives and Directors recognised that human behaviour is complex in that different 
executives are motivated by different factors and these factors can change over time.  
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Typically, executives want to achieve certain career goals within a specific time period.  
Summarising, Executive A noted, “…it depends where you are in life.”  The interviewees 
gave several examples of executives who were not overly concerned with remuneration 
because their career goal was to become a CEO, but they also gave several examples of 
executives who were very concerned with remuneration.  Director C stated, “There are 
certain executives who are completely driven by remuneration, [and] there are some 
executives [who] aren’t. There is no one [standard] answer on remuneration.”  Further, the 
interviewees explained that remuneration is not necessarily the most important factor to 
executives when deciding what jobs to do.  As a case in point, Executive B explained his 
rationale for changing jobs from a low to high potential growth company as follows: 
“So you earn a lot of money if you are willing to [stay] but you don’t actually 
advance your career. You don’t feel very good about it… Crikey, you put a lot of 
life into this [job]. I would just be de-energized working in that environment.” 
 
Nevertheless, money is a powerful motivator for executives. Most of the Executives and 
Directors believed that financial incentives influence how executives behave.  For instance, 
Executive C testified, “Money is the strongest thing on the shelf [and] is the sign of status... I 
want to get paid as much as I can... You have to give people, especially executives… the 
incentive to get off your ass and actually perform...”  Similarly, Director K clarifies why a 
particularly company adopted an executive share option scheme in the 1990s: “We were 
genuinely as a board… convinced that the scheme again was a very important motivator.”  
Further, the quantum also matters.  Large financial incentives are more motivational than 
small ones.  To illustrate, Executive B confessed:  
“One year the board decided to give me a double STI. It’s only fifty thousand… 
it’s not enough money to fundamentally alter your level of motivation. Contrast 
that [to a larger company]… the amount of money available on STI became very 
material. One year I got [more than half a million dollars], I think. Then there’s 
no question: That sort of amount of money motivates your attempts to deliver. No 
question!” 
 
Consistent with the notion of meritocracy, the interviewees believed that executives should be 
rewarded for their relative contribution to firm performance.  Thus, how much others are paid 
and the extent to which this is perceived to be tied to their contribution to firm performance 
can (de-)motivate executives.  This is exemplified in Executive A’s remarks: 
“[T]he thing that high performers hate most: low performers and when low 
performers get paid the same as high performers. It is the most de-motivating 
experience you can ever come across in your life if you are a high performer. If 
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you are a low performer, you don’t mind… If… you pay the high performers and 
low performers the same, you won’t have a high performance organisation.” 
 
Generally, Executives and Directors believed that executives are trustworthy professionals.  
While financial incentives influence how executives behave, executives usually do not make 
decisions that maximise their (potential) wealth at the expense of long-term firm performance.  
As a case in point, Director L elucidated:  
“I think that remuneration is a motivator… of course, they [executives] do want to 
become more wealthy, but there’s not very many executives I’ve seen who would 
sacrifice the long-term position of a company for some just immediate short-term gain 
for themselves… most of these top executives I worked with have been really quite well 
balanced… ‘Well you have to try to do well today, but we’ve got to leave the company 
in good shape for the next… three to five years…’ So they won’t do things that will 
actually debilitate the company.” 
 
However, the interviewees also provided some examples of executives who maximised their 
wealth at the expense of the company.  For instance, Director L described:  
“There is a major company that I was a director of, where I thought there was 
quite an excessive attention to short-term matters… we exited a business… in 
order to get a short-term profit. It was driven by the Chief Executive wanting to… 
make sure they got their bonuses for that quarter… I totally disagreed with the 
exit and it proved… to be… a very bad exit… I just didn’t think the board was 
strong enough in that matter. The board should have… overridden the 
management.” 
 
In contrast, Executive D was adamant that financial incentives are not required to motivate 
executives:  
“You are basically saying people will hold back from doing the best job they can 
unless you hang a carrot in front of them. I find that offensive! …senior executives 
have an at-risk proportion… [but] I don’t think it really changes people’s 
behaviour.”   
 
However, this perception was not common.  Some interviewees were sceptical of executives 
who claimed that financial incentives did not influence their behaviour.  Instead, they 
suggested that these executives are worried that they cannot achieve the targets attached to the 
financial incentives.  For example, Executive E postulated:  
“Something drives those people… [Sometimes,] you… get people that are not a 
bastard [sic] or totally driven by the bottom line results. That may be very 
genuine… [But] I think in a lot of cases, they are driven by this fear of failure.” 
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The interviewees proposed that executives are motivated by extrinsic rewards.  Ego, defined 
as status and reputation, is believed to be an influential motivator.  This is illustrated by 
Director I, who commented, “Never underestimate… reputation [as a motivator]. CEOs are 
motivated to be associated with success.” Similarly, Director E observed that, “Pay is only 
part of it. Motivation [is influenced by]… reputation of the company… amongst your 
community, family and friends…”  Further, the interviewees noted that ego is closely related 
to how much executives are paid.  Drawing on decades of experience, Consultant B 
generalised:  
“With a fair number of chief executives, there is a greed factor. I’ve seen it… I’m 
careful not to put a pure moral judgement on that. It drives performance. Is that 
bad? I’m not saying greed is good… It’s not that simple… There is a big ego 
factor… That’s what got them there. And they want to be rewarded. And it matters 
how much the other guy gets… So does title and status. It’s all a package.” 
 
The interviewees also believed that executives are intrinsically motivated by challenge, 
enjoyment and intellectual curiosity derived from the job.  For instance, Director D put 
forward:  
“It’s the puzzle really… Decision-making under uncertainty, and trying to get it 
right… The best CEOs are the ones that are just passionate about business… 
Those who want to be CEO, they’d do the job for half the pay of being deputy 
CEO. Of course you would. The job is so fantastic. You’re going to turn it down 
because of pay? Give us a break.”  
 
The interviewees’ perceptions of how executives behave are partially consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic because executives are portrayed as both extrinsically 
and intrinsically motivated.  Most executives cannot be classified as either pure agents or pure 
stewards.  Instead, executives are distributed in some manner along a spectrum from pure 
agent to pure steward.  The interviewees portrayed most executives as being trustworthy 
professionals who want to maximise their wealth but not at the expense of the company.  
Director N explained how his ideal CEO would behave: “I would be attracted to someone not 
pushing their money side hard, interested in doing their job and doing it well, and adding 
value to the shareholders.”  However, the interviewees acknowledged that financial 
incentives can motivate some executives to act myopically and put their interests ahead of the 
shareholders’ interests.  This means that boards may not be able to determine how executives 
behave prior to employing them (see Section 7.7).  Nonetheless, Directors prefer executives 
who are stewards rather than agents and believe executives are more steward-like than agent-
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like.  Overall, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on 
executive remuneration. 
 
7.5. Influence of Stakeholders 
This section examines how various parties influence how the RemCo makes and reports 
remuneration decisions (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1).  If the RemCo draws on Corporate Logic 
and/or Investor Logic, then investors’ and analysts’ opinions are likely to be prioritised ahead 
of non-shareholding stakeholders’ opinions.  Also, if the RemCo draws on Corporate Logic, 
then executives are also likely to be influential.  Mimetic pressures in the form of information 
from the Directors’ network, competitors and consultants are also likely to be influential.   
However, how regulators, code issuers and non-shareholding stakeholders are likely to 
influence the RemCo has not been thoroughly researched.  In the NZ context, regulators and 
code issuers are not likely to be influential because there are minimal disclosure requirements, 
no signs that disclosure requirements are likely to change in the near future and code 
recommendations with respect to executive remuneration are not mandatory.  The NZ media 
may be influential because they have been active critics of executive remuneration (see 
Section 7.2).  Non-shareholding stakeholders such as employees, customers and suppliers are 
not likely to be influential because they are rarely mentioned by Directors (see Section 7.3).  
The remainder of this section discusses how these parties influence the RemCo and how 
Corporate and/or Investor Logic may be reinforced by these parties influence attempts. 
 
7.5.1. Executives 
The interviewees recognised that executives have a significant influence on how the RemCo 
makes decisions for several reasons.  First, some directors may adopt the executive’s 
perspective because they are former executives.
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  Second, there is a power imbalance when 
an executive is hired because the remuneration contract is negotiated after a preferred 
candidate has been selected (see Section 7.8.1). Third, the RemCo usually relies on its 
company’s human resources department for advice and information, but this department is 
ultimately controlled by the CEO.  Fourth, the executives, not the RemCo, may hire the 
remuneration consultant.  Fifth, the remuneration consultant may be conflicted because they 
provide data and advice to both the RemCo and the CEO (or human resources department).  
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who were interviewed are former executives.  Two of these directors are former executives of NZX-listed 
companies. The remaining nine directors are former executives from various companies such as ASX-listed 
companies, private companies and multinational companies.  
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Fifth, there may be an information gap (or asymmetry of knowledge) between executives and 
directors.  This point was illustrated by Executive B:  
“The CEO usually does a self-assessment and submits it to them [(i.e. the Board or 
RemCo)].  And they find that it is very difficult to argue… there’s really an 
asymmetry of knowledge… CEOs are usually very strong minded. It’s not an easy 
situation for a Remuneration Committee coz’ they are really part time… they 
don’t actually know much, in reality, about what’s going on…” 
 
However, the RemCo may not adopt the executive’s perspective because a person’s 
perspective may change when their role changes from executive to non-executive director. As 
a case in point, an Executive recalled:  
“I think people who don’t actually manage a business might believe hanging a 
carrot in front of people will make them [executives] perform better, but are they 
[i.e. people who are not managers] actually doing it? I guess I put a board in that 
category… When [Person X] was the CEO, [Person X] never had a variable 
remuneration plan in [Company ABC]. [Person X] objected to it exactly on those 
grounds [i.e. people are not motivated by financial incentives]… [However, when 
Person X] became the director… [Person X] thought that’s a good idea [and 
implemented a financial incentive scheme for executives in Company ABC]. 
 
7.5.2. Directors’ Network and Competitors 
Directors influence each other.  First, during board meetings, directors express and debate 
their opinions in order to make decisions.  This was explained by Director M: 
“[T]he boards I’m on listen very carefully to each other. And if someone’s got a 
view on how to remunerate people… then… [the board] either comes around to 
their view… or simply disregards it. And the board consensus works, generally, in 
those circumstances…”   
 
Second, directors’ opinions are influenced by other directors within their personal and 
professional network.  For instance, Director N remarked, “...you… have a network [where] 
you can get [information] from some of your colleagues, as a double check on the 
consultant.”  Third, directors’ opinions are influenced both directly and indirectly by their 
competitors.  There is an indirect influence in that recruitment and remuneration consultants 
provide the RemCo with intelligence on what their competitors are doing (see Sections 7.5.3 
and 7.5.4).  Also, there is a direct influence in that directors observe what their competitors 
are doing (e.g. reading competitors’ annual reports).  Director L argued that increased 
remuneration disclosure requirements has resulted in increased competition for executives 
and, ultimately, increased pay for executives: 
“[R]emuneration [levels], I think, has been aggravated by disclosure… [In the 
past,] there was no looking across the bloody [sic] fence all the time at what other 
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people got paid… now, you cannot maintain your competitiveness because 
everybody else knows what the hell [sic] you’re doing… it also means your 
competitors know what you’re paying your best people and they know who your 
best people are…” 
 
Essentially, the RemCo is influenced by mimetic (e.g. directors’ network, competitors and 
consultants) pressures to make remuneration decisions in a similar way to other RemCos.
166
   
 
7.5.3. Recruitment Consultants 
Recruitment consultants influence how the Board and RemCo make decisions, particularly 
which candidates are selected to be executives and their employment contracts.  Consultant A 
described how employment contracts are developed:  
“[W]e act as an intermediary [between the board and candidates]… Once it’s [i.e. 
the remuneration package] agreed verbally, that would be put in writing… You’ve 
got the job description, individual employment agreement [and] performance 
agreement.”  
 
It appears to be common that the employment contract is negotiated after a candidate has been 
selected for an executive role.  This may give the executive an advantage in negotiating with 
the RemCo. Further, recruitment consultants are paid a percentage of the executive’s 
remuneration package, which may motivate them to act in the executive’s, not RemCo’s best 
interest.  For example, Director C commented, “…recruitment agents [provide the RemCo 
with] a market value, [but] it will be… [from] the perspective of CEO.”   
 
Similarly, Director I argued:  
“[W]hy did the prize [i.e. CEO pay] get so big? Who was benefiting from the 
prize? Clearly the appointed CEO was benefiting, but I suspect the hidden agent 
in all of this is the recruitment agency and remuneration consultant.”  
 
Recruitment consultants’ beliefs are similar to those of executives, directors and others.  They 
believe that executives should be paid comparably to other executives in similar roles (i.e. the 
market principle) and tied to firm performance (i.e. the pay-for-performance principle), 
although they also acknowledge that incentives do not necessarily motivate executives.  This 
is illustrated by Consultant A, who opined: 
“I think the basic principle that most people would acknowledge is that pay is a 
hygiene factor… people like to know if they are being fairly rewarded for their 
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network may also influence the RemCo.  
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job… They don’t want to be taken advantage of or… underpaid relative to the 
market… [Further,] people are driven differently by performance pay… Some 
people [are] highly motivated by that and some people are less so. And my 
experience is you can never predict who might be or who might not be.” 
 
Thus, recruitment consultants’ discourse on executive remuneration is consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
7.5.4. Remuneration Consultants 
Remuneration consultants influence how the RemCo makes decisions, particularly the level of 
executive remuneration.  All Directors except one stated that they employed remuneration 
consultants to provide data and advice on executive remuneration.  This occurs because, as 
Consultant B noted, “…people require an external validation of remuneration.” Typically, 
boards will cite the opinion of remuneration consultants to justify their remuneration 
decisions to shareholders.  This was observed by Executive B:  
“[Y]ou go and ask the remuneration adviser, which is what Boards do. They 
always want the experts to tell them, so… when the shareholders have a moan, 
they can say, ‘We have got the expert’s advice.’” 
 
Interestingly, many directors were critical of remuneration consultants.  For instance, Director 
F said, “I am personally not overwhelmed by [remuneration consultants], [but] they are useful 
as a point of reference.”  Summarising the criticism of remuneration consultants, Director I 
argued:  
“I say the biggest source of incremental creep over the last 20 years [has] been 
the role of remuneration consultants, because… [they promote] the idea[s] of 
median pay [and] reference… to the market… I think it probably encourages 
CEOs to seek large remuneration packages and [has] empowered board directors 
to approve it.” 
 
This criticism is reflected in Director A’s reason for not using remuneration consultants: 
“What I don’t believe in, particularly, is getting a remuneration consultant and I 
don’t particularly believe in benchmarking against so called comparable 
companies. Companies aren’t comparable.” 
 
Further, Crystal (1991) argued that remuneration consultants face a potential conflict of 
interest because they often provide services to both the board and management of the same 
company.  This is recognised by remuneration consultants.  Consultant E affirmed:  
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“Independence is a very important issue… when it comes to the executives, we are 
engaged by the board. We prefer to be engaged by them and not by the HR [or 
CEO]…” 
 
However, practice varied among the companies sampled: The remuneration consultants were 
hired by either senior management (e.g. CEO) or RemCo. 
 
Remuneration consultants have similar beliefs to those of Executives and Directors.  Also, the 
remuneration principles (particularly the market principle) are embedded in their 
recommendations to RemCos.  Summarising, Consultant C stated that their recommendations 
include:  
“[W]hat the typical market remuneration rate is for this role [including] the base 
salary… and then the performance related pay… And we also provide a 
recommendation as to where… remuneration should be positioned. Now a default 
recommendation… is the median… of the market… The exception to that is… 
some companies have a policy that, ‘we pay the executive the upper quartile…’” 
 
Thus, remuneration consultants’ discourse on executive remuneration is consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
7.5.5. Investors and Analysts 
Typically, Executives and Directors commented that investors and analysts are interested in 
how companies are governed and managed.  This is consistent with Chiu and Monin’s (2003) 
findings that NZ institutional investors are actively engaged with boards of directors.  
However, Executives and Directors had varying experiences on whether or not investors and 
analysts are interested in how much and how executives are paid.  Director J remarked, 
“When I was on the board at [Company XYZ], it was a constant source of feedback and 
comment [from shareholders].”  In contrast, Director H believed institutional investors do not 
ask questions about specific aspects of executive remuneration such as performance measures 
used: “I’ve never had anyone ask that question…”  Nevertheless, most Directors are 
concerned with how their remuneration decisions are perceived by shareholders.  Director O 
explained, “So you put it [i.e. details of the executive remuneration package] on the table with 
shareholders or with the analysts, and they look at that and say, ‘Oh, wow! This makes 
sense.’ So that’s a very big tick…”  However, a few Directors did believe that shareholders 
should not influence executive remuneration.  Director I declared, “If they [shareholders] 
don’t like the CEO, if they don’t like the CEO’s remuneration package, just sell your shares.” 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 246 
 
The interviewees discussed the role of analysts, institutional investors, retail investors (e.g. 
Mums and Dads) and investors’ associations with respect to executive remuneration.  
Executives and Directors regularly communicate with analysts, as Director F noted, “Yes… 
through the chief executive, rather than the board. They [the board] will get involved from 
time to time… at least quarterly briefings with analysts…” Analysts are less concerned with 
executive remuneration than other parties.  Similarly, Executives and Directors regularly 
communicate with institutional investors.  However, institutional investors do raise questions 
about executive remuneration and may threaten to vote against directors or share-based 
incentive schemes at the annual general meeting (AGM) if their concerns are not addressed.  
Directors are keen to allay any concerns prior to the AGM.  However, Directors characterised 
their relationships with institutional investors as friendly, rather than hostile.  For example, 
Director J recalled:  
“It is seldom the case that [institutional] shareholders will reject absolutely every 
part of the package. They would say, ‘well, all the base remuneration is okay… 
We can’t have too much focus on the short-run… For instance… you’ve 
misspecified the objective of xyz…’ So, you go through this period of 
alterations…”  
 
Executives and Directors may have some regular communication with investors’ associations, 
but not retail investors.  There were varying opinions among Directors on the extent to which 
boards should take notice of investors’ associations.  On the one hand, Director G believed: 
“I think [an investors’ association] is a good thing to have… we have never ever 
had anyone for small investors, so I think they have a role to play… If you look at 
their decisions, sometimes, they are actually really sound.” 
 
On the other hand, Director M argued:  
“I’ve been a member of the Institute [of Directors in NZ] for many years… I take 
a lot of notice of their suggestions of what to do and not do. [However, a 
particular investors’ association’s] people turn up to shareholders’ meetings and 
just advertise their own importance, rather than adding anything of any value. So 
I think most boards are quite cynical about [them]…” 
 
Nonetheless, the AGM tends to be the forum at which Directors face scrutiny over their 
remuneration decisions.  For example, Director F asserted:  
“If I… paid [more than one million dollars] to the Chief Executive, I’d feel obliged 
to tell shareholders why I thought it’s a good idea… At the end of the day, you 
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have to be able to stand up and say we’ve decided on this level of remuneration 
because we believe [xyz]…” 
 
Similarly, Director L explained: 
“When you get someone stirring away… before an AGM you say to yourself, 
‘Right, we’ll give that special treatment in order to make sure shareholders really 
know the time of day.’ You know, what’s really happening here, [and] then they 
can vote in an informed way.” 
 
Generally, Executives and Directors have not experienced much backlash against 
remuneration decisions at AGMs.  For instance, Director H testified, “I’ve had no experience 
of shareholders’ dissent, interrogation and dissatisfaction in an AGM around executive 
remuneration.” Similarly, Director E avowed, “…we publish the remuneration report and I 
don’t think anyone has asked a question in the AGM about that.”  Thus, retail investors do not 
directly influence how the RemCo makes remuneration decisions.   
 
Directors’ perceptions of how retail investors may react to their remuneration decisions can 
constrain the RemCo’s remuneration decisions (see Director L’s remarks on the fairness 
principle in Section 7.6).  However, Executives and Directors believe that shareholders ask 
few questions on executive remuneration because they do not read the companies’ annual 
reports.  Director D opined, “…I would say ninety-nine percent of shareholders don’t read the 
notes to the financial accounts.”   
 
Further, Executives and Directors did not believe that NZ listed companies should not be 
required to a produce remuneration report, but, if it had to be produced, they also thought that 
shareholders should not have an advisory or binding vote on the remuneration report.  Instead, 
Directors felt that if shareholders want the board to make different decisions, then they should 
vote for different directors at the AGM.  This view was expressed by Director O: 
“My view has always been that the company’s board runs the business. They are 
accountable. So you should let them get on with the job, and if you don’t like what 
they do then you sack them.” 
 
Overall, the interviewees felt that the current disclosure requirements on executive 
remuneration are sufficient so that shareholders can make informed decisions.  Director A 
remarked, “I don’t think people would want more than the bare minimum… [but companies 
do] not [have] anything to hide… we had no questions in our last annual meeting with 
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shareholders…”  They also believed that RemCos act in the best interests of shareholders 
when making remuneration decisions (see Section 7.3).  
 
7.5.6. Regulators and Code Issuers 
Regulators and code issuers also influence how the RemCo makes and reports remuneration 
decisions.  However, code issuers are far less influential than had been expected (see Chapter 
4).  The following remark by Director L is indicative of the general consensus among 
Directors:  
“So wherever there’s a legal requirement, we’re [the board are] very familiar with 
that. In terms of the stuff produced by [Code Issuers] …I would have to say I do 
not place great [weight] on that. They are sort of remote third parties…”  
 
While most Directors were aware of the codes and official reports produced in NZ (see 
Appendix A), some Directors had little awareness.  Director F commented, “I’m unaware of 
[any Code Issuers] having done anything on remuneration.”  Similarly, when asked if the 
RemCo’s remuneration decisions are made with reference to NZ codes, Director I replied: 
“I couldn’t cite you the document, neither of them, to be honest. I probably should 
be able to, but I am not the chairman of the remuneration committee anymore… 
the weight goes on the way I have seen it done… [and] the independent 
consultant, rather than the regulatory body providing tones of opinion.” 
 
Code Issuers have mixed views on the extent to which their codes have influenced how the 
RemCo makes remuneration decisions.  Most Codes Issuers thought that they have had a 
positive influence. Code Issuer B declared, “I have every confidence that… they [codes] have 
a massive impact.”  Further, one Code Issuer argued that their organisation has been 
instrumental in curbing the incidence of executive share option plans among NZ listed 
companies.  However, Code Issuer G acknowledged that, “[I]t [the code] hasn’t had the 
impact that should have [had].” 
 
Some Directors and Consultants suggested that international codes have had a greater 
influence on how directors make remuneration decisions.  This is partially because a number 
of the largest NZ listed companies are also listed on the ASX.  Also, some Directors were 
exposed to international codes when they worked in AU, the UK or elsewhere.  A common 
belief emerged that NZ regulators and code issuers tend to follow international tends.  For 
instance, Director G stated:  
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“If you go back to the history of adopting codes, Cadbury and the Higgs Report, 
we do tend to adopt codes that [are] coming out from the UK. And there’s some 
sort of alignment. Australia is being a little bit stronger at the moment…” 
 
Similarly, Consultant F affirmed:  
“[T]here’s just a trend we are following, NZ is a bit of a follower. We tend to be 
more of a bit Anglo. What happens in UK flows to Australia and flows to New 
Zealand. So there’s been a lot of swing away from vanilla option schemes to 
things like performance right schemes.” 
 
However, as noted in Section 7.2, NZ listed companies are not required to disclose as much 
on executive remuneration as their international counterparts.  Therefore, coercive and 
normative pressures are weak.  Instead, mimetic pressure is far stronger as non-executive 
directors are concerned with how their peers are remunerating executives (see Sections 7.5.2 
and 7.6.2).  Consultants reinforce this mimetic pressure by providing non-executive directors 
with intelligence on what their peers are doing (see Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4). 
 
7.5.7. Media and the Public 
Directors feel that their remuneration decisions are constrained by potential media and public 
outrage.  For example, one Director recalled that an international candidate was not hired, 
despite being the board’s preferred choice, because his remuneration expectations were much 
higher than those of the NZ candidates.  Executives and Directors believe that NZ’s 
egalitarian culture and the tall poppy syndrome results in an unjustified focus on how much 
executives are paid.  Executive D argued:  
“[The media is] ill-informed. The reality is people are paid what they paid in 
order to attract or retain them. So [comparing executive remuneration] to the 
average wage is irrelevant… They don’t make the same comment… about rugby 
players… for some reason, that’s actually admired… that they get paid millions.” 
 
Similarly, Director M declared:  
“…I would have to say the New Zealand media have the unhealthy tendency to 
focus on what people are getting paid, [as opposed] to what people are doing… I 
guess it goes back to [New Zealand’s] egalitarian roots, [where everyone]… 
wants to think that everyone is paid the same…” 
 
As the Contact example illustrates (see Footnote 149), companies can be sanctioned or 
penalised if the public perceives their remuneration decisions to be illegitimate.  Thus, 
Directors give much consideration to how their remuneration decisions may be perceived by 
the media and public.  As a case in point, Director L elucidated: 
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“[In determining executive remunerating] you’d say, ‘Well, given our size, given 
our turnover and our earnings growth and stuff like that, are we reasonably, 
fairly positioned?’ And in most cases, we say, ‘Would the chairman feel 
comfortable justifying this to the media or to shareholders at an annual meeting 
or a special meeting or whatever?’ And that’s the test.” 
 
Similarly, Director H remarked:  
“I am very, very keen that there’s full disclosure by the CEO coz’ I think… a little 
bit of sunlight… is the best disinfectant and shareholders are deeply sceptical 
about CEO remuneration. In today’s world these people earn huge sums of 
money… [I am always] asking myself [if] a particular action would meet the Paul 
Holmes test. In another words, if I have to go on TV and explain to the Paul 
Holmes show, how would I feel. And it would be the same about disclosing CEO’s 
remuneration… in the public arena. Would I feel comfortable about it? Could I 
defend it? …I think in the interest of ultimately a good relationship between the 
stakeholders and the management, that’s probably where you had to go.” 
 
Therefore, the media’s and the public’s reaction or potential reaction to remuneration 
decisions can act as a constraint on how the RemCo makes and reports remuneration 
decisions.
167
  
 
7.5.8. Employees, Customers, Suppliers and Others 
The interviewees rarely mentioned customers, employees, suppliers and others with respect to 
executive remuneration (see Section 7.3).  This implies that customers’ perceptions are not 
relevant when making remuneration decisions.  However, Director G referred to the example 
of the customer/shareholder revolt at Contact as a reason why customers should be considered 
when making remuneration decisions (see Footnote 149).  Further, a few interviewees 
believed that the RemCo should consider employees, particularly the relativity between 
executives and employees, when making remuneration decisions.  However, Executives and 
Directors appealed to the market principle to override concerns of relativity or vertical equity.  
Executive A declared:  
“We live in a capitalist world and [it] is all market driven. The only things that 
distort that in the lower level is the unions… Withstanding all that, fundamentally 
my job… is to get the very best people we can in every single level and pay them 
according to market.”  
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 However, the RemCo may attempt to manage the media’s and the public’s potential reactions through 
symbolic disclosure (see Sections 7.6.8 and 7.8.3). 
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Additionally, suppliers and others (e.g. communities or the environment) were not mentioned 
at all with respect to executive remuneration.  This reinforces that NZ listed companies are 
shareholder-, not stakeholder-oriented. 
 
7.5.9. Summary and Implications 
There are many parties that, to some extent, influence how the RemCo makes and reports 
remuneration decisions.  Directors strongly emphasised that their current decisions are most 
heavily influenced by their past experiences. As a case in point, when asked how, if at all, had 
NZ codes influenced his opinion or decisions, Director J replied, “They are all part of the 
information set, [but] as I said before, one rules on one’s experiences…”  Directors are also 
influenced by the opinions of other directors and their competitors’ decisions.  This is 
illustrated by Director C, who commented, “The trends… from the other companies are 
usually very influential.”  Recruitment and remuneration consultants are also influential 
because they provide Directors with information on their competitors.  For example, 
Consultant B asserted, “So consultants actually do not just do comparisons, they define norms 
within the remuneration market.”  Further, executives exert both indirect and direct pressure 
because the human resources department may provide the RemCo with advice and data, and 
executives negotiate their pay with the RemCo.  Directors may also adopt an executive’s 
perspective because many Directors are former executives.  In addition, investors, the media 
and the public act as a constraint on remuneration decisions.  Directors are concerned that 
executive remuneration does not depart from NZ’s social norms.  However, regulators and 
codes issuers (and their codes) are not very influential.   
 
7.6. Remuneration Principles 
The interviewees strongly agreed that the agency, fairness, human resources, market, 
motivation, pay-for-performance and responsibility principles should be and are the 
remuneration principles that frame remuneration decision-making.
168
  Two lines of evidence 
were examined to reach this conclusion.  First, without prompting, the interviewees made 
many references to these remuneration principles throughout the interviews.  Second, at the 
end of the interviews, the interviewees were asked to comment on the remuneration 
principles, and they overwhelmingly spoke positively of the remuneration principles.  
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 The conformance principle was only identified as a possible remuneration principle after the interviews had 
been concluded.  Thus, the interviewees were not directly asked to comment on the conformance principle. 
However, many of their comments do indicate that the conformance principle does also frame remuneration 
decision-making. 
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Notably, the Directors believed that the remuneration principles, as a set, represent best 
practice for remuneration policy.  For example, Director N summarised: 
“Remuneration has got to be fair at the start. It’s got to be fair to the company. 
It’s got to be market competitive. It’s got to attract and retain quality staff. They 
also have to be acceptable to the market, shareholders and analysts. So it’s quite 
a complex and volatile issue.” 
 
Few conflicts between remuneration principles were mentioned, but there is a tension 
between the human resources/market principles and the agency/pay-for-performance 
principles.  The above quote alludes to this conflict.  To resolve the tension, the human 
resources/market principles are prioritised ahead of other remuneration principles.  However, 
some interviewees were critical of the remuneration principles’ assumptions and implications, 
but not to the point where they rejected the remuneration principles.  These issues along with 
the implications for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are elucidated in the remainder of 
this section.  
 
7.6.1. Human Resources Principle 
The human resources principle is tightly coupled with the market principle.  An example is 
given by Executive D: “We… want to make sure we can attract and retain good talent… so 
we [pay] near medium to upper quartile [relative to our peers].”  Similarly, Director L said, 
“…you have to attract and retain talented people in a competitive marketplace. [This] is just 
the job of the HR people. So where does it come from? It is just the way in which life is in the 
corporate world.” This quote also illustrates that the human resources and market principles 
are taken-for-granted.  Further, Directors argued that executives are trustworthy, 
knowledgeable professionals who will act in the best interests of shareholders without 
requiring coercion or inducements.  This is reflected in the following anecdote that Director L 
told: 
“[L]ast year we didn’t have a good year… the board had already talked about 
how… to address this because a lot of people are not going to get bonuses… 
[However, the] Chief Executive came to me… and said, ‘We’ve [the senior 
executives] all talked about it and we think we should forgo salary increases this 
year.’ I thought that was a fantastic attitude and I’d like to think it partly reflected 
the fact that we’d also looked after them really well in the years when things had 
gone well.” 
 
Similarly, Executives portrayed themselves as stewards, who can be trusted to make decisions 
to maximise shareholder value (e.g. see Executive D’s comment in Section 7.4).   
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Essentially, Directors argued that while executives are not necessarily motivated by money, 
they are partially attracted to a job because of the money that they are likely to earn.
169
  
Directors believe that executives put forward their best effort irrespective of the incentive 
schemes, but they may leave a job if the remuneration is lower than comparable roles.  This is 
illustrated in Director K’s rationale for adopting an executive share option plan: “We wanted 
to ensure we could attract and retain high quality executives.” 
 
Directors also believed that executives’ decisions affect firm performance.  This was noted by 
Director K, who remarked, “…the higher you get up… the tree, the more you have the ability 
to affect whole company performance.” Thus, Directors believed that if ‘high quality’ 
executives are hired, then debating remuneration is counter-productive.  Director H explained: 
“Good people are the ones you do not want to lose… [The difference 
between] what a good performer costs to retain and what can actually 
be delivered is just, it’s not even worth spending any time talking 
about it.” 
 
7.6.2. Market Principle 
Directors believe that the market principle is paramount.  This is illustrated by Director E, “ 
[The remuneration has] got to be competitive… if you… deliberately [pay] eighty percent of 
what you should, then that isn’t fair and you will lose your staff.”  The market principle acts 
as a constraint on the minimum level of remuneration.  Directors believe the level of 
remuneration cannot be below the median without risking losing their executives.  For 
instance, Director N maintained: 
“[I]f you go for medium, then you will get average type of people. I think a good 
successful company, will value its executives and its staff, and [therefore] it’s got 
to be prepared to pay well to keep quality people… I would be very wary of a 
company who pay average of medium. It says something about the company’s 
attitude.” 
 
While nearly all Directors advocated remunerating at the median level or higher, some 
Directors expressed concern about remunerating at the upper-quartile or higher.
170
  How the 
market principle constrains remuneration decisions is discussed by Director H: 
“In the end, it is always a trade-off between ensuring you retain talent or good 
talent, and not over paying. So there is a temptation if you got a very, very strong 
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 However, the interviewees also acknowledged that, occasionally, some executives are opportunistic and do 
not act in the best interests of the company (see Section 7.4). 
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 The level of executive remuneration is discussed further in Sections 7.7 and 7.8. 
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performer or performers, maybe you start pushing boundaries… But I am nervous 
about really pushing the boundary and paying people well beyond the market…” 
 
7.6.3. Fairness Principle 
The fairness principle implies executive remuneration should be fair, reasonable and 
equitable, but the conditions upon which fairness should be judged are not defined.  The 
interviewees were asked to define fairness.  A layperson may define fairness as vertical 
equality between executives and employees or a sense of equality between executives and the 
average person.  However, the interviewees defined fairness in terms of horizontal equity (or 
the market principle). For example, Executive A commented, “fair and reasonable in my 
mind would be when there’re no serious anomalies in what we… and someone else might be 
paying for the equivalent similar job.”  It can also be defined in terms of the executive’s 
contribution to firm performance (or the pay-for-performance principle).  As Consultant C 
pointed out, “There are some people saying fair is equal… and others say equitable in terms 
[of the executives’] contribution to the business.”  Further, fairness may not be able to be 
precisely defined.  It may be that fairness is a perception that executive remuneration is seen 
to be legitimate or conform to societal expectations (e.g. see Director L’s comment in Section 
7.5.7).  Only Director I disagreed with the fairness principle: “I am less excited about 
fairness. I want one [remuneration scheme] that is effective. What’s the point of being fair and 
broke?”  Overall, the fairness principle offers directors flexibility in setting executive 
remuneration because fairness can be defined in multiple ways.  In this sense, the fairness 
principle blurs the distinction between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
7.6.4. Pay-for-Performance Principle 
Similarly to the fairness principle, the pay-for-performance principle does not define 
performance.  As discussed in Section 7.3, performance is generally defined in financial terms 
such as revenue, profit and share price.  Most interviewees argued that the pay-for-
performance principle is justified because (they believe) executives, particularly CEOs, can 
influence firm performance.  As Director E remarked, “…we are not playing here. We are 
trying to reward good performance.”  Some interviewees disagreed. They argued that many 
factors have more influence on firm performance, particularly if measured by the share price.  
For instance, Director M contended, “…the share price has nothing to do with the chief 
executive’s performance.” These interviewees argued that executives have to work harder 
Chapter 7: Remuneration Decision-Making in the Boardroom 
255 
when firm performance is poor, and concluded that incentive schemes are profit sharing 
schemes in disguise.
171
  This reasoning is explained by Director G: 
“[W]e’ve already seen in the paper recently about… companies [being] less 
profitable and CEOs’ salaries going up again. But… [it] is actually harder to run 
a company when things are bad than when things are good. So in fact, one should 
be actually thinking about… a reverse scheme.” 
 
However, the main problem is that incentives can work too well, as Director I remarked, 
“People are rational. If you set up performance pay that focuses on a narrow definition of 
success, you will get the behaviour that leads to that outcome”.  A few Directors recalled 
examples of executives focusing on the short-term results at the expense of the long-term 
performance (see Sections 7.3 and 7.4).   
 
To challenge the pay-for-performance principle, some interviewees were told that researchers 
have not found a strong relationship between CEO pay and firm performance.  Director L 
replied, “[I]t is a worry… it should be much more strongly correlated with performance than 
with size.”  Further, Director O’s response highlighted why the pay-for-performance principle 
is taken-for-granted: “[M]ost [researchers]… are pretty agnostic about the benefit of 
remuneration at-risk. In spite of that, most companies do it. In spite of that, I’m keen on it. 
And the reason is: it is very plausible.”  Generally, the interviewees shared this view.  Finally, 
Code Issuer A defended the pay-for-performance principle by criticising companies: “But 
mostly, research indicates performance-based pay failed. My answer to that is: [it] failed 
because of poor design.”  Thus, the pay-for-performance principle is taken-for-granted. 
 
7.6.5. Motivation Principle 
The motivation principle is the most controversial of the remuneration principles because the 
interviewees had varying opinions on how executives are motivated (see Section 7.4).  The 
general consensus was that financial incentives are necessary to motivate executives, but 
executives must also find their role challenging and enjoyable.  Some Executives and 
Directors portrayed financial incentives as a potential de-motivator. For instance, Director K 
noted: “[I]f you’ve got… most of your options underwater… Hello! It’s a disincentive, not an 
incentive.”  However, Executive B disagreed:  
“If they [share options] are out of the money… that doesn’t leave me de-motivated, 
coz’ I am still driven hugely by the need… [to] maintain my reputation as a 
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 The interviewees conceptualised performance-based remuneration (or incentive schemes) as either a control 
or a profit-sharing mechanism.  This point is discussed further in Section 7.7. 
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successful person. I’ve still got to sell myself beyond here [i.e. my current 
position].” 
 
Despite these criticisms, the interviewees still believed that the motivation principle is an 
important remuneration principle.  Director K, who is a strong advocate of financial 
incentives, commented, “I’ve never found, with one or two exceptions, chief executives to 
be…. working every day motivated by money.”  While Directors realise that executives are 
motivated by a range of factors, they cannot know with certainty how any particular executive 
is motivated.  In this sense, financial incentives are part of a range of measures that boards use 
to ensure that all types of executives are motivated.   
 
7.6.6. Agency Principle 
There was strong agreement with the agency principle among the interviewees.  Executive A 
stated that share-based incentives do align his interests with those of shareholders: “I think it 
does. You think like a shareholder, so you care about the share price. It also aligns your 
interest in the best terms and the long-term with the shareholders.”  Directors often invoked 
the agency principle when explaining how executive remuneration packages are designed.  As 
illustrated by Director A, who declared, “We really try to align to their [executives] motives, 
their incentives with the shareholders, and those are for long term steady growth and 
returns…”  Further, Directors tended to associate the agency principle with only long-term 
incentives (or share-based incentives).  For example, Director K described a debate in the 
boardroom that occurred when a particular company decided to adopt an executive share 
option plan:  
“[T]here was quite a long and theoretical discussion about how they [share 
options] should be structured, and all the time, you know, the biggest driver was 
alignment to shareholder value and how we could do that over time.” 
 
Directors’ thinking was compartmentalised because they did not consider if other 
remuneration practices might undermine an alignment of interests.  Salary, benefits, other 
fixed pay (e.g. severance pay) and short-term incentives were not seen as adding to or 
subtracting from an alignment of interests.  Thus, the agency principle is taken for granted, 
but only in the context of long-term incentives. 
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However, some Directors criticised how RemCos have implemented or applied the agency 
principle.  The problem is long-term incentives may not align interests because executives and 
shareholders face different risks. This problem is discussed by Director H:  
“There’s always this desire… trying to align management remuneration with 
shareholders. [It] is a great goal… But it’s very difficult to achieve it. Because 
unless they [executives] are actually a shareholder in every sense of the word, 
they can’t have such alignment… Options [cannot create] alignment to 
shareholders because shareholders don’t have an option. What shareholders have 
is capital on the line.”  
 
Similarly, Director D also argued that long-term incentives do not necessarily result in an 
alignment of interest: 
“So… if the shareholders are doing well, then… we’ll [executives] do well too… 
And that’s cloaked up in… ‘We want commonality of purpose between the 
shareholder and executive.’ Then, of course, they [executives] sort of say, ‘But of 
course we can’t have risk on the downside, so this should all just be upside… 
And… [give us] money to buy shares… [and] don’t charge us an interest rate.’ 
…So actually, it’s rubbish about commonality with shareholders because it’s an 
asymmetric one. They [executives] can benefit on the upside, but not on the 
downside.” 
 
Despite this criticism, Director D supported the agency principle.  He suggested that 
executives should be subject to a minimum shareholding requirement (e.g. executives’ 
shareholding must have a market value equal to a fixed multiple of their base salary).  
Director D explained how a minimum shareholding requirement results in an alignment of 
interests:  
“[I]f the proposition is we’re trying to achieve commonality between the 
shareholder and the executives, well, at the end of the day, they’ve got to own 
shares with full downside as well as upside.” 
 
However, whether or not shareholders have common interests was not mentioned by 
Directors.  Shareholders’ interests can vary in terms of their investment time horizon (e.g. 
some are active traders), risk profile and size of their shareholding (Hendry et al., 2006; Lok, 
2010).  Instead, Directors have a fictitious conceptualisation of shareholders: the stereotype 
entails long-term (possibly, indefinite) investment time horizons and diversified investment 
portfolios.  Director N maintains:  
“[S]ophisticated investors, they will understand the need to pay competitive 
salaries to get the right people. And you wouldn’t expect an institutional 
shareholder or analyst to get too bent [out of shape], to shout about that… The 
problem comes [from]… the Mums and Dads in the annual meeting or… [a 
particular investors’] association…” 
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In this sense, some Directors are not worried if real shareholders are concerned about their 
remuneration decisions as long as executives’ interests are aligned with those of the fictitious 
shareholders.  This underscores that the agency principle is taken-for-granted. 
 
7.6.7. Responsibility Principle 
The responsibility principle implies the level of remuneration is dependent on the executive’s 
level of responsibility.  The interviewees generally agreed with this principle.  First, they 
believed that senior executives should be paid more than junior executives.  Director N 
declared, “Generally you’ve got to recognise the different responsibility of the CEO and pay 
them more than their deputy. A percentage? I would argue that maybe a third.”  Second, they 
felt that there should be a relationship between level of executive remuneration and the scope 
of the executive’s role.  For example, the interviewees suggested executives’ base salaries are 
related to firm size in terms of revenue, assets and number of employees.  However, some 
interviewees were concerned that responsibility cannot be easily measured.  Others cited job 
evaluation systems as being able to measure responsibility.
172
 Further, some interviewees 
were concerned that the relationship between executive remuneration and firm size was not at 
the expense of firm performance. Director M argued, “As long as it [remuneration for the 
level of responsibility] doesn’t conflict with their performance. It is important that it is both of 
those things, not just responsibility…”  Thus, the responsibility principle is important, but not 
as important as the pay-for-performance principle. 
 
7.6.8. Conformance Principle 
The conformance principle implies that the RemCo should make remuneration decisions that 
conform to societal expectations.  While the term ‘societal expectations’ does not have a 
precise definition, the interviewees affirmed that RemCos seek to conform and some parties 
(e.g. investors) have more influence than others (see Section 7.5.). Summarising, Consultant 
C stated:  
“In my experience in discussion with executives and directors, the majority of 
their attention is around… ‘What will shareholders think? What will the media 
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 Consultant B explained, “[A] job evaluation [system]… ranks the company and the jobs in it… It says if a 
company’s bigger, you pay more, it says if you’re got more staff you get paid more, it says if the strategy is 
more complex you get paid more – you accumulate points.”  Further, Consultant C remarked, “…job 
evaluation is useful to get a ranking and structure, internally, for an organisation.”  Thus, job evaluation 
systems establish the social norm (or pay ratio of superior to subordinate) that Simon (1957) postulated 
existed in companies.  For a review of job evaluation systems, see Van Sliedregt et al. (2001). 
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think? What will [other] Chief Executives think? What will the employees think?’ 
…[T]here’s a lot of anxiety to getting it right.” 
 
Instead of substantive conformance (as described above), there may be symbolic 
conformance, where the RemCo only reports that its remuneration decisions conform to 
societal expectations.  For instance, one anonymous Executive confessed: 
“We get forced to do it [i.e. make remuneration disclosure]… It is really up to us 
to disclose enough to be able to sit back and say, ‘that’s kind of fair enough’… 
And we’d find ways of making disclosures to, maybe, confuse. Not confuse it, but 
to hide the true picture… I’d say we’d be at the lower end [in terms of 
remuneration disclosure relative to other companies].  We don’t have a lot of 
desire to lead the pack.” 
 
However, this Executive argued that symbolic disclosure of remuneration does not result in 
executives at his company being paid at a higher rate than other executives in comparable 
roles, but he does imply that it results in less shareholder scrutiny of executive remuneration. 
 
7.6.9. Remuneration Principles as a Set 
Undoubtedly, the remuneration principles frame debate in the boardroom on executive 
remuneration, executive remuneration practices and remuneration disclosure.  The 
remuneration principles also frame how consultants make recommendations to RemCos and 
how code issuers interpret companies’ remuneration disclosure and make recommendations in 
codes.  Essentially, the interviewees believe that executives should be remunerated fairly 
(vertical equity), competitively (horizontal equity), for their contribution to firm performance 
and in line with shareholder returns.  However, the market principle is prioritised ahead of 
other principles.  Executives must be remunerated at the median or higher relative to other 
executives in comparable roles.   
 
The market principle and associated remuneration practices such as job evaluation are taken 
for granted as one anonymous Director explained:  
“Well, you ask yourself what’s the other alternative… to a system whereby you 
say we want to pay ourselves comparably to the market… I think you could ignore 
[a particular job evaluation] system. Coz, as I say, I’ve never known a person turn 
down an appointment on the basis that the remuneration package… wasn’t good 
enough [pause], which tells me there’re obviously too high. I think if an 
organisation really had the courage, if [Company EFG] really had the courage, 
and it was prepared to lose a person or two, which it undoubtedly [does] lower 
down in the organisation, [pause] you could break away from [a particular job 
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evaluation] system… And what has also been built around that is the viewpoint 
that you shouldn’t set yourself at the bottom quartile. I mean, I’ve never ever 
heard anyone say they should be at the bottom quartile, but someone has to be at 
the bottom quartile… Only now do I hear the odd organisation say, ‘we should be 
set at the median’. And most of the discussion is, ‘well, of course, I’m not talking 
about myself’… [However,] I’m not on the remuneration committee… I think 
that’s coz most people know I’m pretty hostile on the matter.” 
 
This example illustrates that the remuneration principles, particularly the market principle, are 
deeply embedded in how directors interpret and justify remuneration decisions, and RemCos 
may only be comprised of like-minded directors, who believe in the remuneration principles.   
 
There are, at least, four ways in which tensions between the remuneration principles are 
managed.  First, the remuneration principles are prioritised (or ranked).  A likely rank order 
for the principles is: Market, human resources, pay-for-performance, agency, conformance, 
responsibility, motivation and fairness.  Second, the remuneration principles are redefined or 
ambiguously defined to resolve tensions.  For example, the conformance and fairness 
principles have many definitions (see Sections 7.6.3 and 7.6.8).  Third, theoretical tensions 
can be resolved in practice because directors see executive remuneration as only one part of 
the employment relationship with executives.  For example, the tension between the human 
resources/market principles and agency/pay-for-performance principles can be resolved if 
executives are dismissed following firm performance that is below expectations (see Section 
7.8.1).  Fourth, remuneration decisions are cognitively compartmentalised.  For example, 
implementing the agency principle only concerns long-term incentives, not fixed 
remuneration and short-term incentives (see Section 7.6.4).  Thus, the interviewees consider 
the remuneration principles as complementary, not contradictory. 
 
7.6.10. Summary and Implications 
The remuneration principles are deeply embedded in the thinking and decision-making of 
Executives, Directors and others. This implies that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
are also taken-for-granted or institutionalised.  The interviewees indicated that Corporate 
Logic was the historical position (pre-1990s) and Investor Logic has only became 
institutionalised in recent times (post-1990s).  During the 1990s, Director B recalled that 
share option schemes and the mantra of aligning interests (or the agency principle) became 
increasingly popular among NZ listed companies.  Illustrating that the agency principle is 
taken-for-granted, Director B commented:  
Chapter 7: Remuneration Decision-Making in the Boardroom 
261 
“[The] CEO at the moment doesn’t own any shares in the company. [This] is quite 
a worry to a number of [directors on] the board. [They believe] he should… be 
evidencing faith in the company, he should own shares. I don’t happen to agree 
with that but I’m probably pretty much a lone voice.” 
 
Investor Logic has not replaced Corporate Logic.  Instead, both Logics are able to co-exist in 
the discourse because Directors are able to manage the tensions between the remuneration 
principles.  This is made possible as the remuneration principles are loosely, not rigidly 
defined.  Further, Directors have a pragmatic, not theoretical approach: They have a high 
tolerance for ambiguity.  While Directors portray executives as trustworthy professionals, 
they also believe that financial incentives are required to control (or motivate) executives (e.g. 
see Director L’s comments in Section 7.4).   
 
7.7. Remuneration Practices 
The interviewees described a standard remuneration package that consists of base salary, 
benefits, superannuation, annual bonuses (or short-term incentives) and equity-based bonuses 
(or long-term incentives).  Restricted share plans are favoured over share option plans.  
Bonuses are dependent on a range of financial and non-financial performance measures.  
Some believed that executives should be subject to minimum shareholding requirements.  
Others also noted that executives may receive other remuneration such as recruitment, 
retention and severance payments.  Director L explained why the standard remuneration 
package is a mix of fixed and variable remuneration:  
“I think the two extremes just don’t make sense. If you don’t have any salary 
people don’t have anything to live on and most people don’t have enough capital 
to live off. At the other end of the spectrum, if you have it all on fixed pay you just 
can’t get a close enough relationship to performance. So that’s why people have 
ended up in the middle ground.” 
 
Directors use the remuneration principles to justify these remuneration practices (see Section 
7.6).  On the whole, the standard remuneration package is consistent with both Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic.  This is reinforced by institutional pressures (or societal 
expectations) as Director C affirmed, “[When] remuneration packages [are] completely 
outside the norm and [do not] necessarily have the performance to back it up… [then] that’s 
fair game both for the media and the public.” 
 
Further, the interviewees described how the standard remuneration package has changed over 
time.  Historically, CEOs received mainly fixed remuneration.  There has been, at least a 
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perceived, trend towards a higher proportion of variable remuneration, particularly among the 
largest NZ listed companies (see Section 7.2).  Specifically, share option plans became 
popular in the 1990s and then restricted share plans became popular in the 2000s.  Director L 
explained why this trend occurred:   
“[T]he change in remuneration structure towards more performance-based has 
reflected the [share] market pressures to get the remuneration aligned with the 
company performance…”  
 
Director L also discussed why these trends are not necessarily rational: 
“[There] has been much more active use of options and restricted shares… 
However, there’s been a fashion change because people go nuts… there’s been 
this criticism of options. People have been backing off options and then using 
restricted shares. The irony is if you understand it and do the proper valuations, 
there’s no difference between them. And I think people… don’t know what they’re 
talking about. They create so much fuss in the media and at [the] annual 
meeting… everyone [i.e. directors] says, ‘To hell with it. We’ll go for a different… 
alternative.’ So now there is more emphasis on restricted shares.” 
 
However, executives, directors, investors and others may have different perceptions of what is 
rational and legitimate.  For example, the RemCo may want to award a bonus to an executive 
for their contribution to firm performance, but may perceive such an award as illegitimate if 
shareholder returns have declined (e.g. see Director G’s comments in Section 7.6.4). 
 
Directors had a range of beliefs on how executive remuneration should be structured, but they 
acknowledged that there is no one best way.  This is highlighted by Director J:  
“The issues are really around, how do you structure a package? You’re capturing 
the complexities and the dynamic of an uncertain world… and there’s huge 
judgement involved in these things. There’s no formula… There’s a set of 
principles… You want superior performance to be rewarded.” 
 
There are three executive remuneration practices where Executives and Directors had 
contrasting views.  First, some believed that financial incentives do influence how executives 
behave, while others held the opposite belief (see Section 7.4).  A few Executives and 
Directors argued that financial incentives are a profit sharing mechanism.  For instance, 
Executive D explained:  
“[A] remuneration committee and particularly a board would find it hard to pay 
market remuneration if it was fixed… So to get you to the total you need to be 
competitive, senior executives… have an at risk portion.” 
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Similarly, Director D argued:  
“[The subtext] was, ‘actually, in all of these incentives, we’re actually just 
rewarding you if the organisation has good results’. So let’s be generous, and 
let’s say what we’re saying is, ‘you should share along with the shareholders in 
good results’. So it’s a sharing scheme… And most of the high pay-outs are just 
the benefits of being the lucky person to be there at the right time.” 
 
Additionally, Director F maintained:  
“All incentive schemes are implicitly or explicitly profit sharing schemes. [If] you 
do them properly, what you are saying [is]: ‘If the company is performing well, 
then I’ll give you a share of that improved performance.’ It is the question of 
allocation of the benefits… between capital and labour. And then you can have 
different levels for different levels of contribution. But in the end, what you’re 
talking about is allocating profits. Every dollar of remuneration… [is at] the 
expense of profit.” 
 
This argument is consistent with Corporate Logic, not Investor Logic.  It also highlights that 
some Executives’ and Directors’ arguments are consistent with Corporate Logic, while others 
are consistent with Investor Logic.  Further, the standard remuneration package can be 
justified using Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  
 
Second, the interviewees had different views on how many and what performance measures 
should be used to determine executives’ contribution to firm performance (see Sections 7.7.2 
and 7.7.3).  Third, there were contrasting views among interviewees on what mix of fixed and 
variable remuneration is appropriate.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, some advocate for 
mainly fixed remuneration; whereas, consistent with Investor Logic, others advocate for 
mainly variable remuneration (see Section 7.7.4).  Fourth, setting the level of remuneration 
also proved to be a point of contention (see Section 7.7.5). Some believe median pay relative 
to peers will result in average performance (e.g. see Director N’s comment in Section 7.6.2), 
while one director has argued firm performance will not be harmed if executives are paid at 
the median or lower (see the anonymous Director’s comment in Section 7.6.9).  These and 
other aspects of executive remuneration practices are discussed in the remainder of this 
section. 
 
7.7.1. Fixed Remuneration 
Most Directors have the view that fixed remuneration alone is not sufficient to motivate all 
executives.  For instance, Director K called fixed remuneration, “coming to work money”.  
Benchmarking is used to determine how much fixed remuneration executives are paid.  Some 
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boards hired remuneration consultants to implement job evaluation systems, so that executive 
roles within and between companies could be benchmarked (see Sections 7.5.4 and 7.6.7).  
Others used survey or annual report data to benchmark executive roles.  Typically, fixed 
remuneration is paid at the median relative to peers (see Section 7.7.4), although fixed 
remuneration may be adjusted for an executive’s experience and performance.  However, 
some Directors were critical of benchmarking.  They believed that executive roles, 
particularly in large companies, cannot be compared because there are no or few companies in 
the same industry in NZ.  Executive C described the problem facing NZ companies: 
“I think New Zealand is going to struggle… because there is only one 
telecommunication company… one casino company, a few banks… Overseas you 
have 10 telecommunication companies, a hundred listed transportation 
companies. So… within an industry, you can use some sort of benchmarking… 
[but] we are such a small market. It is exceptionally hard to give you a reason 
behind the salary.” 
 
Further, Directors justified recruitment and retention payments by invoking the human 
resources principle.  However, some Directors were defensive about severance payments.  
With respect to one particular incidence that was well publicised, one anonymous Director 
said, “[it was] an exceptional case, for exceptional circumstances.”173  Other Directors were 
critical of severance payments.  For example, Executive B lamented: 
“Exit packages perplex me. I worry about how hopeless some boards are [to allow 
this] sort of arrangement… how can people get such enormous amounts of money 
when they’re underperforming? If there’s one thing that really embarrasses me as 
a CEO, [it is] when you see clearly a CEO who has not delivered wealth creation 
moved on… with multi-million dollar departure packages. That’s really dumb.” 
 
What emerges is that there are two reasons for severance payments: First, the board wants to 
recognise an executive’s outstanding performance; and second, in the case of poor 
performance, the board uses a severance payment to encourage an executive to leave and 
thereby avoids a costly legal battle.  However, among the interviewees, fixed remuneration is 
less contentious than variable remuneration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
173
 Further elaboration is not possible as the name of the company and the CEO involved cannot be disclosed. 
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7.7.2. Short-term Incentives 
Directors remarked on two significant trends with respect to short-term incentives: First, 
formality has increased as short-term incentives are included in the employment contracts.  
Second, the maximum annual bonus as a percentage of base salary has increased.  Director F 
describes these trends:  
“[In the past,] the short-term incentives… would possibly be no more than 20% of 
base, sometimes even less than that. With no particular rules [other] than they 
were entirely at the discretion of board… there was no sense of negotiated 
entitlement to a short-term performance incentive in those days…” 
 
Most Directors felt that short-term incentives should be dependent on no more than six 
performance measures.  For instance, Director G commented, “Normally, I would imagine, no 
more than 5 or 6.”  Similarly, Director N argued, “Not too many. Maybe maximum half a 
dozen. The more you have, the more complicated… the scheme is… The best schemes are the 
simple ones.”  However, some Executives have been subject to short-term incentives with 
many performance measures.  Executive B offers a case in point:  
“[W]hy do you want to give me 15 objectives for a short term incentive and have 
profit or long term value creation… [equal to] 10% of a STI? [This] just ends up 
[being] a meaningless number. That is sort of how the standard process works. I 
am a huge critic of it… but it’s actually… driven… by… shareholder activism, 
almost do-gooder thinking around how [the] public company should behave…” 
 
Executives and Directors mentioned a range of financial and non-financial performance 
measures, although financial (accounting) performance measures were dominant (see Section 
7.3). For example, Director N remarked, “Typically you would be looking at things like 
profit… market share… cash flow, product development…”  Similarly, Executive D 
mentioned that his key performance indicators included, “profitability, revenue, [and] a few 
other measures…” 
 
Targets have to be set for the performance measures. Directors argued that the targets have to 
be challenging, but not impossible to achieve within a year.  They recognised that target 
setting is an art, not a science.  Some targets may be easily met, while others may not be met 
due to extraordinary or uncontrollable factors.  Director H describing how directors and 
executives should handle this problem:  
“Everyone grows up and becomes adult, and realises it won’t work until you have 
some honesty and integrity about it. There will be a bit of rough justice, but… it 
will even out. Sometimes you’ll get a lucky break, and sometimes you’ll get a kick 
in the teeth.” 
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However, some Executives and Directors were critical of target setting processes. They 
believe that short-term incentives have become, at least partially, guaranteed bonuses.  This 
problem is illustrated by Executive B: 
“[On] the law of averages, it means out of that ten, you will miss a couple, you 
will massively outperform a couple, and you will get the others about right.  When 
you add it up, it will come out as about one hundred percent.” 
 
Director D also highlights this problem, but attributes it to short-term incentives becoming 
standardised and taken for granted:  
“The mindset has been successfully sold that… to be fairly remunerated, people 
have got to have another component [i.e. short-term incentives] and that the rules 
for that component should be sufficiently loose that you always get at least half of 
it, and, if not, all of it.” 
 
Further, the interviewees felt that short-term incentives should be paid in cash and payment 
should be immediate, not deferred.  They argued that deferral is not necessary because of 
long-term incentives.  For instance, when asked about deferral of short-term incentives, 
Director G replied, “No, I don’t agree with that. You’ve got long-term incentives and you’ve 
got short-term incentives.” 
 
7.7.3. Long-term Incentives 
As aforementioned, share option plans become popular in the 1990s, but following much 
criticism were replaced with restricted share plans in the 2000s.  Directors provided three 
rationales for adopting long-term incentives: First, to ensure that executives focus on both 
short- and long-term performance (see Section 7.3); second, to align executives interests with 
those of shareholders (see Section 7.6.6); and third, to attract and retain executives (see 
Section 7.6.1).  As a case in point, Director K affirmed, “[For]…restricted share units or 
share options, it is always about… there is a rewarding element and there is a retention 
element.” Further, long-term incentives are dependent on financial and market-based 
performance measures.  As noted by Director L, “They are typically either related to the 
share price or to the earnings of the company.”  However, some Executives and Directors 
were critical of the use of market-based performance measures such as total shareholder 
return.  For example, Director M argued:  
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“[S]hare prices are a very poor proxy for performance. That’s one of the real 
worries I have for share price-based schemes. Coz’ all sorts of things can 
influence share price and the share price has nothing to do with the chief 
executive’s performance.”  
 
One the other hand, the legitimacy of a company may be threatened if market-based 
performance measures are not used because investors and the media are critical of executives 
being rewarded when the share price declines (see Sections 7.2, 7.5.5 and 7.5.7).  This is 
described by Director K:  
“[W]hat’s happened often is that boards have surrendered their decision-making 
effectively to management, and management’s got the lion’s share… so you get 
[a] huge misalignment where the share price goes down and management comp 
[compensation] goes up. That just destroys the reputation of… capitalism…”  
 
Further, the board may react to (potential) legitimacy threats by constraining executives’ 
decisions to exercise share options.  Executive B explained that share option plans have not 
motivated him because first, the board discouraged him from exercising his share options 
prior to the end of the vesting period and second, the Global Financial Crisis suppressed share 
prices:  
“I have never exercised a single option because on the times that they have been 
in the money I haven’t been allowed to. Insider trading and it’s a bad look. You 
get told off by your board. If it’s the senior people that exercise options before 
their last stage, you get the lectures about bad look. But if you get caught in a 
declining industry… and I have been caught in the first two years here by the 
Global Financial Crisis, the net result is ten or eleven years of running a 
company and [I have] never exercised a single one.” 
 
Moreover, Executive B argued that short- and long-term incentives that are periodically 
evaluated motivate business as usual, rather than business transformation.  He preferred a 
radical solution, where the financial incentive is tied to one objective that if achieved would 
add shareholder value, but there is no time limit on achieving the objective.  Such an incentive 
scheme was not endorsed for listed companies by any other interviewees.  As Executive B 
had raised concerns over the standard remuneration package, he was asked if he had ever 
attempted to negotiate with the RemCo in order to simplify his remuneration package.  
Executive B replied: 
“Not really because in a listed company, that’s just so engrained. I have no 
question whatsoever [that]… if the company is privatised, I would say to the 
owners just give me a much bigger incentive on creating long term value and 
lifting earnings… [What] I do… for my base salary [is]… running a good ship and 
satisfying customers, running the staff – that’s my job and if I don’t do that 
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properly… get someone else… [P]rivate businesses do much more coz’… they 
haven’t got that nonsense disclosure and having to justify to people who don’t 
really understand it… People with serious money know how to incentivise 
people… [They say,] ‘I will give you this large amount of cash if you deliver me 
these results.’ They don’t really work in yearly cycles. They just say, ‘There’s the 
[desired] result [and] when you’ve got it, we will give you this. And if it takes three 
years, that’s fine. If you get it in three months, coz’ you are a miracle worker, then 
that’s fine too.’” 
 
In addition, Executive B argued that long-term incentives cannot align executives’ 
interests with those of shareholders because economic trends have a significant impact 
on companies’ share prices:  
“[With listed companies,] long term incentives are the weakest part of the modern 
remuneration structure and they should be the strongest part.  But they ended up 
[being] the weakest part of all because… so much of it being luck and timing.  
And anyone who does the numbers… can see people getting massive rewards for 
underwhelming outcomes just because they happened to be there at the right 
times. Everyone in the resources and mining business in the last five years has 
become… mega millionaires. [It] doesn’t have anything to do with them, to be 
frank… [T]he global growth of China and massive demand for resources have 
driven prices through the roof… [B]ad management could have [reduced]… some 
of that opportunity but… they [still] would have got 90% of [their long-term 
incentives]…” 
 
A few Directors have also been critical of long-term incentives.  They argue that executives’ 
interests cannot be easily aligned with shareholders’ interests using long-term incentives (see 
Section 7.6.6).  These Directors also believe that most executives will act in the best interests 
of shareholders, whether or not long-term incentives are adopted.  Nevertheless, most 
Executives and Directors favour using long-term incentives.  A few Executives and Directors 
also noted that having a minimum shareholding requirement improves the alignment of 
interests.  This debate illustrates that there is some tension between Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic.  
 
7.7.4. Mix of Fixed and Variable Remuneration 
While the mix of fixed and variable remuneration has changed, there has not been a dramatic 
shift towards a high proportion of variable remuneration in NZ as has occurred in some 
countries (see Section 7.2).  Director L commented on the current mix, “Typically, it would 
be… in New Zealand today… seventy percent fixed and thirty percent flexible…”  This trend 
may be explained by the range of views that interviewees expressed on what is the ideal mix.  
Some Directors supported a high proportion of variable remuneration.  For instance, Director 
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A affirmed, “[W]e broadly accept something like a third fixed, a third short-term, [and] a 
third long-term.” Other Directors wanted a balance between fixed and variable.  Director O 
remarked: “[T]he Chief Executive in my view shouldn’t be getting more than sixty percent 
fixed… probably better if its nearer fifty or forty-five percent fixed, and all the balance at-
risk.” Similarly, Director C declared, “My rule of thumb… [is that] the LTIs probably be 25-
35% of remuneration, STIs will typically be 25% as well, and the base is the balance.”   
 
A few Directors had a conservative mix.  As a case in point, Director N opined:  
“I would say there should be 20-25% at risk, no more than that. And that the at-
risk portion around 50/50 long-term and short-term… [But] if you get say 50% of 
the package at-risk… that forces the behaviour… and may not be taking [into 
account] long-term implications of the strategy…”  
 
One anonymous Director believed that incentives should not be required at all: 
“So then you [start] getting into the incentives game, which is a complete 
nonsense. Why anyone getting paid a quarter of a million dollars, let alone a 
million dollars, feels they need to be incentivised to do their job – I mean, it just 
defeats me! For God’s sake, you’ve probably got a very exciting job for a start, 
and you’re getting paid a very large amount of money. Why you have to be 
incentivised to do your job is – I don’t know.” 
 
This debate is suggestive of a tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  
However, only one Director (see above) rejected performance-based remuneration. While 
some Directors advocated a conservative approach to executive remuneration, they still 
advocated the use of short- and long-term incentives.  Thus, both Logics co-exist as opposed 
to compete in the discourse. 
 
7.7.5. Level of Remuneration 
Generally, the level of remuneration is determined by benchmarking executives’ roles (which 
entails using a job evaluation system).  This may occur for base salary and total remuneration.  
In any case, base salary is linked to variable remuneration because the maximum award for 
short- and long-term incentives is normally expressed as a multiple of base salary.  Further, 
most Executives and Directors have said that executive remuneration is set at the median to 
upper-quartile relative to the comparator group.  For instance, Executive D commented, 
“[W]e basically have a philosophy of setting ourselves somewhere between medium and 
upper quartile.”  Similarly, Director K recalled, “[We] were willing to have for the rest of the 
executives [at] upper quartile.”  Executives and Directors believe that this position is 
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justifiable because executives with above-average talent expect to be paid at an above-average 
rate (e.g. see Director N’s comment in Section 7.6.2). 
 
However, this reasoning is questionable given that executives are motivated by both extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards (see Section 7.4).  Some questioned the ability of remuneration set in the 
upper quartile to attract and retain executives.  For example, Executive E argued:  
“[T]hose good organisations want to pay that top quartile, but they are also 
competing for the same people… [A] long-term incentive plan… might be enough 
to stop people from going. [But] in my experience, that’s never significant enough 
to stop people from going. So they say [it is] a retention tool but it is not.” 
 
Further, incremental creep or the Lake Wobegon Effect (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009) may 
occur if many companies set executive remuneration above the median level.  Several 
Directors believed that this has occurred, particularly as executive remuneration has to be 
disclosed.  However, Executives and Directors did not believe that they had to curb the level 
of remuneration.  Executive C commented on this problem:  
“I guess I’ve never thought of it in that way, but certainly… if everyone is paying 
the upper quartile… [then] upper quartile will keep on creeping… We aimed at 
paying upper quartile, [but] whether we do or not is a different story. Individuals’ 
performance comes into… the conversation… but your logic is right… If you start 
to pay the upper quartile… the average [will] keep coming up.” 
 
There are a range of views on the level of remuneration (also see Sections 7.6.9 and 7.7.4).  
Some Executives’ and Directors’ views are consistent with Corporate Logic’s conservatism 
and with the belief that executives are, at least partially, intrinsically motivated; whereas other 
Executives’ and Directors’ views are consistent with the belief embedded in Investor Logic 
that executives should be rewarded for their contribution to firm performance. 
 
7.7.6. Summary and Implications 
There is a standard remuneration package for executives. This is illustrated by Executive B:  
 “If you ask about any CEO package, or even senior executive [package], the 
expert adviser will say, ‘Look, what you have to do is to pay a base of x and you 
have to have for a CEO: up to 100% of x as an STI and 50% of x as an LTI, and 
for… senior executives: 30% of x STI and 15% of x LTI… They have all these 
percentages.”  
 
There is flexibility within this package.  RemCos will choose different comparator groups, 
performance measures, types of schemes (e.g. share options or restricted shares), mixes of 
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fixed and variable remuneration and levels of remuneration (e.g. median or upper quartile).  
The remuneration principles are used to justify these choices.  Further, some choices are 
consistent with Corporate Logic, while other choices are consistent with Investor Logic.  
Executive remuneration practices in most companies are comparable.  However, there are 
some differences.  This is suggestive of a tension between Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic.  However, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can co-exist because almost any 
remuneration principle can be used to justify the same remuneration practice. 
 
7.8. Remuneration Processes 
This section considers the process of decision-making in order to understand how both Logics 
influence how remuneration decisions are made and reported.  Three decisions are studied: 
How the board hires and replaces executives, how the RemCo makes remuneration decisions 
and how the company reports remuneration decisions.  The CEO is the subject of the 
following discussion, although the arguments are equally applicable to other senior 
executives.    
 
7.8.1. Hiring and Replacing Executives 
There is an old cliché that the board’s most important decisions are hiring and replacing the 
CEO.  Most Directors believe that this cliché is true. For example, Director M commented:  
“In terms of [the] chief executive, that’s the most important appointment the board 
has ever made. And obviously, the remuneration of the chief executive [and] the 
structure of that are the key part of the contract.  And can make a difference if you 
recruit the right person or not…” 
 
The Directors describe a common process for hiring a new CEO.
174
  First, the board (or 
nominations committee) will consider what type of candidate is desired (e.g. qualifications, 
experience, personality, etc), and then hire a recruitment (or search) consultant to identify 
some candidates that fit this remit.  Second, the recruitment consultant will seek expressions 
of interest, interview potential candidates and then draft a shortlist that they will present to the 
board.  The short-listed candidates will normally include at least one insider (i.e. a senior 
executive in the company) and one outsider.  Third, the board will interview the short-listed 
candidates and choose the candidate they believe is the most appropriate.  In general, an 
insider will be selected if the board seeks continuity of the company’s strategy, whereas an 
                                                 
174
 The process described here also applies to other senior executives, except that the CEO will lead the 
recruitment process (not the board). 
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outsider will be selected if the board wants the company to head in a new direction.  Director 
N put this succinctly:  
“It depends on the situation. My view would be it’s generally better to appoint 
from within, but the individual [has to be selected through] a competitive 
process… You appoint the best person for the job. If the company really needs 
change, [then an outsider would be appointed].” 
 
Fourth, the board (and their advisors) will negotiate the employment terms and conditions 
with the candidate (and their advisors).  The recruitment consultant may act as an 
intermediary during these negotiations.   
 
The board’s ability to negotiate the candidate’s remuneration arrangements is potentially 
weakened because this is negotiated after the candidate has been selected, particularly if the 
candidate is already an experienced CEO and/or from outside of New Zealand.  As a case in 
point, Director J described how his board’s ability to negotiate was weakened: 
“[When] you have to go out into the market and hire someone… at chief executive 
level, [it is] a really powerful test or a check… of what you are doing as [best] 
practice. So for instance when I was on the board of [Company PQR], we made 
the decision… to get a new chief executive… So… as one does most of the time 
now, [we] retained a search consultant… And we were presented… with… two 
very good insiders [and] an outsider.  Now… remuneration [is] a subset of [the] 
employment terms and conditions. So you’ve got a whole variety of factors 
there… [There is not] a standard… contract with the chief executive… So you 
start with a clean piece of paper.  And a starting point, obviously, [is:] what has 
this person… been earning in their previous role [and] what are their 
expectations? So… in this case, [where the outside candidate had been working in 
an Australian company,]… he was already a very successful chief executive [with] 
a very fine track record. So you don’t go along to [him] and say, ‘…look, [we 
know] you… earn x now, [but] New Zealand is a very wonderful place [and] we’ll 
be obliged, if you come and work for us, [to pay you] x minus 20%. Thank you 
very much.’ You don’t do it. You can’t do it! Now in his case, we had to make 
adjustments and we felt that we were reasonable and appropriate…” 
 
In general, Executives and Directors believed that an executive would not change jobs unless 
the new job has a higher potential remuneration.  For instance, Director K opined:  
“[For] really good chief executives, you never discuss [remuneration] except… 
when you hire them it is important. I’ve done a number of chief executive 
recruitments… and the biggest point of tension is when you hire them.” 
 
The board has much more ability to negotiate remuneration with candidates when the job 
represents a significant advancement in their career (i.e. the candidate has not been a CEO).  
For example, Director L recalled that three new CEOs (who had previously not been the CEO 
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of a listed company) had actually accepted the board’s remuneration offer without 
negotiating: 
“Normally when they come on board, most of them will be fretting about what 
they get paid. [However, Person X] did not [and Person Y] did not. They were 
both so pleased to be CEOs that what we put to them, we thought what we put to 
them was reasonable, they didn’t argue. [Person Z] was the same. But when they 
[the board and/or the CEO] are recruiting people… if you bring them [i.e. 
candidates] in from outside, then… you’re trying to entice them to move from 
another company [and] then you’ll have to pay them more than the other 
company’s paying them, typically, otherwise they won’t move… And I think if you 
want to make sure they don’t leave you, you have to pay them fairly. So they have 
to perceive it to be fair and reasonable. So although it [i.e. remuneration] may not 
be the greatest motivator, it will be a factor in people’s minds. If they think they 
are being hard done by, then at some point it may lead to [their] being attracted to 
another opportunity [elsewhere].” 
 
Director L’s remarks exemplify three other important points.  First, the market principle is 
paramount because directors believe that CEOs will go elsewhere if they are remunerated at a 
level that is not comparable to other CEOs.  Second, when changing jobs, some CEOs act as 
opportunistic agents (i.e. they want to maximise their potential remuneration), while other 
CEOs act as stewards (i.e. they are less concerned about their potential remuneration because 
they want a challenging and interesting job).  Third, there is a war for talent, where boards are 
willing to remunerate talented (or superstar) CEOs at above median levels in order to attract 
and retain them.  This ties the human resources principle (or Corporate Logic) to Rosen’s 
(1981) extreme value theory and to Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory.  
Thus, the fairness principle (i.e. vertical equity between executives and employees) may be 
excluded from the version of Corporate Logic that is embedded in New Zealand’s discourse 
on executive remuneration because there is excess demand for or a limited supply of talented 
executives. 
 
Turning back to hiring and replacing CEOs, Directors affirmed that knowing when to replace 
CEOs is a critical decision.  This underscores that Directors believe that CEOs are able to 
significantly influence firm performance and if firm performance is below expectations it 
means that the CEO (and, possibly, other executives) should be replaced with more capable or 
motivated individuals.  The pay-for-performance principle is tied to the decision to replace 
CEOs, although severance payments may reduce the sensitivity of pay to performance.   As a 
case in point, Director L declared: 
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“[I]f you’re at the very senior level, if you don’t perform, the ultimate sanction is 
you’re replaced… That’s where you get zero salary and zero everything else, of 
course. Although typically, when people move on they get some sort of 
compensatory payment. [This has] usually been prior agreed and set out in the 
contract. It’s the price you pay for lack of… [job] security…” 
 
Remuneration may be less important to boards than expected because some Directors believe 
that to maximise executives’ ability to influence firm performance requires the board to have 
an advisory role, rather than a monitoring role.  This is consistent with Corporate Logic.
175
  
Director M explained:  
“I always say to boards that I am chairing, ‘Look, you can’t half employ a CEO. 
You are either right behind them or they are fired…’ You can have all these 
discussions you like [about] whether this guy is performing or not, [but at] the end 
of the day, you have to… back this guy [sic] because if you don’t then you are 
dead in the water… I think boards are a bit naive about this. They think they can 
have this carping and snipping about the CEO behind their back…” 
 
However, other Directors maintained that the board should have a monitoring role, which is 
consistent with Investor Logic.  Director O argued that the board has to continually evaluate 
the performance of executives: 
“[T]hey [potential or new directors] don’t envisage that they’ll have to sit around 
with their fellow directors and decide whether the Chief Executive should keep his 
or her job, or in fact be fired.  And yet that’s a pretty common [decision].  Every 
year, and maybe, three or four times a year in many companies, you’ve got to 
have a view about how the management team and the Chief Executive are 
performing. And a lot of people that want to be directors just have no idea how 
you’d do that.” 
 
On the whole, the decision to hire and replace executives is driven by Directors’ assumptions 
that executives significantly influence firm performance.  This is illustrated by Director O: 
“So around the performance conversation… there should be a strong focus on 
consequences. And if it’s a one-off, the first time an executive’s failed, you’d say, 
‘Well, you know, it’s not very good, we’ll have to do better next time’… you might 
restructure the incentives a bit differently for the next year.  But if they miss a 
second time… you probably are in the position of saying, ‘Okay, we’ve got to get 
pretty focused on this. What’s going wrong and what are we going to do to avoid 
it happening again and recover the position?’ And that is getting into the area of 
removal from role as far as I’m concerned. And that’s something boards are 
absolutely terrible at: Holding a poorly performing Chief Executive to account 
and making the decision that they should be removed from role… I think many 
directors find the whole process around that entirely foreign and highly 
uncomfortable…” 
                                                 
175
 Corporate Logic conceptualises the board as advisors to the CEO and other executives, whereas Investor 
Logic conceptualises the board as monitors of these executives (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 and Table 2.3). 
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7.8.2. Making Remuneration Decisions 
There are many remuneration decisions that the board and RemCo make.  Most decisions 
have already been discussed in the preceding sections.  However, some decisions require 
further explanation.  These include: Designing remuneration policies and practices, selecting 
performance measures, setting targets for CEOs, reviewing the performance of CEOs, hiring 
remuneration consultants and evaluating their data and advice, and finally, awarding 
remuneration to CEOs.   
 
7.8.2.1. Designing Remuneration Policies and Practices 
The RemCo designs the general framework for the company’s remuneration policies and 
practices.  Director N summarises:  
“[The] remuneration committee should typically meet at least twice a year. What 
you’re going to do is you set the objectives and so on, KPIs and so on, and the 
overall quantum, and the principles and policy that would apply to the company. 
And then you've got to review performance.”  
 
However, several parties will influence how the RemCo designs this general framework 
including executives, other companies, remuneration consultants and investors (see Sections 
7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.4 and 7.5.5).  As a case in point, Director K recalls:  
“[W]e had four players: we had the Chief Executive, the remuneration committee 
of the board, the professional firms (giving you input particularly around salary 
levels), and then you had your human resources officer.” 
 
Codes are not strongly influential in how Directors make remuneration decisions (see Section 
7.5.6).  However, codes are incorporated into the general framework in some companies.  For 
example, Executive D notes: 
“We review all of those [codes] and we try to distil to our own policy… I think we 
probably pretty much comply with all those [codes]… [It is] just good practice… I 
mean, we are not a company who does any strange things from a governance 
point of view.”  
 
As discussed in Section 7.6, the interviewees agreed that the remuneration principles 
represent ‘best practice’.  The remuneration principles, particularly the human resources, 
market and pay-for-performance principles are incorporated into the general framework of 
most companies.  In addition, the interviewees agreed that there is a standard remuneration 
package for executives, although some criticised elements of it (see Section 7.7).  Drawing on 
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this evidence, two arguments are made. First, most companies’ remuneration policies and 
practices are consistent with both Logics.  Second, the process of designing the remuneration 
policies and practices are perceived as rational, but is constrained by norms (or best practice) 
and societal expectations (or their perception of investors’ and the public’s reactions to their 
design choices). 
 
7.8.2.2. Selecting Performance Measures  
Executives and Directors outlined a range of performance measures on which the short- and 
long-term incentives are dependent (see Sections 7.7.2 and 7.7.3).  Financial performance 
measures are considered to be most important, particularly earnings per share and total 
shareholder return.  Non-financial performance measures are also important, but Executives 
and Directors preferred performance measures that they considered to be robust.  However, 
some Directors argued performance should be evaluated holistically, even if some items 
cannot be measured.  As a case in point, Director O explained:  
“[T]he report that I’m getting from the Chief Executive on how they think they’ve 
done is six pages of very detailed information. And because the information is 
comprehensive, most of it is based on quantitative measures, so there is not much 
room for uncertainty. But I also think you shouldn’t shy away from having non-
quantitative stuff as well [such as] quality of leadership, development of culture. 
Although quite a bit of the culture stuff is quite well quantified.” 
 
Each Director appeared to favour slightly different performance measures. Some preferred 
earnings per share and other accounting measures, while others preferred Economic Value 
Added
TM
 and total shareholder return.  The performance measures that are chosen or 
recommended are consistent with both Logics.  Further, the process of selecting measures is 
comparable to that described above.  However, Directors’ past experiences are also influential 
in that they have strong preferences for certain performance measures.   
 
7.8.2.3. Setting Targets for Executives 
The Board or RemCo sets a range of targets for executives (see Sections 7.7.2 and 7.7.3).   
There are two ways in which targets are set for executives: First, the CEO prepares a business 
plan, including a range of targets, and submits it to the board for approval.  For instance, 
Executive A commented, “[W]e’ve always got a range of targets that are usually fairly highly 
aligned with our strategic plan’s targets.”  Second, the board or RemCo gives the CEO a 
range of targets.  The first way is most common because the CEO has greater knowledge of 
what is important for the company than the board.  For instance, Executive B argued:  
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“[The business plan] will get approved by the board.  Then I will write a set of 
objectives [and] then submit them to the board for their input. You can find that if 
it’s done the other way round [and] you left it to the board: then they are utterly 
hopeless.” 
 
In either case, there is likely to be some discussion and, to some degree, negotiation between 
the board and CEO over the targets.  For example, Executive A recalls, “[There is] a huge 
amount discussion on targets… We don’t set targets with the remuneration in mind. We set 
targets [and] we reviewed all the factors that affect the targets…”  Further, there will also be a 
similar process in place for setting the targets for the CEO’s direct reports, although the board 
or RemCo may approve the targets.  Director G summarised:  
“So you start with a standard model saying… What are the KPIs? ...What time 
frame are we talking about here? Of course as you know there has been a huge 
debate [on] the way these parameters should be set and how they should be 
measured… You don’t want six parameters [that are] all highly correlated.” 
 
The objective is to set targets that are challenging but achievable within the specified 
timeframe.  Director F affirms: “One of the principles [of] remuneration is you should not set 
a target for management which will be unachievable. That’s just silly.”  However, targets, in 
retrospect, will inevitably appear to have been set too low or high because of uncontrollable 
and unforeseeable factors (e.g. see Director H’s comment in Section 7.7.2).  
 
7.8.2.4. Performance Reviews 
Performance reviews are conducted in a variety of ways from informal to formal.  For 
example, Executive A described: 
“I have really a formal process, a partially formal process and a very informal 
process. In terms of the formal process, I have performance criteria and personal 
objectives, and I sit down with the chairman once a year. It’s all written down and 
[I] get a rating against all those criteria and… objectives… We usually do a half 
year check [as well]… The semi formal process involves the board and the CEO… 
It’s just feedback and suggestions… [That is] done twice a year with the board. So 
each board member including me… gets a sheet of paper, [which has on it] the 
general feedback… and specifically, how they feel I am contributing to the board 
and how I am doing as a chief executive… And then there’s the informal process, 
where we encourage open discussion [at] board level… You get feedback all the 
time on things you’ve done well and on things you haven’t done so well…”   
 
Most companies also have similar processes for reviewing the performance of senior 
executives, except that it is the CEO who reviews each executive’s performance.  
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Generally, Executives and Directors were supportive of these processes.  They argued that 
open dialogue between the board and CEO (and other senior executives) is crucial to 
achieving the company’s objectives.  This is illustrated by Director O:  
“My view is that the chairman would recommend to the remuneration committee 
an assessment of the chief executive… [However,] sometimes… to reach a 
conclusion you often have to have quite a debate. And people will say, ‘You can’t 
do that. That’s very destructive.’ I totally disagree.  I think it’s very constructive 
because people… have to engage, debate… Now in a good company… this is 
often explicit in the performance objectives that there must be a dialogue through 
the year, so that the Chief Executive knows how they are tracking on the non-
quantitative measures.” 
 
However, Executive B has not been satisfied with how boards have reviewed his performance 
in the past:  
“Board members are part-timers… so they don’t actually know much in reality 
about what’s going on [with respect to] performance… So I’m always mindful 
[that performance reviews are] not the easiest thing. And [the board] sort of have a 
half-hearted go… [It] will usually be… an unsatisfactory process around 
conversations about packages… coz’ they are so stuck on your advice. And [they] 
sort of formulate a way doing it and life moves on.” 
 
On the whole, interviewees characterised the performance review process for CEOs as 
rational in that through dialogue and debate between the board and the CEO and, similarly, 
between the CEO and his/her direct reports, all of them will gain a better understanding of 
how to maximise shareholder value.  Thus, there is a strong emphasis on advising CEOs, 
rather than monitoring them.  This is consistent with Corporate Logic. 
 
7.8.2.5. Hiring and Evaluating Remuneration Consultants 
Almost all companies hire remuneration consultants to provide the RemCo and, possibly, the 
CEO with data and advice on executive remuneration.  Notably, some Directors only received 
data from consultants, whereas others received data and advice.  In terms of the latter, 
consultants would present their recommendations to the board or RemCo.  A number of 
interviewees commented that companies use remuneration consultants to enhance the efficacy 
and legitimacy of their decision-making (see Section 7.5.4).   
 
There are three main differences between remuneration consultants.  First, some consultants 
are known to be conservative in their estimates of the market rates for CEOs, whereas others 
are known to be optimistic (or generous) in their estimates.  Second, some consultants’ 
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estimates are based on publicly available information, whereas others’ estimates are based on 
their own data (gathered through surveys of companies).  Third, some consultants use job 
evaluation systems as a means of comparing executive roles across industries and sectors, 
others only compare executive roles that are deemed similar (e.g. CEOs of listed companies, 
scaled by firm size).  However, there was no consensus among Directors on which type of 
remuneration consultant is most desirable.   
 
7.8.2.6. Awarding Remuneration to CEOs 
The process of awarding remuneration to executives is standardised. Fixed remuneration is 
tied to a specified position relative to a comparator group (see Section 7.7.1 and 7.7.5).  
Variable remuneration is tied to both fixed remuneration (e.g. maximum award is expressed 
as a percentage of base salary) and performance.  Performance will be quantified using a 
variety of measures, although the board and RemCo will consider other aspects of 
performance.  The CEO’s strategic and business plans will influence the choice of 
performance measures and targets, although Directors do have preferred performance 
measures.  The performance of the CEO and other senior executives will be regularly 
reviewed in both formal and informal ways.  The board is focused on advising (not 
monitoring/policing) executives, although they will replace executives for non-performance. 
Following the performance reviews, the RemCo makes a recommendation to the board on the 
CEO’s remuneration package, and similarly, the RemCo reviews and approves the CEO’s 
recommendations for other senior executives.  The board or RemCo may still award bonuses 
if targets are not met, although only in exceptional circumstances.  Director B illustrated the 
complexities of this point: 
“What can be an issue is if your incentive is to meet budget and you fall short by a 
few dollars… and… the incentive is quite significant. Is it fair [for the board] to 
say, ‘No’?... [It can be] quite a discussion… [I]f you start allowing for minor 
shortfall, then when does it stop being minor?”  
 
On the whole, this process matched what is described in management and accounting 
textbooks (e.g. Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Hanson et al., 2005) and by Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) performance management framework.  This is a rational process.  However, 
companies follow a standardised process because the preferences of Directors and others may 
be institutionalised, not autonomous.  For example, the interviewees have a shared belief that 
shareholder value maximisation should be the corporate objective (see Section 7.3).  Further, 
the RemCo’s decisions are influenced by coercive (e.g. regulators), normative (e.g. directors’ 
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shared beliefs) and mimetic (e.g. competitors and consultants) pressures (see Section 7.5).  
They are also influenced by what they believe is appropriate or legitimate.  As a case in point, 
remuneration decisions are constrained by directors’ perceptions of how the public 
(particularly investors) will react to their decisions (see Sections 7.5.5 and 7.5.7).  Finally, the 
RemCo’s decisions are influenced by fads and fashions.176  For instance, some directors noted 
the trend away from share options towards restricted shares in spite of their belief both types 
of long-term incentives can align executives’ interests with those of shareholders. 
 
7.8.3. Reporting Remuneration Decisions 
The board also has to decide how to report remuneration decisions in press releases, in the 
company’s annual report, on the company’s website, at meetings with analysts and 
institutional investors and at the annual general meeting with shareholders (see Section 7.5.5).  
The company’s annual report is the primary means by which remuneration decisions are 
disclosed to the public.  In terms of the company’s annual report, the board has to decide who 
will write and review the remuneration disclosure.  They also have to decide (or advise the 
writers) how much to disclose and how to phrase the remuneration disclosure.   
 
Typically, the senior management and their staff prepare the remuneration disclosure for the 
company’s annual report, although some disclosure may be outsourced to public relations 
consultants.  As a case in point, Executive B declared:  
“I find it extremely boring. As far as we possibly can, we hire people to write it… 
They usually have a session with me saying ‘…What do you want to cover?’ I give 
them a broad outline… and they go to write it all.” 
 
However, it is rare for remuneration consultants to be involved in preparing the remuneration 
disclosure.   
 
Further, the board and/or RemCo will review and approve the relevant sections of the annual 
report.  The extent of the board’s and the RemCo’s involvement in writing the narrative 
portion of the remuneration disclosure varies considerably between companies. For example, 
Director F commented that, “The management will do all the writing.” 
 
In contrast, Executive B claimed:  
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 Abrahamson’s (1991; 1996) seminal work discussed how managerial fads and fashions constrain managers’ 
decisions and results in, at least temporary, isomorphism of practice. 
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“[R]eporting is driven a lot by your board.  Executives, by and large, want to 
report less as a rule… to meet the minimums because managers don’t value the 
expenditure of time on reporting. Public reports are not marketing documents 
anymore.” 
 
Director L provided additional insight:  
“[T]he remuneration report in most companies would be drafted in the initial 
instance by somebody at senior level in the human resources… department… 
And… there would also be substantial input from the company secretary to ensure 
that the phraseology was acceptable and met all of the legal disclosure 
requirements as well. These are things where you have to have a high level of 
accuracy. And where you’ve got computational matters that need to be addressed 
like valuation of options… then it would be referred to usually the Chief Financial 
Officer. One of his team would be a specialist in that, [but] if he was not a 
specialist then computational work would be done by the human resources 
department.” 
 
Chapter 6 shows that NZ listed companies disclose scant narrative and financial information 
on executive remuneration.  Larger NZ companies (particularly if they are listed on multiple 
stock exchanges) tend to disclose more than smaller NZ companies, but all NZ companies 
disclose much less than AU and UK companies.   
 
Executives and Directors had mixed opinions on how much companies should be required or 
choose to disclose.  Some want to be known as leaders in disclosure as one anonymous 
Executive avowed: 
“We pride ourselves on our reputation and our integrity. We made our business as 
transparent as we can… [We are willing to] up the disclosure on remuneration 
from where we currently are… [It is] about just being transparent. [If] the 
shareholders… [want to] have more information… then we provide it. There’s 
nothing to hide. We are happy to stand up and… justify decisions that we made… 
And we have always felt that [if you] create transparency, you create 
performance… The principle of more disclosure is absolutely the right thing to 
do.” 
 
Similarly, some Directors are amenable to providing voluntary disclosure on executive 
remuneration. For example, Director E explained why a particular company had decided to 
increase their voluntary disclosure:  
“[W]e got the board to agree that if you do it properly, you send the signals to 
shareholders and you’ll get the shareholders’ support [which we needed 
because]… it is a capital intensive business…” 
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Others choose to disclose the minimum that is required.  As a case in point, Executive C said: 
“[W]e will report the minimum amount we have to report. So yes, we comply with what we 
have to comply with, but anymore than that, we would not do it.” 
 
Executive B explained why there is variation in the amount that companies disclose: 
 “[W]e’ve got a board who… sets the standard very high even on disclosure and 
reporting… but other companies choose to do very little. Other companies as a 
rule report nothing if they don’t have to. They just don’t value the effort. For 
them, having the CEO spending a day proof-reading drafts of the report [is] just 
a waste of time to them.” 
 
Director M provided additional insight:  
“I think they all accept the fact that shareholders are entitled to know what they 
are being paid. Some are more sensitive about what the various components are 
and they would prefer not to disclose anything more than the statutory 
requirement… So that’s why there’s variation.” 
 
Most believed that current disclosure requirements are sufficient and that voluntarily 
disclosing extra information on executive remuneration has no benefit and may harm the 
company.  Three reasons for not disclosing additional information on executive remuneration 
were often given.  First, listed companies will have a competitive disadvantage if it has to 
disclose the precise targets that are tied to executives’ short- and long-term incentives because 
their competitors (who are often private companies that do not have to disclose) will know 
their strategy.  For instance, Director C argued:  
“[You] must be prepared to have complete transparency to shareholders and the 
public.  [However,] I’m against the publishing of STIs [particularly the targets] 
simply because it’s commercial information that would potentially damage the 
company…” 
 
Similarly, Executive D maintained:  
“We put some of them in our report… I guess you always have to strike a balance 
with disclosure because our shareholders read it [and] so do your competitors… 
There are things that shareholders… and analysts would like to know but we do 
not necessarily want to tell our competitors… those things… [Companies are] 
encourage[d]… to disclose all remuneration details for your top five executives. 
But we say, ‘Sorry, we are not doing that because that’s information that we think 
people, who might want to hire our staff, need to know.’ Unless that becomes 
mandatory, we won’t disclose it.” 
 
Second, if how much each executive is paid is disclosed, then competitors would be able to 
more easily lure executives to their company (e.g. see Executive D’s comment above and 
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Director L’s comment in Section 7.5.2).  Third, the level of remuneration will be ratcheted 
upwards if companies’ choose to or are required to provide additional disclosure on executive 
remuneration.  Director L asserted: 
“[D]isclosure requirements, which were really… originated with a bunch of 
voyeurs and… people who… were… envious of what might get paid in the 
corporate world… [They] have probably led to a ramping up of remuneration 
because it has led to everybody having much better information about what 
somebody else gets paid and then wanting to get paid the same.” 
 
Further, Executives and Directors believe that remuneration disclosure should be easy to 
understand and faithful to the company’s remuneration policies and practices.  Remuneration 
disclosure should not be misleading (c.f. one anonymous Executive’s comment in Section 
7.6.8).  However, some Directors noted that a boilerplate phraseology for remuneration 
disclosure may be emerging, and this reduces the information content of the disclosure.  
Director I explained:  
“So the danger for disclosure is people will be compliant. If you require them to 
disclose, they will be compliant. But over time they will evolve their language 
around compliance: essentially [it] becomes meaningless.” 
 
Executives and Directors attitudes towards remuneration disclosure are generally consistent 
with Corporate Logic because they believe that shareholders will not gain much insight from 
remuneration disclosure and shareholders should not be involved in deciding how much 
executives are paid (see Section 7.5.5).  Directors do not believe that additional remuneration 
disclosure and shareholders’ voting on a remuneration report would act as a control 
mechanism on executive remuneration.  Such a view would have been consistent with 
Investor Logic.   
 
For example, when Directors were queried on the nature of Australia’s and the UK’s 
remuneration reports and the requirement for shareholders to vote on them, they expressed 
opinions that were consistent with Corporate Logic.  Director H simply commented, “I don’t 
know. Maybe the whole thing is going mad a bit. I can’t add a lot to it.” 
 
Director F admitted:  
“I’m a bit old fashioned [as] I think that directors were appointed to set the 
remuneration of the chief executive. And if the shareholders don’t like that, [then] 
they should fire the directors. You shouldn’t… give shareholders the ability to 
approve, [whether or not the vote is] binding or non-binding, [the] remuneration 
of the chief executive.” 
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Director L testified: 
“I think shareholders should set directors’ remuneration and they should elect 
directors, and directors should set management’s remuneration. If shareholders 
are unhappy with what directors are doing, they should not re-elect the directors. 
Right! And they should not approve directors’ remuneration. Right! That’s how 
they fix it… You don’t just start getting bloody [sic] masses of shareholders voting 
around particular operational issues of the company – that’s not how you get 
things fixed. No, I think it’s ridiculous. Absolutely nuts! It’s not based on any 
sensible governance.  It’s just based on public opinion and media noise.” 
 
Overall, most Executives and Directors believed that remuneration disclosure should be kept 
to a minimum and Directors should remain in control of deciding executive remuneration.  
This is consistent with Corporate Logic. 
 
7.8.4. Summary and Implications 
Executives and Directors described the process of making and reporting remuneration 
decisions as well as how the process should occur.   Their descriptions and opinions were 
consistent with Corporate Logic because they emphasised an advisory role for the board, 
where executives and directors collaborate to make remuneration decisions which will 
maximise shareholder value.  Directors also believed that meeting minimum remuneration 
disclosure requirements is sufficient, although some Executives and Directors wanted their 
companies to be known as leaders in remuneration disclosure.  Further, the process of making 
and reporting remuneration decisions is rational in that Executives and Directors attempt to 
make decisions that are most likely to result in shareholder value being maximised.  However, 
the process is influenced by concerns for legitimacy.  Directors do not want to make decisions 
that are criticised by the public, particularly investors (also, see Section 7.5).  Directors’ 
perceptions of best practice also influence their decisions. 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
The main conclusion is that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are deeply embedded in 
the discourse on executive remuneration, although both Logics influence remuneration 
decision-making in different ways.  This conclusion is drawn for a number of reasons.  First, 
NZ listed companies have a conservative approach to executive remuneration (Corporate 
Logic).  Second, shareholder value maximisation is the favoured corporate objective (both 
Logics).  Third, Executives and Directors believe that executives are motivated by both 
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extrinsic and intrinsic rewards (both Logics), but executives do not usually put their interests 
ahead of those of shareholders (Corporate Logic).  Fourth, the RemCo is influenced by many 
parties including executives, other directors, consultants, investors, the media, and, to a lesser 
extent, code issuers.  Corporate Logic fits the internal dynamics of the RemCo, while Investor 
Logic fits the external dynamics of intense investor and media scrutiny.  Fifth, Directors 
strongly agree with the remuneration principles, although the fairness principle is redefined 
(both Logics).  Sixth, some Directors favoured low variable remuneration and conceptualised 
incentives as a profit-sharing mechanism (Corporate Logic), whereas others favoured high 
variable remuneration and conceptualised incentives as a control mechanism (Investor Logic).  
Seventh, the process of remuneration decision-making is characterised as collaborative, where 
the board and RemCo have an advisory role (Corporate Logic), although the board and 
RemCo do not exist to rubber stamp the CEO’s decisions.   
 
Another conclusion is that both Logics are able to co-exist in the discourse.  This conclusion 
is drawn for several reasons.  First, Directors have a high tolerance for ambiguity.  For 
example, while some Directors believed that executives are trustworthy stewards, they also 
believed that financial incentives were necessary (both Logics).  Second, Directors prioritise 
the remuneration principles in order to minimise conflict: The market principle is dominant 
(Corporate Logic).  Third, Directors keep remuneration decisions separate to minimise 
conflict (both Logics).  Fourth, different Directors justify the standard remuneration package 
using different remuneration principles (both Logics).  Fifth, Directors are not subject to 
strong coercive and normative pressure.  For instance, NZ remuneration disclosure 
requirements are limited and all NZ codes related to executive remuneration are non-binding 
or voluntary.  Directors are subject to normative pressure in the form of professional norms 
that emerge from directors’ and their consultants’ networks as well as mimetic pressure in the 
form of a desire to make remuneration decisions that are similar to their competitors (which is 
further reinforced by consultants).  These institutional pressures are not strong, but are likely 
to reinforce Corporate Logic and, to a lesser extent, Investor Logic.   
 
However, at least one mystery remains: There is a standard remuneration package for 
executives of NZ listed companies and this package is indicative of a compromise between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, yet NZ listed companies are subject to less institutional 
pressure than their international counterparts and the remuneration principles afford RemCos 
much flexibility in justifying their decisions to investors.  Put differently: Why do RemCos 
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make the same decisions when there is a wide-ranging distribution of opinions among 
Executives and Directors?  It may be that as RemCos follow comparable processes in making 
decisions, they inevitably reach similar decisions.  Rationality may have isomorphic effects, 
particularly if directors’ preferences are institutionalised (not autonomous).  Further, RemCos 
are concerned that their decisions are legitimate in the eyes of the public, particularly 
investors.  This may constrain their decisions.  For example, Executive D suggested that 
RemCos adopt incentive schemes as a justification to investors for paying executives at the 
market rate.  This also suggests that remuneration practices can be symbolic.  It may be that 
Corporate Logic is substantiated in practice, whereas Investor Logic is used as a symbolic 
discourse in corporate annual reports.  These issues are further discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion  
 
8.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings from Chapters 5, 6 and 7 in the context 
of the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3.  In particular, Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) 
finding that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic is reconciled 
with the present study’s finding that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded 
in the discourse on executive remuneration.  Consideration is given to the beliefs of directors, 
executives, investors, code issuers and others.  Despite having a range of beliefs, these parties 
are united by their belief in shareholder value maximisation.  This partially explains why both 
Logics are embedded in the discourse.  Other reasons are also discussed, particularly 
competitive and institutional pressures.  In addition, how remuneration committees are able to 
strategically respond to competitive and institutional pressures is explored.  Further, how both 
Logics constrain and enable remuneration committees is explained.  Thus, this chapter 
attempts to bridge the macro-micro divide by explaining how remuneration committees are 
influenced by both Logics, and contribute to and change the legitimacy of both Logics in 
society. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2 revisits the definitions of Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic and proposes a definition for a new logic, ‘both Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic’.  Also, some observations are made on the distribution of belief in Corporate Logic 
and/or Investor Logic amongst directors, executives, investors, code issuers and others.  
Section 3 challenges Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) argument that Investor Logic originated in 
the 1970s.  The origin of Corporate Logic is also considered.  Then, the process by which 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were most likely diffused is described with emphasis on 
recent history (1980s-2000s).  A strengthening of Investor Logic over time as a legitimate 
discourse in AU, NZ and UK is noted.  Section 4 explains how Corporate Logic and/or 
Investor Logic have become embedded in this discourse on executive remuneration.  
Particular attention is also given to how both Logics influence how remuneration committees 
make and report decisions.  Section 5 introduces the original concept of the institutional 
position and explains the different ways in which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can co-
exist in the discourse. 
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8.2. Nature of and Distribution of Belief in the Institutional Logics 
Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive 
remuneration (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  Two aspects of this finding are discussed here.  First, 
the nature of the institutional logics is considered.  Drawing on the findings and prior 
research, definitions of Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and both Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are constructed.  However, these definitions are not definitive and can change 
over time because institutional logics are socially constructed (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
Second, the likely distribution of beliefs amongst executives, directors, code issuers, investors 
and others is explored.  Most code issuers and companies appear to have beliefs that are 
consistent with Investor Logic only or both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic (see Chapters 
5 and 6).  Directors and executives have beliefs that are consistent with one of the three 
aforementioned institutional logics (see Chapter 7).  How and why the distribution of beliefs 
has changed over time is discussed further in later sections of this chapter.  
 
Corporate Logic is a set of normative beliefs, including shareholder value maximisation as the 
corporate objective, executives behave as stewards (or trustworthy professionals), and 
executives should be remunerated comparably to their peers (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3; 
Chapter 3, Tables 3.2 and 3.5; Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  However, there are differences between 
the theoretical (normative) and practiced versions of Corporate Logic.  First, there is a belief 
expressed by some directors that the executives they hire are very talented and should be 
remunerated at the upper-quartile relative to their peers (see Chapter 7; Ogden and Watson, 
2011).  If a significant portion of directors share this belief, then executive remuneration will 
be ratcheted upwards over time.  Second, directors and executives do not believe in the 
fairness principle or vertical equity between executives and employees (see Chapter 7; 
Bender, 2004).  Further, Corporate Logic is consistent with some beliefs expressed in the 
texts of companies and code issuers in AU, NZ, the UK and the US (see Chapters 5 and 6; 
Crombie et al., 2010).  Also, US investors’ beliefs were consistent with Corporate Logic in 
the 1970s (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
Investor Logic is a set of normative beliefs, including shareholder value maximisation as the 
corporate objective, executives behave as agents, and executives should be remunerated for 
their individual contributions to firm performance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3; Chapter 3, 
Tables 3.2 and 3.5; Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  There are no significant differences between the 
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theoretical (normative) and practiced versions of Investor Logic.  Notably, directors and 
executives recognise the theoretical (or abstract) nature of shareholder value maximisation 
because shareholders have different risk preferences and investment time horizons (see 
Chapter 7; Hendry et al., 2006; Lok, 2010).  Essentially, code issuers and companies believe 
that executives can be programmed to maximise shareholder value using short- and long-term 
incentive schemes (see Chapters 6 and 7).  Further, Investor Logic is consistent with some 
beliefs expressed in the texts of companies and code issuers in AU, NZ, the UK and the US 
(see Chapters 5 and 6; Crombie et al., 2010).  Also, Investor Logic is consistent with the 
beliefs of investors in NZ, the UK and the US (Chiu and Monin, 2003; Lok, 2010; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004). 
 
Aside from a common belief in shareholder value maximisation, Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are opposing beliefs systems.  Believers in Corporate Logic conceptualise 
short- and long-term incentive schemes as a mechanism for sharing profits between 
executives and shareholders (see Chapter 7).  On the other hand, believers in Investor Logic 
conceptualise incentive schemes as a mechanism for controlling and directing executives (see 
Chapters 6 and 7; Bender, 2004; Lok, 2010).  The tension between Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic is resolved if firm performance is meeting or exceeding expectations.  For 
example, a NZ executive argued that remunerating executives at the competitive level 
required the adoption incentive schemes in order to legitimise the level of remuneration to 
those directors and investors whose beliefs were consistent with Investor Logic (see Chapter 
7, Section 7.7).  From the Investor Logic perspective, incentives schemes are only effective if 
variable pay is sensitive to firm performance.  Thus, if firm performance declines, then 
incentive schemes can no longer be used as a justification for paying executives at a 
competitive level.  This tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is exacerbated 
by a further belief held by NZ executives and directors that greater effort is required when 
performance declines than when performance rises (see Chapter 7).  Therefore, the conclusion 
that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can co-exist (or merge) is paradoxical. 
 
Nevertheless, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are sets of normative beliefs that are  
both embedded in the texts of code issuers and companies in AU, NZ, the UK and the US (see 
Chapters 5 and 6; Crombie et al., 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  For executive 
remuneration, the core belief is that executives should be remunerated at the median relative 
to their peers when firm performance is below or at expectations, and at the upper quartile 
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relative to their peers when firm performance is above expectations.  Essentially, executives 
have plenty of upside potential, but limited downside risk.  However, executives may be 
replaced if firm performance is very low; replacing executives is an enactment of the pay-for-
performance principle (see Chapter 7).  This is a pragmatic approach to executive 
remuneration, where directors and executives are tolerant of ambiguity (see Chapter 7; 
Esienberg, 1984).  Further, executive remuneration practices can be justified with multiple 
remuneration principles (see Chapters 6 and 7).  This may enable believers in either Corporate 
Logic or Investor Logic to rationalise any remuneration decision.   
 
Another possibility is that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can co-exist because one or 
both Logics are symbolic, not substantive (Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995, 2004).  For instance, the level of remuneration can be manipulated by selecting a 
skewed comparator group and incentive payments can be manipulated by setting easy targets 
(e.g. see UK’s official reports: Greenbury, 1995; Trade and Industry Committee, 2003).  
Investor Logic would be symbolic if such manipulation occurred.  Some argue that this has 
occurred because the empirical evidence indicates a weak relationship between CEO pay and 
firm performance (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.5 and Chapter 3, Section 3.2).  However, a weak 
relationship can also be explained if Corporate Logic is substantive and Investor Logic is 
symbolic (this is consistent with the aforementioned NZ executive’s argument).  The reverse 
could also occur, where Investor Logic is substantive and Corporate Logic is symbolic.  For 
example, some companies used the human resources and market principles, but had a very 
strong emphasis on performance-based remuneration (e.g. CGU, UK, 1998 in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3.3).  Further, both Logics may be symbolic.  This is consistent with Bebchuk and 
Fried’s (2004) managerial power theory, where executives effectively set their own pay 
because the board of directors is selected by the CEO.  The symbolic and substantive nature 
of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is discussed further in Section 8.5. 
 
The only alternative Logic embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration is 
Stakeholder Logic (see Chapter 6; Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006).  Prior research indicates that 
Stakeholder Logic is most likely to be embedded in the discourse in Asian and European 
countries (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2).  Thus, it is not surprising that the present study 
indicate that Stakeholder Logic is symbolic because only Anglo-Saxon countries were 
studied.  For code issuers, shareholders’ interests are prioritised ahead of non-shareholder 
stakeholders’ interests (see Chapter 6).  For companies, non-shareholding stakeholders are 
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conceptualised as the means to the end of shareholder value.  For example, the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2007, p.59) stated, “The objective of the new [long-term 
incentive] plan is to motivate participants to increase profitability and customer satisfaction in 
order to improve long term shareholder value”.   This is consistent with a corporate objective 
of enlightened shareholder value maximisation (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004a).  Further, 
several AU and UK companies had mission statements consistent with stakeholder value 
maximisation, but their performance measures were profit- or market-based (e.g. earnings per 
shares, return on capital employed and total shareholder return).  Interestingly, Zajac and Fiss 
(2006) found some German companies decoupled their mission statements and practices.   
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 provided some insight into the distribution of beliefs among investors, 
employees, customers, and other stakeholders.  Shareholder value maximisation is both the 
recommended and practiced corporate objective in Anglo-American countries (see Chapters 6 
and 7; also, see Edmonds and Hand, 1976; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Hendry et al., 
2006; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Lok, 2010; Pye, 2000, 2001; Wen and Zhao, 2011; 
Witt and Redding, 2012).  Either Corporate Logic or Investor Logic may be legitimate in 
Anglo-American countries.  Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that the legitimacy of Investor 
Logic waxed while Corporate Logic waned among US investors in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  While investors’ beliefs were not directly examined, there was evidence of a 
strengthening of Investor Logic in AU, NZ and the UK from the early 1990s onwards.  The 
standard remuneration package for executives became increasingly complex with more 
incentive schemes, performance measures and targets adopted, although future research is 
required to ascertain the precise nature of these changes (see Chapter 6).  Further, NZ 
directors and executives commented on a change in NZ culture from egalitarian to 
meritocratic as well as an increasing adoption of incentive schemes and an increasing 
proportion of (potential) variable remuneration (see Chapter 7).  On the whole, while both 
Logics are embedded in the discourse, Investor Logic appears to be stronger than Corporate 
Logic (see Section 8.4.4). 
 
8.3. Origins and Diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
The origins of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have not been discussed thus far.  Zajac 
and Westphal (2004) argued that Investor Logic originated in the late 1970s.  Investor Logic 
became increasingly embedded in the discourse of US investors and regulators and companies 
in the 1980s.  They did not discuss the origins of Corporate Logic.  Further, they 
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conceptualised the process of diffusion as one-way.  Following poor economic growth in the 
1970s, US investors’ and regulators’ beliefs changed from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic, 
and then US companies conformed by adopting practices and espousing discourse that was 
consistent with Investor Logic (although some these practices were symbolic).  Following 
Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) method, the present study imply that AU, UK and, to a lesser 
extent, NZ companies also conformed to institutional pressure from code issuers and 
transitioned from no Logic to both Logics in the 1990s.  However, this interpretation assumes 
that public documents (e.g. corporate annual reports) are reflective of the beliefs that were 
held in society at the time.  This is problematic because companies did not disclose how 
remuneration decisions were made until the mid-1990s, but remuneration decisions were 
obviously made before then.  Therefore, the remainder of this section considers the origins of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic and then the process of diffusion and institutionalisation. 
 
8.3.1. Origins of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
With respect to remuneration, the core beliefs that are now called Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic have their origins in the emergence of the organisation, where employers hired 
employees.  Corporate Logic implies that employers can trust their employees to make 
decisions that they would make as long as they remunerate the employees comparably to their 
peers.  Investor Logic implies that employers cannot trust their employees to make decisions 
that they would make unless they use monitoring and incentives to control and direct their 
behaviour.  Thus, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic will both have emerged hundreds (if 
not thousands) of years ago with the first organisations.  As the first organisations emerged, 
there would have been a progression from sharing tasks in groups to a division of labour and 
then to managerial hierarchy and a separation of ownership and control.  Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic may have emerged at different stages during this progression.   
 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have no precise origins because ideas and language 
evolve over time.  However, the theoretical underpinnings of Investor Logic were developed 
at least by the time of the British Industrial Revolution in the mid-1700s.  Adam Smith (1776, 
p.936) briefly mentioned remunerating directors with a portion of the company’s profit as a 
means of controlling directors.  More substantively, John Stuart Mill (1848, p.157) observed: 
“[I]t is a common enough practice to connect [the managers of joint stock 
companies’] pecuniary interest with the interest of their employers, by giving 
them part of their remuneration in the form of a percentage of profits.”  
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By the early 1900s, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were entrenched in the academic and 
business discourse on executive remuneration.  An early exemplar of Investor Logic is 
Fredrick W. Taylor’s (1911) The Principles of Scientific Management with respect to his 
emphasis on using monitoring and incentives to control employees.  In contrast, an early 
exemplar of Corporate Logic is Chester I. Barnard’s (1938) The Functions of the Executive.  
Barnard (1938, p.143) wrote:  
“Notwithstanding the great emphasis upon material incentives in modern times… 
there is no doubt in my mind that unaided by other motives they constitute weak 
incentives beyond the level of bare physical necessities.”   
 
Further, Milkovich and Stevens’ (1999) findings are suggestive of US companies having a 
standard remuneration package since the early 1900s and that the underlying approach was 
based on the market and pay-for-performance principles (i.e. both Logics).  However, they 
also argue that there was a concern for vertical equity (or the fairness principles) from 1925 to 
1975.
177
  This is consistent with other writers’ arguments that Corporate Logic was strongest 
in that period (e.g. Boyer, 2005; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Adding weight to this argument 
is that the real value of CEO compensation in US companies barely rose from the 1950s to 
1970s (Frydman and Saks, 2010).  
 
Moreover, John C. Baker’s work on executive remuneration in the 1930s and 1940s 
illustrated that there were two types of companies: Those supportive of performance-based 
remuneration and others that believed incentives were not necessary.  Baker (1936, p.61) laid 
out the reasons for and against each approach and concluded that both approaches have merit: 
“At present more and more companies are adopting incentive payment plans for 
executives or reviving plans which were dormant during the depression. This 
study suggests that executive compensation, as far as it relates to salary and bonus 
plans, may follow two lines in the near future: (1) large cash salaries for senior (or 
“policy”) executives with no bonuses, or (2) cash salaries with moderate bonuses 
after dividends have been earned and paid to stockholders. By such arrangements, 
it is believed, the desirable mutuality of interests between owners and 
management would be best served.” 
 
This illustrates that the Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were competing, not co-existing 
in the discourse on executive remuneration.  However, Baker (1940, p.120-121) in later work 
                                                 
177
 A strengthening of Investor Logic from the late 1970s onwards, particularly in the UK and US, may have 
been triggered or spurred on by the socio-political changes at the time.  There was a shift from corporate 
capitalism to market capitalism with Thatcherism in the UK and Reaganomics in the US as well as a shift in 
macro-economic policies from Keynesian to monetarism in both the UK and the US (Englander and 
Kaufman, 2004; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Moran, 2006). 
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appeared to blend both Logics as, for example, he justified the use of executive share option 
plans using the human resources and agency principles. 
 
The origins of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic rest in the beliefs of long dead employers.  
It is likely that variants of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic emerged independently in 
different countries and at different times in history.  It is doubtful that the core beliefs of 
either Corporate Logic or Investor Logic were invented by any one individual and then 
diffused around the world.  However, there are still patterns of diffusion.  The history of 
executive remuneration is one of increasing complexity in the standard remuneration package, 
where additional incentive schemes, performance measures and methods of target-setting 
have been added over time (Milkovich and Stevens, 1999; Wells, 2011).  The history of the 
regulation of executive remuneration is one of additional disclosure requirements and 
shareholder rights following public outrage over abnormal payments to executives (Cheffins, 
2011; Murphy, 2011; Wells, 2011).  These changes are consistent with a strengthening of 
Investor Logic.  Further, Investor Logic has been diffused by high-profile (or large) 
companies, business schools, consultants, regulators and investors (Boyer, 2005; Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000; Spector and Spital, 2011; Williams, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  
It is less clear how Corporate Logic was diffused, but directors’ professional and personal 
networks may have been influential (Davis and Greve, 1997).  In any case, future research on 
the historical diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is needed. 
 
8.3.2. Diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in Recent Times 
Chapter 5 indicates that Investor Logic became stronger in AU, NZ and the UK from the late 
1980s to the late 2000s.  The sequencing of events in the UK has been as follows: First, a jolt 
(or legitimacy crisis) would occur, where the public would be outraged over a corporate 
scandal (e.g. rewards for failure) or a financial crisis (e.g. Dot-com Bubble) (see Appendix E, 
Section E.3).  Second, the Government, a regulator, a stock exchange, professional 
association or business association would launch an official inquiry into the causes of the jolt 
and possible solutions to prevent further jolts (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Solomon, 2007).  
They would call for public submissions and hear evidence from experts.  Then they would 
produce an official report and/or code.  Third, the Government would review the Companies 
Act and, possibly, issue new remuneration disclosure requirements or give shareholders 
further rights (e.g. non-binding vote on the remuneration report) (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.4).  This sequencing of events has repeated several times (see Appendix E, Section E.3).  
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Also, there has been a bandwagon effect with code production: As organisations produce 
codes, other organisations are encouraged to produce codes as well (see Appendix E, Section 
E.3).  Further, code issuers review and reissue their codes on a periodic basis (e.g. every two 
to four years) (see Appendix E, Section E.3).   
 
The sequencing of events in AU is comparable to that in the UK, except that there have been 
fewer official inquiries (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2 and Table 4.3).  In terms of executive 
remuneration, AU disclosure requirements and shareholder rights have exceeded those of the 
UK.  Both AU and UK companies are required to produce remuneration reports that 
shareholders vote to accept or reject at annual general meetings.  The results of the 
shareholders’ vote on the remuneration report were non-binding in the UK (UK’s The 
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002).178  In contrast, it changed in AU from 
non-binding in 2004 to binding in 2011 as directors are required to seek re-election if 25% or 
more of shareholders vote to reject the remuneration report in two consecutive years (AU’s 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 
2004; Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Bill 2011).  The change in AU was recommended by the AU Government’s 
Productivity Commission’s (2009) inquiry on Executive Remuneration in Australia.  As with 
many AU and UK official inquires and new codes, the Productivity Commission (2009, p.iv) 
inquiry was motivated by a jolt: “Concerns have been raised over excessive remuneration 
practices, particularly as we face almost unprecedented turmoil in global financial and equity 
markets.”  Finally, there are several AU organisations that produce codes and these code 
issuers regularly review their codes (see Appendix E, Section E.3). 
 
The sequencing of events in NZ is different to those in AU and the UK.  There have been 
fewer jolts concerning the corporate governance of NZ listed companies, and consequently, 
fewer official inquiries and new codes.  International jolts have motivated NZ code issuers, 
particularly the Dot-com Bubble (exemplified by the Arthur Andersen and Enron scandal) and 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s (2003) code.  Notably, most NZ codes were 
produced between 2003 and 2005 (see Chapter 4, Table 4.3).  Further, remuneration 
disclosure requirements have not changed since the Companies Act 1993 required companies 
to disclose how many employees are paid over $100,000 (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2).  
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 However, the UK Government has recently proposed to further increase shareholders’ rights and introduce a 
binding vote on the remuneration report (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012). 
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However, NZ directors, executives, consultants and code issuers believe that NZ companies 
are influenced by international trends, particularly the shift from mainly fixed remuneration to 
mainly variable remuneration for executives (see Chapter 7).  This explains why the incidence 
of remuneration principles in NZ corporate annual reports is much lower than in AU and UK 
corporate annual reports, but is still increasing over time (see Chapter 5).  Also, it explains 
why NZ companies use the standard remuneration package for executives (see Chapter 6). 
 
The strengthening of Investor Logic in AU, NZ and the UK between the late 1980s and late 
2000s appears to be consistent with Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) argument that there has been 
a change in beliefs among investors and regulators and this resulted in companies changing 
their beliefs and practices.  Similarly, Point and Tyson (2006) found that companies’ 
disclosure is copied from codes.  Findings in Chapters 5 and 6 are also supportive of 
companies’ disclosure being copied from codes.  However, companies “are constituted as 
active players, not passive pawns” (Scott, 2008, p.178).  Prior to the aforementioned changes, 
the beliefs of some directors and executives would have been consistent with Investor Logic 
and they may have seen these jolts as an opportunity to have their beliefs taken more seriously 
in society.  Further, code issuers and companies are not independent bodies.  Directors of 
companies are members of professional associations, which lobby code issuers, and are 
members of code issuers (see Appendix E, Section E.2; Jones and Pollitt, 2004).  Therefore, 
the strengthening of Investor Logic is likely to have resulted from a political negotiation 
between all parties in society, where directors and investors have had the most influence.  
 
An alternative explanation for the strengthening of Investor Logic is that this change has been 
by and large symbolic (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Business is likely to defend itself and 
the status quo following a legitimacy crisis (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Oliver, 1991).  After 
all, directors and their advisors have been heavily involved in producing codes and, probably, 
making submission to code issuers as well (see Appendix E, Section E.2).  For example, the 
UK’s Greenbury (1995) committee was established by the Confederation of British Industry 
(a business association) and its members included 7 directors, 1 executive, 1 representative 
from a directors’ association, 1 stockbroker and 1 representative from an investors’ 
association.  The Greenbury committee received advice from 5 remuneration consultants and 
submissions from 89 individuals and organisations.  Notably, 63 (71%) submissions were 
from directors and executives.  Further, all of the UK’s official inquiries were chaired by 
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experienced directors of listed companies.
179
  Similarly, the Australian Stock Exchange’s 
Corporate Governance Council is comprised of 20 entities including representatives of 
business, investors and the professions.  Further, NZ’s Securities Commission’s (2004a, 
pp.37-39) official inquiry received submissions from mainly directors and executives.  
However, further research is required to ascertain the extent to which directors, investors and 
others have influenced the production of official reports and codes. 
 
8.4. An Institutional Logics Perspective on Remuneration Decision-Making 
The remuneration committee has to make three decisions: How and how much to remunerate 
executives and how to report these decisions.  Socio-political forces influence how these 
decisions are made because the remuneration committee has to reconcile the different beliefs 
of influential parties from inside the company (its members and executives) and from outside 
(investors, consultants, regulators and others) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5; Chapter 7).  The 
remuneration committee and influential parties use remuneration principles to justify their 
recommendations on what decisions should be made (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  Further, while 
the remuneration committee and influential parties perceive their recommendations to be 
rational, their recommendations are only rational to those who share their beliefs.  Put 
differently, believers in Corporate Logic will be perplexed by the insistence of believers in 
Investor Logic on using performance-based remuneration; whereas believers in Investor 
Logic will perceive believers in Corporate Logic as greedy and opportunistic as they 
emphasise the competitiveness of remuneration (see Chapter 7).  As the distribution of belief 
in Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic is not one-sided, remuneration decision-making is 
analogous to a political negotiation and remuneration decisions represent compromises and 
temporary truces.  This process of remuneration decision-making is discussed in greater detail 
next. 
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 In the UK, the official inquiries have been chaired by experienced directors of listed companies. These 
include: the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1991-1992), chaired by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury and established by the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession; A Study 
Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (1995), chaired by Sir Richard (Executive Chairman, Marks and 
Spencer) and established by the Confederation of British Industry (an association of business that is 
controlled by senior executives); Committee on Corporate Governance (1995-1998), chaired by Ronnie 
Hampel (Chairman, Imperial Chemical Industries) and established by the Financial Reporting Council; Non-
executive Directors Review (2002-2003), chaired by Derek Higgs (Director, British Land) and established by 
the UK Government; and The Walker Review (2009), chaired by Sir David Walker (Vice Chairman, Legal 
and General Group) and established by the UK Prime Minister. 
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8.4.1. Competitive and Institutional Pressures 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that there are competitive, coercive, normative and 
mimetic pressures that compel organisations to become increasingly similar over time.  Prior 
qualitative research on remuneration committees (e.g. Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 
2008) and Chapters 5, 6 and 7 indicate that there has been both an isomorphism of discourse 
and practice.  There is a standard remuneration package for executives, justified with multiple 
remuneration principles, which is recommended by most code issuers and practiced by most 
companies (see Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7).  However, while remuneration committees are 
influenced by these pressures, they are also capable of responding to them (Hermanson et al., 
2011; Main et al., 2008).  Next, how these pressures influence remuneration committees and 
how they respond is considered.   
 
Competitive pressure in the forms of the stock market, the market for corporate control and 
the managerial labour market influence remuneration committees.  First, the stock market 
influences how remuneration committees design their long-term incentive schemes because 
they believe that shareholder value maximisation is the corporate objective and share prices 
tell them how well they are achieving that corporate objective (see Chapter 7; Hermanson et 
al., 2011; Lok, 2010).  Analysts and the media, as information suppliers to the stock market, 
also influence remuneration committees (see Chapter 7; Hermanson et al., 2011).  As shown 
in Chapter 7, some NZ directors are deeply concerned that their remuneration decisions are 
perceived as legitimate by the stock market, whereas others believe that investors should sell 
their shares if investors think that executives are overpaid.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, 
NZ directors believed that investors should not impinge on their professional autonomy to 
made remuneration decisions.  Consistent with Investor Logic, NZ executives felt pressured 
by the stock market to meet earnings targets in the short-term.  This is consistent with Pepper 
et al.’s (2012) findings that long-term incentive schemes are not effective because UK 
executives heavily discount the future.  Counterbalancing this short-term focus, NZ directors 
are acutely focused on long-term shareholder value. 
 
Second, the market for corporate control may influence the time horizon of remuneration 
committees.  Dalton et al. (2007, p.33) note that “the primary legacy of the market for 
corporate control is, perhaps, executives’ focused emphasis on increasing firms’ stock 
price…”  Prior qualitative research and the present study  have not examined the influence of 
the market of corporate control on remuneration committees.  However, Chapter 6’s findings 
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are suggestive of a shortening of the vesting period of long-term incentives from 5-10 years in 
the late 1980s to early 1990s to 3-5 years in the late 2000s.  Similarly, NZ directors and 
executives believed that the long-term is 3-5 years (not reported in Chapter 7).  However, a 
vesting period of 3 years may have become the norm in the UK in the 1980s because of 
normative pressure from UK’s Association for British Insurers and due to tax rules on 
executive share option schemes (Bender, 2004).  Further research is required to ascertain if 
remuneration committees have reduced the length of the vesting period as their belief in 
Investor Logic has strengthened. 
 
Third, the managerial labour market has a strong influence on remuneration committees.  
After all, the human resources and market principles are widely diffused (see Chapter 5). 
Directors believe that if executive remuneration is not competitive (i.e. at the median or above 
relative to a comparator group), then they will experience difficulty recruiting and retaining 
talented executives (see Chapters 6 and 7; Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2011; Ogden and 
Watson, 2011).  Empirical evidence indicates that executives are paid comparably to their 
peers (Ezzamel and Watson, 2002; Fulmer, 2009).  However, the managerial labour market 
may not be efficient because executives do not regularly change jobs.  Directors have 
recognised that the managerial labour market is not efficient (Greenbury, 1995; Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005).  Moreover, competitive pressure from the managerial labour market exerted 
on remuneration committees may be a myth.  Directors have rarely reported any actual 
recruitment and retention problems, but they do believe that they will experience problems if 
executive remuneration is not competitive (see Chapter 7; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  In this 
respect, the managerial labour market may be a normative pressure, not a competitive 
pressure because belief in the human resources and market principles has become a 
rationalised myth. 
 
Coercive pressure appears to influence how companies report remuneration decisions in their 
annual reports.  In an exploratory study of 23 European companies, Point and Tyson (2006) 
showed that the phraseology of companies’ remuneration policies was copied from codes.  
They concluded that codes exert pressure on companies.  Chapter 5’s findings are supportive 
of this argument.  However, it may be that code issuers’ recommendations came from 
companies.  This is quite likely as directors are members of code issuers and make 
submissions to code issuers (see Section 8.3).  Further, prior qualitative research on 
remuneration committees, that has had an institutional theory lens, has not found coercive 
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pressure to be strong (Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008).  However, it may be that 
prior research has not explicitly studied how codes influence remuneration committees.  
Nonetheless, codes may be indirectly influential.  For example, Lok (2010) found that UK 
institutional investors were concerned if companies did not comply with the UK’s Combined 
Code, particularly if firm performance was declining.  On the other hand, NZ directors do not 
believe that regulators and code issuers have a significant influence on how they made 
remuneration decisions (see Chapter 7).  On the whole, coercive pressure only influences how 
much companies have to disclose on executive remuneration, not how remuneration 
committees make remuneration decisions. 
 
Normative pressure influences how remuneration committees make decisions in a general 
sense.  Remuneration committees want to make decisions that are perceived by investors and 
the media as normal, not abnormal (see Chapter 7, Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; 
Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  Norms are formed and diffused through codes, consultants’ 
networks, directors’ (personal and professional) networks and other professional networks 
(e.g. accountants and lawyers).  Codes may reinforce existing norms, but they do not appear 
to change existing norms because their recommendations are principles-based and non-
specific (see Chapters 6 and 7; Ogden and Watson, 2008).  Consultants are influential, but 
reinforce existing norms because their data and advice is based on what most companies are 
doing (see Chapter 7; Bender, 2011; Hermanson, et al., 2011).  Certainly, consultants 
reinforce the human resources and market principles (see Chapter 7; Ogden and Watson, 
2011).
180
  Directors’ networks are also influential because directors use their networks to 
check that their decisions are consistent with the beliefs and decisions of other directors (see 
Chapter 7; Hermanson et al., 2011).
181
  It may be that norms within the professions influence 
what performance measures are selected (e.g. accountants as advisors) and how employment 
contracts are structured (e.g. lawyers as advisors), although prior research and the present 
study provides no evidence of such an influence. 
 
Mimetic pressure influences how remuneration committees make and report decisions 
because of the homogeneity in the processes they follow to make decisions, the decisions they 
                                                 
180
 One NZ consultant believed that there are norms (and beliefs and values) embedded in the methods (e.g. job 
evaluation systems) that consultants use.  There is scant research on the use of job evaluation systems.  
Specifically, there is no research on how job evaluation systems influence the structure and level of executive 
remuneration.  This is an opportunity for future research. 
181
 In this respective, the directors’ network is also a form of mimetic pressure. 
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make and the remuneration disclosure produced (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7; Bender, 2011; 
Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; Point and Tyson, 2006).  The case for mimetic 
pressure is strengthened by the wide diffusion of the human resources and market principles 
(see Chapter 5).  NZ directors confirmed that they are influenced by their competitors’ 
remuneration decisions (see Chapter 7).  Also, remuneration consultants are a likely source of 
mimetic pressure (see Chapter 7; Bender, 2011).  However, this contradicts Ogden and 
Watson (2008), who found no evidence of mimetic pressure influence on how remuneration 
committees designed long-term incentive schemes.  Further, Main et al. (2008) pointed out 
that it is near-impossible to distinguish between mimetic pressure and social learning.  From 
the NZ directors’ perspective, making and reporting remuneration decisions is part imitation 
and part learning (see Chapter 7).  Learning occurs as NZ directors would collect intelligence 
on their competitors, evaluate the information and then adopt those practices that are 
perceived to be beneficial and modify those practices if necessary (not reported in Chapter 7). 
 
Competitive and institutional pressures influence how remuneration committees make and 
report remuneration decisions to varying degrees (see above).  However, the extent to which 
each party behind these pressures (e.g. consultants, investors, media, etc) have beliefs that are 
consistent with Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic is not known.  Investors’ beliefs are 
probably consistent with Investor Logic (Hendry et al., 2006; Lok, 2010), although retail 
investors (mums and dads) may be more trusting of executives (Corporate Logic) and ethical 
investors, according to Solomon (2007), want executives to maximise stakeholder value 
(Stakeholder Logic or Political Logic).  Similarly, there may be a range of beliefs held in the 
media because the media focuses on relationships between CEO pay and firm performance 
and CEO pay and the average wage for employees (see Chapter 7; Lok, 2010).  Consultants 
may (appear to) believe in both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic because they want to sell 
data on the market rate to companies and sell advice to companies on how to design their 
incentive schemes (see Chapter 7; Bender, 2011; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  Therefore, 
future research is required to understand the distribution of beliefs among these parties and 
the relative strength of the different pressures.  
 
8.4.2. Making Remuneration Decisions 
At the organisational level, the process by which remuneration committees make decisions is 
driven by the desire to maximise shareholder value both in the near and distant future (i.e. 
efficiency), as well as the desire to have their decisions perceived to be legitimate by 
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shareholders, executives, other directors and, to a lesser extent, non-shareholding stakeholders 
(i.e. legitimacy).  Competitive and institutional pressures influence what is perceived as 
efficient and legitimate because people’s beliefs (or preferences) are embedded, not 
autonomous (Cyert and March, 1992; March and Simon, 1993).  However, there is a 
distribution of beliefs.  Within this process, there is a tension between efficiency and 
legitimacy because directors and others have different beliefs about what is efficient.  Put 
differently, believers in Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have different perceptions of 
what is the appropriate means to achieve shareholder value maximisation (see Chapters 3, 6 
and 7).  Further, remuneration committees cannot resolve these tensions because 
institutionalised beliefs are not easily changed and due to their human limitations.  In terms of 
the latter, Main et al. (2008, p.234) observe:  
“It is necessary, therefore, to recognize the remuneration committee’s cognitive 
limitations in the face of finite information, bounded computational capacity and 
restricted time constraints.” 
 
At the organisational field level, the tensions have been resolved.
182
  There is a standard 
remuneration package for executives (see Chapters 3 and 6).  Both Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic can co-exist in the discourse on executive remuneration because almost all 
executive remuneration practices can be justified with either Corporate Logic or Investor 
Logic.  Believers in Corporate Logic are satisfied with executives receiving short- and long-
term incentives because they perceive these incentives to be necessary to attract and retain 
talented executives and to pay executives at the market rate (see Chapter 7; Ogden and 
Watson, 2011).  Believers in Investor Logic are satisfied with executives receiving short- and 
long-term incentives because they perceive these incentives to be necessary to motivate (i.e. 
control and direct) executives and align executives’ interests with those of shareholders. 
Further, while public outrage over rewards for failure, corporate scandals and financial crises 
have resulted in increased remuneration disclosure requirements and shareholder rights, it has 
not altered the process by which executive remuneration is determined (see Section 8.3).  If 
anything, public outrage has resulted in the entrenchment of the remuneration principles, the 
standard remuneration package and the process for determining remuneration (e.g. use of 
consultants and imitating competitors). 
 
                                                 
182
 An organisational field includes a group of organisations (e.g. listed companies) and parties that are interested 
in the affairs of one or more organisations in the group (e.g. customers, investors, regulators, suppliers, etc) 
(Scott, 2008). 
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However, one question remains: Why is there limited substantive variation in executive 
remuneration practices that companies adopt?  Put differently, why is there a standard 
remuneration package, when directors and others have a range of beliefs?  These questions 
have been partially addressed in the preceding discussion.  Competitive and institutional 
pressures compel remuneration committees to follow the same processes and make 
comparable decisions.  There are several other reasons.  First, remuneration decisions are path 
dependent, i.e. directors do not revisit prior decisions (Main et al., 2008).  As new incentive 
schemes are ‘invented’, they are added to existing incentive schemes.183  This has contributed 
to the standard remuneration package becoming more complex over time.  However, this has 
been a case of change in form, not substance because there are few companies that do not use 
performance-based remuneration (see Chapter 6).   
 
Second, confirmation bias may result in directors and others erroneously validating their 
beliefs.  Confirmation bias occurs when people accept facts that support their beliefs, while 
dismissing facts that do not support their beliefs (for a review see Nickerson, 1998).  
Directors who believe in Investor Logic may dismiss cases where performance-based 
remuneration does not work due to poor design or uncontrollable factors (e.g. Global 
Financial Crisis).  For example, one NZ director commented, “[M]ost [researchers]… are 
pretty agnostic about the benefit of remuneration at-risk. In spite of that, most companies do 
it. In spite of that, I’m keen on it. And the reason is it is very plausible.”184  Similarly, 
directors who believe in Corporate Logic may attribute recruitment and retention problems to 
an uncompetitive remuneration package, rather than other aspects of the job or the company.  
The challenge of the job was a significant motivator for most NZ executives (see Chapter 7).  
Further, while some recruitment problems related to the level of remuneration, most NZ 
directors did not believe that recruitment and retention due to uncompetitive remuneration 
was a significant problem (see Chapter 7).  Further research on how confirmation bias affects 
remuneration committees’ decision making is required.   
 
                                                 
183
 Chapter 6 shows that the executive remuneration practices have become more complex over time.  However, 
Chapter 6’s findings are qualitative, not quantitative.  Further quantitative research is required to validate this 
inference.  For example, Greenbury (1995) criticised executive share option schemes and encouraged 
companies to consider adopting restricted share schemes that are conditional on meeting targets.  An 
interesting question is: Did companies replace their executive share option schemes with restricted share 
schemes or did they simply add restricted share schemes? 
184
 Quotes from interviewees are presented in italics. 
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Third and most importantly, the institutional identities of the non-executive director, the board 
and the remuneration committee constrain directors’ abilities to make remuneration decisions 
that do not fit with these identities.  Lok (2010, p.1308) argues, “institutional logics not only 
direct what social actors want (interests) and how they are to proceed (guidelines for action), 
but also who or what they are (identity).”  However, institutional identity as a concept has 
rarely been studied in prior research on corporate governance (cf. Lok, 2010).
185
  Belief in 
shareholder value maximisation and performance-based remuneration is all but required for 
the non-executive director (see Chapter 7; Lok, 2010; Pye, 2000).  Also, codes portray the 
non-executive director as both a ‘judge’ and ‘problem-solver’ (not reported in Chapter 6).  
For example, the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (2006, p.3) states, “…non-executive 
directors should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy… [and] 
scrutinise the performance of management…”  As a problem-solver, the remuneration 
committee has a limited toolkit (e.g. short- and long-term incentive schemes).  Even if the 
remuneration committee does not believe that performance-based remuneration will alter 
executive behaviour, their institutional identity requires that they use it.  Further, rejecting 
performance-based remuneration is akin to the remuneration committee rejecting its identity 
and ability to solve problems.  Further research is required to generate additional insight into 
how institutional identities constrain and enable directors, executives and others.  As Lok 
(2010) notes, executives can manage (or rework) their identities.  Directors may also be able 
to manage their identities (e.g. justifying incentive schemes using the human resources 
principle). 
 
8.4.3. Reporting Remuneration Decisions 
Corporate annual reports are prepared by directors, executives, other employees and, possibly, 
public relations consultants (see Chapter 7; Milner, 2009).  Prior qualitative research on 
remuneration committees has not investigated how remuneration disclosure decisions are 
                                                 
185
 Prior research on corporate governance that has drawn on institutional theory has taken a macro perspective 
by studying how institutional pressures influence remuneration committees (e.g. Main et al., 2008).  
However, a micro perspective can inform whether institutional identities are imposed upon individuals when 
they work in organisations (Glynn, 2008; Lok, 2010).  Further, the concept of institutional identity is 
comparable to Cyert and March’s (1992) logic of appropriateness or March and Simon’s (1993) rule-based 
action.  Cyert and March (1992, p.231) explain how the logic of appropriateness (or an institutional identity) 
can constrain decision-making: “[A] decision maker asks: (1) What kind of situation is this? (2) What kind of 
person am I? (3) What is appropriate for a person such as I in a situation such as this? Such rule-following is 
neither wilful nor consequential in the normal sense. It does not stem from the pursuit of interests and the 
calculation of future consequences of current choices. Rather, it comes from matching a changing (and often 
ambiguous) set of contingent rules to a changing (and often ambiguous) set of situations.” 
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made.
186
  Nevertheless, Chapter 7 showed that NZ directors and executives portrayed the 
reporting of remuneration decisions as an accounting of the facts (except for one executive, 
see Chapter 7, Section 7.6.8).  That is, remuneration disclosure is believed to be incremental 
information, not impression management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007).  However, they 
could still manage their remuneration disclosure by choosing to disclose the minimum or 
greater than the minimum.  Most believed that minimum disclosure was sufficient.  There are 
many reasons why companies may choose to disclose the minimum.  Most significantly, this 
is a least cost and easiest choice.  From an institutional logics perspective, companies may 
choose to report the minimum because their culture does not fit with their societal 
expectations.  In other words, the legitimate institutional logic in society may differ from the 
institutional logic embedded in any given company.  Disclosing the minimum may enable 
companies to hide the fact that their culture does not fit.  However, further research is 
required to investigate this possibility. 
 
Remuneration disclosures are part-factual and part-rhetorical.  In particular, Chapter 6 showed 
that the remuneration principles are truisms that cannot be easily refuted.  It is unlikely that 
investors, regulators and others will argue that companies should not attract and retain 
talented executives or that companies should not remunerate executives for their individual 
contributions to firm performance.  This is illustrated in the National Australia Bank’s (AU, 
1998, p.72) remuneration policy for senior executives: 
“The Company operates in a variety of different countries… in which we are 
competing for top executive talent. Senior executives have a direct impact on the 
performance of the company and its future prospects and the Board believes it is 
imperative that remuneration levels are set to be among the leaders of major 
corporations… to ensure that the bank is able to attract and retain the best 
available executive talent.” 
 
Arguing against the remuneration principles would constitute a rejection of the institutional 
identities of directors and executives as ‘problem-solvers’, who are capable of maximising 
shareholder value.  This is unlikely given that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have 
become the institutionalised discourse on executive remuneration (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7; 
Green et al., 2008; Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
                                                 
186
 Note that NZ mandatory disclosure requirements are minimal relative to AU or the UK.  Hence, NZ directors 
and executives did not have much to say about how remuneration disclosures were prepared.  Much of their 
comments focused how the accuracy of the numbers was validated. 
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8.4.4. Implications for Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
With respect to Australia’s and the UK’s remuneration regulations, one NZ director believed 
that, “[M]aybe the whole thing is going mad a bit…”  From an institutional logics perspective, 
the standard remuneration package for executives and the process of making remuneration 
decisions also appears to be mad or insane.  Corporate Logic implies that boards (and 
remuneration committees) should hire executives that are stewards, pay them competitively 
and then replace them if their performance is below expectations.  For believers in Investor 
Logic (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2005), such an approach is mad because 
they believe that executives and employees are opportunistic and extrinsically motivated.  
However, Williams (1923) long ago pointed out that people with these beliefs often do not 
believe that it applies to them.  Empirical evidence from the management and psychology 
literature indicates that people behave like agents and stewards as well as in other ways (Frey 
and Osterloh, 2002; Furnham, 2005; Hernandez, 2012).  For example, in experimental 
research, Fong and Tosi (2007) found that irrespective of whether monetary incentives were 
offered in a task, high conscientiousness participants exhibited very high levels of effort and 
task performance.  Therefore, boards should focus their efforts on identifying executives that 
are stewards or exhibit high conscientiousness, rather than hiring charismatic but narcissistic 
executives (Khurana, 2002). 
 
On the other hand, Investor Logic implies that boards (and remuneration committees) should 
hire executives and only pay them grandly if firm performance improves.  The standard 
remuneration package for executives appears to be consistent with Investor Logic.  However, 
it is not because of the underlying but unreasonable assumption that executives are capable of 
choosing the course of action that will maximise their short- and long-term incentive 
payments.  The rationality of executives is bounded (March and Simon, 1993).  For example, 
the UK’s CGU (1998) had two short-term incentive schemes and four long-term incentives 
schemes, which presented executives with an incredibly complex optimisation problem (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3).  Faced with such complexity, executives are likely to heavily 
discount the value of long-term incentives and focus on the short-term (Pepper et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the standard remuneration package should be simplified.  Base salaries plus a 
portion of profit is sufficient (Mill, 1848; Smith, 1776) as long as directors, who are 
independent, monitor executives diligently and the company’s accounts are audited.  
Chapter 8: Discussion 
307 
Directors can simply replace executives if they focus too heavily on the short-term at the 
expense of the long-term.
187
 
 
In 2007, no large listed companies in AU, NZ and the UK had executive remuneration 
practices that were as simple as described above (see Chapter 6).  The standard remuneration 
package and the processes that reproduce it are engrained in the thinking of directors and 
executives (see Chapter 7; Bender, 2004, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2011; Main et al., 2008; 
Ogden and Watson, 2011).  They cannot conceive of any alternatives.  This illustrates that 
there is a distribution of beliefs within and between companies and other parties (e.g. code 
issuers), but those beliefs are consistent with Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Further, 
the resulting complexity is a product of political negotiations between directors, executives, 
investors and others as well as institutional pressures, institutional identities and path 
dependence (see discussed above).  While Investor Logic appears to be stronger than 
Corporate Logic, Corporate Logic may be stronger because the outcome of this complexity 
may be executives being paid comparably to their peers irrespective of firm performance (see 
Chapter 7; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  However, a definitive conclusion is not possible 
because the distribution of beliefs among directors, executives, investors and others is not 
known.  Further research on the distribution of beliefs is required to gain additional insight 
into the process of remuneration decision-making.  
 
8.5. Institutional Positions 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can be substantive or symbolic in that an organisation’s 
public discourse may be coupled or decoupled from their private discourse (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).
188
  An organisation is most likely to decouple its public discourse from its 
private discourse when its culture or collective belief-set does not fit with societal 
expectations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2008).  This means an organisation’s 
conformance to societal expectations is symbolic, not substantive.  An organisation may 
                                                 
187
 This assumes that the labour market for non-executive directors is efficient and that the appointment of non-
executive directors is controlled by shareholders, not executives (Fama, 1980; cf. Bebhuk and Fried, 2004).  
It also assumes that the tenure of non-executives directors is longer than that of executives.  The 
reasonableness of these assumptions can be easily criticised because of the perennial problem of ‘who 
watches the watcher?’  Any additional monitoring and incentive mechanisms that are introduced may resolve 
one problem, but will undoubtedly create other problems.  Long ago, McGregor (1960, p.9) argued that, “the 
ingenuity of the average worker is sufficient to outwit any system of controls devised by management.”  This 
equally applies to the shareholder-director and director-executive relationships.  There is no one best 
solution. 
188
 Private discourse is hidden from public view.  For example, board meetings are closed to the general public 
(including shareholders). 
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choose symbolic conformance, rather than opposing societal expectations because the latter 
may result in the organisation being sanctioned or punished (Scott, 2008).  The present study 
did not investigate substantive and symbolic conformance in any depth, but Chapters 6 and 7 
did reveal possible cases of symbolic conformance.  As argued in Section 8.4, directors may 
use short- and long-term incentive schemes to increase the level of executive remuneration 
(substantive), while appearing to satisfy investors’ desires for executive remuneration to be 
sensitive to firm performance (symbolic).  This section considers the legitimacy of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic as well as how and why companies may use symbolic conformance 
to appear legitimate.   
 
An institutional logic may be embedded in an organisation’s public and private discourse 
(substantive conformance) or only embedded in an organisation’s public discourse (symbolic 
conformance).  Given that there are multiple institutional logics in any organisational field 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), an organisation’s discourse can be 
characterised as having one institutional logic that is substantive and another that is symbolic.  
This is called an organisation’s institutional position.189  Essentially, an institutional position 
describes the relationship between the public and private discourse of an organisation (e.g. 
code issuer, company, investor, etc), where substantive means coupled and symbolic means 
decoupled.  Any institutional position may be legitimate or illegitimate.  Typically, an 
organisation will engage in symbolic conformance to preserve its private discourse which it 
perceives as more efficient than the alternative discourse which has acquired more legitimacy 
in society (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Scott, 2008).  This implies that an organisation 
can respond strategically to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008; Suchman, 
1995).  However, an organisation may engage in symbolic conformance because there is no 
institutional logic embedded in its private discourse.  The internal dynamics of an 
organisation may be chaotic or political in nature, and symbolic conformance is deployed to 
hide the chaos or internal politics from public view.
190
      
 
                                                 
189
 An institutional position is original concept that has not been discussed in the literature on institutional 
theory. 
190
 Typically, neo-institutional sociologists conceptualise organisations (and organisational actors) as intentional 
(see Greenwood et al.’s, 2008, The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism).  That is, 
organisational action has purpose and meaning to those within and outside of the organisation.  
Organisational actors act as a collective, i.e. as an organisation, and organisations are motivated by either 
efficiency and/or legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008).  However, this is an 
oversimplification of organisational life because organisational decision-making can be chaotic (or lacking 
coherence and intentionality) or political in nature (Cohen et al., 1972; Miller et al., 1999). 
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Figure 8.1 outlines the nine possible institutional positions that an organisation can occupy 
which arise from Investor Logic and Corporate Logic being symbolic and/or substantive, or 
neither Logic being embedded in an organisation’s discourse.191  Positions 7, 8 and 9 imply 
that an organisation’s public and private discourse are tightly coupled.  Positions 4 and 6 
imply that an organisation’s culture does not fit with societal expectations, and either 
Corporate Logic or Investor Logic becomes symbolic in order to protect its legitimacy and 
preserve its private discourse.  Position 5 implies that an organisation has no culture, where 
decision-making may be highly chaotic or political in nature.  This position may be 
maintained if there is no institutional logic that is legitimate in society.  Positions 1, 2 and 3 
are comparable to Position 5, except there is a degree of intentionality because Corporate 
Logic and/or Investor Logic are symbolic.  As neither Corporate Logic nor Investor Logic is 
substantive, the organisation may be attempting to deliberately mislead society.  Thus, 
positions 1, 2 and 3 are consistent with directors and executives acting in their self-interest at 
the expense of shareholders and others, i.e. excessive managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2004). 
 
Figure 8.1: Institutional Positions 
1. Investor Logic (symbolic) 
 
 
2. Investor Logic (symbolic) 
and 
Corporate Logic (symbolic) 
 
 
3. Corporate Logic (symbolic) 
     
4. Investor Logic (symbolic) 
and 
Corporate Logic (substantive) 
 
 
5. None 
 
 
6. Corporate Logic (symbolic) 
and 
Investor Logic (substantive) 
     
7. Corporate Logic 
(substantive) 
 
 
8. Corporate Logic (substantive) 
and 
Investor Logic (substantive) 
 
 
9. Investor Logic 
(substantive) 
 
Determining which institutional positions are legitimate or which institutional positions 
organisations occupy has not been studied.  However, some inferences can be made.  Given 
that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in most codes from AU, NZ, the 
UK and the US (see Chapter 5; Crombie et al., 2010), position 8 is legitimate.  However, 
                                                 
191
 There may be degrees of coupling or decoupling (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008).  This point is not 
discussed here.  However, it does imply that there is a continuum between each opposing pair of institutional 
positions (e.g. from position 1 to 3, from position 1 to 9, from position 1 to 7, etc).  
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competitive and institutional pressures compel companies to adopt Investor Logic (see 
Section 8.4; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  This implies that positions 6 and 9 are also 
legitimate.  Companies face sanctions if they do not appear to occupy positions 6, 8 and 9.  
Investors can sanction companies by suppressing their share prices, not re-electing their 
directors or voting against remuneration reports.  Regulators and some code issuers (e.g. stock 
exchanges) can sanction companies by fining or delisting companies that do not comply with 
laws or codes.  However, companies may be able to defend against these sanctions.  For 
example, Conyon and Sadler (2010) found that UK companies did not alter the level or design 
of the CEO’s remuneration package after a significant portion of shareholders had voted 
against the remuneration report.  Similarly, Arcot et al. (2010) found that UK companies 
explanations for non-compliance with the Combined Code to be lacking substance.   
 
Chapter 5 shows that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are legitimate discourses.  
However, given that Corporate Logic only is not embedded in any codes and almost any 
corporate annual reports, Corporate Logic may only be legitimate if it is joined with Investor 
Logic (see Chapter 5, Tables 5.3 and 5.9).  Therefore, companies can occupy positions 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 8 and 9, but companies that occupy positions 1, 2, 3, 4 risk being sanctioned if society 
(e.g. investors, regulators and code issuers) discovers that Investor Logic is symbolic.  Indeed, 
AU, NZ and UK companies have occupied a range of institutional positions (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3).  Further, positions 5 and 7 appear to be illegitimate because performance-based 
remuneration is an institutionalised part of the standard remuneration package for executives 
(see Chapters 3 and 6).  As shown in Chapter 7, most NZ directors and executives cannot 
perceive of alternative executive remuneration practices.  Also, one NZ director suggested 
that he was excluded from joining remuneration committees because his beliefs were different 
to most other directors (i.e. he did not believe that performance-based remuneration was 
necessary). 
 
Included in Chapter 6 are two examples of changing institutional positions.  First, Associated 
British Foods (UK, 1998, 2007) transitioned from position 7 to 8.  In 2000, it adopted 
performance-based remuneration despite having an organisational culture that was consistent 
with executives as stewards.  However, it may have transitioned from position 7 to 5, if the 
remuneration committee intends to pay executives at the market rate irrespective of firm 
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192
  Second, Brierley Investments (NZ) transitioned from either position 1 or 7 to 
9.  Prior to 1998, Brierley Investments had become a conglomerate, focused on maximising 
dividends to shareholders (position 7).  However, the former CEO’s high severance payment 
and the chairman’s statement were indicative of managerial entrenchment and opportunism 
prior to 1998 (position 1).
193
  The transition to position 9 was apparent because Investor Logic 
only was deeply embedded in the chairman’s statement.  As a postscript, Brierley Investments 
may have further transitioned to position 4 or 7.  By 2002, the major shareholder had taken 
control of the company, renaming it to BIL Investments and appointing himself executive 
chairman. Further, comparing BIL Investment’s 2003 and 2004 remuneration policies reveals 
that pay-for-performance principle was dropped while the human resources and market 
principles remained.
194
  
 
As aforementioned, companies risk being sanctioned if society discovers that their discourse 
is symbolic.  The sanctions may be particularly acute if companies are discovered to occupy 
positions 1, 2 or 3.  While no instances of corporate malfeasance were documented in the 
present study, the case of Enron and its collapse is an example of a company occupying 
position 1 and then being revealed as such.
195
  Essentially, Investor Logic was embedded in 
Enron’s discourse, but its discourse was symbolic because executives acted opportunistically 
and at the expense of shareholders, employees and others (McLean and Elkind, 2003; 
Rapoport and Dharan, 2004).   
 
                                                 
192
 This statement should be qualified.  Corporate Logic does not imply that incompetent or opportunistic 
executives should be paid at the market rate despite a persistent decline in firm performance.  Instead, 
Corporate Logic implies that when firm performance is declining, executives will still be paid at the market 
rate as long as they are deemed competent and acting in the best interests of the company and its 
shareholders. Executives will be replaced if they are not. 
193
 In 1997, Paul Collins, CEO of BIL, received NZ$1.3 million in remuneration.  Following his dismissal in 
1998, he received NZ$5.4 million in remuneration.  Thus, his severance payment was approximately NZ$4 
million, which is one of the highest in NZ corporate history (Fox, 12 July 2003).  This severance payment is 
questionable given that under Collins’ leadership BIL’s share price declined dramatically. 
194
 BIL Investments’ (NZ, 2003, p.59) remuneration policy was as follows: “In reviewing and determining the 
remuneration packages of the Chief Executive Officer and the senior executives, the Committee considers 
their responsibilities, skills, expertise and contribution to the Group’s performance and whether such 
remuneration is competitive and sufficient to ensure that the Group is able to attract and retain executive 
talent. The Company advocates a performance-based remuneration system that is flexible and responsive to 
the market, Group’s and individual employee’s performance.”  The last sentence of this remuneration policy 
was removed from the 2004 remuneration policy (BIL Investments, NZ, 2004, p.59).  Thus, the pay-for-
performance principle was deemphasised.  
195
 Note: Position 1 indicates that a company is portraying to society that it is occupying position 9. 
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Enron’s (2000, p.13) executive remuneration policy was similar to those of other companies 
in the sample of the present study, although it had a stronger emphasis on the pay-for-
performance principle (Investor Logic) than others:  
“The basic philosophy behind executive compensation at Enron is to reward 
executive performance that creates long-term shareholder value. This pay-for-
performance tenet is embedded in each aspect of an executive’s total 
compensation package… In order to assure that an executive’s compensation is 
tied to performance, more dollars of total compensation are placed at risk, tied to 
Enron absolute performance and performance relative to the S&P 500 group of 
companies.” 
 
Enron’s financial and narrative reporting was fictitious and ideological to say the least (Craig 
and Amernic, 2004; Rapoport and Dharan, 2004).  Also, its organisational culture has been 
characterised as totalitarian and cult-like (Tourish and Vatcha, 2005).  It appears that Enron’s 
remuneration policies and practices are consistent with Investor Logic, yet they enabled 
executives to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.  For instance, “[Lou] Pai [a 
senior executive]… sold over $250 million worth of Enron stock – more than anybody else at 
the company” (McLean and Elkind, 2003, p.334).   
 
Further, The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, United States Senate (2002, p.3) investigated The Role of the Board of Directors in 
Enron’s Collapse and concluded: 
“The Enron Board of Directors approved excessive compensation for company 
executives, failed to monitor the cumulative cash drain caused by Enron’s 2000 
annual bonus and performance unit plans, and failed to monitor or halt abuse by 
Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay of a company-
financed, multi-million dollar, personal credit line.” 
 
The bankruptcy of Enron and conviction of the Kenneth Lay, chairman, and Jeffrey Skilling, 
CEO, illustrates the sanctions that individuals and companies can receive for occupying an 
illegitimate institutional position (Powell, 2007). 
 
Given the exploratory nature of the present study, it is not known how AU, NZ and UK 
companies are distributed across the institutional positions and how the distribution has 
changed over time.  Chapters 5 and 6 are suggestive of companies being distributed across a 
range of positions, although positions 5 and 7 would appear to be rarely occupied.  The 
strengthening of Investor Logic (see Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4) is indicative of a shift in the 
distribution towards positions 6, 8 and 9.  Similarly, it is not known what institutional 
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positions are legitimate in AU, NZ and the UK and whether the institutional positions that are 
legitimate have changed over time.  Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there has been a 
transition from Corporate Logic (position 7) to Investor Logic (position 9) in terms of what is 
legitimate in the eyes of investors.  Such a transition is partially supported by the present 
study’s analysis of code issuers’ recommendations (see Chapters 5 and 6).  But it is possible 
that multiple positions are legitimate.  Nonetheless, the concept of the institutional position 
that has been introduced should provide a fruitful avenue for future research on Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic as well as other possible institutional logics.  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive 
remuneration.  Despite being opposites, there has not been an institutional battle between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in recent times.  Instead, both Logics have been 
reinforced in the discourse as various parties have sought to solve the perceived problem of 
executives being overpaid and defend themselves against the charge.  While remuneration 
committees are constrained by competitive and institutional pressures, the various 
remuneration principles (e.g. the agency and human resources principles) afford directors 
sufficient flexibility to justify almost any remuneration practice.  In this institutional setting, 
the standard remuneration package is an outcome of political negotiation between parties, 
rather than the merging of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Both Logics imply that 
executive remuneration practices should be simple, but the standard remuneration practice is 
anything but simple.  Certainly, executives are not capable of responding in a calculative 
manner to the vast array of incentives found in the standard remuneration package.  Instead, 
both Logics are embedded in the discourse because people have different beliefs about what is 
efficient and legitimate, and people respond strategically to other people’s beliefs.  Overall, 
the chapter highlights many opportunities for research from an institutional logics perspective.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
 
9.1. Introduction 
This PhD research’s main thesis is: Ideas matter.  How people make decisions, justify their 
decisions to others, interpret how other people react to their decisions and interpret other 
people’s decisions is dependent on the ideas that are ingrained in their cognitive faculties.  
However, ideas are not objective or part of physical reality.  Instead, ideas have inter-
subjective meaning based on people’s shared but negotiated understanding of social reality.  
The present study investigated a specific set of ideas known as institutional logics of 
corporate governance, within a particular setting, the discourse on executive remuneration in 
AU, NZ and the UK.  Institutional logics of corporate governance are highly-ordered sets of 
ideas – beliefs, norms, rules and values – that form a coalescing discourse on how corporate 
governance should be interpreted, justified and practiced.  At the organisational level, how 
institutional logics both constrain and enable how remuneration decisions are made and 
reported was studied.  At the organisational field level, how multiple institutional logics are 
able to exist in any particular setting; that is, whether and how institutional logics compete or 
co-exist was examined.   
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 2 summarises the main findings from Chapters 2 
to 8 and discusses how these findings contribute to knowledge.  Substantial insight has been 
generated into the discourse on executive remuneration from an institutional logics 
perspective.  How this insight informs and advances institutional theory is discussed in 
Section 3.  The implications of the findings for practice are considered in Section 4, but  
caution is necessary in order to avoid over-generalisation.  There is not one best set of 
executive remuneration principles, practices and processes.  Many future research 
opportunities have been mentioned throughout this thesis.  Section 5 outlines how researchers 
may further investigate the discourse on executive remuneration from an institutional logics 
perspective. A final comment is offered in Section 6. 
 
9.2. Main Findings and Contribution to Knowledge 
An original and novel framework was developed that both conceptualised and facilitated the 
study of institutional logics of corporate governance (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).  Derived from 
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a substantial body of work on corporate governance, the framework has two dimensions (with 
two possibilities in each): The corporate objective (shareholder value maximisation and 
stakeholder value maximisation) and a behavioural model of executives (agents and 
stewards).  This gives rise to four possible institutional logics: Corporate Logic, Investor 
Logic, Political Logic and Stakeholder Logic.  The framework highlights that researchers 
have been studying the same institutional logics, but labelling them differently.
196
  Thus, the 
framework enables prior corporate governance research on institutional logics to be unified 
and synthesised (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.5).  Prior research is suggestive of an 
institutional battle between institutional logics in several countries, particularly between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic in the US (Green et al., 2008; Zajac and Westphal, 2004) 
and, possibly, in the UK (Lok, 2010).  However, prior research has been narrowly focused on 
a few aspects of corporate governance (e.g. corporate objective and share option plans).  The 
present study has been broader as it investigated how institutional logics are embedded in the 
discourse on executive remuneration as a whole.  
 
An innovative and unique approach to both conceptualise and enable the study of the 
discourse on executive remuneration was developed.  First, the discourse was deconstructed 
into three components: Principles, practices and processes.  Second, following an extensive 
review of prior research, an inventory of remuneration principles was produced (see Chapter 
3, Table 3.2).  These provide a cognitive frame for directors and others when they are making, 
interpreting and justifying remuneration decisions.  However, there are ambiguities inherent 
in and tensions between the remuneration principles.  These were explored in the present 
study.  Third, an inventory of remuneration practices was produced and these were then 
linked to the remuneration principles (see Chapter 2, Table 3.4).  Fourth, after synthesising 
prior research, a model that illustrates how remuneration committees make and report 
remuneration decisions was produced (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1).  Fifth, consideration was 
given to how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have different implications for 
remuneration principles, practices, and processes (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6).  Thus, this has 
been the first study to investigate the discourse on executive remuneration as a whole from an 
institutional logics perspective.   
 
                                                 
196
 This is exemplified by Investor Logic, which is also been called: Agency Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004), 
Investor Capitalism (Green et al., 2008), Board Reform Logic (Shipilov et al., 2010) and Logic of 
Shareholder Value Maximisation (Lok, 2010).   
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The present study investigated how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic shape the discourse 
on executive remuneration in different institutional settings.  AU, NZ and the UK were 
selected as opportune sites to study the predicted institutional battle between Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic because there had been much public outrage over executive remuneration 
in AU and the UK, but not NZ (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2).  Thus, it was expected that 
Investor Logic would be stronger than Corporate Logic in AU and the UK, but not in NZ.   
Differences between code issuers and companies were also anticipated.  To explore how 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic diffused and were embedded in discourse, two types of 
organisational texts, namely codes and corporate annual reports, were studied.  These texts 
were produced over a long time period: 1991 to 2010 for codes as well as 1989 (UK only), 
1998 and 2007 for corporate annual reports (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.4 and 4.5).  Further, to 
explore potential differences between public and private discourse as well as the effect of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic on how remuneration committees make and report 
remuneration decisions, the talk of NZ directors, executives, remuneration consultants and 
code issuers was studied (see Chapter 4, Section 4.6). 
 
9.2.1. Research Question 1 
To what extent have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic become embedded in 
AU, NZ and UK organisational texts with respect to executive remuneration? 
 
Chapter 5 showed that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic had become widely diffused 
in AU, UK and, to a lesser extent, NZ codes and corporate annual reports by 2007.  Also, the 
evidence is suggestive of code issuers exerting coercive and normative pressure on 
companies, and companies conforming (or adopting code issuers’ recommendations).  This is 
similar to Crombie et al.’s (2010) and Point and Tyson’s (2006) findings.  There are at least 
three possible explanations.  First, a shared understanding between code issuers and 
companies emerged as code issuers produced and disseminated codes.  Second, code issuers, 
who were often led by directors, produced codes that reflected the existing remuneration 
policies and practices of companies (see Section 9.2.4).  In which case, the change simply 
reflects a shift from no disclosure to some disclosure.  This means that both Logics may have 
already been embedded in how directors and others conceptualised executive remuneration.  
Third, as remuneration disclosure requirements changed in AU and the UK, companies had to 
disclose ‘something’ on executive remuneration and they simply adopted the wording found 
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in codes and in other companies’ disclosure (this is an known as the ‘boilerplate disease’).  
Future research is required to explore the plausibility of these explanations. 
 
Chapter 5 also showed that there was a change from no Logic to both Corporate and Investor 
Logic in the texts of code issuers and companies from AU, NZ and the UK.  Both Logics 
appear to be legitimate discourse in that all the remuneration principles (except the fairness 
principle) form the recommendations of code issuers and remuneration policies of companies. 
This was markedly different to Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) finding of a transition from 
Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in the US.  However, Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) 
also show that practices can be symbolic.  They found many US companies adopted but did 
not implement long-term incentive plans and stock repurchase plans.  Therefore, it may be 
that the remuneration principles are symbolic, not substantive.  Some code issuers and 
companies may be believers in one or both Logics, while others may adopt the remuneration 
principles in order to appear legitimate.  For example, companies may use remuneration 
principles as a ‘smokescreen’ to hide executive remuneration practices that are inconsistent 
with societal expectations.  Overall, the remuneration principles afford directors much 
flexibility in justifying executive remuneration practices (see Sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.3). 
 
The following question arises from these findings: Given that Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic have different implications for executive remuneration, how can both Logics co-exist in 
organisational texts?  As aforementioned, this may be resolved if some remuneration 
principles are symbolic, while others are substantive.  The findings are suggestive of an 
alternative explanation.  The practiced version of Corporate Logic embedded in organisational 
texts is different to the theoretical version of Corporate Logic (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3) 
because the fairness principle is less widely diffused than the other remuneration principles, 
particularly in corporate annual reports.  In the absence of the fairness principle, the practiced 
version of Corporate Logic conceptualises executives as talented individuals, capable of 
maximising shareholder value, but also wanting to be remunerated at the market rate.  
Companies have to be prepared to remunerate executives at levels above the median if they 
want to attract and retain talented executives.
197
  This also implies that executives are 
extrinsically motivated and, therefore, monetary incentives are needed to control and direct 
                                                 
197
 When the human resources principle is unconstrained by the fairness rationale, there is a possibility that there 
will be a ratchet effect (or the Lake Wobegon effect), as Greenbury (1995) warned.  However, further 
research is required to ascertain if this has occurred in AU, NZ or in the UK.   
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their behaviour.  Thus, the tension between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is resolved, 
enabling both Logics to co-exist in organisational texts. 
 
9.2.2. Research Question 2 
How, if at all, have Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influenced how executive 
remuneration has been conceptualised in AU, NZ and UK organisational texts? 
 
Chapter 6 shows that there is shared understanding of executive remuneration among code 
issuers and companies in AU, NZ and the UK.  At the core of this shared understanding are 
the remuneration principles (except the fairness principle).   The remuneration principles are 
closely tied to executive remuneration practices.  The human resources and market principles 
are tied to base salaries and recruitment and retention schemes.  For companies, the human 
resources principle can be used to justify paying executives above the median relative to peers 
and awarding executives unconditional recruitment and retention payments.  The agency, 
motivation and pay-for-performance principles are tied to short- and long-term incentive 
schemes.  However, it is not often this straightforward.   Code issuers and companies use each 
of the remuneration principles to justify many different executive remuneration practices.  
This illustrates the flexibility of the remuneration principles.  First, the remuneration 
principles are difficult to dispute.  For example, shareholders are unlikely to argue that boards 
should not use remuneration practices to attract and retain talented executives.  Second, the 
remuneration principles are also open to interpretation.  Notably, code issuers contribute to 
this flexibility because their recommendations are principle-based, non-specific and often 
unrestrictive with respect to executive remuneration practices. 
 
Chapter 6 also shows that there is a standard remuneration package for executives, although it 
has changed over time.  In the oldest of the sampled codes and corporate annual reports, the 
standard remuneration package was simple: Executives received base salaries, pensions, 
annual bonuses, and, possibly, share options.  In the most recently sampled texts, the standard 
remuneration package is complex: Executives received base salaries (a portion of which may 
be ‘at-risk’), pensions (although not defined benefit schemes), annual bonuses (a portion of 
which may be deferred), share options and restricted shares.  Also, conditions attached to 
short- and long-term incentives have become increasingly complex.  For example, targets 
must be met for share options or restricted shares to be granted and further targets must be 
met for those share options or restricted shares to be exercised.  Further research is required to 
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ascertain the precise timing of these changes in codes’ recommendations and companies’ 
practices.  However, these changes have not altered the fundamental tenet of the standard 
remuneration package: Executives are capable of maximising shareholder value, but only if 
executive remuneration practices are designed appropriately. 
  
The illustrative examples presented in Chapter 6 show that both Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic are embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration.  However, the practiced 
version of Corporate Logic embedded in the discourse is different to the theoretical version as 
the fairness principle is rarely tied to any executive remuneration practices.  Further, the 
discourse analysis did not reveal any alternative remuneration principles or institutional 
logics.  There was no support for a transition in institutional logics over time.  Instead, 
companies went from no remuneration disclosure in the 1990s to a lot in the 2000s.  The first 
stage of the discourse analysis revealed that almost all remuneration practices can be justified 
in a manner that is consistent with Corporate Logic only, Investor Logic only or both Logics.  
This may mean that the discourse is symbolic in that corporate annual reports may be used to 
defend executive remuneration against criticism and may not be reflective of how 
remuneration decisions are made in the boardroom (this is analogous to impression 
management; for a review see Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007).  It may also mean that there 
are different groups of companies, where each of the Logics is embedded in their beliefs to 
varying degrees.   
 
The second stage of the discourse analysis revealed that few codes or corporate annual reports 
in their entirety were consistent with Corporate Logic only or Investor Logic only.  This 
finding may be attributable to the breadth of both Logics’ implications for corporate 
governance and executive remuneration (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3 and Chapter 3, Tables 3.2 
and 3.5).  It is also a result of there not being a definitive indicator of any Logic, although a 
transition between Logics may be evidenced by a change in the desired and actual mix of 
remuneration.  This is an opportunity for future research.  Further, the second stage presented 
a number of exemplars of each of the Logics.  Stakeholder Logic appeared to be symbolic 
because companies that espoused stakeholder value maximisation had performance measures 
that emphasised profit and shareholder value.  In the sub-sample studied in Chapter 6, 
Associated British Foods (UK, 1998) was the only exemplar of Corporate Logic only.  
However, both Logics became embedded in their discourse by 2007 and this change is 
attributed to a change in societal norms (i.e. a strengthening of Investor Logic).  Some codes 
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and corporate annual reports were presented as exemplars of Investor Logic only because of 
their strong emphasis on performance-based remuneration.  The case of Brierley Investments 
(NZ, 1998) also illustrated how Investor Logic can be used to defend a company and its board 
during a legitimacy crisis. 
 
9.2.3. Research Question 3 
How, if at all, do Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence the thinking and 
decision-making of NZ organisational actors with respect to executive 
remuneration? 
 
Chapter 7 shows that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse 
(or talk) of NZ directors, executives and others.  Directors and executives asserted that the 
corporate objective should be and is shareholder value maximisation.  When making 
remuneration decisions, they believed that shareholders’ interests are paramount, rather than 
non-shareholding stakeholders.  However, directors also believed that companies should not 
have to be required to produce a remuneration report on which shareholders would vote.  
Further, directors and executives did not describe executives as being purely agents or purely 
stewards.  They believed that executives are motivated by both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.  
There was no suggestion of a crowding-out effect (Frey and Osterloh, 2005).  They also 
believed that most executives will act in the best interests of shareholders, even if such actions 
may reduce the likelihood of receiving bonuses.  However, a few directors recalled some 
instances of executives putting their interests ahead of those of shareholders (i.e. myopic 
behaviour).  Thus, executive behaviour is ambiguous, complex and dynamic.  It cannot be 
reduced to agent or steward.  This partially explains why both Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic are embedded in the discourse because executives are part-agent and part-steward. 
 
NZ directors and executives also talked of remuneration principles and remuneration 
practices.  They generally agreed that the remuneration principles as a set represent ‘best 
practice’ for companies.  Notably, the fairness principle was almost never described in terms 
of vertical equity.  Instead, directors and executives usually defined fairness in terms of 
shareholders’ interests and horizontal equity (i.e. the market principle).  Similar to Ogden and 
Watson (2011), the market principle was prioritised ahead of the other principles.  Also, the 
market principle acted as a partial constraint on the human resources principle.  Put 
differently, while all directors (except one) advocated remunerating at the median or above, 
they were wary of remuneration levels exceeding the upper quartile.  Further, the standard 
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remuneration package was both recommended and practiced.  The remuneration principles 
were closely tied to a range of executive remuneration practices.  While each practice could 
be justified with multiple remuneration practices, the pay-for-performance principle was tied 
to annual bonuses and the agency principle was tied to equity bonuses.  Interestingly, 
directors provided four different rationales for using short- and long-term incentives: 
Motivate executives, retain executives, gain approval from shareholders for the level of 
remuneration, or share profits between shareholders and executives.  Thus, both Logics are 
embedded in the discourse because directors and executives had a wide range of beliefs. 
 
The internal dynamics of remuneration decision-making are complex.  NZ directors believed 
that the most critical decisions are related to hiring and replacing executives, rather than how 
much and how executives are remunerated.  Essentially, if directors hire the ‘right’ 
executives, then they do not have to worry about firm performance.  Similarly, if executives 
are not performing as expected, then directors must know when to replace them to prevent 
poor firm performance.  Also, directors have limited time to make remuneration decisions.  
Other decisions (e.g. strategic planning and budgeting) are given priority over remuneration 
decisions.  Further, remuneration committees follow a standard process in making 
remuneration decisions.  They review of the performance of the CEO and, possibly, his/her 
direct reports.  Remuneration consultants provide data and advice on the positioning of the 
level of remuneration and the latest trends in short- and long-term incentive schemes.  Then 
there will be some negotiation between the chairman (or the remuneration committee) and the 
executives.  However, directors commented that executives tend to negotiate vigorously when 
they are hired, rather than when remuneration is set each year.  On the whole, both Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic influence this process, but in an uncertain way because directors, 
executives and consultants have a range of beliefs, although almost all of them want the same 
outcome from this process (i.e. the standard remuneration package).  
 
The external dynamics of remuneration decision-making are also complex.  In making 
remuneration decisions, NZ directors were most strongly influenced by their perceptions of 
how investors and, to a lesser extent, the media would react to their decisions.  Some directors 
recalled making hiring and remuneration decisions which they perceived to be sub-optimal 
because they thought that investors and the media would not have recognised the optimal (or 
rational) decision as legitimate.  Remuneration committees were also subject to institutional 
pressures.  Mimetic pressure was strong because directors did not want to make remuneration 
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decisions that were markedly different from their competitors (i.e. the conformance and 
market principles).  This was reinforced by consultants who provided remuneration 
committees with intelligence on their competitors.  Normative pressure was also strong 
because directors have strong personal and professional networks.  Imitation occurred as 
directors discussed their decisions with other directors.  However, coercive and normative 
pressures in the form of codes were weak.  Some directors had read the NZ codes, while other 
directors were not aware that NZ codes offered any guidance on executive remuneration.  
Many directors also believed that code issuers do not have the expertise to offer guidance to 
directors.  Thus, the embedding of both Logics was reinforced by normative and mimetic 
pressures. 
 
9.2.4. Further Findings 
Drawing on prior research and the findings from Chapters 5, 6 and 7, additional insights into 
how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have shaped the discourse on executive 
remuneration are generated in Chapter 8.  First, the definitions of Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are revisited and then a definition of the combination of both Logics is 
considered.  Both Logics are able to co-exist because of the distribution of beliefs among 
directors, investors, regulators and others.   
 
Second, the origins and diffusion of both Logics are discussed.  The origins of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic are unclear, but date back at least as far as the British Industrial 
Revolution.  It is likely that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic were not invented by an 
individual.  Their core ideas emerged as employers first hired employees and then decided 
how to remunerate them.  The historical diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is 
not yet well understood, but business schools, consultants, directors’ networks, investors and 
regulators would have contributed to the diffusion.  There is room for further research on that 
topic.  With respect to being the legitimate discourse in society, Investor Logic has become 
stronger than Corporate Logic in recent times due to public outrage over corporate scandals 
and financial crises.  Corporate Logic and Investor Logic did not diffuse from code issuers to 
companies because directors and their advisors were members of and lobbied code issuers.  It 
is likely that most codes are reflective of best practice among companies and, in this respect, 
represent a defence of business in an attempt to quell public outrage over corporate scandals 
and financial crises. 
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Third, how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence the process of making and reporting 
remuneration decisions is explored further.  Notably, the complexity of the standard 
remuneration package for executives cannot be fully explained by the merging of both Logics.  
Instead, the complexity is a result of the political nature of the institutional setting.  There are 
many parties with a range of beliefs, although investors’ beliefs are likely to be consistent 
with Investor Logic.  Each party’s objective is to have their beliefs become the legitimate 
discourse.  However, no single party is dominant.  Negotiation results in compromise.  At the 
organisational field level, this negotiation is described in terms of competitive and 
institutional pressures.  Normative and mimetic pressures in the form of belief in the human 
resources and market principles by directors and consultants appear to be the strongest.  At 
the organisational level, this negotiation is manifested in directors struggling to reconcile 
what they believe is efficient with what they believe is legitimate.  The institutional identity of 
directors as problem-solvers, where short- and long-term incentive schemes are their toolkit, 
also constrains the possible decisions that directors can legitimately make.     
 
Fourth, the concept of an institutional position is introduced. This is a new and original 
concept that has not appeared in prior research on institutional theory.  As Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic can be substantive or symbolic, there is a range of possible institutional 
positions that companies can occupy.  Each institutional position that companies can occupy 
may or may not be legitimate.  Prior research and the present study indicate that code issuers, 
investors and others favour institutional positions where Investor Logic is substantive.  
However, some companies’ use of Investor Logic may be symbolic.  This enables companies 
to maintain a private discourse that differs from their public discourse and is inconsistent with 
societal expectations.  Examples from Chapter 6 illustrate that companies can hold a range of 
institutional positions.  The case of Enron’s collapse is used to illustrate that when symbolic 
discourse is revealed, companies can find themselves severely sanctioned.  Further research is 
required in order to determine the distribution of companies across the different institutional 
positions. 
 
9.2.5. Contribution to Knowledge 
The present study contributes to knowledge as follows:  
1. Advancing Zajac and Westphal (2004), the definitions of Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are clarified and extended.  Both Logics have implications for 
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executive remuneration principles, practices and processes, and these are explicated 
(see Chapters 3, 6, 7 and 8). 
 
2. Prior research on executive remuneration has lacked a comprehensive framework for 
conceptualising and studying the discourse on executive remuneration.  Thus, such a 
framework has been constructed (see Chapters 2 and 3) and then the robustness of the 
framework has been validated through content and discourse analyses of talk and texts 
(see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).  
 
3. Extending Zajac and Westphal (2004), some insight into the origins and diffusion of 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have been generated, particularly with respect to 
recent times in AU, NZ and the UK (1989-2010) (see Chapters 5 and 8). 
 
4. Adding to the small but growing body of research that has taken an institutional logics 
perspective (for a review see Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), it has been shown how 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic co-exist, as distinct from compete, in the 
discourse on executive remuneration. 
 
5. Bridging the macro-micro divide (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000), it has also been 
shown that while there has been a strengthening of Investor Logic at the organisational 
field level, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have been reinforced at the 
organisational level.  This occurs because while the remuneration principles are 
widely diffused, the fairness principle is not defined in terms of vertical equity and the 
human resources/market principles are prioritised ahead of other principles (see 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
 
6. There is a small but growing body of knowledge on how remuneration committees 
make decisions, much of which had not been published when the present study was 
initiated (see Chapter 3).  Chapter 7’s findings confirm the findings from prior 
qualitative research on remuneration committees (e.g. Bender, 2004; Main et al., 2008; 
Hermanson et al., 2011).  Extending prior research, beliefs of directors and executives 
are shown to be influential with respect to how decisions are made and reported.  
Building on prior research, Chapter 8 also showed that a range of competitive and 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
325 
institutional pressures influence how remuneration committees make and report 
decisions. 
 
7. Adding to Lok (2010), who studied corporate governance, not executive remuneration, 
the present study explored how both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence the 
institutional identity of directors and consequently how they make remuneration 
decisions (see Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
8. Reconciling  the theoretical concept of organisational legitimacy (Scott, 2008; 
Suchman, 1995) and the symbolic management perspective on corporate governance 
(Fiss and Zajac 2004, 2006; Westphal and Zajac, 1998, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995, 2004), the concept of the institutional position was introduced, which illustrates 
how companies attempt to maintain their culture (which may or may not fit with 
societal expectations) and their legitimacy in society. 
 
9.3. Theoretical Implications  
With respect to institutional theory, the present study has three significant implications.  First, 
the findings add weight to the claim that people’s beliefs (i.e. Corporate Logic or Investor 
Logic) determine what is efficient and legitimate in society.  This builds on Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008, p.105), who pointed out that, “Key constructs in the analysis of organization, 
such as efficiency, rationality, participation, and values are not neutral, but are themselves 
shaped by the logics of inter-institutional system.”  In their seminal paper on institutional 
theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that organisations change for two reasons: 
Competitive pressure (or efficiency) and institutional pressures (or legitimacy).  They believe 
that efficiency and legitimacy are distinct but overlapping arbiters of organisational survival.  
Institutional researchers have propagated this view.  For example, Westphal and Zajac (1994) 
and Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that companies use long-term incentive plans to 
enhance their efficiency or legitimacy.  Similarly, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) argue 
that code issuers produce codes because they believe that if companies comply with their 
recommendations, then companies will perform better and, hence, the economy will grow 
faster (i.e. efficiency); or they believe that doing so will enhance their companies’ and 
country’s legitimacy.  However, what is efficient is politically negotiated and socially 
constructed (see Chapters 7 and 8).  It is dependent on the beliefs, norms, rules and values 
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which become taken-for-granted or institutionalised within a society (Alford and Friedland, 
1985; Scott, 2008).  Thus, efficiency is a subset of legitimacy.   
 
Second, a toolkit for researchers who wish to adopt an institutional logics perspective is 
provided.  Lounsbury (2007, p.302) remarks that “most environments are subject to multiple, 
competing logics that provide a foundation for ongoing contestation and change…”  When 
the present study was initiated, there were no theoretical frameworks and analytical tools 
available to make it clear how to study “multiple, competing logics” in institutional settings 
where there has been much change.  The toolkit developed here (see Chapters 2, 3 and 8) 
should be of much use to researchers who want to deconstruct the discourse on executive 
remuneration and who want to understand how institutional logics of corporate governance 
diffuse over time.  Further, the original concept of the institutional position will help 
researchers to understand how organisations manage “ongoing contestation and change”.  In 
addition, this toolkit will help researchers to frame and synthesise their findings, so that 
coherence and a more complete understanding of institutional change from an institutional 
logics perspective can be generated.  While organisations and organisational fields can be 
ambiguous, complex and dynamic, an institutional logics perspective can bring striking clarity 
as has been shown (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4.4). 
 
Third and most importantly, this PhD research has begun to develop an institutional theory of 
executive remuneration, which is presented in Figure 9.1.  As shown in the ‘theoretical 
context’, there are many organisational theories and branches of institutional theory that shed 
light on the social reality of executive remuneration (see Chapter 2, Sections 2.3 and 2.4).  
The evidence summarised in this Chapter points towards an institutional logics perspective (or 
discursive institutionalism) being particularly insightful.  Within this theory, the ‘societal 
context’ shapes and, to a lesser extent, is shaped by how executive remuneration decisions are 
made and reported by companies, and how stakeholders interpret and respond to these 
decisions (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.1).  The present study indicates that both Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic shape remuneration principles, practices and processes.  However, both 
Logics are not simply constraints (‘an iron cage’), but are also enablers because of the 
ambiguous nature of each Logic and tension between the Logics.   For example, the 
remuneration principles afford the remuneration committee much flexibility in making and 
reporting remuneration decisions.  Further, given the distribution of beliefs among directors, 
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executives, investors and others, the process depicted is dynamic and political, where multiple 
parties are involved in the negotiation of executive remuneration.  
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Figure 9.1: Towards an Institutional Theory of Executive Remuneration 
PROCESSES: Power and 
Politics (e.g. making and 
reporting remuneration 
decisions)
OUTCOMES: Legitimacy and 
Efficiency (e.g. stakeholders 
respond to remuneration 
decisions and reporting)
FRAME: Institutions and 
Institutional Logics (e.g. battle 
or truce between Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic)
THEORETICAL CONTEXT:
(1) Rational Choice, Historical, Sociological and Discursive Institutionalism; 
(2) Agency, Institutional, Stewardship and Stakeholder Theories
SOCIETAL CONTEXT:
(1) Tensions within and between organisations, organisational fields, and societies; 
(2) Jolts (or crises), institutional entrepreneurship and social learning
Change in or 
reinforcement of 
legitimate institutional 
position/s
Shaping of institutional 
identities, discourse 
and practices
Degree of coupling between 
public and private discourse 
and practices
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Institutions and institutional logics (e.g. Corporate Logic and Investor Logic) provide the 
‘frame’ for organisational discourse and practices (e.g. remuneration principles and the 
standard package for executives) within an organisational field.  Institutional logics also shape 
the institutional identities of powerful organisational actors such as institutional investors, 
non-executive directors and executives (see Chapters 7 and 8; Lok, 2010; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  This identity work defines how organisational actors will construct their 
institutional identity and shapes how organisational actors will interpret and justify 
remuneration decisions.  For example, non-executive directors believe that remunerating 
‘high-performing’ executives below the median level relative to their peers would be 
abnormal (see Chapter 7).  Further, the prevailing institutional logics inform organisational 
actors of what is efficient (or socially desirable means-end relationships).  For example, 
Investor Logic implies that short- and long-term incentives can motivate executives (‘means’) 
to maximise shareholder value (‘end’).  The prevailing institutional logics also inform 
organisational actors of what is legitimate (or societal expectations).  For example, companies 
are expected to adopt codes’ recommendations, despite limited empirical evidence that doing 
so will enhance efficiency (see Chapter 2).  However, there is ambiguity within and tension 
between institutional logics.  Corporate Logic and Investor Logic can be interpreted in 
different ways; this has been illustrated in the present study (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
‘Processes’ refer to how remuneration committees make and report remuneration decisions in 
the broadest sense.  There is a private (or hidden) process by which non-executive directors 
meet to negotiate with executives and then make these decisions.  There is also a semi-public 
process where they seek to discuss these (potential) decisions with financial analysts and 
institutional investors, as well as a public process where they seek shareholder and public 
approval of their decisions.  Code issuers and codes are also potentially influential in these 
processes, although non-executives directors and their advisors and associations may have 
captured the process of code production (see Appendix E).  All of these processes involve 
power and politics as the different parties have a variety of beliefs and interests, and they are 
attempting to negotiate outcomes that fit their institutional identities and fulfil their 
needs/desires.  For example, Hendry et al. (2006) and Lok (2010) found that institutional 
investors want companies to maximise shareholder value in the short-term.  This is a social 
reality where organisational actors have semi-autonomous preferences that are constrained by 
the prevailing institutional logics (see Chapter 7; Lok, 2010).   
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The ‘outcome’ of the aforementioned processes is remuneration committees making and 
reporting remuneration decisions that may be substantive/coupled or symbolic/decoupled.  
Companies normally occupy an institutional position that appears to be legitimate to powerful 
stakeholders such as investors and regulators in order to gain access to resources and avoid 
costly sanctions.  As stakeholders respond to companies’ remuneration decisions, they are 
inherently judging the efficiency and legitimacy of those decisions.  For example, Zajac and 
Westphal (2004) found that investors reward both substantive and symbolic remuneration 
practices.  While the present study did not investigate how stakeholders respond to 
companies’ remuneration decisions, Chapter 7 did show that non-executive directors are 
deeply concerned with how investors and others perceive their remuneration decisions.  
Chapter 8 discussed how this process can result in companies gaining, maintaining or losing 
their legitimacy by occupying legitimate or illegitimate institutional positions, but further 
research is required.  Moreover, occupying an illegitimate institutional position affects not 
only the company, but the whole organisational field as code issuers, particularly regulators, 
respond by producing new laws and codes.  Thus, as stakeholders respond to remuneration 
decisions, the prevailing institutional logics and legitimate institutional positions may be 
reinforced or changed.   
 
The broader ‘societal context’ affects the distribution of beliefs (e.g. executives as agents or 
stewards) among organisational actors and their power within an organisational field.  This is 
because there are many institutions, institutional logics and institutional processes within the 
societal context that influence any given organisational field (Alford and Friedland, 1985; 
Thornton et al., 2005).  For instance, Fiss and Zajac (2004, 2006) found that Investor Logic 
and Stakeholder Logic are competing in Germany, partially due to changes in financial 
regulations.  The present study found that jolts (or crises) result in new codes being produced, 
and that the remuneration principles are common to both codes and corporate annual reports.  
However, codes may be a defence against public outrage over crises (e.g. corporate scandals 
and rewards for failure) as non-executive directors are heavily involved in code production.  
Institutional entrepreneurship and social learning can also bring about institutional change in 
an organisational field (Battilana et al., 2009; Zajac and Westphal, 2004), although such 
possibilities were not investigated in the present study.  Overall, while there is no doubt that 
economic, political and social trends will shape the prevailing institutional logics and 
remuneration principles, practices and processes, further research is required to understand the 
strength and nature of these influences.  
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9.4. Practical Implications 
Before the practical implications of the present study’s findings are considered, heed of what 
motivated this research is taken and what beliefs the researcher holds about the potential for 
theory to become embedded in practice (or for academics to influence practitioners) is 
considered.  Inspiration was drawn from the work of the late Sumantra Ghoshal, particularly 
his posthumous article, entitled, “Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good 
Management Practices” (Ghoshal, 2005, p.75).  Ghoshal argued that neo-classical economics, 
particularly agency theory, has had a negative impact on society because the teaching of these 
ideas has taught managers that society expects them to act opportunistically.   
 
Ghoshal (2005, p.87) argued:   
“In essence, social scientists carry an even greater social and moral responsibility 
than those who work in the physical sciences because, if they hide ideology in the 
pretense of science, they can cause much more harm.” 
 
This PhD research has been motivated by Ghoshal’s concern that ideology may be a hidden 
subtext in scientific endeavour.  As has been shown, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
are embedded (or hidden) in academic, business and political discourse on executive 
remuneration.  As sets of beliefs, not empirical truths, both Logics can skew the beliefs and 
judgement of decision-makers.  This partially explains why executive remuneration practices 
have become so complex over time (see Chapter 8). 
 
The beliefs of others cannot, however, be condemned.  Instead, academics, directors, 
regulators, and others are urged to critically reflect on their beliefs and how their beliefs shape 
their decisions.  However, the search for the Holy Grail of executive remuneration – a means 
for ensuring that executives will act in the best interests of shareholders – is condemned as it 
is an eternal and, ultimately, pointless quest because there is no Holy Grail.  There is no one 
best way of designing executive remuneration for all companies.  It appears that different 
variants of performance-based remuneration have been repeatedly heralded as the Holy Grail.  
Profit-sharing, executive share option schemes, restricted share schemes, and the like do not 
stand up to close scrutiny.  Executives do not possess the calculative abilities to alter their 
actions in such a way that they will optimise their incentive payments (Pepper et al., 2012).  
Therefore, academics, directors, regulators and others should contemplate the following 
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question: How, if at all, would executives’ actions change if their remuneration packages 
were simplified?   
 
There are many different types of code issuers including regulators, stock exchanges, 
investors’ associations, directors’ associations, business (or executives’) associations, and 
professional associations.  An off-hand reading of Chapter 6 might appear to infer that code 
issuers should provide detailed rules that mandate how boards and remuneration committees 
should make and report remuneration decisions.  Such an interpretation would be wrong.  
However, further official inquiries in the vein of the UK’s Greenbury (1995) report are 
necessary in order to illuminate the difficulties boards and remuneration committees 
experience in making and reporting remuneration decisions.  Code issuers should reconsider 
their support for the human resources/market principles because of the ratchet effect.  It seems 
unreasonable to expect all companies to pay competitively because, by definition, some 
executives must be below average.  Similarly, they should reconsider their support for the 
agency/pay-for-performance principles.  The empirical evidence is unequivocal: Companies 
that adopt performance-based remuneration do not necessarily maximise shareholder value 
(Rost and Osterloh, 2009; Tosi et al., 2000; Devers et al., 2007).  Finally, code issuers should 
be careful in how they phrase their recommendations in order to avoid boilerplate language 
(e.g. “attract, motivate and retain”) being propagated (see Chapters 5 and 6; Point and Tyson, 
2006).   
 
Recruitment and remuneration consultants should also reconsider their support for the 
remuneration principles (as per above).  This is because consultants have a central, but hidden 
role in making remuneration decisions.  Recruitment consultants can sway the remuneration 
expectations of candidates (i.e. potential executives) and boards.  Remuneration consultants 
can sway remuneration committees’ decisions on the level and design of remuneration 
packages for executives.  As one NZ consultant argued, “So consultants actually do not just 
do comparisons, they define norms within the remuneration market.”  It would be too easy to 
argue that employment contracts and remuneration consultants’ reports should be disclosed.  
Some may argue that a little bit of sunshine is the best disinfectant.  However, adding 
remuneration disclosure requirements does not result in lower levels of executive 
remuneration or increased sensitivity of executive remuneration to firm performance (e.g. 
Conyon and Salder, 2010).  Instead, recruitment and remuneration consultants should, if they 
do not do so already, take a holistic approach to executive motivation in order to ensure that 
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their clients consider non-financial and intrinsic rewards when designing employment 
contracts and remuneration practices (e.g. Frey and Osterloh, 2002).   
 
Directors, particularly members of remuneration committees, do not have an easy job.  They 
have to balance the competing interests of multiple parties.  They have to make decisions that 
are rational from their perspective, keep executives satisfied and minimise the risk of outrage 
from shareholders and the public.  Certainly, the NZ directors who volunteered their time to 
participate in this research were intelligent and methodical in how they made and reported 
remuneration decisions.  They also had strong beliefs.  As documented in Chapter 7, some of 
their beliefs were strongly consistent with Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  The main 
weakness in the NZ directors’ reasoning was that almost all of them believed the executives 
they hired were stronger performers, deserving of the remuneration that was set at the median 
or higher relative to their peers.  This line of reasoning could result in a ratchet effect.  An 
alternative explanation is that the NZ directors interviewed were from companies that 
outperformed their competitors, which also explains why they recommend above-average 
remuneration.
198
  Nevertheless, directors should reconsider their beliefs and the executive 
remuneration practices that they currently use.  However, it may be following critical 
reflection, they find that no change is warranted.  After all, there is no one best solution. 
 
Executives are portrayed in academic, business and political discourse as being capable of 
maximising shareholder value, but only if they are coerced by short- and long-term incentive 
schemes (see Chapter 6).  Instead of using complex incentive schemes with multiple targets, 
one NZ executive argued for a simpler approach: Salary plus a substantial bonus for achieving 
a significant objective, but with no time frame.  He thought that having annual targets served 
only to promote business as usual, rather than business transformation.  However, most of the 
NZ directors and executives interviewed also argued that executives are motivated by a range 
of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.  Performance-based remuneration was not portrayed as the 
only or best means of motivating executives.  On the other hand, there may be a self-selection 
effect, where the executives of for-profit companies are, on average, more extrinsically 
motivated than their counterparts in not-for-profit entities.   
 
                                                 
198
 This alternative explanation cannot be easily dismissed because there is no objective measure of firm 
performance.  However, the NZ directors that were interviewed have been directors of companies that have 
experienced both rising and declining firm performance in terms of profitability and shareholder returns. 
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One NZ director remarked: 
“[T]here’s a [lot] of people out there who are not driven for one moment by the 
dollar… I can tell you that the CFO of [a charity] who is highly confident.  And I 
would quite happily employ [this CFO] in a senior role in [a listed company]… 
[This CFO says] ‘I want to be benchmarked against other relevant entities, but 
deduct 25% from my salary…’ Do you find that in a corporate world? No you 
don’t.” 
 
On the whole, executives should reconsider their beliefs and, if they do not already, discuss 
with their boards what motivates them.  Perhaps, executives should reject some components 
of their remuneration packages that cannot realistically have any effect on their behaviour.  
 
9.5. Future Research Opportunities 
Prior research has not studied the discourse on executive remuneration, as a whole, from an 
institutional logics perspective.  This has meant that many avenues for future research have 
been mentioned throughout this PhD thesis.  The most pressing of these future research 
opportunities are discussed here. 
 
Drawing on content and discourse analysis, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 showed how the discourse on 
executive remuneration can be deconstructed into remuneration principles, practices and 
processes and then reconstructed from an institutional logic perspective.  In doing so, the 
nature of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic was revealed.  However, the content analysis in 
Chapter 5 was limited to the study of six remuneration principles and the discourse analysis in 
Chapter 6 did not quantify the multitude of remuneration practices that form part of the 
discourse (e.g. change in incidence of practices over time).  A significant future research 
opportunity is mapping and quantifying the discourse on executive remuneration.  Chapter 3, 
Table 3.5 sets out the theoretical differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, 
which researchers can use as a map to study the discourse.  The main drawback of this 
approach is that the historical diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic cannot be 
easily studied because of scant remuneration disclosure requirements prior to the 1990s in 
most countries.  Nevertheless, recent trends in the diffusion of Corporate Logic, Investor 
Logic and alternative Logics (e.g. Stakeholder Logic) can be studied.   
 
When studying recent trends in the diffusion of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, there are 
at least three opportunities for future research.  First, how AU and UK companies change 
their discourse on executive remuneration following a large negative shareholder vote on their 
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remuneration report should be studied.  As noted in Chapter 8, organisational fields are 
political arenas and remuneration disclosure is partially rhetorical in nature.  Such research 
would generate insight into how competitive and institutional pressures influence companies 
and how they respond to these pressures.  Second, trends in companies’ desired and actual 
mix of fixed and variable remuneration should be tracked.  This will show how support for 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic waxes and wanes over time.  Third, companies’ corporate 
objectives and performance measures should be studied.  Chapter 6’s findings indicated that 
some companies had a mismatch because their mission statements were stakeholder-oriented, 
but their performance measures were profit- and shareholder value-oriented.  This would 
build on Fiss and Zajac’s (2004; 2006) and Zajac and Westphal’s (1995; 2004) research on 
the symbolic and substantive nature of Corporate Logic, Investor Logic and Stakeholder 
Logic.   
 
The main limitation of studying the historical diffusion of institutional logics is that public 
discourse is not necessarily reflective of private discourse.  With respect to the discourse on 
executive remuneration, there is almost no public discourse in corporate annual reports prior 
to the 1990s in AU, NZ and the UK.  To resolve this limitation, researchers should seek 
access to organisational archives.  Archival research can generate much insight into how 
external and internal pressures influence how decisions are made in organisations.  Two types 
of organisations should be studied: Code issuers and companies.  As noted in Chapter 8, code 
issuers produce consultation documents, receive hundreds of submissions from the public and 
then produce official reports and codes.  Some code issuers do maintain archives that 
researchers can access (e.g. The Cadbury Archive, http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cadbury/).  The 
members of code issuers have to wade through a mass of talk and texts before making their 
recommendations.  Drawing on an institutional logics perspective, research should investigate 
the beliefs embedded in this talk and text in order to understand how recommendations are 
made.  For instance, members of code issuers may be swayed by those with shared (not 
different) beliefs.   
 
Companies also maintain archives of the minutes from board and committee meetings.  
Researchers should seek access to historical (not recent) materials in companies’ archives in 
order to increase the likelihood of being granted access (e.g. Johanson, 2008).  Pye (2000, 
2002) showed that the talk of UK directors has changed over time.  Specifically, she found 
that directors talked of “a strategic focus”, “shareholder value” and “corporate governance” in 
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the late 1990s, while this talk had not been present in the late 1980s.  This may be evidence of 
a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic.  There are two lines of inquiry that 
researchers could follow.  First, researchers could study patterns in phraseology between 
companies in similar and different institutional settings.  Using content analysis, this would 
generate insight into how institutional logics have diffused (or waxed and waned) over time.  
Second, researchers could carry out case studies of a single company’s archive in order to 
understand how institutional logics compete or co-exist in the talk of the boardroom.  Using 
discourse analysis, researchers could produce a more fine-grained understanding of how 
remuneration decisions are made.  Particular attention should be given to how remuneration 
principles are prioritised (or ordered) when remuneration decisions are made (see Chapter 7). 
 
However, researchers should not shy away from studying recent times and gaining access to 
directors and others.  As this research found, many directors and executives are willing to be 
interviewed and help researchers gain an understanding of their social realities.  The main 
limitation of the interview phase of the present study was that investors (e.g. fund managers), 
analysts, media, politicians, and other non-shareholding stakeholders were not interviewed.  It 
was argued in Chapter 8 that there is a distribution of beliefs among these parties and that this 
distribution along with the political nature of decision-making (e.g. people have to make 
compromises) has resulted in the emergence and entrenchment of an overly-complex 
remuneration package for executives.  Some poignant questions to ask these parties are: How 
do they think the standard remuneration package influences how executives make decisions?  
How do they predict executives would behave if they received simpler remuneration packages 
(e.g. salary plus a portion of earnings)?  It is unrealistic to expect executives to be able to 
determine the optimal course of action given the array of incentives in the standard 
remuneration package (Pepper et al., 2012).  The rationality (or computational abilities) of 
executives are bounded (March and Simon, 1993).  Thus, such research should further 
understanding of organisational decision-making from an institutional logics perspective. 
 
Building on the preceding line of inquiry, researchers should survey a wide range of parties 
(as per above) in order to gain insight into the distribution of beliefs in society.  The main 
limitation of comparative (or international) corporate governance research has been that prior 
research has focused on the regulatory frameworks of different countries, rather than the 
beliefs of people in different countries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  Further research in the 
vein of Edmonds and Hand (1976) and Witt and Redding (2012) is required to understand 
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what corporate objective people think companies should pursue and how people think 
executives should/do behave.  In addition, people’s opinions of the remuneration principles 
should also be ascertained.  For example, questionnaires could be used to determine how 
directors rank (or order) the remuneration principles.  If the human resources and market 
principles are ranked ahead of other principles, then this would explain why executive 
remuneration seems to only ever increase (see Chapter 7; Ogden and Watson, 2011).  It would 
also add weight to the argument that Corporate Logic is substantive and Investor Logic is 
symbolic because it may be that executives are paid at the market rate irrespective of firm 
performance (see Chapter 8).   
 
9.6. Conclusion 
This PhD research has shown that ideas do indeed matter.  Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic are old ideas that have merged to become a coalescing discourse with durable meaning.  
Both Logics are deeply embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration.  Both Logics 
provide a common thread that ties executive remuneration principles, practices and processes 
inextricably together.  This is an intriguing finding because Corporate Logic and Investor 
Logic have opposing assumptions about how executives should behave, and directors and 
others have a range of beliefs that are consistent with Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  
At the organisational field level, competitive and institutional pressures have compelled 
companies to adopt executive remuneration practices that are consistent with both Logics, 
although many companies have been more than willing to do so.  At the organisational level, 
the institutional identity of (non-executive) directors compels them to adopt these practices, 
and they manage tensions by prioritising the remuneration principles.  Further, the political 
nature of both organisations and organisational fields also explains why both Logics have 
merged and why executive remuneration practices have become complex.  However, 
directors, code issuers, investors and others are urged to reconsider their beliefs and take a 
simpler approach to executive remuneration.  A simpler approach does not constitute a silver 
bullet or the Holy Grail, but it is more transparent and its motivational effects are no worse 
than current practices.  
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Appendix A: List of Codes of Practice 
 
Appendix A includes references for the sampled codes of practice.  The references are divided 
into three lists: Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
 
A.1. Australia 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003). Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Recommendations. Sydney: Australian Stock Exchange Ltd. 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2007). Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations (2
nd
 ed.). Sydney: Australian Securities Exchange. 
ASX Corporate Governance Council (2010). Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments (2
nd
 ed. with amendents). Sydney: Australian 
Securities Exchange. 
Australian Council of Super Investors (2009). A Guide for Superannuation Trustees to 
monitor Listed Australian Companies. Melbourne: Australian Council of Super 
Investors. 
Australian Institute of Company Directors & Australian Shareholders’ Association (2007). 
Executive Equity Plan Guidelines. Sydney: Australian Institute of Company Directors.  
Australian Institute of Company Directors (2000). Executive Share and Option Scheme 
Guidelines. Sydney: Australian Institute of Company Directors.  
Australian Institute of Company Directors (2003). Executive Service Agreements. Sydney: 
Australian Institute of Company Directors.  
Australian Investment Managers’ Association (1995). Corporate Governance: A Guide for 
Investment Managers & A Statement of Recommended Corporate Practice. Sydney: 
Australian Investment Managers’ Association. 
Australian Investment Managers’ Association (1997). Corporate Governance: A Guide for 
Investment Managers and Corporations (2
nd
 ed.). Sydney: Australian Investment 
Managers’ Association. 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (2009). Prudential Practice Guide. Melbourne: 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Australian Shareholders’ Association (2004a). Director and Executive Remuneration. 
Chatswood: Australian Shareholders’ Association. 
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Australian Shareholders’ Association (2004b). Equity-Based Incentive Schemes. Chatswood: 
Australian Shareholders’ Association. 
Bosch, H. (1991). Corporate Practices and Conduct. Melbourne: Information Australia. 
Bosch, H. (1993). Corporate Practices and Conduct (2
nd
 ed.). Melbourne: Information 
Australia. 
Bosch, H. (1995). Corporate Practices and Conduct (3
rd
 ed.). Melbourne: Information 
Australia. 
Hilmer, F. G. (1993). Strictly Boardroom. Melbourne: Information Australia. 
Hilmer, F. G. (1998). Strictly Boardroom (2
nd
 ed.). Melbourne: Information Australia. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (1999). Corporate Governance: A Guide for 
Investment Managers and Corporations (3
rd
 ed.). Sydney: Investment and Financial 
Services Association. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (2002). The Blue Book - Corporate 
Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations (4
th
 ed.). Sydney: 
Investment and Financial Services Association. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (2004). The Blue Book - Corporate 
Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations (5
th
 ed.). Sydney: 
Investment and Financial Services Association. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (2007a). IFSA Guidance Note No. 12.00. 
Executive Equity Plan Guidelines. Sydney: Investment and Financial Services 
Association. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (2007b). IFSA Guidance Note No. 13.00. 
Employee Share Ownership Plan Guidelines. Sydney: Investment and Financial 
Services Association. 
Investment and Financial Services Association (2009). The Blue Book - Corporate 
Governance: A Guide for Investment Managers and Corporations (6
th
 ed.). Sydney: 
Investment and Financial Services Association. 
The Productivity Commission (2009). Productivity Commission Inquiry Report: Executive 
Remuneration in Australia. Melbourne: The Productivity Commission. 
 
A.2. New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (2003). Improving Corporate Reporting: 
A Shared Responsibility. Wellington: Institute of Chartered Accountants of New 
Zealand. 
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Institute of Directors in New Zealand Inc. (2005). Code of Practice for Directors. Wellington: 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand Inc. 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand Inc. (2010). Code of Practice for Directors. Wellington: 
Institute of Directors in New Zealand Inc. 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts (2003). Corporate Governance White Paper. Wellington: 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts. 
MinterEllisonRuddWatts (2009). Corporate Governance White Paper (Updated 18 March 
2009). Wellington: MinterEllisonRuddWatts. 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX) (2004). Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. 
Wellington: New Zealand Exchange. 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX) (2005). Guidance Note – Policy Statements. Wellington: New 
Zealand Exchange. 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX) (2009). NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules. Wellington: New Zealand 
Exchange. 
New Zealand Exchange (NZX) (2010). NZSX/NZDX Listing Rules: Appendix 1. Wellington: 
New Zealand Exchange. 
New Zealand Shareholders’ Association Inc. (2004). Chief Executive Pay: Discussion 
Document. Auckland: New Zealand Shareholders’ Association Inc. 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (1994). NZSE Listing Rules. Wellington: New Zealand Stock 
Exchange. 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (1999). NZSE Listing Rules (2
nd
 ed.). Wellington: New Zealand 
Stock Exchange. 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (2003). NZSE Listing Rules (3
rd
 ed.). Wellington: New Zealand 
Stock Exchange. 
Securities Commission (2004). Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines: A Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers. Wellington, NZ: 
Securities Commission. 
Securities Commission (2006). Securities Commission Principles of Corporate Governance - 
Update. Wellington: Securities Commission.  
Securities Commission (2010). Securities Commission Principles of Corporate Governance - 
Update. Wellington: Securities Commission. 
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A.3. The United Kingdom 
Association of British Insurers (1993). Share Scheme Guidance - A joint statement from the 
investment committees of the ABI and NAPF. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (1996). Long Term Remuneration for Senior Executives. 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (1999a). Share-based Incentive Schemes – Guideline 
Principles. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (1999b). Share option and Profit Sharing Incentive Schemes. 
London: Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (2002). Guidelines on Executive Remuneration. London: 
Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (2005). Principles and Guidelines on Remuneration. London: 
Association of British Insurers. 
Association of British Insurers (2007). Executive Remuneration – ABI Guidelines on Policies 
and Practices. London: Association of British Insurers. 
Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds (2001). Institutional Investors and 
Corporate Governance. London: Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds. 
Cadbury, A. and the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992). 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: 
Gee & Co. 
Financial Reporting Council (2003). The Combined Code of Corporate Governance. London: 
The Reporting Council. 
Financial Report Council (2006). The Combined Code of Corporate Governance. London: 
Financial Report Council. 
Financial Report Council (2008). The Combined Code of Corporate Governance. London: 
Financial Report Council. 
Financial Report Council (2009). 2009 Review of the Combined Code: Final Report. London: 
Financial Report Council. 
Financial Report Council (2010). The UK Corporate Governance Code. London: Financial 
Report Council. 
Greenbury, R. (1995). Director’s Remuneration: Report of a study group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury. London: Gee & Co. 
Hampel, R. and the Committee on Corporate Governance (1998). Committee on the 
Corporate Governance: Final Report. London: Gee Publishing. 
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Hermes Investment Management Limited (1999). International Corporate Governance 
Principles. London: Hermes Investment Management Limited. 
Hermes Investment Management Limited (2003). Corporate Governance Principles for 
Business Enterprises. London: Hermes Investment Management Limited. 
Hermes Investment Management Limited (2006). The Hermes Corporate Governance 
Principles. London: Hermes Investment Management Limited. 
Hermes Investment Management Limited (2008). The Hermes Principles: What shareholders 
expect of public companies – and what companies should expect of their investors. 
London: Hermes Investment Management Limited. 
Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors. London: 
The Department of Trade and Industry. 
ICSA Guidance on Terms of Reference – Remuneration Committee (2007). ICSA Guidance 
on Terms of Reference – Remuneration Committee. London: ICSA. 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (2002). The Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles. Retrieved from 
http://institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/ISC
Code161109.pdf  
London Stock Exchange (1998). The Combined Code of Corporate Governance. London: 
London Stock Exchange Plc.  
National Association of Pension Funds Limited (2007). Corporate Governance Policy and 
Voting Guidelines. London: National Association of Pension Funds Limited. 
Trade and Industry Committee (2003). Rewards for Failure: Sixteenth Report of Session 
2002-03. London: The Stationery Office Limited. 
The UK Shareholders’ Association (1994). Boardroom Remuneration: UKSA Position paper 
No.2.  West Cowes, Isle of Wight: The UK Shareholders’ Association. 
Walker, D. (2009). A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial 
Industry Entities: Final Recommendations. London: The Walker review secretariat. 
Retrieved from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm 
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Appendix B: List of Companies 
 
Appendix B identifies the publicly listed companies that are sampled and the years in which 
their annual reports are sampled.  There are two samples, ‘Top 50’ and ‘Continuous’, and 
some companies are included in both samples.  The Top 50 sample includes the largest 50 
companies by market capitalisation that were listed on the NZX (New Zealand Stock 
Exchange), ASX (Australian Stock Exchange) and LSE (London Stock Exchange) as at 31 
December 1989 (LSE only), 1998 and 2007.  Based on the largest 50 companies as at 31 
December 2007, the Continuous sample includes companies that are continuously listed on 
the NZX, ASX and LSE from 31 December 1998 to 2007 and continuously listed on the LSE 
from 31 December 1989 to 2007.  Note that the 1989 and 1998 lists of companies include 
those companies that merged to form a company on the 2007 list.   
 
The sample is presented in three tables: Table B.1 includes the Australian companies, Table 
B.2 includes New Zealand companies and Table B.3 includes the United Kingdom 
companies.  Some companies are listed on multiple stock exchanges and, therefore, could 
appear on two or three tables.  However, companies that are listed on multiple stock 
exchanges are only included in the table of their home country.  For example, Westpac 
Banking Corporation Ltd is an Australian company that is listed on both ASX and NZX, but 
is only listed on Table B.1.   
 
Table B.1: Australian Sample of Publicly Listed Companies 
Companies UK 
1989 
UK 
1998 
UK 
2007 
AU 
1998 
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NZ 1998 NZ 2007 
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Alcoa Inc cd               
Alumina Ltd (Formerly, 
WMC Limited) 
              
Amcor               
AMP Limited               
Australia and New Zealand 
Banking Group Limited 
              
ASX Limited               
Australian Foundation 
Investment Company 
              
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Australian Gas Light 
Company 
              
AXA Asia Pacific Holdings 
Ltd (Formerly, National 
Mutual Holdings Ltd) 
              
Babcock & Brown Ltd               
BHP Billiton Ltd                
Bluescope Steel Ltd               
Brambles Ltd (Formerly, 
Brambles Industries Ltd) 
              
Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd               
Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling 
Company S.A. 
              
Coles Myer Ltd               
Colonial Ltd               
Comalco Ltd               
Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia Ltd 
              
Crown Ltd (Formerly, 
Publishing and Broadcasting 
Ltd) 
              
CSL Ltd               
CSR Ltd               
Fairfax Media Ltd               
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 
(Formerly, Allied Mining & 
Processing Ltd) 
              
Foster's Group Ltd (Formerly, 
Foster's Brewing Group Ltd) 
              
GIO Australia Holdings Ltd               
Goodman Group Ltd 
(Formerly, Goodman Hardie 
Industrial Property Trust) 
              
GPT Group Ltd               
Harvey Norman Ltd               
Howard Smith Ltd               
Insurance Australia Group 
Ltd 
              
Leighton (Formerly, Leighton 
Contractors Ltd) 
              
Lend Lease Corporation Ltd               
Macquarie Airports Ltd               
Macquarie Group Ltd 
(Formerly, Macquarie Bank 
Ltd) 
              
Macquarie Infrastructure 
Group (Formerly, 
Infrastructure Trust of 
Australia) 
              
Mayne Nickless Ltd               
National Australia Bank Ltd               
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Newcrest Mining Ltd 
(Formerly, Normandy Mining 
Ltd) 
              
News Corporation Inc 
(Formerly, The News 
Corporation Ltd) 
              
North Ltd               
Orica Ltd               
Origin Energy Ltd (Formerly, 
Boral Ltd) 
              
Pacific Dunlop Ltd               
Pioneer International Ltd               
Placer Dome               
Qantas Airways Ltd               
Qbe Insurance Group Ltd               
Rio Tinto Ltd               
Santos Ltd               
Southcorp Ltd               
St George Bank Ltd               
Stockland (Formerly, 
Stockland Trust) 
              
Suncorp-Metway Ltd               
Tabcorp Holdings Ltd               
Telstra Corporation Limited               
The Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Ltd 
              
Toll Holdings Ltd               
Transurban Group Stapled               
Wesfarmers Ltd               
Westfield Group Ltd 
(Formerly, Westfield 
Holdings Ltd) 
              
Westfield Trust               
Westpac Banking 
Corporation 
              
Woodside Petroleum Ltd               
Woolworths Ltd               
Worleyparsons Ltd               
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Air New Zealand Ltd                
AMP NZ Office Trust               
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APN News & Media Ltd                
Auckland International 
Airport Ltd  
              
Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd               
Baycorp Holdings Ltd               
BIL International Ltd 
(Formerly, Brierley 
Investments Ltd) 
              
Carter Holt Harvey Ltd               
Cavalier Corporation Ltd               
CDL Hotels New Zealand 
Ltd 
              
Colonial Ltd               
Contact Energy Ltd                
Corporate Investments Ltd                
DB Group Ltd                
Ebos Group Ltd                
Fernz Corporation Ltd               
Fisher & Paykel Appliances 
Holdings Ltd  
              
Fisher & Paykel Healthcare 
Corporation Ltd  
              
Fisher & Paykel Industries 
Ltd  
              
Fletcher Building Ltd  
(Formerly, Fletcher 
Challenge Ltd ) 
              
Goodman Fielder Ltd                
Goodman Property Trust               
Guinness Peat Group Plc               
Hallenstein Glasson Holdings 
Ltd  
              
Hellaby Holdings Ltd                
Independent Newspapers Ltd                
Infratil Ltd (Formerly, 
Infrastructure & Utilities NZ 
Ltd ) 
              
ING Medical Properties Trust               
ING Property Trust               
Kiwi Income Property Trust               
Lion Nathan Ltd                
Lyttelton Port Company Ltd               
Mainfreight Ltd                
MetlifeCare Ltd               
Michael Hill International Ltd                
Milburn New Zealand Ltd                
National Mutual Holdings 
Ltd 
              
Natural Gas Corporation 
Holdings Ltd  
              
New Zealand Oil and Gas Ltd                
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New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd , The 
              
Nuplex Industries Ltd                
PGG Wrightson Ltd                
Port of Tauranga Ltd                
Ports of Auckland Ltd                 
Power New Zealand Ltd                
Progressive Enterprises Ltd                
Property for Industry Ltd                
Pumpkin Patch Ltd                
Pyne Gould Corporation Ltd               
Qest New Zealand Ltd               
Rakon Ltd                
Reid Farmers Ltd                
Ryman Healthcare Ltd                
Sanford Ltd                
Skellerup Holdings Ltd                
Sky City Entertainment 
Group Ltd (Formerly, Sky 
City Ltd ) 
              
Sky Network Television Ltd                
Sovereign Ltd               
St Lukes Group Ltd                
Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd                
Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd  
              
Tourism Holdings Ltd                
Tower Ltd                
Trans Tasman Properties Ltd                
TransAlta New Zealand Ltd               
Tranz Rail Holdings Ltd               
TrustPower Ltd                
Vector Ltd                
Warehouse Group Ltd , The               
Waste Management NZ Ltd               
Williams & Kettle Ltd               
Wilson & Horton Ltd                
Wrightsons Ltd               
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Abbey National Plc               
Allied Zurich Plc               
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Allied-Lyons Plc               
Amoco               
Anglo American Plc 
(Formerly, Anglo American 
Corporation) 
              
Antofagasta Plc               
Asda Group Plc               
Associated British Foods Plc               
Astra AB               
AstraZeneca Plc                
Aviva Plc               
BAA Plc               
Bae Systems Plc               
Bank of Scotland Plc               
Barclays Plc               
Bass Plc               
BAT Industries Plc               
Benckiser NV               
BG Group Plc (Formerly, 
British Gas Plc) 
              
Billiton Plc               
BOC Group Plc               
Boots Co Plc               
BP Amoco Plc               
BP Plc               
British Aerospace Plc               
British American Tobacco 
Plc 
              
British Petroleum Co Plc               
British Sky Broadcasting 
Group Plc 
              
British Telecommunications 
Plc 
              
BT Group Plc               
BTR Plc               
Cable & Wireless Plc               
Cadbury Schweppes Plc               
Centrica Plc               
CGU Plc               
Colt Telecom Group Plc               
Commercial Union 
Assurance Plc 
              
Consolidated Gold Fields Plc               
Cordiant Communications 
Plc 
              
Diageo Plc               
ED & F Man Group Plc               
Enterprise Oil Plc               
Fisons Plc               
General Accident Plc               
               
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 388 
               
Companies UK 
1989 
UK 
1998 
UK 
2007 
AU 
1998 
AU 
2007 
NZ 1998 NZ 2007 
 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
T
o
p
 5
0
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s 
General Electric Company 
Plc 
              
GKN Plc               
Glaxo Holdings Plc               
Glaxosmithkline Plc               
GlaxoWellcome Plc               
Granada Group Plc               
Grand Metropolitan Plc               
Great Universal Stores Plc               
Grey Global Group Plc               
Guardian Royal Exchange Plc               
Guinness Plc               
Halifax Plc               
Hanson Plc               
Hbos Plc               
Hong Kong Shanghai 
Banking Corporation Plc 
              
HSBC Holdings Plc               
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc               
International Power Plc               
Kazakhmys Plc               
Kingfisher Plc               
Ladbrokes Plc               
Land Securities Group Plc               
Legal & General Group Plc               
Lloyds Bank Plc               
Lloyds TSB Group Plc               
Man Group Plc               
Marks & Spencer Group Plc 
(Formerly, Marks & Spencer 
Plc) 
              
Midland Bank Plc               
Minorco S.A.               
National Grid Plc (Formerly, 
National Grid Group Plc) 
              
NatWest Plc (Formerly, 
National Westminster Bank 
Plc  
              
Norwich Union Plc               
Old Mutual Plc               
Orange Plc               
Pearson Plc               
Peninsular & Oriental Steam 
Navigation Plc 
              
Philip Morris Plc               
Prudential Plc               
Racal Electronics Plc               
Racal Telecom Plc               
Railtrack Group Plc               
Reckitt & Colman Plc               
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Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc               
Reed Elsevier Plc               
Reed International Plc               
Rentokil Initial Plc               
Reuters Group Plc               
Rolls-Royce Plc               
Rothmans International Plc               
Royal & Sun Alliance 
Insurance Plc 
              
Royal Bank Of Scotland 
Group Plc (Formerly, Royal 
Bank Of Scotland Plc) 
              
Royal Dutch / Shell 
Petroleum Plc 
              
Royal Dutch Shell Plc               
Royal Insurance Plc               
Sabmiller Plc               
Sainsbury (J) Plc               
Scottish & South Energy Plc               
Scottish Hydro-Electric Plc               
Shell Transport & Trading Co 
Plc 
              
Shire Plc (Formerly, Shire 
Pharmaceuticals Group Plc) 
              
SmithKline Beecham Plc               
South African Breweries Plc               
Southern Electric Plc               
Standard Chartered Plc               
Sun Alliance Plc               
Tesco Plc               
TSB Plc               
Unilever Plc               
United Utilities Plc               
Vodafone Group Plc               
Wellcome Plc               
WM Morrison Supermarkets 
Plc 
              
Wpp Group Plc (Formerly, 
Wpp Plc) 
              
Xstrata Plc               
Zeneca Plc (Formerly, 
Imperial Chemical Industries 
Plc) 
              
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Appendix C: Examples of Remuneration Principles 
 
Appendix C includes examples of remuneration principles found in codes of practice and 
corporate annual reports from the United Kingdom (UK), Australia (AU) and New Zealand 
(NZ).  The remuneration principles studied include the human resources, market, fairness, 
agency, pay-for-performance, and motivation principles.  This appendix includes one table of 
examples for each remuneration principle.  Each table includes three columns and three rows: 
there are columns for codes, 1998 corporate annual reports and 2007 corporate annual reports; 
and there are rows for AU, NZ and the UK.  Thus, there are nine cells in each table and within 
each cell there are three examples, except in fairness principle table as there are no examples 
for the 1998 corporate annual reports of AU and NZ.  Keywords in the examples are 
presented in bold.  The examples were randomly selected from the codes and corporate annual 
reports.  However, there are no examples of remuneration principles for 1989 corporate 
annual reports from the UK.  This is because there are few examples to select.  Overall, 
Appendix C contains 156 examples of remuneration principles. 
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Table C.1: Examples of the Human Resources Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU  “Executive share option schemes are supported as a 
method of…attracting quality management…” 
(AIMA, 1995, p. 25) 
“Executive incentive schemes are supported as a 
method of improving company performance through: 
Motivating and retaining key employees; Attracting 
quality management…” (AICD, 2000) 
“When setting the level and structure of 
remuneration, a company needs to balance its desire 
to attract and retain senior executives…” (ASX, 
2007, p.35) 
“The committee considers independent advice on 
policies and practices to attract, motivate and retain 
strong performers.” (CSR, 1998, p.31) 
“Attracting and retaining highly skilled people, 
through competitive remuneration and developmental 
opportunities, remained a priority during the 
reporting period.” (WMC, 1998, p.10) 
“Woodside offers competitive remuneration and 
benefits to attract people with the abilities to meet 
challenging performance standards.” (Woodside, 
1998, p.52) 
“Designed to attract and retain key talent in an 
increasingly globalised market, whilst at the same 
time aligning the interests of senior executives with 
those of shareholders.” (Telstra, 2007, p.87) 
“The Charter for the Remuneration Committee… 
requires that the Group adopt policies… to attract 
and retain key executives …” (Westfield, 2007, 
p.101) 
“Our reward strategy provides a comprehensive 
framework aimed at attracting and retaining 
talented employees…” (Westpac, 2007, p.39) 
NZ “Remuneration is a critical consideration in 
attracting, retaining and motivating directors and 
executives.” (NZ Securities Commission, 2003a, 
p.15) 
“Adequate remuneration is necessary to attract, 
retain, and motivate high quality directors and 
executives.” (NZ Securities Commission, 2004, p.25) 
“Remuneration for directors should be set at levels 
designed to attract, motivate and retain the best 
people available.” (IOD, 2005, p.6) 
“Baycorp directors are mindful of the need to retain 
and recognise key executives.” (Baycorp, 1998, p.9) 
“It remains the Remuneration Committee’s policy 
that remuneration and benefit levels should… 
attract, incentivise, reward and retain the directors.” 
(Guinness Peat, 1998, p.41) 
“The Board also believes that executive share plans 
encourage the attraction and retention of talented 
executives by rewarding participants for enhancing 
shareholder wealth.” (National Mutual, 1998, p.26) 
“The company’s remuneration strategy aims to 
attract, retain and motivate high calibre 
employees…” (Fletcher Building, 2007, p.46) 
“…a remuneration policy to enable the Company to 
attract and retain executives and Directors who will 
create value for shareholders.” (Goodman Fielder, 
2007, p.40) 
“The Scheme also assists the Company to attract, 
motivate and retain key executives in an environment 
where such executives are in high demand.” 
(Mainfreight, 2007, p.63) 
UK “The remuneration packages UK companies offer 
must, therefore, be sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate Directors and managers of the highest 
quality.” (Greenbury, 1995, p.10) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully...” (FRC, 
2003, p.12) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully…” (FRC, 
2006, p.11) 
“…the requirements of recruitment or retention 
may on occasion justify the payment of a salary 
outside the range regarded as appropriate to a 
particular position” (British American Tobacco, 
1998, p.7)  
“The basic objectives of these policies are that 
executives… should receive compensation… which 
will attract, motivate and retain executives of the 
necessary calibre.” (Reuters, 1998, p.11) 
“The Committee’s objective is to set remuneration to 
attract and retain high calibre executives…” (Royal 
& Sun Alliance, 1998, p.38)  
“Provide competitive rewards to attract, motivate 
and retain highly-skilled executives willing to work 
around the world” (BHP Billiton, 2007, p.162) 
“The Group’s remuneration policy is to ensure that 
…cost effective packages are provided which attract 
and retain executive directors…” (Lloyds TSB, 
2007, p.65) 
“Reed Elsevier aims to provide a total remuneration 
package that is able to attract and retain the best 
executive talent from anywhere in the world, at an 
appropriate level of cost.” (Reed Elsevier, 2007, 
p.53) 
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Table C.2: Examples of the Market Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU “Remuneration as a whole must be reasonable and 
comparable with market standards, taking into 
account the responsibilities and commitment of the 
executive and the outcomes…” (AICD, 2000) 
“It should also advise whether the remuneration… is 
reasonable in comparison with industry 
benchmark.” (IFSA, 2004, p.23) 
“The executive’s remuneration as a whole should be 
reasonable and comparable with industry 
standards.” (AICD, 2007, p.4) 
“…remuneration will be competitively set so that the 
Bank can seek to attract, motivate and retain high 
quality local and international executive staff…” 
(Commonwealth Bank, 1998, p.26) 
“The Board's practice with respect to Director 
remuneration …to remain competitive with the 
market, having regard to companies of similar size 
and complexity…” (Mayne Nickless, 1998, p.11) 
“In determining competitive remuneration rates, the 
committee seeks… advice on …trends among 
comparative… companies.” (WMC, 1998, p.32) 
“The Company’s remuneration policy is designed to 
be competitive and equitable…” (CSL, 2007, p.41) 
“This advice assists the Nomination & Remuneration 
Committee in making a determination of the 
remuneration levels that are appropriate for the 
Group, relative to the market in which it competes.” 
(Suncorp-Metway, 2007, p.136) 
“…the Group aims to set competitive rates of base 
salary.” (Westfield Group, 2007, p.102) 
NZ “The board should have a clear policy for setting 
remuneration of executives (including executive 
directors) and non-executive directors at levels that 
are fair and reasonable in a competitive market for 
the skills, knowledge and experience required by the 
entity.” (NZ Securities Commission, 2004, p.24) 
“Remuneration-setting procedures and criteria for 
senior executives should ensure adequate and 
defensible levels of salary and incentives, with a clear 
linkage both to market equivalents and company 
performance.” (IOD, 2005, p.6) 
“…remuneration has been independently set by the 
Remuneration Committee in line with general market 
trends.” (Baycorp, 1998, p.9) 
“…recommending market-related remuneration for 
Group Managing Director…” (Colonial, 1998, p.31) 
“To add value for employees… by operating a 
competitive remuneration system that rewards 
employee contributions.” (TransAlta, 1998, p.26) 
“…the Company has structured an executive 
remuneration framework that is market competitive 
and complementary to the reward strategy of the 
organisation.” (APN, 2007, p.27) 
“Staff are fairly and equitably remunerated relative to 
comparable positions…” (Auckland International 
Airport, 2007, p.81) 
“…the Company has structured an executive 
remuneration framework that is market competitive 
and complementary to the reward strategy of the 
organisation.” (Telecom, 2007, p.89) 
UK “Shareholders require that the remuneration of 
directors should be both fair and competitive.” 
(Cadbury, 1992, p.31) 
“They [Remuneration Committee] should be aware 
what other comparable companies are paying and 
should take account of relative performance” 
(Greenbury, 1995, p.16) 
“Consideration should be given to criteria which 
reflect the company’s performance relative to a group 
of comparator companies in some key variables such 
as total shareholder return.” (FRC, 2006, p.21) 
“To achieve this the remuneration of senior team must 
be competitive within the food retailing industry…” 
(Asda, 1998, p.28) 
“Salaries are reviewed annually… taking into 
consideration inter alia such factors as …salaries in 
comparable organisations and the general pay awards 
made to staff overall.” (Bank of Scotland, 1998, p.56) 
“The [Remuneration] committee aims to ensure that 
remuneration packages offered are competitive …” 
(Bas, 1998, p.18) 
“…executive compensation should… reflect the 
market trend…” (Associated British Foods, 2007, 
p.40) 
“The committee regularly reviews both the 
competitiveness of the Group’s remuneration 
structure and its effectiveness in incentivising 
executives to enhance value for shareholders over the 
longer term.” (Rolls-Royce, 2007, p.55) 
“Vodafone’s policy will be to provide executive 
directors with remuneration generally at levels that 
are competitive with the largest companies in 
Europe.” (Vodafone, 2007, p.78) 
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Table C.3: Examples of the Fairness Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU “Transparency, accountability and fairness are 
essential in both designing incentive schemes and 
disclosing information to shareholders…” (AICD, 
2000) 
“Transparency, accountability and fairness are 
essential principles that should guide companies when 
designing equity plans.” (ASA, 2007, p.4) 
“Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
…Companies should ensure that the level and 
composition of remuneration is sufficient and 
reasonable and that its relationship to performance is 
clear.” (ASX, 2007, p.35) 
 “Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly.” 
(Fairfax Media, 2007, p.18) 
“Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly.” 
(Westfield Group, 2007, p.120) 
“9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly.” 
(Woolworths, 2007, p.69) 
NZ “The working group agrees that, when used 
excessively or inappropriately, share options can 
create unacceptable risks to corporate reporting.” 
(NZICA, 2003a, p.53) 
“The remuneration of directors and executives should 
be transparent, fair and reasonable.” (NZ Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.24) 
“Remunerate directors and management fairly and 
transparently.” (IOD, 2005, p.6) 
 “SKY has policies in place to ensure that it 
remunerates fairly and responsibly.” (Sky Network, 
2007, p.70) 
“Fairly and reasonably reward executives having 
regard to the performance of the Company, the 
performance of the executives and the general pay 
environment.” (TrustPower, 2007, p.27) 
“…Westpac has remuneration policies that fairly and 
competitively reward executives…” (Westpac, 2007, 
p.39) 
UK “Shareholders require that the remuneration of 
directors should be both fair and competitive.” 
(Cadbury, 1992, p.31) 
“Remuneration committees should ensure that the 
total rewards available are not excessive.” 
(Greenbury, 1995, p.42) 
“The total rewards potentially available should not be 
excessive.” (Combined Code v3, 2006, p.21) 
“…ensuring that senior executives… are rewarded 
fairly for their respective individual contributions to 
the Group’s performance.” (CGU, 1998, p.32) 
“The [Remuneration] Committee considers each 
element of the reward package to ensure that it 
remains relevant and stretching and that the overall 
reward package is not excessive.” (National 
Westminster Bank, 1998, p.66) 
“The [Remuneration] package should also: • be seen 
to be fair by comparison with the packages of other 
groups of employees within the Company.” (Zeneca, 
1998, p.66) 
“To provide a remuneration package that: • is fair and 
transparent.” (Bae Systems, 2007, p.66) 
“The package is designed to attract and retain high 
quality executives, induce loyalty and motivate them 
to achieve a high level of corporate performance in 
line with the best interests of shareholders, while not 
being excessive.” (Imperial Tobacco, 2007, p.49) 
“The Committee is satisfied that the overall 
remuneration structure is set at levels which are 
reasonable and appropriate.” (Scottish & South 
Energy, 2007, p.44) 
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Table C.4: Examples of the Agency Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU “…remuneration packages should be designed to 
align the interests of executives with those of 
shareholders through direct equity participation…” 
(IFSA 3rd ed., 1999, p.25) 
“…remuneration committees should seriously 
consider whether… options are useful in achieving 
the required objective of aligning the interests of 
executives and shareholders, and if so how large the 
grant should be.” (ACID, 2003) 
“Equity plans serve to align the interests of 
executives with shareholders…” (AICD, 2007, p.5) 
“We recognise the value in aligning management and 
shareholder interests …” (Coca-Cola Amatil, 1998, 
p.7) 
“Directors are also provided with longer term 
incentive through option schemes, which act to align 
the Directors' actions with the interests of the 
shareholders.” (Harvey Norman, 1998, p.7) 
“…the Board strongly believes… shareholders will be 
better served by a remuneration structure which is 
more closely aligned with the interests of 
shareholders.” (Orica, 1998, p.8) 
“The framework aligns executive reward with… the 
creation of value for shareholders…” (Fortescue 
Metals, 2007, p.26) 
“Achieving further alignment of management and 
security holder interest through fee and remuneration 
initiative.” (Macquarie Infrastructure, 2007, p.4) 
“The key principles of the Group’s Executive 
Remuneration Strategy are to: • Align with the 
interests of and create value for shareholders….” (St 
George, 2007, p.18) 
NZ  “Share options are, however, a useful tool for 
aligning the interest of management and directors 
with those of shareholders.” (NZICA, 2003a, p.53) 
“This “conflict” can simply be avoided through… 
clear strategies of aligning shareholder interest with 
executive reward.” (NZSA, 2004) 
“Share ownership by directors can have the advantage 
of aligning remuneration with the interests of 
shareholders by increasing the focus of directors on 
company strategy, performance and share value over 
time.” (IOD, 2005, p.5) 
“AMP’s compensation policy is intended to foster a 
high performance environment… and align the 
interest of employees with shareholders.” (AMP, 
1998, p.32) 
“Introducing an objective remuneration system is a 
key component of this change because historically, 
management incentives have not been aligned to 
shareholder returns.” (Brierley, 1998, p.6) 
“The approach also aligns management interests with 
those of Shareholders.” (Guinness Peat, 1998, p.42) 
“AMP Board’s approach to executive remuneration is 
to align remuneration with the creation of value for 
AMP shareholders.” (AMP, 2007, p.11) 
“With a performance-based component to its fee 
structure, the remuneration of GNZ is closely aligned 
with Unitholder returns.” (Goodman Property Trust, 
2007, p.7) 
“The current management fee structure was 
introduced in April 1999. It was designed to align the 
interests of the manager and shareholders…” 
(Property for Industry, 2007, p.17) 
UK “The performance-related elements of remuneration 
should be designed to align the interest of Directors 
and shareholders and to give Directors keen incentive 
to perform at the highest levels.” (Greenbury, 1995, 
p.17) 
“The performance-related elements of 
remuneration… should be designed to align their 
[executives] interests with those of shareholders…” 
(FRC, 2003, p.12) 
“…remuneration …should be designed to align their 
[executives] interests with those of shareholders…” 
(FRC, 2006, p.12) 
“…remuneration arrangements… provide an incentive 
to executives and align performance and reward with 
the interests of shareholders.” (British 
Telecommunications, 1998, p.34) 
“CGU’s remuneration objectives are broadly the same 
for all employees… and reward superior performance 
in a manner which is consistent with the interest of 
shareholders.” (CGU, 1998, p.32) 
“…objectives: … to align the interests of the directors 
with the shareholders of the parent companies.” (Reed 
International, 1998, p.43) 
“The alignment of executive remuneration to the 
generation of shareholder value has been a strong and 
consistent theme...” (British American Tobacco, 
2007, p.58) 
“The Remuneration Principles which the Committee 
has applied are: …to provide alignment between 
achieving results for shareholders and the rewards for 
executives.” (Prudential, 2007, p.102) 
“…remuneration philosophy for senior executives is 
based on the following precepts: • Aligning the 
interests of executive directors with shareholders…” 
(Reed Elsevier, 2007, p.53) 
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Table C.5: Examples of the Pay-for-Performance Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU “The incentive should be tied to the long-run 
performance goals of the firm…” (Hilmer, 1993, 
p.75) 
“Incentive schemes should… provide rewards for 
materially improved company performance.” 
(AICD, 2000) 
“Incentive schemes should be designed around 
appropriate performance benchmarks that measure 
relative performance and provide rewards for 
materially improved company performance.” (ASX, 
2007, p.36) 
“The remuneration of executive directors… 
comprises… a cash incentive based on annual 
performance measures…” (Comalco, 1998, p.23) 
“The Plan… provide[s] the economic entity’s key 
executives with incentive for performance linked to 
the Company’s share price…” (Normandy Mining, 
1998, p.72) 
“Senior executives’ remuneration… is substantially 
influenced by incentive plans that reward executives 
for long term profitable growth of the economic 
entity.” (Westfarmers, 1998, p.59) 
“…remuneration will incorporate… variable pay for 
performance elements, both short term and long 
term…” (Coca-Cola Amatil, 2007, p.18) 
“…executive remuneration is driven by Company… 
performance through the… short-term and long-term 
incentive programs. These components of 
remuneration are “at risk”…” (Santos, 2007, p.57) 
“Woolworths’ current remuneration structure is 
comprised of two components: • the variable or “at 
risk” component which is performance-based…” 
(Woolworths, 2007, p.45) 
NZ “Executive (including director) remuneration 
packages should include an element that is dependent 
on entity and individual performance.” (NZ 
Securities Commission, 2004, p.24) 
“The NZSA supports performance-based 
remuneration for CEOs.” (NZSA, 2004) 
“Align director and employee remuneration and 
incentives with company strategy and performance.” 
(IOD, 2005, p.5) 
“The Executive [Share Option] Plan’s pricing formula 
allows participants to benefit only to the extent that 
the Company’s share price out-performs the NZSE-40 
gross index after taking account of dividends paid.” 
(Air New Zealand, 1998, p.41) 
“Performance bonus payments are contingent on the 
achievement of agreed performance goals…” (ANZ, 
1998, p.29) 
“To review and recommend to the Board: Chief 
Executive’s remuneration… to ensure that any bonus 
or incentive is linked to a performance appraisal…” 
(Goodman Fielder, 1998, p.30) 
“Key executive remuneration comprises… an “at 
risk” component which is earned subject to company 
profitability.” (Hallensteins, 2007, p.40) 
“[Remuneration] Packages for senior managers 
include a cash bonus opportunity linked to Company 
performance in areas subject to the manager’s 
control.” (Nuplex, 2007, p.48) 
“The principles underlying our executive 
remuneration policy are: paying for performance, 
with rewards linked to achievements against both 
financial and non-financial targets.” (Westpac, 2007, 
p.40) 
UK “The key to encouraging enhanced performance by 
Directors lies in remuneration packages which: • link 
rewards to performance, by both company and 
individuals…” (Greenbury, 1995, p.11) 
“A significant proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link 
rewards to corporate and individual performance.” 
(FRC, 2003, p.12) 
“…link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance.” (FRC, 2006, p.11) 
“We shall continue to link performance to reward, 
performance being measured against the market.” (BP 
Amoco, 1998, p.4) 
“…this is achieved by means of an annual bonus and 
a long-term incentive plan directly related to the 
Company’s longer-term performance.” (Prudential 
Corporation, 1998, p.33) 
“…to set remuneration to attract and retain high 
calibre executives by offering above average levels of 
reward for consistently superior business 
performance.” (Royal & Sun Alliance, 1998, p.38) 
“The Company’s remuneration strategy, policy and 
package for executive directors is: • Reward upper 
quartile performance with upper quartile reward.” 
(Bae Systems, 2007, p.66) 
“Remuneration policies continue to …a significant 
proportion of the Executive Directors’ total reward 
should be performance based.” (National Grid, 
2007, p.88) 
“…to align the interests …through a variable 
performance-based compensation policy…” (Reckitt 
Benckiser, 2007, p.18) 
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Table C.6: Examples of the Motivation Principle 
 Codes of Practice  Corporate Annual Reports – 1998 Corporate Annual Reports – 2007 
AU “One of the board’s performance-enhancing roles is 
to provide positive encouragement for management 
via the design of financial incentives.” (Hilmer, 1993, 
p.68) 
“This Guideline is not intended to restrict… the 
flexibility of companies to attract, retain and 
motivate employees...” (IFSA, 1999, p.26) 
“The company should design its remuneration policy 
in such a way that it: • motivates senior executives to 
pursue the long term growth and success of the 
company.” (ASX, 2007, p.35) 
“The [Remuneration] committee considers… policies 
and practices to attract, motivate and retain strong 
performers.” (CSR, 1998, p.31) 
“It is the broad policy of the company that its 
remuneration structure will… attract, motivate and 
retain high calibre employees.” (Orica, 1998, p.38) 
“Senior Executives – Remuneration levels are 
competitively set to attract, retain and motivate 
appropriately qualified and experienced senior 
executives capable of discharging their respective 
responsibilities.” (Santos, 1998, p.40) 
“The Board has adopted a remuneration policy… to 
… motivate executives to achieve challenging 
performance levels.” (Brambles, 2007, p.58) 
“…remuneration will be competitively set to attract, 
motivate and retain top calibre executives.” (Coca-
Cola Amatil, 2007, p.18) 
“Rio Tinto’s total rewards strategy is designed to 
attract, retain and motivate the skilled workforce 
essential to the success of our business.” (Rio Tinto, 
2007, p.90) 
NZ “Share options, however, can be a useful mechanism 
for motivating senior staff to achieve top 
performance…” (NZICA, 2002, p.23) 
“Adequate remuneration is necessary to attract, retain, 
and motivate high quality directors and executives.” 
(NZ Securities Commission, 2004, p.25) 
“Remuneration for directors should be set at levels 
designed to attract, motivate and retain the best 
people available.” (IOD, 2005, p.6) 
 
“The Group’s remuneration policy is to ensure that 
remuneration packages… are sufficient to attract, 
retain and motivate personnel…” (ANZ, 1998, p.29) 
“To encourage management… incentive 
compensation will be linked directly to the 
management team’s achievement of wealth creation 
targets.” (Brierley, 1998, p.6) 
“It remains the Remuneration Committee’s policy 
that remuneration and benefit levels should… attract, 
incentivise, reward and retain the directors.” 
(Guinness Peat, 1998, p.41) 
“To prosper, the Company must attract, motivate and 
retain highly-skilled Directors and executives.” 
(Goodman Fielder, 2007, p.40) 
“The [Remuneration] Scheme also assists the 
Company to attract, motivate and retain key 
executives in an environment where such executives 
are in high demand.” (Mainfreight, 2007, p.63) 
“To grow and successful, Telecom must be able to 
attract, retain and motivate capable employees.” 
(Telecom, 2007, p.88) 
UK “The remuneration packages UK companies offer 
must, therefore, be sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate Directors and managers of the highest 
quality.” (Greenbury, 1995, p.10) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully…” (FRC, 
2003, p.12) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to 
attract, retain and motivate directors…” (FRC, 2006, 
p.11) 
“The aim of the Board… is to maintain a policy 
which… will attract, retain and motivate executive 
directors of appropriate calibre.” (Abbey National, 
1998, p.46) 
“The [Remuneration] Committee aims to adopt 
policies which enable the Group to attract, retain and 
motivate able Executive Directors and senior 
executives…” (National Grid, 1998, p.23) 
“The… executive remuneration policy aims to attract, 
retain and motivate high calibre senior executives 
through pay…” (Pearson, 1998, p.46) 
“The Group aims to attract, motivate and retain high 
calibre executives by rewarding them with 
competitive… packages…” (Man, 2007, p.72) 
“Management, incentivised by the remuneration 
system, is delivering outstanding performance.” 
(Reckitt Benckiser, 2007, p.18) 
“The basic objective of the policy is that members of 
the executive committee should receive remuneration 
…which will attract, motivate and retain individuals 
of the necessary calibre.” (Sabmiller, 2007, p.48) 
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Appendix D: Institutionalising the Discourse on 
Executive Remuneration 
 
Appendix D reproduces Crombie (2011), Institutionalising the Discourse on Executive 
Remuneration. This paper was presented at the British Accounting Association Annual 
Conference (21-23 April 2009), which was held in Dundee, Scotland.  The paper was subject 
to blind peer review before being accepted for presentation at this conference.   
 
The findings presented in the paper are similar to those in Chapter 5.  At the time the paper 
was prepared, an institutional logics perspective had not been adopted.  This means that the 
paper is underdeveloped compared to the discussion in Chapters 5 and 8 on the diffusion of 
institutional logics of corporate governance.   
 
Further, the paper’s terminology is different to that in the body of the thesis.  In particular, the 
remuneration principles are termed remuneration logics.  Also, there are ten remuneration 
logics.  Six remuneration logics are the same as the remuneration principles that are 
introduced in Chapters 1 and 3.  The remaining four remuneration logics were excluded after 
an institutional logics perspective was adopted.  These included the achievement, appropriate, 
consultant and contribution logics.  The achievement and contribution logics were excluded 
because they are almost identical to the pay-for-performance principle.  The appropriate logic 
was excluded because it is not meaningful.  It is an affirmation, e.g. the executive 
remuneration should be designed appropriately. But what is appropriate is not defined.  The 
consultant logic was not included because it is not a remuneration principle per se, but a 
statement on whether or not companies do or should use remuneration consultants.  
 
Finally, the paper presents statistics (e.g. industry and firm performance) that are not included 
in Chapter 5.  As noted in Chapter 4, these findings were excluded because few statistically 
significant correlations were found.  The paper’s main finding was that most codes and 
corporate annual reports include many remuneration logics.  This is consistent with the 
findings presented in Chapter 5.  
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Institutionalising the Discourse of Executive Remuneration:  
An Analysis of Corporate Governance Codes and Annual Reports  
from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
 
Neil Crombie (University of Canterbury) 
 
The recurrent crisis in corporate governance has led to periodic reviews of corporate 
governance codes of best practice in most developed countries.  These codes tend to 
recommend the same set of executive remuneration policies.  The Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports issued in the UK in 1992 and 1995 respectively have been the most influential.  This 
study finds that the language of the Cadbury and Greenbury reports have been perpetuated 
through subsequent regulations (e.g. codes of best practice) and companies’ annual reports in 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (UK).  The language consists of phrases 
such as ‘attract, motivate and retain’, ‘fair and competitive’ and ‘align interests’ which 
collectively are supposed to explain or justify executive remuneration.  These explanations of 
executive remuneration are consistent with notable academic theories such as human capital, 
market and agency theory.   
 
This paper studies the influence of regulations on the disclosure in companies’ annual reports 
in Australian, New Zealand and the UK.  In comparing the disclosure of companies in their 
1998 and 2007 annual reports, the content analysis reveals that the disclosure became 
homogeneous and consistent with the regulations in Australia and the UK, but not in New 
Zealand. As there are few regulations in New Zealand related to executive remuneration, it is 
not surprising that the amount of voluntary disclosure in New Zealand companies’ annual 
reports has been minimal.  These findings support institutional theory’s notion of institutional 
isomorphism: Normative pressure transmitted the language (or discourse) of executive 
remuneration from academia to practice; Coercive pressure has compelled companies to adopt 
this language in their annual reports; Mimetic pressure has reinforced this pattern in 
disclosure.   
 
The coercive pressure of regulation has been the most influential on companies’ disclosure 
behaviour.  Australian and UK regulations have adopted a ‘comply or explain’ approach to 
their corporate governance codes of best practice.  As many directors’ and executives’ 
associations have been involved with the writing of these regulations, it is not surprising that 
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companies have willingly adopted the language within the regulations. While the explanations 
of executive remuneration within this language (or discourse) are individually compelling, as 
a set of explanations there are conflicts, inconsistencies and ambiguities. It has long been 
argued that one-size does not fit all, yet a ‘boilerplate’ approach to executive remuneration 
policy has emerged.  The institutionalisation of the discourse of executive remuneration has 
been bad for practice because it provides boards of directors with a seemingly credible 
defence against challenges to their executive remuneration practices and has led to 
homogeneity in disclosure. 
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1.0 Introduction  
“I succumbed more than I should have to the two favourite siren songs 
of American CEOs. First, if your company has performed brilliantly, 
then you should pay your top people brilliantly.  However, if your 
company has performed poorly, you can’t afford to make people suffer 
very much, because they will simply leave and go elsewhere; in other 
words, you have to keep good people.  Simple logic, of course, 
mandates that there can be very few effective people at the top of a 
lousy-performing organization.  But simple logic was apparently not 
my forte.  As a result, I helped create the phenomenon we see today: 
huge and surging pay for good performance, and huge and surging pay 
for bad performance, too.” (Crystal, 1991, p.11) 
 
In his book, In Search of Excess, Graef Crystal (1991) described how compensation 
consultants justified executive remuneration to boards of directors, shareholders and society.  
There are many logics used to justify executive remuneration which can be found in the press 
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releases and annual reports of companies (Zajac and Westphal, 1995), the corporate 
governance codes of best practice of countries (Point and Tyson, 2006) and the journal 
articles of academics (St-Onge et al., 2001).  For example, the agency logic asserts that 
incentives are required to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders, whereas 
the human resources logic asserts that remuneration is needed to attract and retain scarce 
managerial talent (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Legitimacy theory (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Deegan, 2006) contends that these remuneration logics are used to confer legitimacy on 
organisations, particularly the boards of directors as they have to justify or explain their 
decisions to shareholders and society.   
 
Logics consist of one or more statements designed to persuade, convince or influence the 
opinion of others.  The logics used to justify executive remuneration (hereinafter, 
remuneration logics) can be classified as rhetoric (see Larson, 2004 for a review of rhetoric 
analysis).  In the classical sense, an orator uses rhetoric to persuade the audience of the 
correctness of their argument.  The focus of this study is on the rhetoric within texts rather 
than speeches.  Corporate governance codes of best practice, commissioned reports on 
executive remuneration, hard regulation such as laws and soft regulation such as listing rules 
(hereinafter, regulations) contain remuneration logics designed to convince companies to 
adopt certain executive remuneration practices.  Annual reports also contain remuneration 
logics designed to convince shareholders and society that the companies’ executive 
remuneration practices are legitimate.   
 
This research is concerned with how regulators and companies use remuneration logics to 
explain executive remuneration practices. Content analysis is used to examine the 
remuneration logics within texts from three countries, namely Australia, New Zealand and the 
UK.  These countries are similar in many respects due to their historical economic and 
political ties.  However, the amount of regulation and the size of the companies across these 
countries are quite different.  Regulations published between 1991 and 2008 from these three 
countries are examined.  Annual reports from the largest 50 listed companies in 1998 and 
2007 from each of these three countries are also examined.  The research traces the origins of 
the most prominent remuneration logics in these texts and the diffusion of these remuneration 
logics over time.  Initially this research focused on the global financial crisis occurring in the 
early 2000s as exemplified by the Enron scandal and how the changes in subsequent 
regulations influenced the reporting behaviour of companies in Australia, New Zealand and 
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the UK.  However, the scope of the research was expanded to include earlier regulations, 
particularly the influential Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports in the UK
199
.   
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.147) asked “What makes organizations so similar?” Their 
answer was institutional isomorphism in the form of three pressures: normative, coercive and 
mimetic.  These pressures influence organisations, particularly when organisations undergo 
change.  A financial crisis can be a catalyst for organisational change.  Shareholders and 
others will often blame the boards of directors and executives of companies for the financial 
crisis as well as seeking out alternative ways thinking and organising.  So existing logics may 
be discarded and replaced with new or previously unpopular logics.  For example, the 
independence of directors and the separation of chair and CEO have increased in popularity 
due to the Enron scandal.  Regulators (e.g. securities commission) will often commission 
reports into the causes of financial crises and issue new regulations to prevent reoccurrences. 
These regulations are likely to be entrenched in popular (normative) logics. In order to defend 
their legitimacy, companies may imitate other (successful) companies, adopt (changing) 
social norms or comply with (new) regulations.   
 
Institutional theory asserts that organisations risk loosing their legitimacy if they do not 
conform to isomorphic pressures.  However, organisations “are also capable of responding to 
these influence attempts creatively and strategically” (Scott, 2008, p.178).  Isomorphic 
pressures are not always homogeneous, do not necessarily change rapidly and are not outside 
the influence of organisational actors.  For example, Sir Richard Greenbury was both the 
Chair and CEO of UK retailer Marks and Spencer and the Chair of a commissioned report on 
directors remuneration (Greenbury, 1995).  Companies may be able to manipulate the public’s 
mood for change in their favour, which leads to the reinforcement of the status quo, rather 
than any meaningful changes.  Similarly, companies may decouple the remuneration logics 
espoused in their annual reports from the underlying reality of their executive remuneration 
practices.  While institutional theory asserts that organisations will conform, legitimacy 
theory asserts that there are many reasons why organisations may choose to conform (Deegan, 
2006).  Firstly, the conformity may be an illusion as the organisations have manipulated the 
isomorphic pressures so that they do not have to change.  Secondly, the conformity may be 
                                                 
199
 While regulations are examined from 1991 to 2008, the annual reports of companies are only examined in 
1998 and 2007 because of time constraints and unavailability of annual reports prior to 1995.  
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symbolic in that the organisation’s outside appearance is decoupled from its underlying 
reality. Thirdly, the conformity may be substantive as the organisation changes its practices.   
 
In comparing the disclosure of companies in their 1998 and 2007 annual reports, this study 
found that the amount of disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies is much 
lower than that of Australian and UK companies as comparatively the New Zealand 
environment has been relatively devoid of regulations.  The contents of the disclosure in the 
companies’ annual report has converged over time and become increasingly consistent with 
the regulations.  However, the high degree of homogeneity in the disclosure of companies 
limits its meaningfulness.  Institutional theory explains these patterns: Normative pressure, 
such as academics advocating the merits of agency theory, has transmitted many of the 
remuneration logics from theory to practice; Coercive pressure in the form of homogeneous 
regulations have compelled companies to use a standard set of executive remuneration 
policies; Mimetic pressure as companies copy their peers has reinforced the standard set of 
executive remuneration policies.  Consistent with legitimacy theory, companies have 
managed these isomorphic pressures by, for example, having their representatives on the 
committees which establish regulations.  It has long been argued that one-size does not fit all, 
yet a “boilerplate” approach to executive remuneration policy has emerged.  
 
This research contributes to institutional theory, legitimacy theory and discourse analysis.  
Studies in corporate governance have often not linked regulations with the reporting 
behaviour of companies (e.g. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  Further, studies of executive remuneration policy have sought to 
determine the antecedents and effects of disclosure practices (e.g. Zajac and Westphal, 1995 
and Wade et al., 1997), rather than the institutional causes for the change in reporting 
behaviour.  Also, Phillips et al. (2004) expressed concern than discourse has not been 
adequately considered in studies of institutionalisation.  These limitations are addressed in 
this research as it explains how regulations and the annual reports of companies have changed 
over time, particularly how they have responded to financial crises.  Moreover, the 
comparative analysis of Australia, New Zealand and the UK shows how institutions and 
organisations in different environments respond to global events.  Finally, this research shows 
how companies strategically manage isomorphic pressures (Oliver, 1991) and symbolically 
manage their legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
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Instead of investigating the level of executive remuneration or the structure of executive 
remuneration, this research takes a novel approach by examining the remuneration logics used 
to justify executive remuneration practices in regulations between 1991 and 2008 as well as 
the 1998 and 2007 annual reports of companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  The 
paper is organised as follows.  First, the most prominent remuneration logics within these 
texts are defined and discussed.  Second, a model of the process of the institutionalisation of 
these remuneration logics is developed.  The remaining sections include the research method, 
findings, discussion and conclusion.     
 
2.0 Justifying Executive Remuneration Practices 
A pilot study was undertaken to determine the breadth of logics used to justify executive 
remuneration practices.  Several annual reports of companies in Australia, New Zealand and 
the UK were analysed.  While many remuneration logics were identified, only the most 
popular remuneration logics were included in this research (see table 1). 
 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
The central premise of this research is that the remuneration logics used in practice are 
consistent with and perhaps derived from academic theories and philosophies.  Academics 
have theorised about how academic theories influence practice (see Sturdy, 2004 for a review) 
as well as lamenting about the apparent gap between research and practice (Baldridge et al., 
2004 and Tushman et al., 2007).  Keynes (1936, p.383) argued that “Madmen [sic] in 
authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler 
of a few years back.”  He believed that the ideas of economists and philosophers have a 
greater influence on those in practice than the motive of self-interest.  Barley et al.’s (1988) 
research challenges this idea as it found that academics altered their research to match 
practice, rather than practitioners
200
 altering their decisions to match theory.  However, 
academic research has certainly influenced practitioners (Sturdy, 2004); for example, Porter’s 
(1980; 1985) competitive strategy and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory have been 
highly influential in the academy and practice.    
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In light of recent corporate scandals in the US (e.g. Enron and Worldcom) and elsewhere (e.g. 
HIH in Australia, Parmalat in Europe), academics have questioned whether academic theories 
and philosophies have been a positive or negative influence on business and society 
(Englander and Kaufman, 2003; Ghoshal, 2005; Osterloh and Frey, 2003; Frey and Osterloh, 
2005).  Ghoshal (2005, p.75) argues “Many of the worst excesses of recent management 
practices have their roots in a set of ideas that have emerged from business school academics 
over the last 30 years.”  He is particularly critical of liberalism and agency theory.  Further, 
there is growing concern than agency theory may be self-fulfilling in practice (Arce, 2007; 
Cohen and Holder-Webb, 2006; Ferraro et al, 2005; Cassidy, 2002; Madrick, 2003).  That is, 
by acting on the assumption that individuals are self-interested, boards of directors may alter 
the behaviour of executives as the use of incentives may crowd-out executives’ sense of duty 
and crowd-in their sense of self-interest (Miller, 1999; Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
 
Certainly, academics are engaged in training students who are/become practitioners and 
disseminating their research amongst other academics and practitioners.  However, academics 
are also influenced by practice. Inductive methods rely on drawing theories from observation.  
Further, some academics were/are practitioners and vice-versa.  This research does not assert 
that all theories of executive remuneration were formulated independently of practice, or that 
the remuneration logics contained within regulations and annual reports were exclusively 
drawn from academic theories.  Drawing on institutional theory (Scott, 2008), this research 
proposes that the dissemination of academic theories and philosophies through discourse (e.g. 
education and publication) create normative pressures amongst practitioners.  But these 
normative pressures may not be harmonious as academics may be disseminating competing 
theories (e.g. agency theory vs. stewardship theory, see Davis, et al. 1997).  The following 
discussion tentatively relates the remuneration logics (examined in this research) to a variety 
of academic theories and philosophies.  
 
The human resources logic (Zajac and Westphal, 1995; or corporate logic, Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004) argues that the level and form of executive remuneration must be sufficient 
to attract and retain high calibre managerial talent.  This logic is consistent with a number of 
theories.  Human capital theory asserts that the skill level of employees determines their 
remuneration (Becker, 1964).  That is, offering above average pay will attract above average 
executives, assuming that the skill level of executives is observable.  Similarly, managerialist 
theory (Chandler, 1962) and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) assert 
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that executives are a scare and valuable resource which have unique knowledge and expertise, 
and it is necessary to pay executives  
to retain their skills.  While stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) also argues that 
executives are a resource to be retained, it contends that individuals are motivated by both 
extrinsic (e.g. money) and intrinsic rewards (Davis et al., 1997).  However, the literature on 
the human resources logic is predominately concerned with extrinsic rewards (e.g. money).  
Thus, financial economists do believe that individuals motivated by money are also self-
interested (Jensen et al, 2004). 
 
Consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1983), the agency logic is 
concerned with how to manipulate the self-interest of executives and align their interests with 
those of the shareholders.  As shareholders cannot contract ex-ante for all eventualities and 
monitor executives without incurring considerable cost, incentives (e.g. share options) are 
believed to be the most efficient form of control over executives.  As mentioned above, this 
may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy as in the absence of incentives executives may not act 
self-interestedly (Miller, 1999; Ghoshal, 2005).  The agency logic presents a caricature of the 
behaviour of individuals.  It does not account for other motives such as sentiment, duty and 
excellence (Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006).  Following the agency logic can lead executives to 
maximise short-term profit, rather than long-term shareholder value, as well as to ignore the 
interests of stakeholders
201
.  To overcome these problems, Jensen et al. (2005) argues that 
incentives should be designed so that executives consider stakeholders as the means to the end 
of shareholder value; that is, enlightened self-interest.  However, the agency logic (as it is 
presented in practice) is silent on these issues and implicitly endorses narrow self-interest 
(e.g. short-termism). 
 
The pay-for-performance, contribution and achievement logics are performance logics (Wade 
et al., 1997).  They assert that executive remuneration schemes should link remuneration to 
performance.  The pay-for-performance logic has its roots in scientific management (Taylor, 
1911), which advocates that employees be rewarded for improvements in productivity.  For 
executives, a variable pay philosophy means being rewarded for improvements in shareholder 
value (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1992).  Individualism or meritocracy (Young, 1958) is the 
underlying assumption; that is, an executive can influence firm performance.  Similarly, the 
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central proposition of the theory of the firm (Coase, 1937) is that “managers of an enterprise 
guide its activities in such a way as to maximize the monetary well-being of its owners” 
(Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970, p.710).  This assumption is embodied in the contribution 
logic; that is, individuals should be rewarded for their contribution to firm performance.  
Also, the achievement logic emphasises the need to reward the achievement of specific 
performance objectives (e.g. strategic and financial).  This echoes Locke’s (1967) goal-setting 
theory; that is, individuals find setting and having goals to be motivational.  But as Bonner 
and Sprinkle (2002) point out, goals are most effective when linked to rewards.  
 
The market logic asserts that there is a managerial labour market and market forces (of supply 
and demand) determine the level and form of remuneration in this market; that is, executives 
must be paid competitively.  This logic is consistent with market theory (Smith, 1776; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) as St-Onge et al. (2001, p.258) explains “The labor market is 
composed of firms and employees with no one having undue influence… All positions are 
open and filled in a competitive manner… Market forces determine compensation levels.”  
However, the managerial labour market may not be as efficient and effective as the market 
logic contends.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) argue that executives have captured the 
remuneration committees of companies.  Khurana (2002; and Pick, 2005) argues that boards 
of directors do not act rationally when they hire new CEOs.  Interlocking directorships mean 
that remuneration committees are unlikely to penalise CEOs without risking penalising 
themselves (Davis et al., 2003).  Essentially, the invisible hand of the managerial labour 
market is really translucent and somewhat under the influence of CEOs. 
 
The fairness and appropriate logics are seemingly similar as remuneration that is fair is also 
appropriate, but this is an over-simplification.  The fairness logic is concerned with executive 
remuneration being fair, equitable, reasonable and not excessive.  Consistent with equity 
theory (Adams, 1965), it contends that the distribution of remuneration among employees 
should be equitable.  However, the evidence shows that the remuneration of CEOs is many 
times greater than employees (Mishel et al., 2007).  Conversely, the appropriate logic argues 
that executive remuneration should be contingent on the firm’s circumstances and the level of 
the executive’s responsibility.  This logic is consistent with contingency theory (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and the managerial discretion 
hypothesis (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).  Thus, the fairness and appropriate logics are 
quite different. 
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Embodied in the motivation logic is the underlying assumption in most of the aforementioned 
logics that money motivates individuals to maximise their effort.  Money is an effective 
motivator when short-term productivity is the goal (e.g. fruit picking).  However, as 
expectancy theory explains, there are many factors that influence the effort of individuals 
(Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968).  In determining how much effort to exert, 
individuals judge whether increased effort will  
lead to increased performance, whether increased performance will lead to increased rewards 
and the desirability of the rewards offered (see Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002 for a review).  The 
motivation logic presents a caricature of human behaviour.  Individuals respond differently to 
the same incentives due to personalities and circumstances, and rate money as a motivator 
differently (see Furnham, 2005 for a review).  Notably, executives tend to be well above the 
average in terms of wealth, which mitigates the effect of monetary incentives (Furnham, 
2005).   
 
The consultant logic suggests that external remuneration consultants should advise boards of 
directors (or remuneration committees) on the CEO remuneration packages in order to ensure 
objectivity.  Since the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal, corporate governance reforms 
have emphasised the need to have independent directors (Cosenza, 2007).  Independent 
remuneration consultants are also advocated (Crystal, 1991).  Agency theory also argues that 
remuneration consultants should be independent so that the remuneration committee’s 
decisions are impartial (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Legitimacy theory asserts that external 
verification of executive remuneration practices confers legitimacy on boards of directors 
(Wade et al., 1997).  However, Crystal (1991) highlights that remuneration consultants are 
often hired by the CEO, or when hired by the board of directors, remuneration consultants 
will give favourable reviews of the CEO so that their consultancy firm is hired by the CEO to 
advice on remuneration for the whole company.   
 
These remuneration logics are normative statements about how boards of directors should 
remunerate their executives.  This leads to conflicts or inconsistencies when multiple 
remuneration logics are employed.  For example, a CEO of a firm experiencing declining 
performance according to the pay-for-performance logic will receive declining pay, but the 
market logic may dictate that the CEO could earn more elsewhere so their pay should not 
decline and the human resources logic argues that a highly skilled CEO should be retained 
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and compensated accordingly.  Indeed, CEO pay is more highly related to firm size than firm 
performance (Becht et al., 2007; Jensen et al., 2005; Murphy, 1999).  There is also a conflict 
between the fairness logic and the other logics.  For example, the fairness logic conflicts with 
the agency logic as it asserts that only executives and shareholders interests need to be aligned 
because employees are viewed as a resource to be exploited; the alternative view is 
stakeholder theory (Alam, 2006; Smith, 2003).  It may be that the users of these remuneration 
logics (e.g. executives) are not concerned with potential inconsistencies because the 
remuneration logics are used as a discursive device to confer legitimacy, rather than a 
reflection of the users’ personal believes (Wade et al., 1997).   
 
The next section discusses how these remuneration logics may become institutionalised. 
 
3.0 Institutionalisation: Crisis, Regulation and Reporting 
Drawing on new institutional sociology, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that institutional 
isomorphism in the form of normative, coercive and mimetic pressures influence 
organisations to change (see diagram 1).  These pressures steer organisations towards 
common ideologies and adaptations.  So as organisations change become they increasingly 
similar (Moll et al., 2006; Scott, 2008).  Normative pressures are shared beliefs, values or 
expectations and are often shaped by academia, professions and consultants.  For example, 
Ghoshal (2005) argues that business schools’ advocacy and teaching of liberalism (e.g. 
agency theory) has lead to firms to widely adopt share options schemes.  Coercive pressures 
are rules or laws and are often shaped by governments and their proxies (e.g. the UK’s 
Financial Reporting Council).  For example, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) found that 
stock exchanges and governments have issued a number of corporate governance codes of 
best practice in the 1990s.  Mimetic pressures are organisational adaptations that become 
widely used and are often shaped by organisations sharing knowledge (e.g. employees 
moving between firms) and making comparisons with other organisations (e.g. benchmarking; 
industry standards).  For example, the organisational adaptations (e.g. total quality 
management) of financially successful companies are often copied by financially unsuccessful 
companies in order to improve financial performance (Heugens and Lander, 2007). 
 
--- Insert Diagram 1 here --- 
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Normative, coercive and mimetic pressures are also subject to change.  Institutions which 
shape these pressures are influenced by other institutions and organisations.  Bringing about 
institutional isomorphism necessitates that one pressure dominates the other pressures or there 
is harmony between the pressures.  For example, shareholder value maximisation is the 
dominant corporate objective, particularly in US companies despite the advocacy by many 
academics of stakeholder value maximisation (Smith, 2003; Jensen et al., 2005).  Shareholder 
value maximisation cannot be deinstitutionalised while there is still much academic debate on 
which of shareholder theory and stakeholder theory is best (see Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004; 
Freeman et al., 2004).   
 
Greenwood et al. (2002) described the stages of institutional change.  Firstly, destabilising 
institutionalised practices requires “precipitating jolts”, which are events such as social 
upheaval, technological disruptions or regulatory change.  Secondly, “deinstitutionalisation” 
occurs when new or existing actors “introduce new ideas and thus the possibility of change” 
(p.60).  Thirdly, “pre-institutionalisation” occurs when “organisations innovate 
independently” (p.60) and this transforms new ideas into viable new practices.  Fourthly, 
“theorization” about the new practices is required to pick a winner among the new practices.  
Actors theorise about what were the causes of organisational failure, how the new practices 
may overcome these causes and how the best of the new practices is morally or pragmatically 
superior to the others.  Fifthly, “diffusion” of new best practice occurs as actors accept the 
theorised justifications and begin to objectify the new best practice.  Sixthly, “re-
institutionalisation” occurs when the new best practice becomes taken-for-granted and gains 
cognitive legitimacy, although some new best practices become fads and fashions and thus 
not fully institutionalised.  
 
This research is concerned with discursive practices (i.e. the remuneration logics), rather than 
technical practices (e.g. total quality management).  Phillips et al.’s (2004) discursive model 
of institutionalisation complements Greenwood et al.’s (2002) stages of institutional change.  
Phillips et al. (2004) note that institutions change through discourse as technical practices are 
embedded in discourse.  As discourse is socially constructed from texts, they argue that new 
texts can alter discourse and changes in discourse lead to changes in institutions.  Further, 
precipitating jolts can lead to the production of new texts which either defend the legitimacy 
of existing practice or advocate institutional change.  For texts to become part of an 
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organisational field’s discourse, the text must be fit with the other texts that constitute the 
discourse and must be diffused amongst a key group of actors. 
 
The discourse of executive remuneration is embodied in regulations and companies’ annual 
reports (i.e. texts).  This research investigates how this discourse has changed over time.  
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) and Enrione et al. (2006) found that precipitating jolts 
(e.g. financial crises or corporate scandals) lead to the production of new regulations.  It is 
proposed that the new regulations will become part of the discourse if they are consistent with 
existing regulations.  This will lead to greater coercive pressure on companies to conform to 
the recommendations of the regulations. However, companies may attempt to manage this 
coercive pressure by manipulating it or strategic managing their disclosure behaviour.  To 
manipulate the coercive pressure, companies and their representatives may lobby the issuers 
of the regulations or they may be the issuers.  To strategically manage the coercive pressure, 
companies may either symbolically or substantively comply with the regulations.   
 
4.0 Method 
This research investigates how remuneration logics are used to explain or justify executive 
remuneration practices in regulations and companies’ annual reports.  Drawing on 
institutional theory, the influence of the coercive pressure of regulation on companies’ annual 
reports is examined.  Drawing on legitimacy theory, the ability of companies and their actors 
(e.g. directors and executives) to manage this coercive pressure and their companies’ 
legitimacy is also examined.  Enrione et al. (2006) found that financial crises lead to new 
regulations, but they did not study how these regulations influenced companies’ disclosure 
behaviour.  This research examines how the changes in regulations in Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK influence the disclosure behaviour of each of their largest 50 listed companies.  
The changes in regulations pertaining to executive remuneration are examined from 1991 to 
2008.  The contents of the companies’ annual reports in 1998 and 2007 are also examined.  
The focus of this research is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the remuneration logics 
used to explain their remuneration.  Content analysis is used to determine which remuneration 
logics are used, when they are used and how often. 
 
4.1 The Sample 
Initially all regulations related to corporate governance from New Zealand, Australia and the 
UK were identified and obtained.  Textbooks (e.g. Du Plessis et al., 2005; Farrar, 2001; 
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Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007) and websites (e.g. the European Corporate Governance 
Institute’s, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) helped identify the relevant regulations.   
If available, electronic copies (e.g. pdf) of the regulations were obtained so that the texts 
could be easily searched.  Hard copies of some regulations were also obtained. 98 texts were 
gathered and scrutinised.  Texts were discarded if they were not related to executive 
remuneration (e.g. the Smith report (2003) on audit committees), except New Zealand’s 
listing rules (issued in 1994, 1999 and 2003).  These texts were included because the lack of 
guidance on executive remuneration in New Zealand is a significant finding and is 
highlighted by the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s silence on the matter.  In the end, 39 texts 
are included in the sample and these were issued between 1991 and 2008 (see table 2). 
 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
 
The sample of companies is not random.  It includes the 50 largest companies in terms of 
market capitalisation that were listed on Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), New Zealand 
Stock Exchange (NZX) and the London Stock Exchange (FTSE) on 31 December 1998 and 
2007.  Market capitalisation information was obtained from newspapers (The Times, London; 
The Australian; National Business Review, New Zealand) and the websites of the stock 
exchanges.  The largest 50 companies were selected because they are the most likely to 
disclose information about their executive remuneration policies and practices.  As legitimacy 
theory contends, companies that are heavily publically scrutinised will use disclosure (e.g. in 
annual reports) to defend or legitimise their decisions (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 
2006).  And the largest companies are publically scrutinised more heavily, particularly their 
CEO pay, than the smallest companies (Ogden and Watson, 2008).   
 
The annual reports for the 50 largest companies across three counties and two time periods 
were gathered.  Electronic or hard copies were obtained from the companies’ websites, Global 
Reports (www.global-reports.com), NZX Deep Archive Service and University libraries 
(including University of Canterbury, University of Sydney and Strathclyde University).  As 
the 1998 and 2007 lists of companies are quite different and to allow intra-company 
comparisons, the 1998 annual reports of the companies on the 2007 list were also gathered
202
.  
Thus, there are two samples (see table 3): firstly, the ‘Top50’ sample included 297 annuals 
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reports (only 3 are missing); secondly, the ‘Continuous’ sample included 293 annual reports 
(only 2 are missing).  There are more companies on the 1998 continuous list than the 2007 
continuous list because many companies merged in between periods and all of the pre-merger 
companies are included on the 1998 continuous list.  For example, Astra AB (Sweden) 
merged with Zeneca Plc (UK) in 1999 to form AstraZeneca. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
 
4.2 The Data  
Descriptive data on the sampled companies were gathered from online sources (e.g. stock 
exchange websites) and their annual reports.  The descriptive data included industry 
classification, location of the companies’ headquarters and countries in which in the 
companies are listed, as well as market capitalisation, revenue, net profit after tax, total assets 
(opening and closing), net assets (opening and closing), dividend per share, return on assets 
(net profit after tax / average total assets), return on equity (net profit after tax / average 
equity) and debt-to-equity (total closing debt / total closing equity).  The three stock 
exchanges used different industry classification schemes.  These schemes were cross-coded 
against The Times’ industry classification scheme, and the data for the companies’ industry 
classification were recoded accordingly.  Other descriptive data, such as share price and board 
characteristics, were excluded from the sample due to time and cost constraints. 
 
Data on the companies’ executive remuneration practices were also excluded from the 
sample.  The pilot study revealed that the CEOs of the largest companies in Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK have similar remuneration packages.  Typically, the CEO’s remuneration 
package includes a salary, an annual (cash) bonus, share options and shares.  The incentives 
are usually contingent upon strategic, financial and market performance objectives.  However, 
the exact details of these performance measures are not always disclosed due to their 
commercially sensitive nature, particularly in New Zealand companies’ annual reports.  
Between 1998 and 2007, there did not appear to be much change in executive remuneration 
practices, although there was shift from share options to alternative equity based schemes (see 
Hall and Murphy, 2003).  Since there would have most likely been limited variation between 
companies and over time in the executive remuneration practices employed, there would be 
no significant correlation with the remuneration logics employed.  While some remuneration 
logics should be correlated with some executive remuneration practices (e.g. the agency logic 
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and share options), this research does not examine how companies’ justify the adoption of 
executive remuneration practices (see Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Wade et al., 1997).  Instead, 
this research is concerned with how the use of remuneration logics has changed over time, 
particularly in response to financial crises and new regulations. 
 
The pilot study revealed 10 prominent remuneration logics.  Content analysis was used to 
detect the presence or absence of these remuneration logics in the regulations and companies’ 
annual reports (see Bryman and Bell, 2003, Chapter 9).  Each of the remuneration logics were 
coded 1 (present) or 0 (absent) for each of the texts included in the sample.  A coding 
instructions document was produced to ensure that the content analysis was reliable and 
repeatable.  The instructions included definitions, examples and keywords associated with the 
remuneration logics (see tables 1 and 4). 
 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
 
The remuneration logics within the regulations and companies’ annual reports were not 
always easily identified.  Often significant portions of the texts had to be read and re-read, 
although electronic keyword searches increased the speed and accuracy of the process. In the 
companies’ annual reports, the remuneration policies were usually located in the corporate 
governance statement, directors’ report, or notes to the financial statements, but were 
occasionally located in other sections.  When phrases related to the CEO and their 
remuneration were identified the phrases were scrutinised in order to determine whether or 
not the phrases embodied one or more remuneration logics.  The coding instructions provided 
clear guidelines for coding these phrases as either present or absent.  The data were recorded 
on coding sheets.  To be coded as present, phrases needed to be related to one or more 
remuneration logics and related to the CEO.  It was critical to determining the role of the CEO 
as some are the managing director and others are the chief executive.  Further, some phrases 
(e.g. in the companies’ remuneration policies) did not apply to the CEO but applied to, for 
example, non-executive directors or employees.  Keyword searches revealed many different 
uses of the keywords (see table 4) which were not consistent with the corresponding 
remuneration logic.  The phrases within the text were only coded as present if they were 
consistent with the remuneration logics.   
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All of the coding of the regulations and companies’ annual reports was carried out by the 
author.  To ensure that the coding was reliable and repeatable, the author recoded a sample of 
4 regulations and 10 annual reports.  Only a few errors were detected.  The recoded data were 
almost identical to the original data.  Further, two research assistants were employed to 
analyse the contents of 10 annual reports.  The research assistants were post-graduate 
students.  They were given an hour briefing on the coding process as well as the coding 
instructions to read after the briefing.  Before they began coding, the author met with the 
research assistants to ensure that they understood the idiosyncrasies of the coding process.  
The coding sheets of the research assistants were compared with the author’s coding sheets, 
and there was a high degree of similarity.  However, one of the research assistants coded the 
agency logic as present many more times than the other two coders.  A meeting with the 
research assistant revealed that she had misinterpreted the coding instructions.  After this 
research assistant revised the coding of the agency logic, the three coders’ data were almost 
identical.  
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
This research focused on identifying trends in the use of remuneration logics in regulations 
and companies’ annual reports.  The data were stored, sorted and analysed using Microsoft 
Excel
TM
 and SPSS
TM
.  The analysis of the data was simplistic.  The average and standard 
deviations were calculated for all of the variables.  For the companies, differences between 
the groups (e.g. 1998 vs. 2007; listed in one vs. multiple countries; high vs. low users of 
remuneration logics) were tested and significance levels were scrutinised.  Also, correlations 
between remuneration logics and the other variables were calculated and significance levels 
were scrutinised.  Further, regression analyses between the remuneration logics (dependent 
variables) and the other variables such as return on assets (independent variables) were 
calculated and significance levels were scrutinised.  However, much of data analysis yielded 
statistically insignificant results (e.g. the regression analyses) and these results are not 
included in the findings.  Comparing the average use of remuneration logics in regulations 
and companies’ annual reports between countries yields the most interesting and significant 
findings. 
 
4.4 Limitations 
There are three significant limitations of the method employed.  Firstly, the time period 
studied for companies is limited by the availability of their annual reports.  Companies’ 
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websites and the Global Reports database do not include many annual reports prior to 1998.  
Also, the cost of obtaining photocopies of annual reports from overseas universities is 
prohibitively expensive. Future research could expand the time period under study to include 
companies’ annual reports prior to early regulations such as the Bosch (1991) and Cadbury 
(1992) reports.  Secondly, the sample was truncated as only the largest 50 companies were 
included.  This non-random sample limits the analysis.  It is assumed that firm size is related 
to disclosure behaviour, but this cannot be proved without expanding the sample.  Thirdly, the 
number of variables studied is limited.  The antecedents of remuneration logics require further 
investigation. 
 
5.0 Findings 
The findings are presented below.  The descriptive statistics highlight the differences between 
the largest 50 companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  While there are significant 
size differences, the companies’ performance across the three countries is comparable.   The 
issuers of regulations and their motivation to issue new regulations are described.  Consistent 
with other studies (e.g. Enrione et al., 2006) corporate scandals are the main motivator for 
creating new regulation.  The content analysis of the regulations and annual reports reveals 
that the remuneration logics are used extensively in Australia and the UK, but not in New 
Zealand.  Correlation analyses are presented on the relationships between the remuneration 
logics, and the relationships between remuneration logics and the financials of the companies.  
Also, differences between companies listed in one country and multiple countries are 
examined.  These analyses highlight the influence of regulation and firm size on the use of 
remuneration logics.      
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sampled companies operate in a wide variety of industries (see table 5).  The banking and 
finance industry in all three countries contains the highest number of companies.  The 
industry classification data reflects the idiosyncrasies of the three countries.  However, there 
are few statistically significant correlations between industries and remuneration logics
203
.   
 
--- Insert Table 5 here --- 
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 The results of this analysis are not reported here. 
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The majority of the largest 50 companies listed on the ASX, NZX and FTSE in both 1998 and 
2007 also have their headquarters in that country (see table 6).  It is also common for the 
largest 50 companies to be listed on multiple stock exchanges (see table 7).  While there are 
many dual listings of companies on the ASX and NZX, Australian companies are more likely 
to be in the NZX Top50 than New Zealand companies are to be in the ASX Top50.  Many 
Australian and New Zealand companies are also listed on overseas stock exchanges, but few 
are large enough to be in the FTSE Top50.  The Top50 on each stock exchange and in each 
time period can be divided into two groups fairly evenly: Companies listed on one stock 
exchange and companies listed on multiple stock exchanges, although UK companies have 
shifted towards multiple listings by 2007.  It is likely that there are significant differences 
between these two groups as companies listed on multiple exchanges will face more 
regulatory and investor scrutiny than those listed on one exchange.  The differences between 
these two groups are analysed later. 
 
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
--- Insert Table 7 here --- 
 
The financial statistics highlight while New Zealand’s largest companies are much smaller 
than Australia’s largest companies, both of these countries’ largest companies are much 
smaller than the UK’s largest companies (see table 8).  The financial statistics are presented in 
the local currency, but the New Zealand dollar has the least value and the UK pound has the 
most value in both 1998 and 2007, which reinforces the size difference.  The performance of 
Australia’s, New Zealand’s and the UK’s largest companies is comparable, although the UK’s 
largest companies are more highly leveraged than Australia’s and New Zealand’s which also 
distorts their return on equity.  The performance of all companies in 2007 is much higher than 
in 1998, perhaps reflecting the effects of the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998) and the 
recent global economic boom (2002-2007).  The relationship between the financial statistics 
and remuneration logics are discussed later. 
 
--- Insert Table 8 here --- 
 
5.2 The Issuers of Regulations and Their Motivation to Issue Regulation 
Australian institutions have produced at least 18 regulations on executive remuneration 
between 1991 and 2007 (see table 9a and 9b).  Du Plessis et al. (2005) suggests that the early 
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regulations, the Bosch (1991, 1993 and 1995) and Hilmer (1993 and 1998) reports, have been 
largely forgotten and overshadowed by subsequent developments.  The Bosch reports were 
produced by collaboration between many institutions, whereas the Hilmer reports were 
produced by the Sydney Institute (a privately funded think tank).  These reports were 
produced in response to “the excesses of the 1980s”, court decisions and overseas 
developments in corporate governance (e.g. Cadbury, 1992).   
 
The Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA, formerly AIMA) and the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) have both periodically produced many 
reports on executive remuneration, usually in the form of corporate governance codes of best 
practice.  These reports were motivated by a range of factors, particularly high profile 
corporate collapses and changes in Australia’s corporate law.  Similarly, the Horwath (2002) 
report and Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Act (2004) were motivated 
by high profile corporate collapses.  These include HIH, Harris Scarfe, Ansett and OneTel 
(see Du Plessis et al., 2005). 
 
The issuers most involved in producing regulations are the professional associations (22%), 
the directors’ association (15%), the fund managers’ association (12%), the financial services 
association (12%), and the stock exchange (10%).  However, the involvement of these issuers 
has been somewhat sporadic between 1991 and 2007.  More recently, the stock exchange, the 
directors’ association and investors’ association have produced the most regulations.  Given 
that corporate collapses are the most cited reason for producing regulations and that issuers 
are also related to the corporate collapses (e.g. directors), the issuers are acting to defend their 
legitimacy. 
 
--- Insert Table 9a here --- 
--- Insert Table 9b here --- 
 
New Zealand institutions have not produced many regulations on executive remuneration and 
are typically produced by one issuer (see table 10).  Table 10 overstates the number of 
regulations as the NZX’s (formerly, NZSE) three editions of listing rules do not include any 
recommendations of substance regarding executives’ remuneration.  Except for the 2004 
edition which states that “2.6 Every Issuer should have a formal and transparent method to 
recommend Director remuneration packages to shareholders. [And] 2.7 Directors are 
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encouraged to take a portion of their remuneration under a performance-based Equity Security 
compensation plan…”  Further, the two reports of the NZ Securities Commission are part of 
the same report.  Thus, New Zealand institutions only produced 7 regulations on executive 
remuneration between 1991 and 2007. 
 
The New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) reports and the NZ Securities 
Commission report were motivated by the financial crisis of 2000-2002, particularly the 
Enron and Arthur Anderson debacle.  NZICA was most certainly defending its legitimacy in 
its reports.  For example, NZICA (2003a, p.1) stated that “The working group did not find any 
evidence of systematic reporting failure in New Zealand. Nor did time working group 
consider reporting failure of the magnitude found in the United States likely in New Zealand 
at this time.”  These reports were part of NZICA’s strategy to reassure the public that the New 
Zealand companies were not affected by the financial crisis.  But New Zealand has not been 
immune to corporate governance problems.  For example, the partial re-nationalisation of Air 
New Zealand in 2001; the profit warnings of Vertex in 2002; the receivership of Feltex in 
2006; the collapse of many finance companies in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (Stock, 2008). 
 
--- Insert Table 10 here --- 
 
UK institutions produced many regulations between 1991 and 2008, but only 9 are concerned 
with executive remuneration (see table 11).  The early reports were motivated by corporate 
scandals and the perception that directors were overpaid, whereas the later reports were part 
of a periodic review process. The stock exchange (16%) and stock exchange regulator (26%) 
as well as professional associations have been involved in producing the majority of 
regulations.  The Confederation of British Industry (CBI), a business association, has also 
been involved with two significant reports, Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) which lead 
to the Combined Code.  The Combined Code is significant as listed companies must comply 
with it or explain why they do not comply.  It uses many of the remuneration logics.  The CBI 
represents 200,000 British companies including 80% of the FTSE100 companies 
(www.cbi.org.uk).  Thus, UK companies are self-governed in the sense that many of their 
directors have served on the committees which produced the regulations on executive 
remuneration. 
 
--- Insert Table 11 here --- 
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The most common issuer of regulations in Australia, New Zealand and the UK are 
professional associations, which are predominately institutes of chartered accountants.  
Directors, executives and business associations have also been common issuers.  Stock 
exchanges and their regulators have been common issuers in the UK, but not Australia and 
New Zealand.  Further the majority of these regulations have been produced in response to 
both local and international corporate scandals.  The issuers are defending their legitimacy by 
issuing regulations and manipulating the isomorphic pressures by setting the regulations 
which they must adhere to. 
 
5.3 The Use of Remuneration Logics in Regulations and Annual Reports 
Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 and the UK’s Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
2002 both require companies to include a remuneration report in their annual report which 
explains their remuneration policies.  However, the remuneration logics are almost absent 
from these regulations.  Instead, the remuneration logics are found in the ASX’s Principles of 
Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (2003 and 2007) and the 
Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998, 
2003, 2006 and 2008).  For example, both codes include the fairness logic (ASX, 2007, p.35: 
“Remunerate fairly and responsibly”; FRC, 2006, p.21, “The total rewards potentially 
available should not be excessive.”).  However, both codes do not mandate that the 
remuneration logics within the codes must be included in companies’ remuneration reports 
and both codes do not prescribe how these principles (in the form of remuneration logics) 
should be implemented in practice.  Both countries have adopted a principles-based or a 
‘comply or explain’ approach; that is, companies are free to design and explain their executive 
remuneration practices as they see fit, but they must disclose their executive remuneration 
policies and practices.  New Zealand regulations are almost nonexistent in comparison to 
Australia and the UK. 
 
Given the different regulatory environments in Australia, New Zealand and the UK, the use of 
remuneration logics in regulations is not surprising (see chart 1).  In the UK, the Cadbury 
(1992) report contains 4 remuneration logics, the Greenbury (1995) report contains 9 and the 
Combined Code (1998) contains 7.  All of the regulations in the UK contain multiple 
remuneration logics and there is an upward trend in the use of remuneration logics between 
1991 and 2008.  In Australia, the Bosch (1991; 1993; 1995) and Hilmer reports (1993; 1998) 
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averaged 2.2 remuneration logics, whereas the regulations produced by AICD, IFSA and 
ASX between 2000 and 2007 averaged 7.1 remuneration logics.  The upward trend in the use 
of remuneration logics is more pronounced in Australia than in the UK.  In New Zealand, the 
NZICA (2002; 2003a; 2003b) reports averaged 2.3 remuneration logics, the Securities 
Commission (2004) report included 6, and the NZ Shareholders’ Association (2004) web-
article included 4, and the Institute of Directors’ (2005) code included 7.  While chart 1 shows 
an upward trend in the use of remuneration logics for New Zealand, regulations in New 
Zealand did not include any remuneration logics until 2002.  
 
--- Insert Chart 1 here --- 
 
The same trends in the use of remuneration logics in regulations are found in the largest 50 
companies’ annual reports in Australia, New Zealand and the UK (see chart 2).  Companies’ 
annual reports contained on average the following remuneration logics: in the UK, 6.5 in 1998 
and 8.2 in 2007; in Australia, 3.4 in 1998 and 8.7 in 2007; and in New Zealand, 0.9 in 1998 
and 3.6 in 2007.  Companies in all three countries experienced an upward trend in the average 
use of remuneration logics, particularly Australia.  New Zealand lags behind Australia and the 
UK in the use of remuneration logics in both regulations and annual reports.  In 1998, there is 
a clear gap between Australia and the UK, but in 2007, Australia and the UK are at 
comparable levels.  However, whether the increased volume of disclosure has had any other 
benefits (e.g. increased stock market efficiency) is indeterminable. 
 
--- Insert Chart 2 here --- 
 
Each of the remuneration logics has increased in usage between 1998 and 2007 in both 
regulations and annual reports in all three countries (see table 12).  Once a remuneration logic 
is included in a regulation or an annual report, subsequent editions of the regulation or annual 
report also include the remuneration logic; that is, it was rare for an issuer or a company to 
stop using a remuneration logic once it was adopted.  For the remuneration logics used in the 
largest 50 companies’ annual reports, the most used are the pay-for-performance, market and 
human resources logics, whereas the least used are the appropriate, contribution and fairness 
logics.  While the fairness logic is used extensively in the regulations of all three countries, it 
rates consistently as the least used remuneration logic in the companies’ annual reports in all 
three countries.  The results show that companies favour those logics which justify increasing 
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remuneration; for example, the market logic implies that pay should be competitive and 
Jensen et al. (2005) points out that no one wants to have below average remuneration, so 
companies set their remuneration levels to be consistent with the upper quartile of comparable 
firms or increase the average by altering the comparator group.   
 
--- Insert Table 12 here --- 
 
The increase in the number of remuneration logics used per company is significant (see table 
13).  In Australia, in 1998 36% of companies used 0-2 remuneration logics and 6% used 8-10, 
whereas in 2007 0% used 0-2 and 80% used 8-10.  In New Zealand, in 1998 81% of 
companies used 0-2 remuneration logics and 2% used 8-10, whereas in 2007 44% used 0-2 
and 14% used 8-10.  In the UK, in 1998 2% of companies used 0-2 remuneration logics and 
29% used 8-10, whereas in 2007 2% used 0-2 and 72% used 8-10.  The change in the use of 
remuneration logics between 1998 and 2007 is most pronounced amongst Australia 
companies with all companies using at least 6 remuneration logics.  In 2007, UK companies 
had not adopted as many remuneration logics as Australian companies, but the two groups are 
not significantly different as only one UK company had less than 6 remuneration logics.  The 
findings indicate that Australian and UK companies have responded to the financial crises and 
subsequent regulations by adopting the language of the regulations.  After the Greenbury 
(1995) report was issued, a reporter for the Financial Times, Jim Kelly (1996, p.13) 
commented “Greenbury requires a statement of remuneration policy and E&Y found that the 
dreaded accountants’ disease – known as “boilerplate” – had taken hold. Time and time again, 
companies’ rewards policy was designed to “attract, retain and motivate”, a phrase hijacked 
from the Greenbury report itself.”  The findings indicate that the “boilerplate” disease is a 
consequence of regulation.  Variation in the executive remuneration policies of Australian and 
UK companies greatly diminished between 1998 and 2007. 
 
--- Insert Table 13 here --- 
 
Table 12 shows that the sample of Top50 and the sample of Continuous companies use the 
remuneration logics to the same extend; there are no statistically significant differences 
between these two groups.  However, the sample of Continuous companies is eclectic as a 
result of mergers and acquisitions between 1998 and 2007.  To determine whether stable 
companies change their remuneration policies, a sub-sample containing only those companies 
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which were continuously listed and that do not make any major acquisitions between 1998 
and 2007 was constructed.  The differences in means between 1998 and 2007 are analysed 
(see table 14).  The findings show that stable continuously listed companies in all three 
countries used the remuneration logics to the same degree as less stable companies.  
 
--- Insert Table 14 here --- 
 
5.4 The Relationships between the Remuneration Logics 
Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that there was a negative correlation between the use of the 
agency and human resources logics in US companies from 1976 and 1990.  This research 
analyses the correlations between the remuneration logics below. 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for Australian companies in 1998 and 2007 
reveals few statistically significant results (see tables 15 and 16).  A number of the 
correlations are incalculable because some of the remuneration logics are used by no 
companies (the fairness logic in 1998) or all companies (the pay-for-performance and market 
logics).  The results indicate that no statistically significant relationships between the 
remuneration logics persist over time, except for the correlation between the human resources 
and the consultant logics (0.364** in 1998 and 0.393** in 2007; ** p<0.01).  This result is 
consistent with Crystal’s (1991) concerns that remuneration consultants are not independent, 
but favour the CEO.  There are no statistically significant negative correlations. 
 
--- Insert Table 15 here --- 
--- Insert Table 16 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for New Zealand companies in 1998 and 2007 
reveals many statistically significant results (see tables 17 and 18).  Only the correlation 
between the fairness logic and the other remuneration logics in 1998 is incalculable as no 
companies use the fairness logic.  83% of the correlations in 1998 and 67% in 2007 are 
statistically significant, which is the most of the three countries.  63% of the correlations in 
1998 persist in 2007.  There are no negative correlations.   Many of the correlations between 
the fairness logic and the other remuneration logics in 2007 are not statistically significant, 
except the human resources and market logics.   
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--- Insert Table 17 here --- 
--- Insert Table 18 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics for UK companies in 1998 and 2007 reveals 
very few statistically significant results (see tables 19 and 20).  Only the correlation between 
the market logic and the other remuneration logics in 2007 is incalculable as all companies 
use the market logic.  The results indicate that no statistically significant relationships 
between the remuneration logics persist over time.  There are no statistically significant 
negative correlations. 
 
--- Insert Table 19 here --- 
--- Insert Table 20 here --- 
 
The results from the correlations between remuneration logics highlight the difference 
between heavily regulated (Australia and the UK) and unregulated (New Zealand) countries.  
While regulations in Australia and the UK do not mandate that companies include the 
remuneration logics in their annual reports, the regulations may as well because the coercive 
pressure created by the regulations leads companies to adopt the remuneration logics.  There 
are almost no statistically significant correlations between the remuneration logics amongst 
Australian and UK companies because the coercive (regulatory) pressure crowds-out any 
relationships that might have otherwise existed.  Conversely, in the absence of regulation in 
New Zealand, there are many statistically significant relationships between remuneration 
logics and these generally persist over time.  Amongst New Zealand companies, the 
relationships between the human resources, contribution, achievement, market, appropriate 
and motivation logics are the strongest and most persistent.  Perhaps, in an unregulated 
environment, these companies which adopt these remuneration logics are more efficient that 
those that do not (this is investigated further below). 
 
5.5 The Relationships between Remuneration Logics and the Financials 
The correlations between remuneration logics and the financials for Australian companies in 
1998 and 2007 reveal few statistically significant results (see tables 21 and 22).  Correlations 
between the fairness logic and the financials in 1998 are incalculable as no companies use the 
fairness logic.  Also, correlations between the pay-for-performance and market logics and the 
financial in 2007 are incalculable as all companies use these remuneration logics.  Only 14% 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 424 
of the correlations in 1998 and 6% of the correlations in 2007 are statistically significant.  
None of the statistically significant correlations persist over time.  There are only two 
statistically significant negative correlations.  The consultant logic is negatively correlated 
with both return on assets (-0.204 in 1998; -0.336* in 2007, p<0.05) and return on equity (-
0.023 in 1998; -0.322* in 2007, p<0.05).  Crystal (1991) argues that remuneration consultants 
work for the benefit of the CEO, rather than shareholders.  These correlations support this 
premise as poor firm performance is related to using consultants to justify executive 
remuneration. 
 
--- Insert Table 21 here --- 
--- Insert Table 22 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logics and the financials for New Zealand companies 
in 1998 and 2007 reveals many statistically significant results (see tables 23 and 24). 
Correlations between the fairness logic and the financials in 1998 are incalculable as no 
companies use the fairness logic.  39% in 1998 and 71% in 2007 of the correlations are 
statistically significant, although 26% of the statistically significant correlations in 1998 have 
dissipated in 2007.  The correlation between net profit after tax and the agency logic is 
negative in 1998 (-0.513***; p<0.001), but is positive in 2007 (0.454**; p<0.01); this result is 
yet to be explained.  The consultant logic is negatively correlated with return on assets in 
1998 (-0.310*; p<0.05), but this statistically significant correlation dissipates in 2007.  The 
relationship between the remuneration logics and firm performance is weak.  A firm size 
effect explains the statistically significant correlations.  Larger companies are more likely to 
disclose their remuneration policies because they have more resources available to prepare the 
annual report and they are more visible in the public eye (i.e. they need to legitimise their 
executive remuneration practices). 
 
--- Insert Table 23 here --- 
--- Insert Table 24 here --- 
 
The correlations between remuneration logic and the financials for the UK companies in 1998 
and 2007 reveals very few statistically significant results (see tables 25 and 26).  Correlations 
between the market logic and the financials in 2007 are incalculable as all companies use the 
market logic.  8% in 1998 and 6% in 2007 of the correlations are statistically significant.  
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None of the statistically significant correlations in 1998 are also present in 2007.  There are 
several statistically significant negative correlations.  In 2007, the consultant logic is 
negatively correlated with return on assets (-0.312*, p<0.05). 
 
--- Insert Table 25 here --- 
--- Insert Table 26 here --- 
 
The results indicate that regulations crowd out any relationships between the remuneration 
logics and the financials of the companies.  Regulation creates a coercive pressure and 
Australian and UK companies have responded by adopting the remuneration logics.  In New 
Zealand’s relatively unregulated environment, there is a stronger relationship between the use 
of remuneration logics and the financials of the companies. However, in Australia in 1998 
there was also relatively limited regulation, yet there was not a strong relationship between 
the use of remuneration logics and the financials of the companies.  Alternatively, the results 
indicate a size threshold effect.  That is, when companies reach a certain size (e.g. by market 
capitalisation), they become more visible in the public eye and need to legitimise their 
executive remuneration practices.  In New Zealand, the size of the largest 50 companies 
varies much more than in Australia and the UK.  Thus, the statistically significant results are 
highlighting the difference between the large and small companies in New Zealand.   
 
5.6 The Differences between Companies Listed in One Country and Multiple Countries 
To further examine the size threshold effect, the differences between countries listed in one 
country and multiple countries are analysed (see table 27).  The results show that there are 
few statistically significant differences between Australian and UK companies that are listed 
on one or more stock exchanges, although in 2007 the Australian companies listed on 
multiple stock exchanges are somewhat larger than those listed on one.  Further, the results 
show that New Zealand companies listed on multiple stock exchanges have statistically 
significantly higher average use of the remuneration logics (6 out of 10 in 1998; 8 out of 10 in 
2007).  This highlights the coercive pressure created by country-specific regulations.   
 
--- Insert Table 27 here --- 
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6.0 Discussion 
Enrione et al. (2006) found that corporate scandals were the precipitating jolts that lead to the 
adoption of new corporate governance codes.  However, the newness of these regulations and 
their influence on disclosure behaviour was not studied.  This research found that new 
regulations in Australia, New Zealand and the UK did not contain new remuneration logics.  
Instead, the language of the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports are embedded in 
subsequent regulations.  There have been many precipitating jolts throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, but they have not lead to the creation of new ideas and practices.  The effect of the 
financial crises has been to entrench the existing discourse of executive remuneration in 
regulations and companies’ annual reports.   
 
The discourse of executive remuneration has been scantly studied.  Previous research has 
found that companies use remuneration logics to legitimise their executive remuneration 
practices (Zajac and Westphal, 1995; Wade et al., 1997).  This research found that the 
discourse of executive remuneration used in regulations is also used in companies’ annual 
reports.  The main reason for the homogeneity is that the issuers of the regulations are 
professional, directors’ and business associations, which have an interest in producing 
company-friendly regulations.  Consistent with legitimacy theory, Australian, New Zealand 
and UK companies bolster their legitimacy by seemingly conforming to coercive pressure. 
 
A “boilerplate” approach to executive remuneration policy has emerged.  Companies’ annual 
reports use a plethora of remuneration logics to justify their executive remuneration practices.  
These remuneration logics are seemingly unchallengeable; for example, investors are unlikely 
to question an executive remuneration policy that is designed to align the CEOs interest to 
those of the investors.  The remuneration logics are rhetoric designed to convince 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the efficacy of companies’ executive remuneration 
policies.  The findings show that the “boilerplate” has been increasingly entrenched in 
companies’ annual reports over time.  The “boilerplate” of remuneration logics is bad for 
practice (Ghoshal, 2005) as it crowds out variation.   
 
Interestingly, the fairness logic which is included in many of the regulations is the least used 
remuneration logic.  The fairness logic is, however, inherently ambiguous as fairness is not 
defined.  It is not clear whether fairness is concerned with comparisons, for example, between 
CEOs and employees, or other criteria.  
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7.0 Conclusion 
This research studied the use of remuneration logics in regulations and companies’ annual 
reports in Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  The findings indicated that new regulations 
are produced in response to financial crises and corporate scandals.  Further, the issuers of 
these regulations include stock exchanges, stock exchange regulators, professional 
associations, directors’ associations, business associations, fund managers’ associations and 
investors’ associations.  These regulations often include remuneration logics, which 
originated in the Cadbury (1992) and Greenbury (1995) reports.  UK companies’ annual 
reports in 1998 and 2007 include to high degree these remuneration logics.  While Australian 
regulations have adopted these remuneration logics, they were not extensive used until the 
early 2000s.  Consequently, Australian companies’ annual reports in 1998 did not include 
many remuneration logics, whereas in 2007 they included the same amount of remuneration 
logics as their UK counterparts.   The UK and Australian regulations require companies to 
disclose their executive remuneration policies and have adopted a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to their corporate governance codes of best practice.  And generally UK and 
Australian companies will comply and have adopted the language of executive remuneration 
contained within the regulations.   
 
In contrast, there have been few New Zealand regulations until recently and these regulations 
have not included many of the remuneration logics.  Consequently, New Zealand companies 
do not disclose much information about their executive remuneration policies, although the 
information that is disclosed does include the remuneration logics.  The findings suggest that 
in the absence of regulation, there is a size threshold for the disclosure of executive 
remuneration policies.  That is, in New Zealand there is a strong correlation between firm size 
and the use of the remuneration logics.  Also, New Zealand companies which are listed in 
multiple countries tend to disclose more than those listed in New Zealand only. 
 
The executive remuneration policies of Australian and UK companies have become 
increasingly homogenous over time.  The findings are consistent with institutional 
isomorphism, particularly coercive pressures.  Firstly, normative pressure transmitted the 
discourse of executive remuneration from academia to practice.  This is evidenced by the high 
degree of similarity between the remuneration logics used in regulations and companies’ 
annuals reports, and the academic theories and philosophies related to executive 
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remuneration.  Secondly, coercive pressure has compelled companies to adopt this discourse 
in their annual reports.  This is evidenced by the leader-follower pattern as companies’ 
disclosure in their annual reports has significantly increased after new regulations have been 
issued, but note that the regulations do not mandate that companies use the remuneration 
logics.  Thirdly, mimetic pressure has reinforced this pattern in disclosure.  This is evidenced 
by the time lag in companies adopting the remuneration logics. It takes several years after the 
regulations have been issued for the majority of companies to adopt the remuneration logics 
as some companies take a ‘wait and see’ approach.   
 
The regulations do not mandate that companies use the remuneration logics, yet many 
companies in Australia, New Zealand and the UK do.  The findings indicate that directors’ 
associations, business associations and (to a lesser extent) executives’ associations have had 
significant input into the production of the regulations on executive remuneration.  Since 
these groups have had a degree of control over the regulation (i.e. the coercive pressure), it is 
not surprising that companies have adopted the language of the regulations.  Thus companies 
have managed their legitimacy by quelling public anxiety about executive remuneration by 
complying with regulations and disclosing remuneration logics designed to convince the 
public (including shareholders) of the legitimacy of their executive remuneration practices.  
 
Future research should investigate the companies’ use of remuneration logics in more depth.  
Firstly, the relationship between firm and board characteristics, executive remuneration 
practices, the use of remuneration logics and firm performance should be investigated.  In 
order to determine whether the use of remuneration logics is associated with increased 
efficiency and whether firms decouple their executive remuneration policies from their 
executive remuneration practices.  Secondly, archival analyses which trace the adoption of 
remuneration logics in academic publications, regulations, news media publications and 
companies’ annual reports will provide further evidence on how normative pressures develop 
and whether academia has significantly influenced the language of executive remuneration.  
Thirdly, interviews with executives, directors, investors and other institutional actors will 
provide evidence on whether the remuneration logics are entrenched in the beliefs of these 
actors.  That is, are the remuneration logics confined to regulations and annual reports 
(symbolic meaning) or do these actors use the remuneration logics to justify their beliefs and 
decisions in practice (substance meaning).   
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Tables 
 
Remuneration 
Logics 
Explanations or Justifications Related Theories and Philosophies 
Human 
Resources 
High performing executives are a 
scarce resource, which makes their 
remuneration more costly than other 
employees. Thus a high level of 
remuneration is necessary to attract 
and retain high calibre managerial 
talent. 
Managerialist Theory (Chandler, 
1962); Stewardship Theory 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991); 
Resource Dependency Theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); 
Human Capital Theory (Becker, 
1964) 
Agency Incentives are necessary to align the 
interests of the CEO with those of 
the shareholders. 
Agency Theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1983) 
Pay for 
Performance 
The remuneration of executives 
should rise and fall with firm 
performance. 
 
Scientific Management (Taylor, 
1911); Variable Pay Philosophy 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 1992) 
Contribution Individuals should be rewarded for 
their contribution to firm 
performance. 
Meritocracy (Young, 1958); Theory 
of the Firm (Coase, 1937; Baker, 
1939; Lewellen and Huntsman, 
1970) 
Achievement Individuals should be rewarded for 
the achievement of specific 
performance objectives.  
Goal Setting Theory (Locke, 1968) 
Market Market forces (of supply and 
demand) determine the level and 
form of remuneration.  As 
executives can move freely between 
companies, a competitive 
remuneration package is necessary. 
Market Theory: Classical 
Economics and the Invisible Hand 
(Smith, 1776); Neoclassical 
Economics (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992) 
Fairness Executive remuneration should be 
fair, equity, reasonable and not 
excessive. 
Equity Theory (Adams, 1965) 
Appropriate Executive remuneration should be 
appropriate given the firm’s 
circumstances and the level of 
managerial responsibility. 
Contingency Theory (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1992; Barkema and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998); Managerial 
Discretion Hypothesis (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987) 
Motivation Executives are most effectively 
motivated using monetary 
incentives.  
Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964; 
Porter and Lawler, 1968) 
Consultant External remuneration consultants 
advise boards of directors in order to 
ensure objectivity when setting 
executive remuneration packages.  
Legitimacy Theory (Wade et al., 
1997); Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989) 
Table 1: The Logics Used to Justify Executive Remuneration Practices 
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Institutional Isomorphism
Company
External
Advisors
Competitors
Regulators
Professional
Bodies
Academics
Shareholders
Normative 
Pressure
Coercive Pressure
Mimetic 
Pressure
 
Diagram 1: The Institutional Landscape 
 
Country 1991-1997 1998-2006 2007-2008 Total 
Australia 5 11 2 18 
New Zealand 1 10 0 11 
United Kingdom 2 7 1 10 
Total 8 28 3 39 
Table 2: Number of Regulations in the Sample 
 
Country Top50-1998 Top50-2007 Continuous-
1998 
Continous-2007 
Australia 50 50 48 46 
New Zealand 48 50 45 40 
United Kingdom 49 50 65 49 
Total 147 150 158 135 
Table 3: Number of Annual Reports of Companies in the Sample 
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Remuneration 
Logics 
Examples from Annual Reports Examples from Regulations Keywords 
Human 
Resources 
“The company’s remuneration strategy aims to attract, 
retain and motivate high calibre employees…” 
(Fletcher Building Ltd, 2007, p.46) 
“Boards and remuneration committees must have 
flexibility to offer the packages required to attract, 
retain and motivate people of the calibre and 
experience they need to make their companies 
successful” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 6.5) 
Attract; retain; select; 
secure; or recruit 
Agency “The company believes this shareholding strengthens 
the alignment of senior executives with the interests of 
shareholders and puts their own remuneration at risk 
to long-term company performance.” (Fletcher 
Building Ltd, 2007, p.49) 
“A key concern should be to ensure, through the 
remuneration system, that Directors share the 
interest of shareholder in making the company 
successful.” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 6.16) 
Align or link; 
interests or rewards; 
and CEO and 
shareholders 
Pay for 
Performance 
“Remuneration will incorporate, to a significant 
degree, variable pay for performance elements, both 
short term and long term focussed…” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 1998, p.126) 
 
“A significant proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link 
rewards to corporate and individual performance.” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2006, para. B.1) 
Pay for performance; 
performance based; 
variable; or at risk 
Contribution “…and where each is well rewarded for their 
contribution to the success of the business.” 
(Sainsbury, 1998, p.i) 
 
 
“If a part of executive directors’ remuneration is 
related to entity performance over time, their efforts 
are more likely to be focused on making a 
contribution to future investor returns rather than 
only on short term gains” (New Zealand Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.25) 
Contribute; influence; 
effort; merit; impact; 
or delivery 
Achievement “In 1998 the bonus scheme was structured such that 
the bonus payable was equal to 10% of basic salary for 
the achievement of budgeted EPS targets and 20% for 
the achievement of more stretching EPS targets.” 
(British Aerospace, 1998, p.34) 
“Schemes involving performance bonuses or profit-
sharing can assist in the growth of shareholder 
value by focussing employees on the achievement 
of key short-term individual and collective goals.” 
(New Zealand Institute of Directors, 2005, para. 
3.8) 
Achieve 
Table 4a: Examples of and Keywords associated with the Remuneration Logics 
Appendix D: Institutionalising the Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
433 
 
Remuneration 
Logics 
Examples from Annual Reports Examples from Regulations Keywords 
Market “Executive Directors’ salaries are reviewed each year 
by the Committee and adjusted to reflect the 
performance and the competitiveness of salaries 
relative to the market.” (British Aerospace, 1998, 
p.34) 
“Remuneration as a whole must be reasonable and 
comparable with market standards…” (Australian 
Institute of Company Directors, 2000, para. 5.2) 
Competitive; market; 
comparable; or peers 
Fairness “For 2007, the Committee is looking at ways of 
operating the existing remuneration framework in line 
with the following key principles: …and • reward 
performance on a fair and equitable basis.” 
(Sainsbury, 2007, p.37) 
 
 
“Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly” 
(ASX, 2007, p.35) 
Fair; reasonable; 
equitable; or not 
excessive 
Appropriate “Also, the Committee recognises the need to structure 
remuneration packages to incentivise and reward an 
appropriate balance between long and short term 
performance. (British Aerospace, 1998, p.32) 
“Equity-based remuneration has limitations and can 
contribute to ‘short-termism’ on the part of senior 
executives. Accordingly, it is important to design 
appropriate schemes.” (ASX, 2007, p.36) 
Appropriate 
Motivation “These enhancements aim to strengthen the motivation 
of executives to produce superior performance.” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2007, p.52) 
“Remuneration for directors should be set at levels 
designed to attract, motivate and retain the best 
people available.” (New Zealand Institute of 
Directors, 2005, para. 3.13) 
Motivate or 
incentivise 
Consultant “Directors are satisfied that they have received 
independent advice that this constitutes an appropriate 
remuneration package for the role of chief executive 
officer.” (Fletcher Building Ltd, 2007, p.45) 
“The committee may need to draw on outside 
advice. This should combine quality and judgement 
with independence.” (Greenbury, 1995, para. 4.17) 
Independent or 
external; and 
consultants or 
advisors 
Table 4b: Examples of and Keywords associated with the Remuneration Logics 
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Industries Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
Banking & Finance 9 11 6 5 14 11 
Investment Companies 2 2 5 4 0 0 
Construction & Property 5 5 5 8 0 1 
Consumer Goods 5 3 5 2 5 7 
Engineering 1 0 0 4 3 2 
Health 1 1 1 3 2 2 
Industrials 5 5 1 0 1 0 
Leisure 2 2 2 2 1 0 
Media 2 2 3 2 5 5 
Natural Resources 9 6 5 4 3 5 
Professional & Support 
Services 1 2 
 
0 
 
0 1 0 
Retailing 5 3 3 4 6 6 
Technology 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Telecoms 1 2 2 2 5 1 
Transport 1 5 6 5 2 1 
Utilities 1 1 6 4 1 4 
Table 5: Industry Classification of Largest 50 Companies
205
 
 
Headquarters Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
Australia 47 46 5 7 0 1 
New Zealand 2 1 44 41 0 0 
United Kingdom 0 0 1 1 47 47 
Other 1 3 0 1 2 2 
Table 6: Location of Headquarters of Largest 50 Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
205
 While most companies do not operate exclusively in one industry, companies were classified into the industry in 
which the majority of their revenue is earned. 
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Countries 
Listed  
Australia 
– 1998 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand 
– 1998  
New 
Zealand 
– 2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom 
– 2007  
New Zealand 0 0 34 30 0 0 
New Zealand and 
Australia 8 6 9 16 0 0 
New Zealand and Others 0 0 4 3 0 0 
New Zealand, Australia 
and UK 0 0 3 1 0 0 
Australia 21 31 0 0 0 0 
Australia and UK 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Australia and Others 20 12 0 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 0 21 10 
UK and Others 0 0 0 0 28 40 
Table 7: Countries in which Largest 50 Companies are Listed 
 
Financials  Australia 
– 1998 
 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand – 
1998  
New 
Zealand – 
2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom  
– 2007  
 AU$/US$ AU$/US$ NZ$/US$ NZ$/US$ UK£/US$ UK£/US$ 
Exchange Rate on 31 
December 
0.612 0.878 0.527 0.768 1.663 1.984 
 AU$ 
(000,000) 
AU$ 
(000,000) 
NZ$ 
(000,000) 
NZ$ 
(000,000) 
UK£ 
(000,000) 
UK£ 
(000,000) 
Market Capitalisation 7,916
206
 
(9,088)
207
 
23,661 
(25,146) 
2,842 
(7,125) 
5,326 
(13,358) 
19,119 
(20,098) 
27,847 
(29,163) 
Revenue 5,975 
(6,852) 
11,842 
(13,972) 
2,337 
(5,660) 
2,628 
(6,430) 
9,958 
(9,524) 
22,902 
(33,322) 
Net Profit after Tax 394 
(604) 
1,691 
(2,548) 
125 
(575) 
414 
(1,063) 
711 
(572) 
2,227 
(3,222) 
Total Assets 22,601 
(45,069) 
54,184 
(109,239) 
8,913 
(29,784) 
20,171 
(78,825) 
42,522 
(65,831) 
129,845 
(303,381) 
Net Assets 4,065 
(4,822) 
7,959 
(9,000) 
1,672 
(3,566) 
1,896 
(4,642) 
5,716 
(12,176) 
12,186 
(18,457) 
 AU$ AU$ NZ$ NZ$ UK£ UK£ 
Dividend per Share 0.31 
(0.26) 
0.75 
(0.67) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
0.24 
(0.30) 
0.19 
(0.13) 
0.29 
(0.22) 
 Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio 
Return on Assets 4.50% 
(3.77%) 
7.97% 
(7.91%) 
5.78% 
(6.59%) 
8.91% 
(8.15%) 
6.84% 
(6.84%) 
8.10% 
(7.02%) 
Return on Equity 10.99% 
(7.93%) 
22.40% 
(19.89%) 
10.19% 
(14.06%) 
19.83% 
(20.31%) 
23.90% 
(29.11%) 
40.01% 
(83.87) 
Debt-to-equity 3.18 
(4.74) 
4.96 
(8.86) 
2.01 
(3.94) 
2.90 
(8.04) 
7.38 
(10.19) 
8.77 
(15.26) 
Table 8: Financial Statistics of Largest 50 Companies 
                                                 
206
 The first number in each box is the average. 
207
 The second number (in parentheses) in each box is the standard deviation. 
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Australia                 
Bosch Report 
(1
st
 ed.) 
1991 
1   1 1 3  2      
 
8 
Excesses of the 1980s. 
Bosch Report 
(2
nd
 ed.) 1993 1   1 1 3 1 2      
 
 
9 
Excesses of the 1980s; Influence of 
Cadbury & US Business Roundtable 
reports; Australian court decisions. 
Hilmer Report 
(1
st
 ed.) 1993             1 
 
 
1 
Aftermath of the AWA Case; Excesses 
of the 1980s; New management theories; 
Developments in UK. 
Bosch Report 
(3
rd
 ed.) 1995    1 1 3  1      
 
 
 
 
 
6 
New listing rules & laws; Australian 
court decisions; Overseas developments 
in corporate governance, e.g. General 
Motors guideline (1992), Cadbury report 
(1992), Hong Kong code (1995), etc; 
Influence of institutional investors. 
AIMA (1
st
 ed.) 1995       1       1 --- 
Hilmer Report 
(2
nd
 ed.) 1998             1 
 
 
1 
Aftermath of the AWA case; Excesses 
of the 1980s; Overseas developments in 
corporate governance, particularly UK. 
IFSA (3
rd
 ed.) 1999       1       
 
1 
Influence of fund managers; The Hoare 
Panel (1994); OECD principles. 
Table 9a: Issuers of Regulations in Australia and Their Stated Motivation (2000-2007)
208
 
 
                                                 
208
 The bolded number indicates the main issuer of the regulation. 
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AICD on ESOS 2001    1          1 Corporations Act 2001. 
Corporations 
Act 2001   1           
 
1 
Doubts about the enforceability of the 
old Corporations Law. 
IFSA (4th ed.) 2002       1       
 
1 
Excesses of 1980s and recent high 
profile collapses 
Horwath Report 2002            1 1 
 
 
2 
Recent collapses, e.g. HIH, Harris 
Scarfe, Ansett and OneTel.; US Blue 
Ribbon Committee Report (1999) 
ASX Principles 
(1st ed.) 2003 1             
 
1 --- 
AICD on 
Executives 2003    1          
 
1 
Corporations Act and new ASX listing 
rules. 
ASA on 
Executive Pay 2004         1     
 
1 
Concern over growth in executive pay 
levels and relationship to performance. 
CLERP Act  2004   1           
1 High profile corporate collapses; Aim to 
restore confidence to the market. 
IFSA (5th ed.) 2004       1       1 Excesses of the 1980s; CLERP 2004. 
AICD on 
Executive 
Incentives 2007    1     1  1   
 
 
3 Periodic review of policies 
ASX Principles 
(2nd ed.) 2007 1             
 
1 --- 
Proportional 
Involvement 
(1991-2007)  10% 0% 5% 15% 7% 22% 12% 12% 5% 0% 2% 2% 7% 
 
 
Table 9b: Issuers of Regulations in Australia and Their Stated Motivation (2000-2007) 
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New Zealand                 
NZSE Listing 
Rules (1st ed.) 1994 1             
 
1 --- 
NZSE Listing 
Rules (2nd ed.) 1999 1             
 
1 --- 
NZICA on 
Transparency  2002      1        
 
1 
Response to US corporate governance 
and auditing crisis, e.g. Enron and 
Arthur Andersen 
NZICA on 
Reporting  2003      1        
 
1 
Response to US accounting scandals, 
e.g. Enron and WorldCom 
NZICA on 
Corporate 
Governance 2003      1        
1 NZICA on Reporting (2003); US crisis 
& Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002); OECD 
principles. 
NZX Listing 
Rules (3rd ed.) 2003 1             
1 
--- 
NZ Securities 
Commission - 
Background & 
Consultant 2003  1            
 
1 
Initiated by Minister of Commerce; 
Draws on local bodies work (e.g. 
NZICA) and international practice (e.g. 
OECD); US corporate governance crisis. 
NZ Securities 
Commission - 
Principles 2004  1            
 
1 
Initiated by Minister of Commerce; 
Draws on local bodies work (e.g. 
NZICA) and international practice (e.g. 
OECD); US corporate governance crisis. 
NZSA on CEO 
Pay 2004         1     
1 
Shareholder disquiet 
IOD's Code 2005    1          1 --- 
Proportional 
Involvement  30% 20% 0% 10% 0% 30% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Table 10: Issuers of Regulations in New Zealand and Their Stated Motivation 
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United 
Kingdom  
               
Cadbury Report 1992 1 1    1        
3 Corporate scandals, e.g. BBCI & 
Maxwell; Societal perception that 
directors are overpaid; Harsh economic 
climate. 
Greenbury 
Report 1995           1   
1 Perception that directors received too 
many share options when utilities were 
privatised; Golden handshakes; 
Perception that no one is accountability 
for directors’ remuneration. 
Hampel 1998 1   1  1 1 1   1   
6 Cadbury (1992) & Greenbury (1995) 
reports; Corporate scandals. 
Combined Code 
(1st ed.) 1998  1            
1 
Hampel report (1998). 
CIMA Report 2001      1        
1 Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and 
Hampel (1998) reports. 
Combined Code 
(2nd ed.) 2003  1            
1 
Higgs (2003) and Smith (2003) reports. 
Deloitte Report 
(2004) 2004   1          1 
 
2 
Report requested by Department of 
Trade & Industry. 
Combined Code 
(3rd ed.) 2006  1            
1 Biennial review by Financial Reporting 
Council. 
Combined Code 
(4th ed.) 2008 1 1    1        
3 Biennial review by Financial Reporting 
Council. 
Proportional 
Involvement  16% 26% 5% 5% 0% 21% 5% 5% 0% 0% 11% 0% 5% 
  
Table 11: Issuers of Regulations in the UK and Their Stated Motivation 
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Chart 1: Number of Remuneration Logics in Regulations 
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Chart 2: Number of Remuneration Logics in Annual Reports of Companies 
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# of 
Texts 
Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant Total 
UK             
Top50-2007 50 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.44 0.92 1.00 0.36 0.80 0.90 0.96 8.18 
Top50-1998 48 0.90 0.67 0.96 0.27 0.77 0.92 0.14 0.50 0.84 0.69 6.50 
Continuous-2007 49 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.43 0.92 1.00 0.37 0.82 0.90 0.96 8.18 
Continuous-1998 65 0.78 0.62 0.89 0.22 0.52 0.88 0.14 0.43 0.74 0.66 5.88 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 8 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.14 0.43 1.00 0.71 0.71 0.86 0.71 7.43 
Regulation-Pre1998 2 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 6.50 
             
Australia             
Top50-2007 50 0.92 0.90 1.00 0.72 0.90 1.00 0.66 0.88 0.80 0.90 8.68 
Top50-1998 50 0.52 0.22 0.56 0.12 0.22 0.60 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.64 3.42 
Continuous-2007 46 0.93 0.89 1.00 0.74 0.91 1.00 0.63 0.89 0.80 0.91 8.72 
Continuous-1998 48 0.46 0.21 0.58 0.10 0.25 0.56 0.00 0.23 0.33 0.54 3.27 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 5 0.69 0.62 0.69 0.31 0.08 0.54 0.69 0.46 0.69 0.23 5.00 
Regulation-Pre1998 13 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.40 0.00 2.40 
             
New Zealand             
Top50-2007 50 0.54 0.34 0.66 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.22 0.30 0.32 0.28 3.58 
Top50-1998 49 0.13 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.88 
Continuous-2007 40 0.60 0.38 0.68 0.28 0.40 0.43 0.25 0.38 0.35 0.35 4.08 
Continuous-1998 45 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.11 1.13 
             
Regulation-1998to2007 10 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.40 0.00 3.00 
Regulation-Pre1998 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 12: Average Use of Remuneration Logics in the Annual Reports of Companies and Regulations 
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Number of 
Remuneration 
Logics 
Australia 
– 1998 
 
Australia 
– 2007  
New 
Zealand – 
1998  
New 
Zealand – 
2007  
United 
Kingdom 
– 1998 
United 
Kingdom  
– 2007  
0 9 0 35 7 1 0 
1 5 0 3 8 0 0 
2 4 0 2 7 0 1 
3 7 0 2 5 1 0 
4 8 0 3 7 2 0 
5 5 0 2 5 10 0 
6 8 5 0 1 10 2 
7 1 5 0 3 12 11 
8 1 7 0 3 8 16 
9 2 17 1 2 4 13 
10 0 16 0 2 2 7 
Total 50 50 48 50 49 50 
Table 13: Number of Remuneration Logics per Company for Largest 50 Companies 
 
 Australia New Zealand United Kingdom 
 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 1998 2007 Sig. 
Human Resources 0.500 0.929 *** 0.108 0.622 *** 0.871 0.936  
Agency 0.238 0.905 *** 0.135 0.405 ** 0.613 0.839 * 
Pay for Performance 0.571 1.000 *** 0.270 0.676 *** 0.871 0.936  
Contribution 0.119 0.738 *** 0.108 0.297 * 0.226 0.419  
Achievement 0.293 0.905 *** 0.162 0.405 * 0.586 0.936 ** 
Market 0.595 1.000 *** 0.081 0.432 *** 0.936 1.000  
Fairness 0.000 0.592 *** 0.000 0.243 ** 0.129 0.387 * 
Appropriate 0.268 0.905 *** 0.081 0.405 ** 0.517 0.774 * 
Motivation 0.381 0.810 *** 0.108 0.378 ** 0.807 0.871  
Consultant 0.571 0.905 *** 0.108 0.351 * 0.645 0.968 ** 
Total Remuneration 
Logics 
3.524 8.691 *** 1.162 4.216 *** 6.129 8.065 *** 
Number of 
Continuously Listed 
Companies
209
 
42 37 31 
Table 14: Difference between Means of Continuously Listed Companies
210
 
 
                                                 
209
 The number of continuously listed companies has been reduced to those companies that have not changed 
significantly between 1998 and 2007, e.g. no major mergers or acquisitions.  
210
 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.220 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
*0.358 0.276 1.000        
Contribution 0.108 **0.547 0.203 1.000       
Achievement 0.071 0.267 **0.404 0.225 1.000      
Market **0.441 **0.434 **0.674 0.176 **0.363 1.000     
Fairness       1.000    
Appropriate *0.346 0.128 0.206 **0.468 0.102 0.170  1.000   
Motivation **0.637 0.205 *0.329 0.108 0.164 *0.357  *0.299 1.000  
Consultant **0.364 **0.398 0.259 0.277 0.226 **0.493  0.134 *0.302 1.000 
Table 15: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for Australian Companies in 1998
211
 
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.147 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
  1.000        
Contribution 0.144 0.238  1.000       
Achievement **0.393 0.111  0.238 1.000      
Market      1.000     
Fairness -0.056 0.042  0.023 -0.099  1.000    
Appropriate 0.118 0.082  0.181 0.082  0.125 1.000   
Motivation 0.221 *0.333  -0.089 0.000  -0.042 -0.185 1.000  
Consultant **0.393 0.111  -0.059 **0.556  -0.099 0.082 0.167 1.000 
Table 16: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for Australian Companies in 2007 
  
                                                 
211
 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency **0.423 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
**0.543 **0.474 1.000        
Contribution *0.342 **0.545 **0.374 1.000       
Achievement **0.429 **0.423 **0.693 *0.342 1.000      
Market **0.810 **0.423 **0.393 **0.570 0.238 1.000     
Fairness       1.000    
Appropriate **0.552 **0.377 0.134 *0.314 0.236 **0.552  1.000   
Motivation **0.423 **0.644 **0.474 0.234 **0.683 0.163  **0.377 1.000  
Consultant **0.423 **0.644 **0.474 0.234 **0.423 **0.423  **0.377 **0.644 1.000 
Table 17: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for New Zealand Companies in 1998 
  
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency *0.324 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
0.185 *0.337 1.000        
Contribution **0.490 **0.434 0.177 1.000       
Achievement **0.461 **0.413 **0.402 **0.567 1.000      
Market **0.640 0.221 0.214 **0.479 **0.523 1.000     
Fairness *0.296 0.128 0.177 0.068 0.153 **0.380 1.000    
Appropriate *0.342 0.175 *0.286 *0.284 **0.487 **0.387 0.179 1.000   
Motivation **0.633 *0.322 0.040 *0.360 0.265 **0.523 0.257 **0.393 1.000  
Consultant **0.397 0.117 0.260 *0.314 0.241 **0.429 0.099 **0.369 0.145 1.000 
Table 18: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for New Zealand Companies in 2007 
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 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.053 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
-0.070 0.076 1.000        
Contribution 0.050 0.024 -0.110 1.000       
Achievement -0.020 0.043 0.136 -0.009 1.000      
Market -0.101 0.269 *0.315 0.010 0.197 1.000     
Fairness -0.055 *0.284 0.084 0.151 0.220 0.122 1.000    
Appropriate -0.061 0.188 0.211 0.219 0.060 0.006 0.167 1.000   
Motivation **0.398 -0.072 -0.091 0.140 0.027 -0.132 0.023 -0.101 1.000  
Consultant 0.069 0.010 -0.137 *0.299 -0.039 -0.036 -0.108 0.058 0.066 1.000 
Table 19: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for UK Companies in 1998 
  
 
 Human 
Resources Agency 
Pay for 
Performance Contribution Achievement Market Fairness Appropriate Motivation Consultant 
Human 
Resources 
1.000          
Agency 0.239 1.000         
Pay for 
Performance 
**0.479 0.239 1.000        
Contribution 0.181 0.079 0.181 1.000       
Achievement *0.316 0.118 *0.316 0.261 1.000      
Market      1.000     
Fairness -0.060 -0.108 -0.060 0.091 0.068  1.000    
Appropriate **0.408 -0.031 0.153 0.040 0.221  0.271 1.000   
Motivation 0.272 0.082 0.272 0.027 0.147  -0.028 0.000 1.000  
Consultant **0.479 0.239 **0.479 0.181 *0.316  -0.060 0.153 0.272 1.000 
Table 20: Correlations between Remuneration Logics for UK Companies in 2007 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.039 0.119 0.066 0.109 -0.013 0.248 -0.087 0.109 0.205 
Agency 0.101 -0.039 -0.121 0.105 0.074 0.218 -0.006 -0.015 0.054 
Pay for Performance *0.330 *0.313 0.111 **0.374 *0.296 0.268 -0.182 -0.056 *0.282 
Contribution 0.205 0.150 -0.174 0.250 0.136 **0.377 -0.173 0.006 0.236 
Achievement 0.219 0.214 0.253 0.257 0.194 *0.291 0.120 0.231 *0.279 
Market 0.174 0.237 0.052 0.244 0.127 0.189 -0.117 -0.028 0.254 
Fairness          
Appropriate 0.205 0.088 0.233 0.203 0.079 **0.390 0.088 *0.349 0.251 
Motivation 0.046 0.014 0.029 0.125 0.073 *0.331 -0.050 0.056 0.171 
Consultant 0.032 0.154 -0.103 0.150 0.006 0.233 -0.204 -0.023 0.185 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.236 0.229 0.068 *0.324 0.173 **0.446 -0.116 0.104 *0.343 
Table 21: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for Australian Companies in 1998
212
 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.255 *0.352 *0.317 0.080 0.024 0.042 0.077 0.131 0.106 
Agency -0.010 0.032 -0.056 -0.011 -0.055 -0.160 0.019 0.028 0.090 
Pay for Performance          
Contribution 0.188 0.140 0.150 *0.309 0.157 0.091 -0.137 0.012 0.252 
Achievement -0.006 -0.022 -0.132 -0.014 -0.153 0.055 -0.077 0.003 0.129 
Market          
Fairness 0.063 -0.082 -0.017 -0.164 -0.123 -0.018 -0.073 -0.146 -0.020 
Appropriate 0.121 -0.017 0.225 0.078 -0.004 0.221 0.086 0.129 0.135 
Motivation 0.136 0.182 -0.021 0.034 0.058 0.071 0.117 0.119 0.049 
Consultant 0.210 0.092 -0.079 0.158 0.050 0.174 *-0.336 *-0.322 0.141 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.261 0.169 0.101 0.126 -0.006 0.129 -0.092 -0.020 0.236 
Table 22: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for Australian Companies in 2007 
                                                 
212
 Key: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level; ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources **0.440 *0.346 0.039 **0.461 **0.380 0.246 0.028 0.0362 **0.384 
Agency 0.241 *0.308 ***-0.512 *0.354 *0.336 0.039 *-0.328 *-0.286 0.055 
Pay for Performance ***0.714 ***0.642 0.108 ***0.677 ***0.628 0.248 -0.170 0.055 *0.289 
Contribution *0.336 0.258 -0.086 0.279 0.262 0.155 0.021 0.113 0.029 
Achievement ***0.568 **0.457 0.176 ***0.511 ***0.516 *0.359 -0.091 0.080 0.173 
Market *0.285 0.203 -0.040 0.276 0.251 -0.011 0.071 0.045 0.133 
Fairness          
Appropriate -0.082 -0.120 0.036 -0.138 -0.145 0.090 *0.343 0.222 -0.050 
Motivation 0.222 0.283 -0.111 *0.368 *0.298 *0.362 *-0.310 -0.175 *0.303 
Consultant 0.149 0.239 -0.149 *0.317 0.256 0.005 *-0.310 -0.200 0.198 
Total Remuneration Logics ***0.510 **0.455 -0.053 ***0.534 **0.483 0.240 -0.120 0.000 0.258 
Table 23: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for New Zealand Companies in 1998 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources **0.463 ***0.565 **0.458 **0.378 *0.334 0.273 0.111 *0.297 0.218 
Agency **0.426 *0.348 **0.454 **0.366 **0.398 0.172 0.103 0.244 0.192 
Pay for Performance **0.392 *0.326 *0.356 **0.381 **0.407 0.261 -0.007 0.051 0.146 
Contribution ***0.603 ***0.664 ***0.535 ***0.616 ***0.558 ***0.550 -0.009 0.271 **0.412 
Achievement ***0.672 ***0.712 ***0.494 ***0.648 ***0.632 *0.368 -0.099 0.148 *0.322 
Market ***0.572 ***0.614 **0.473 ***0.583 ***0.494 *0.295 -0.139 0.209 *0.331 
Fairness **0.409 *0.290 *0.350 **0.401 *0.352 0.171 -0.221 0.019 *0.333 
Appropriate **0.455 ***0.536 *0.350 **0.396 *0.296 **0.399 0.113 *0.312 *0.350 
Motivation **0.409 ***0.488 **0.453 *0.308 0.250 0.169 0.225 **0.449 0.240 
Consultant **0.369 **0.392 *0.300 *0.302 0.193 **0.450 -0.038 0.084 *0.354 
Total Remuneration Logics ***0.762 ***0.791 ***0.676 ***0.698 ***0.623 ***0.504 0.011 *0.337 **0.458 
Table 24: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for New Zealand Companies in 2007 
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 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources -0.192 -0.093 -0.086 0.008 -0.054 -0.067 -0.009 -0.068 0.020 
Agency *0.330 0.106 0.005 0.144 0.115 0.152 -0.110 0.202 0.100 
Pay for Performance -0.034 0.174 0.009 0.191 0.044 0.128 -0.193 -0.137 0.084 
Contribution 0.105 -0.101 0.096 0.029 0.137 *0.339 0.000 -0.042 -0.080 
Achievement -0.029 0.207 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.250 0.117 -0.042 -0.130 
Market 0.235 *0.282 0.093 *0.307 0.125 0.092 -0.126 *-0.333 0.014 
Fairness 0.102 0.146 0.185 0.196 0.147 *0.317 0.015 0.016 0.128 
Appropriate 0.087 0.058 -0.135 0.203 0.072 0.258 *-0.300 -0.013 0.134 
Motivation -0.148 -0.086 -0.098 -0.043 -0.122 -0.092 0.089 0.062 -0.084 
Consultant 0.061 -0.224 -0.053 -0.011 -0.170 0.132 0.082 0.093 0.166 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.195 0.098 -0.005 0.264 0.089 **0.428 -0.151 -0.137 0.089 
Table 25: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for UK Companies in 1998 
 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(Natural Log) 
Revenue 
(Natural 
Log) 
Net Profit 
after Tax 
(Natural Log) 
Total Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Net Assets 
(Natural Log) 
Dividend per 
Share 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Debt-to-
equity Ratio 
Human Resources 0.258 0.254 0.061 0.227 0.104 0.015 -0.187 0.051 0.111 
Agency 0.200 0.245 -0.013 *0.287 0.253 -0.120 **-0.373 -0.066 0.125 
Pay for Performance 0.069 0.176 -0.007 0.186 0.098 0.011 *-0.286 0.019 0.101 
Contribution -0.179 -0.098 0.056 -0.045 -0.230 0.094 -0.084 0.168 0.210 
Achievement 0.028 0.135 -0.053 -0.044 0.004 -0.052 -0.081 0.045 -0.075 
Market          
Fairness -0.158 -0.037 0.021 -0.122 -0.167 -0.045 0.041 0.167 0.109 
Appropriate *0.322 0.235 0.023 0.131 0.104 0.122 -0.021 0.095 0.039 
Motivation -0.178 -0.169 -0.124 -0.042 -0.066 0.059 -0.193 0.010 0.007 
Consultant -0.119 -0.080 -0.104 0.045 -0.110 -0.185 *-0.312 0.028 0.109 
Total Remuneration Logics 0.017 0.116 -0.013 0.096 -0.051 0.004 -0.276 0.153 0.184 
Table 26: Correlation between Remuneration Logics and Financials for UK Companies in 2007 
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 Australia – 1998 Australia – 2007 New Zealand – 1998 New Zealand – 2007 United Kingdom – 
1998 
United Kingdom – 2007 
 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 1 2+ Sig. 
Human 
Resources 
0.524 0.517  0.871 1.000  0.031 0.313 ** 0.333 0.850 *** 0.905 0.893  1.000 0.950  
Agency 0.191 0.241  0.871 0.947  0.000 0.188 * 0.233 0.500  0.571 0.750  0.800 0.900  
Pay for 
Performance 
0.476 0.621  1.000 1.000  0.031 0.625 *** 0.567 0.800  0.952 0.964  1.000 0.950  
Contribution 0.095 0.138  0.645 0.842  0.031 0.188  0.100 0.400 * 0.095 0.393 * 0.500 0.425  
Achievement 0.143 0.310  0.903 0.895  0.000 0.375 *** 0.067 0.700 *** 0.810 0.750  0.900 0.925  
Market 0.571 0.621  1.000 1.000  0.063 0.250  0.100 0.800 *** 0.905 0.929  1.000 1.000  
Fairness 0.000 0.000  0.677 0.632  0.000 0.000  0.100 0.400 * 0.048 0.214  0.200 0.400  
Appropriate 0.191 0.172  0.871 0.895  0.031 0.063  0.133 0.550 ** 0.429 0.571  0.600 0.850  
Motivation 0.476 0.276  0.774 0.842  0.000 0.188 * 0.133 0.600 *** 0.857 0.821  1.000 0.875  
Consultant 0.667 0.621  0.903 0.895  0.000 0.188 * 0.167 0.450 * 0.714 0.679  1.000 0.950  
Total 
Remuneration 
Logics 
3.333 3.512  8.516 8.947  0.177 2.375 *** 1.933 6.050 *** 6.191 6.724  8.00 8.225  
Market 
Capitalisation  
$5.19
213
 $9.89  $15.82 $36.45 ** $0.43 $7.96 *** $0.83 $12.08 ** £13.87 £22.92  £15.14 £31.02  
Revenue $3.49 $7.77 * $6.25 $20.97 *** $0.32 $6.61 *** $0.43 $5.92 ** £9.19 £10.52  £15.53 £24.74  
Net Profit 
after Tax 
$0.18 $0.55 * $0.91 $2.96 ** $0.02 $0.35  $0.05 $0.96 ** £0.65 £0.76  £1.38 £2.44  
Total Assets $16.83 $29.39  $35.73 $99.70  $0.48 $28.77 ** $1.01 $55.29 * £52.03 £37.35  £106.05 £158.75  
Net Assets $2.53 $5.41  $6.15 $12.70 * $0.24 $5.05 *** $0.54 $4.19 ** £3.61 £5.40  £6.84 £14.67  
Dividend per 
Share 
$0.31 $0.30  $0.85 $0.63  $0.16 $0.21  $0.19 $0.36  £0.20 £0.21  £0.29 £0.30  
Return on 
Assets 
5.3% 3.9%  7.1% 9.4%  6.8% 3.7%  9.3% 8.32%  6.5% 7.1%  7.3% 8.3%  
Return on 
Equity 
12.6% 9.8%  17.8% 29.9% * 10.4% 9.8%  15.8% 25.9%  29.3% 19.8%  23.4% 44.2%  
Debt-to-
Equity Ratio 
3.39 3.03  3.43 7.44  1.52 3.07  1.03 5.70 * 11.26 5.33  9.88 8.49  
Number of 
Companies 
21 29  31 19  34 16  30 20  21 28  10 40  
Table 27: Differences between Means of Companies Listed in One Country and Multiple Countries 
                                                 
213
 Monetary figures are quoted in local currency (Australian dollars, New Zealand dollars and UK pounds) and in billions (except dividend per share). 
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Appendix E: Other Aspects of Codes of Practice  
 
E.1. Introduction 
Appendix E includes descriptive statistics and a brief discussion on the authorship of codes 
and the stated reasons for producing codes. 
 
E.2. Authorship of Codes of Practice 
The sample included eleven types of code issuers that produced codes (or official reports) on 
executive remuneration including: stock exchanges, stock exchange regulators, Government 
departments or agencies, directors’ associations, professionals’ associations (e.g. associations 
of accountants or lawyers), law firms, fund managers’ or financial services associations, fund 
management firms, investors’ associations, business associations, and non-profit 
organisations (e.g. research institutes).
214
  Some of the codes were co-authored.  For example, 
the Australian Institute of Directors’ (2007) Executive Equity Plan Guidelines are jointly 
issued with the Australian Employee Ownership Association and the Australian Shareholders’ 
Association.   Also, many of the codes are endorsed by multiple entities.  For example, the 
ASX Corporate Governance Council’s (2003) Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Recommendations is endorsed by 20 entities.  This indicates that there are many 
types of organisations that are interested in executive remuneration.  However, codes on 
executive remuneration have not been produced by consumer advocacy groups, community 
advocacy groups, environmental groups, political parties and universities. 
 
Table E.1 shows what types of organisations produced the sampled codes in AU, NZ and the 
UK from 1991 to 2010.  Notably, many codes are produced (or at least endorsed) by multiple 
organisations.  In the UK, many codes have been produced by fund managers’ or financial 
services associations such as the Association of British Insurers, and Government agencies 
such as the Financial Reporting Council.  In AU, many codes have also been produced by 
fund managers’ associations, but associations of directors, executives, professionals (e.g. 
                                                 
214
 Entities that have not produced any codes or official reports on executive remuneration include Governments 
(specifically, law-makers), executives’ associations, accounting firms, employees’ associations and 
universities (or academics).  However, this does mean that these entities are uninterested in executive 
remuneration.  On the contrary, these entities have produced codes and official reports on corporate 
governance, made submissions to code issuers and offered comments to the media.  Further, Governments 
produce laws that include disclosure requirements on executive remuneration, although these laws do not 
include recommendations on how and how much executives should be paid. 
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accountants) and investors have endorsed more codes than in the UK and NZ.  In both AU 
and NZ, the stock exchange is self-regulated and, hence, produces codes.  There has been a 
similar range of code issuers in NZ compared to AU and the UK, but NZ organisations have 
produced fewer codes.  Overall, companies and their advisors have as strong an interest in 
producing codes as Governments and investors. 
 
Table E.1: Types of Code Issuers 
Types of Code Issuers 
United Kingdom Australia New Zealand 
Primary
1
  All
2
 Primary  All Primary  All 
Stock Exchange 3 (11%) 4 (14%) 3 (13%) 5 (21%) 7 (44%) 7 (44%) 
Stock Exchange 
Regulator 4 (14%) 4 (14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (19%) 3 (19%) 
Government (Law) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Government Department 
or Agency 3 (11%) 4 (14%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Directors’ Association 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 3 (13%) 9 (38%) 1 (13%) 2 (13%) 
Executives’ Association 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (13%) 12 (25%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Professionals’ 
Association 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 36 (25%) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 
Accountancy Firm 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Law Firm 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (13%) 2 (13%) 
Fund Managers’ or 
Financial Services 
Association 10 (36%) 20 (43%) 9 (38%) 31 (67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Fund Management Firm 5 (18%) 5 (18%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Investors’ Association 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 2 (8%) 7 (29%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
Employees’ Association 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Business Association  1 (4%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 4 (17%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Academics or University 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Non-profit Organisation 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 28  24  16  
Notes: 
1 ‘Primary’ refers to the code issuer who instigated the production of the code or, if the instigator is unknown, 
the code issuer that is named first in the code.  The ‘Primary’ columns show how many codes that each type 
of code issuer is the instigator or first author. 
2 ‘All’ refers to every code issuer that is named as an author or endorser of the code.  The ‘All’ columns show 
how many codes that each type of code issuer has authored and endorsed. 
 
E.3. Stated Reasons for Producing Codes of Practice 
Table E.2 shows what reasons code issuers gave for producing the codes that are sampled.  
There are four main reasons: First, jolts such as financial crises, corporate scandals and 
rewards for failure; second, inspired by other texts; third, scheduled revision; and fourth, other 
reasons such as a desire to improve firm performance by providing boards with guidance, or 
being invited by Government to produce a code or an official report.  Many code issuers cited 
multiple reasons, but a few gave no reason.  The reasons given illustrate that jolts capture the 
public’s attention and Governments respond by asking organisations to produce codes and 
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code issuers respond by producing official reports and codes.  Further, there may be either a 
collective rationality among code issuers as new codes are based on old codes, or a 
bandwagon effect, where code issuers risk their legitimacy if they do not produce codes.  In 
addition, code issuers, particularly in AU and the UK, are likely to schedule periodic revision 
of their codes.  This explains why there has been a proliferation of codes in many countries 
(Enrione et al., 2006) and illustrates how normative pressure to comply with codes’ 
recommendations may increase over time (see Section 5.4.5).   
 
Table E.2: Stated Reasons for Producing Codes 
Stated Reasons United Kingdom Australia New Zealand 
# of texts % of total # of texts % of total # of texts % of total 
Jolts (e.g. corporate 
scandals) 
11 39% 10 42% 6 25% 
Inspired by other texts 12 43% 13 54% 3 13% 
Scheduled revision 3 11% 5 21% 0 0% 
Other reasons 8 29% 9 38% 3 13% 
Not stated 1 4% 1 4% 9 38% 
Total 28  24  16  
 
Table E.3 presents selected extracts from a range of codes on the stated reasons for producing 
codes.  In discussing jolts (e.g. corporate scandals), the language of code issuers is striking 
because they frame jolts as problems that they are capable of solving.  In this sense, codes are 
presented as solutions to these problems: Code issuers are advancing the proposition that if 
boards follow the code recommendations, then there will be no more financial crises, 
corporate scandals, rewards for failure, etc.  Further, the manner in which code issuers refer to 
other codes is also striking because they are presenting an aura of rationality.  Essentially, 
code issuers are trying to persuade the public that their code represents ‘best practice’ because 
their codes’ recommendations are building on other codes’ recommendations.  This is 
reminiscent of the search for the Holy Grail of corporate governance (see Chapter 2).  
However, code issuers have failed to realise that there is no Holy Grail.  Further, the authority 
of the codes issuers is enhanced by invoking the authority of Governments or professing 
moral superiority (e.g. UK’s Hermes, 2008).   
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Table E.3: Selected Extracts on the Stated Reasons for Producing Codes 
Stated Reasons United Kingdom Australia New Zealand 
Jolts (e.g. corporate 
scandals) 
Greenbury (1995, p.9): “Recent concerns about 
executive remuneration have centred above all 
on some large pay increases and large gains 
from share options in the recently privatised 
utility industries. These increases have 
sometimes coincided with staff reductions, pay 
restraint for other staff and price increases… 
There have also been concerns about the 
amount of compensation paid to some 
department Directors.” 
IFSA (2002, p.3): “Fund managers first 
developed these Guidelines as a result of some 
of the corporate excesses during the 1980s… 
Recent high profile collapses have firmly 
placed Corporate Governance in the spotlight 
of the wider community. It is therefore timely 
to review the IFSA Guidelines to ensure that 
IFSA continues to provide best practice 
guidance to its Members and Australian listed 
companies.” 
Minter Ellison (2003, p.1): “The issue of 
“corporate governance” is currently a major 
focus in New Zealand and international 
boardrooms, with regulators and with 
governments. This has been in response to high 
profile collapses and massive destruction in 
shareholder value around the world including 
Enron, Worldcom, OneTel and HIH.” 
Inspired by other texts ABI (1999a, p.1): “In the light of developing 
practice, including the emergence of LTIPs… 
and the conclusions of the Greenbury and 
Hampel reports and the provisions of the 
Combined Code, it is appropriate to reassess 
the practical application of the Guidelines and 
their underlying principles.” 
IFSA (2009, p.11): “These Guidelines will be 
reviewed by IFSA to take account of 
Australian developments… and the status of 
international best practice principles.” 
Minter Ellison (2003, p.2): “We have not 
attempted to summarise the various reports or 
recommendations around the world, which we 
have reviewed… Generally, they are all worthy 
documents which are well written, considered 
and useful reference points.” 
Scheduled revision Financial Reporting Council (2010, p.1): “The 
Code has been enduring, but it is not 
immutable. Its fitness for purpose in a 
permanently changing economic and social 
business environment requires its evaluation at 
appropriate intervals. The reviews preceding 
this one were in 2005 and 2007.” 
ACSI (2009, p.3): “ACSI first developed 
Corporate Governance Guidelines in March 
2003 as a supplement to existing regulatory 
and industry standards. Since then, the 
Guidelines have been updated every two years 
to take into account the changing regulatory 
and governance landscape.” 
NZX (2010, p.5): “NZX may from time to time 
amend these Rules, in accordance with the 
relevant Procedure.” 
Other reasons Hermes (2008, p.3): “So far Hermes (and 
indeed all other fund managers) have been less 
explicit in addressing the question of the 
management implications of accepting the goal 
of value creation. This document aims to fill 
that gap… We would like to replace the 
damaging finger-pointing which has 
characterised the City-Industry debate in the 
past, with a positive dialogue between 
managers and owners about the proper purpose 
of the corporation.” 
Productivity Commission (2009, p.IV): “I, 
CHRIS BOWEN, Assistant Treasurer, under 
part 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 
1998, hereby request that the Productivity 
Commission undertake an inquiry into the 
current Australian regulatory framework 
around remuneration of directors and 
executives…” 
Securities Commission (2004a, p.3): “The 
Minister of Commerce asked the Securities 
Commission in June 2003 to take a lead in 
developing corporate governance principles for 
New Zealand.” 
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Governance 
 
Appendix F reproduces Crombie (2011). This paper was presented at the Fifth New Zealand 
Management Accounting Conference (17-18 November 2011), which was held in Wellington, 
New Zealand.  The paper was subject to blind peer review before being accepted for 
presentation at this conference.   
 
As described in Chapter 4, a pilot study was undertaken to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the discourse on corporate governance and executive remuneration in codes and corporate 
annual reports from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  Six texts were studied 
including one code and one corporate annual report from each country.  The objective of the 
pilot study was to understand how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in 
organisational texts.  The findings from this pilot study are presented in Crombie (2011) and 
reproduced in this appendix.  
 
The paper’s findings are underdeveloped compared to the findings in Chapter 6.  To a great 
extent, the paper does illustrate the differences between Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  
However, the general framework of corporate governance had not been fully developed at the 
time the paper was prepared (see Chapter 2, Table 2.3).  Consequently, Corporate Logic and 
Stakeholder Logic were blended in the paper.  As explained in Chapter 2, Corporate Logic 
assumes that the corporate objective is shareholder value maximisation, whereas Stakeholder 
Logic assumes that it is stakeholder value maximisation.  The paper mistakenly argues that a 
corporate objective of stakeholder value maximisation is consistent with Corporate Logic.  
The corporate objective of Wesfarmers is also misclassified in the paper.  It is consistent with 
enlightened shareholder value maximisation, not stakeholder value maximisation because 
customers and employees are conceptualised as a means to the end of shareholder value.
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 Wesfarmers (AU, 2007, p.i) state, “Our primary objective is to provide a satisfactory return to shareholders. 
We aim to achieve this by: - satisfying the needs of customers… - providing a safe and fulfilling working 
environment for employees… responding to the attitudes and expectations of the communities in which we 
operate…”  While, Wesfarmers’ phrase “provide a satisfactory return to shareholders…” is unusual, the 
performance measures on which executives’ short- and long-term incentives are based are mainly profit-
oriented (see Wesfarmers, 2007, p.126).  This is consistent with Corporate Logic. 
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Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance  
 
Abstract 
Purpose:  Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there are two institutional logics of corporate 
governance: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  This paper examines how Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic are embedded in public discourse on corporate governance. 
 
Design/methodology/approach:  A selection of codes of practice and corporate annual reports 
from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are sampled.  Extracts from the 
sampled texts are collected and analysed.  These extracts relate to eight aspects of corporate 
governance (including incentive schemes and performance measures). 
 
Findings:  Public discourse on corporate governance is consistent with both Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic.  Investor Logic is more deeply embedded in the sampled codes of practice 
than Corporate Logic; whereas both logics are deeply embedded in the sampled corporate 
annual reports. 
 
Theoretical implications: Despite Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing 
assumptions about human behaviour and implications for corporate governance, these logics 
appear to have merged into a new institutional logic. 
 
Paper Type: Empirical 
 
Key words: Corporate governance; Institutional theory; Discourse analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in public 
discourse on corporate governance as represented by codes of practice and corporate annual 
reports.  Corporate Logic asserts that directors and executives are knowledgeable 
professionals that can be trusted by stakeholders to act in their best interests (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  By contrast, Investor Logic asserts that executives are self-interested, 
independent directors should be appointed to control executives, and financial incentives are 
necessary to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders (Zajac and Westphal, 
2004).  This research is not concerned with the empirical validity of these knowledge claims.  
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Instead, this research is concerned with how institutional logics are embedded in public 
discourse.  Institutional logics are beliefs, ideas, norms, rules and values that are a coalescing 
discourse with a durable meaning, which materially influences organisational behaviour 
(Thornton et al., 2005).  While Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) only examined a few aspects 
of corporate governance, this research examines many aspects of corporate governance in 
order to understand how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence organisational 
behaviour. 
 
This paper is organised as follows.  The literature on institutional theory, discourse theory and 
institutional logics is reviewed in section 2.  In assessing prior research, a gap in knowledge is 
articulated.  How this gap is studied is discussed in section 3.  This includes a description of 
the research questions and method.  Section 4 presents the findings from the discourse 
analysis of three codes and three corporate annual reports.  The findings closely examine the 
consistency between the theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic and 
the principles and recommendations in codes and policies and practices in corporate annual 
reports.  A discussion of the findings is presented in section 5, and considers how both logics 
can co-exist in public discourse despite having opposing implications for corporate 
governance.  Concluding comments are drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Institutional theory has traditionally sought to explain how and why organisations in the same 
industries become homogeneous over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Homogeneity 
amongst organisations occurs as organisations conform to societal expectations.  Institutions 
are societal expectations that have become taken-for-granted or ingrained in society.  By 
conforming to societal expectations, organisations reproduce and empower institutions.  There 
are three institutional pressures that compel organisations to conform (Scott, 2008).  
Organisations are subject to: First, coercive pressure through laws and law enforcement; 
Second, normative pressure through codes of practice and certification by professional bodies; 
Third, mimetic pressure through people’s desire to imitate others.  However, organisations are 
not slaves to institutions; organisations may symbolically conform to or resist institutional 
pressures.  Further, institutional theory does not rule out heterogeneity amongst organisations.  
For example, heterogeneity can arise when institutional pressures are weak or conflicting. 
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Discourse theory is the study of how people use language to interpret and construct their 
social reality (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000).  Language encompasses all talk and texts, 
whereas discourse is a subset of language that has a durable meaning and influences the 
behaviour of individuals and organisations.  Further, discourse defines power relationships 
and knowledge claims in society (Phillips, 2003).  Embedded in discourse are beliefs, ideas, 
norms, rules and values, which are learnt and reproduced through talk and texts, particular in 
the context of organisational discourse.  Organisations are both enabled and constrained by 
discourse, particularly Grand Discourse and Mega-Discourse (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000).  
These are highly integrated and ordered sets of language that represents the taken-for-granted 
or universal way of talking, writing and acting.  Thus, Grand Discourse and Mega-Discourse 
are akin to institutions (Phillips, 2003; Schmidt, 2010).  Through the production and 
consumption of texts, organisations can influence and are influenced by institutions or Mega-
Discourse (Phillips et al., 2004). 
 
At the intersection of institutional and discourse theory are institutional logics, which 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p.804) defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
social reality.”  Societal institutions include the corporation, market, state, family, profession, 
and religion (Friedland and Alford, 1991), and these institutions are defined and shaped by a 
range of institutional logics within different societies or countries (Thornton et al., 2005).  
Institutional logics define what organisational behaviours are and are not socially expected 
and desirable.  However, institutional logics can change over time as new ways of thinking 
and acting challenge existing institutions.  For example, Thornton et al. (2005) found that 
public accounting transitioned from Fiduciary Logic to Corporate Logic as growing revenues 
and profits become the mission of accountancy firms following World War II. 
 
 
Zajac and Wesphal (2004) argue that there are two institutional logics of corporate 
governance, namely Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, which define and shape corporate 
governance systems that are both internal and external to the corporation.  Rooted in 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004) and stewardship 
theory (Donaldson, 1990; Davis et al., 1997), Corporate Logic asserts that management 
(directors and executives) are trustworthy and have the specialist expertise to govern and 
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manage corporations in the best interests of all stakeholders.  By contrast, Investor Logic 
asserts that management, in the absence of controls and incentives, will act opportunistically.  
Only investors, through the invisible hand of capital markets, can monitor and discipline 
management to ensure that shareholder value is maximised.  This is rooted in agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).  Based on opposing assumptions about human 
behaviour and the corporate objective, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing 
implications for corporate governance, which are summarised in Table 1. 
 
The eight aspects of corporate governance that are reviewed in Table 1 build on Zajac and 
Westphal’s (2004) theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Given a 
positive view of human behaviour and a stakeholder-oriented corporate objective, Corporate 
Logic implies that non-executive directors will be strategic advisors to executives.  Vertical 
and horizontal equity (e.g. comparable to others in similar roles, but fair to employees and 
other stakeholders) will be the primary determinants of the remuneration of non-executive 
directors and executives.  Internal (financial and non-financial) performance measures will be 
used to assess the performance of executives, who may receive modest bonuses in recognition 
of their commitment and loyalty.  By contrast, Investor Logic has a negative view of human 
behaviour and a shareholder-oriented corporate objective.  To monitor executives, non-
executive directors should be financially independent of the corporation.  As capital markets 
are efficient, external (market-based) performance measures (e.g. total shareholder return) are 
not as easily manipulated by executives as internal performance measures.  Contingent on 
external performance measures, financial incentives for executives are necessary to align their 
interests with those of shareholders.   
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Table 1: Theoretical Conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
Aspects of Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Human behaviour Executives are trustworthy and 
motivated by intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards 
Executives are opportunistic and 
motivated by extrinsic rewards 
Corporate objective Stakeholder value maximisation  Shareholder value maximisation 
Independence of the board of 
directors 
Both non-executive and executive 
directors should be independent of 
mind 
Board should comprise of a 
majority of non-executive directors, 
who are financially independent 
Role of the board of directors 
(particularly, non-executive 
directors) 
The board (and non-executive 
directors) is a strategic advisor to 
executives 
The board (particularly non-
executive directors) is a monitor 
and judge of executives 
Role of the remuneration 
committee 
The remuneration committee is a 
strategic human resources advisor; 
it has to ensure there is a balance of 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for 
executives. 
The remuneration committee 
(comprising of entirely independent 
directors) is an evaluator of the 
performance of executives; it has to 
ensure that incentives are designed 
to align executives’ interests with 
those of shareholders. 
Remuneration policies and 
practices for non-executive 
directors 
Fees; Retirement payments Fees – Cash and shares; No 
retirement payments 
Remuneration policies and 
practices for executives 
Mainly fixed remuneration. 
Increases depend on stakeholder 
value and comparisons with other 
executives. 
Mainly variable remuneration 
including short- and long-term 
incentives. Increases depend on 
shareholder value. 
Performance measures for 
evaluating executives 
Financial and non-financial Financial and market-based 
measures 
 
Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic 
to Investor Logic amongst US corporations.  When US corporations adopted long-term 
incentive plans, Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that justifications of these plans were 
consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, 
long-term incentive plans may be adopted to attract and retain talented executives; whereas 
consistent with Investor Logic, long-term incentive plans may be adopted to align executives’ 
interests with those of shareholders.  While the choice of justification was dependent on the 
power of the board and firm performance, justifications consistent with Investor Logic 
become more common over time.  Further, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that investors 
reaction to the adoption of stock repurchase plans changed from negative in the early 1980s to 
positive in the mid 1980s, irrespective of these plans being implemented.  Consistent with 
Investor Logic, investors reacted favourably to stock repurchase plans as such plans 
represented management’s intention to return free cash flows to the capital markets.  This is 
inconsistent with Corporate Logic because stock repurchase plans represent an admission by 
management that they do not have any future investment opportunities. 
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Crombie (2009) and Crombie et al. (2010) challenge Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) conclusion 
that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic.  In a study of the 
largest 50 US corporations, Crombie et al. (2010) found that justifications of the Chief 
Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) remuneration in 1998 and 2007 proxy statements were 
consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Contra to Zajac and Westphal 
(1995), they found that the presence of these justifications increased over time to the point of 
where almost all proxy statements contained the same set of justifications.  Similarly, 
Crombie (2009) found the same pattern of diffusion in the annual reports of the largest 50 
publicly listed companies in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  These 
findings indicate that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become the taken-for-
granted ways of justifying executive remuneration or institutionalised discourse. 
 
Crombie (2009) and Crombie et al. (2010) also studied codes of practice on corporate 
governance.  These are mainly produced by regulators, stock exchanges, investors’ 
associations and directors’ associations.  Codes often include principles and recommendations 
on executive remuneration.  Both studies found that justifications of remuneration are 
diffused first in codes and then in corporate annual reports (or proxy statements), indicating 
that codes are the manifestation of coercive and normative pressure.  Further, these 
justifications of remuneration are consistent both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  
Interpreted through Phillips et al.’s (2004) discursive model of institutionalisation, this 
evidence shows that texts are influential and corporations can gain legitimacy (or attest to 
their conformance to societal expectations) through their corporate annual reports.  However, 
Crombie (2009), Crombie et al. (2010) and Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) did not examine 
how deeply embedded Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are in the discourse on corporate 
governance because only justifications of executive remuneration are studied. 
 
3. Research Method 
This research “tries to explore the ways in which the socially produced ideas and objects that 
populate the world are created and maintained” (Phillips, 2003, p.222).  In doing so, this 
paper has two objectives: first, to map and analysis the discourse on corporate governance 
within codes of practice and corporate annual reports; second, to examine the extent to which 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in this discourse.  While previous research 
has studied a few aspects of the discourse across many organisational texts, this research 
investigates many aspects of the discourse across a few organisational texts.  Consequently, 
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my epistemological position is interpretive structuralism and methodological position is 
qualitative.  Through a discourse analysis (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000), this research 
examines the discourse on corporate governance from a macro or long-range perspective in 
order to contextualise Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  This approach will enable me to 
gain a deeper, richer understanding of these institutional logics (Bryman and Bell, 2003).   
 
The sample of organisational texts is draw from Crombie’s (2009) sample.  While Crombie 
(2009) sampled a range of organisational texts produced between 1991 and 2008, this 
research samples organisational texts that were produced in recent years because these texts 
are more likely to be shaped by both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  One code of 
practice and one corporate annual report from Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom are sampled; six texts in total.   
 
The sampled texts include three codes, namely: Financial Reporting Council’s (2006) 
Combined Code from the UK (‘FRC Code’), ASX Corporate Governance Council’s (2003) 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice from Australia (‘ASX Code’), 
and Securities Commission’s (2004) Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines (‘SecCom Code’).  These codes are selected because they are the most influential 
and prominent.  FRC Code and ASX Code are legally enforceable.  Listed companies must 
disclose in their annual reports if they comply with these codes or explain why they do not 
comply.  SecCom Code is not legally enforceable, but is still influential as it was produced by 
a Government agency.   
 
The sampled texts also include three corporate annual reports, namely: Legal & General 
Group plc’s 2007 Annual Report from the UK (‘L&G Report’), Wesfarmers Limited’s 2007 
Annual Report from Australia (‘Wesfarmers Report’), and Hallenstein Glasson Holdings 
Limited’s 2007 Annual Report from New Zealand (‘H&G Report’).  Two criteria were used 
to select these corporate annual reports.  First, the companies selected had to be listed on only 
one stock exchange to minimise the influence of foreign codes.  Second, the companies 
selected should be representative of the largest 50 listed companies, where representative 
means that the corporate annual report includes the average number of justifications of 
remuneration (as reported in Crombie, 2009).  L&G Report, Wesfarmers Report and H&G 
Report were randomly selected from companies in the sample that met these criteria. 
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Phillips (2003, p.223) argues that, “Discourse analysis… is the structured and systematic 
study of collections of interrelated texts and the processes of their production, dissemination, 
and consumption.”  Both codes and corporate annual reports are sampled because these texts 
are interrelated; for example, the dissemination of codes influences the production of 
corporate annual reports (Crombie, 2009).  This discourse analysis examines the principles 
and recommendations in codes and policies and practices in corporate annual reports.  By 
systematically studying the consistency between the theoretical conceptions of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic and the discourse on corporate governance in the codes and 
corporate annual reports, this paper reveals the extent to which these institutional logics are 
embedded in the texts.  However, it may be that the institutional logics are not deeply 
embedded in the texts.  The principles and recommendations in codes and policies and 
practices in corporate annual reports may be ambiguous, conflicting or superficial.  Therefore, 
four possible outcomes are considered: Corporate Logic only; Investor Logic only; both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic; no (or another) logic. 
 
As defined in Table 1, eights aspects of corporate governance that may vary between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are studied.  These aspects of corporate governance are 
the most prominent in academic discourse on corporate governance and provide a clear 
distinction between institutional logics.  The discourse analysis involved multiple close 
readings of the texts.  All phrases, sentences and paragraphs that are related to these aspects of 
corporate governance were collected from the texts, and then analysed for consistency with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  In some cases, there were insufficient quotes from 
the texts on several aspects of corporate governance for any conclusion to be made.  But in 
most cases, the quotes from the texts were highly consistent with Corporate Logic, Investor 
Logic or both logics. 
 
The main limitation of this research is that the analysis of the quotes from the texts relies on 
the subjective interpretations of the researcher.  This is unavoidable in discourse analysis.  
However, quotes from the texts are presented in this paper, so that the readers of this research 
can re-interpret my findings and conclusions.  Of course, it can be argued that I have chosen 
to include only those quotes that fit with my argument.  This is why a detailed analysis of the 
texts is available upon request.  Further, confirmation bias may have led me to choose only 
those quotes that fit with Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  While there are many 
institutional logics that influence organisational behaviour (Thornton et al., 2005), Corporate 
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Logic and Investor Logic were not chosen prior to the research beginning.  These institutional 
logics emerged as I undertook through multiple close readings of the texts.  Therefore, this 
main limitation has been, to some extent, mitigated. 
 
4. Findings 
An overview of the codes and corporate annual reports is given in Table 2.  Two aspects of 
the texts are studied.  First, the proportion of the texts dedicated to corporate governance and 
remuneration is calculated.
216
  A comparable proportion of the codes are dedicated to 
corporate governance, but SecCom Code has a lower proportion dedicated to remuneration 
than the other codes.  Notably, SecCom Code only has 494 words on remuneration, while 
FRC Code has 1,173 words and ASX Code has 2,091 words.  A comparable proportion of the 
corporate annual reports are dedicated to corporate governance and remuneration, but H&G 
Report has much fewer words on these matters than L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  
H&G Report only has 1,042 words on remuneration, while L&G Report has 7,383 words and 
Wesfarmers Report has 7,182 words.   
 
Second, the remuneration principles or policies espoused in the codes and corporate annual 
report are reproduced, and the six remuneration rationales studied are typically part of these 
principles.  Principles are fundamental beliefs or propositions on which recommendations or 
practices are derived.  In both the codes and corporate annual reports, a common set of 
justifications of remuneration are found in the principles on which the recommendations in 
codes and practices in corporate annual reports are based.  Typically, these principles are: to 
attract and retain talented executives; to pay executives at a competitive level in the market; 
and to link executive remuneration to firm performance.  However, these principles are 
general (or non-specific) in nature.  This affords decision-makers much flexibility in 
determining remuneration recommendations and practices as is shown in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
The remuneration principles and policies from the codes and corporate annual reports are 
broadly consistent with both logics.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, executives are depicted 
as being high-quality or talented, rather than opportunistic.  However, L&G’s policy does 
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 Note that words are not double counted; any words about remuneration found in sections on corporate 
governance are counted as part of remuneration.  Also note that remuneration includes words about non-
executive directors, executives and other employees.   
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imply that incentives are necessary to align executives’ interests with those of shareholders, 
which is consistent with Investor Logic.  Fairness, in the broadest sense of the word, is 
emphasised as executive remuneration ensures horizontal equity (between executives) and 
vertical equity (executives compared to employees and shareholder returns).  This is also 
consistent with Corporate Logic.  But consistent with Investor Logic, the remuneration 
policies assert that executive remuneration should be dependent on firm performance.  
However, these remuneration policies are also non-specific.  Further analysis is required to 
determine whether this consistency with both logics remains as these policies are elaborated 
and applied in the texts. 
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Table 2: Overview of Selected Texts 
 Word Count Remuneration Principles or Policies 
Codes of Practice   
UK: FRC Code (2006) 1. Total: 7,669 words 
2. Corporate Governance 
(CG): 6,255 words (82%) 
3. Remuneration (REM): 
1,173 words (15%) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for 
this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (p11)  “There should be a formal and transparent 
procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of 
individual directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration.” (p.12) 
AU: ASX Code (2003) 1. Total: 16,686 words 
2. CG: 14,102 words (85%) 
3. REM: 2,091 words (13%) 
“Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly  Ensure that the level and composition of 
remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its relationship to corporate and individual performance 
is defined. This means that companies need to adopt remuneration policies that attract and maintain 
talented and motivated directors and employees so as to encourage enhanced performance of the 
company. It is important that there be a clear relationship between performance and remuneration, and 
that the policy underlying executive remuneration be understood by investors.” (p.51) 
NZ: SecCom Code (2004) 1. Total: 7,620 words 
2. CG: 6,695 words (88%) 
3. REM: 494 words (6%) 
“The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair, and reasonable. The board 
should have a clear policy for setting remuneration of executives (including executive directors) and non-
executive directors at levels that are fair and reasonable in a competitive market for the skills, knowledge 
and experience required by the entity.” (p.17) 
Corporate Annual Reports   
UK: Legal & General (2007) 1. Total: 89,605 words 
2. CG: 8,936 words (10%) 
3. REM: 7,383 words (8%) 
“The Group’s remuneration policy is broadly consistent for all employees and is designed to support 
recruitment, motivation and retention. Remuneration is considered within the overall context of the 
Group’s sector and the markets in which the divisions operate. The policy for the majority of employees 
continues to be to pay around the relevant mid-market level with a package designed to align the interests 
of employees with those of shareholders, with an appropriate proportion of total remuneration dependent 
upon performance. Management work in partnership with the trade union, Unite, to ensure our pay 
policies and practices are free from unfair bias. This is monitored by an annual equal pay audit.” (p.49) 
AU: Wesfarmers (2007) 1. Total: 64,560 words 
2. CG: 8,809 words (14%) 
3. REM: 7,182 words (11%) 
“Wesfarmers aligns its remuneration policies with shareholder interests by setting performance targets for 
senior executives that are based on factors that are under their control and that maximise long-term total 
shareholder returns. These policies are directed at attracting, motivating and retaining quality people. Key 
principles in developing the remuneration structure and levels are: creation of shareholder value; market 
competitiveness; and recognition of individual performance. Alignment with these principles is achieved 
through a variable pay structure. Annual incentives are heavily weighted to return on capital and earnings 
before interest and tax measures, and long term incentives have a return on equity focus…” (p.125) 
NZ: Hallenstein Glasson 
(2007) 
1. Total: 14,195 words 
2. CG: 2,268 words (16%) 
3. REM: 1,042 words (7%) 
“The function of the [Remuneration] Committee is to make specific recommendations on remuneration 
packages and other terms of employment for Directors and executive Directors. The Committee utilises 
independent advice where necessary to ensure remuneration practices are appropriate for the Company, 
and to ensure the best possible people are recruited and retained.” (p.39) 
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Table 3 highlights the extent to which Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic are embedded in 
selected codes of practice and corporate annual reports.  Embedded refers to the degree of 
consistency between theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic and 
public discourse on corporate governance (including executive remuneration).  Consistency is 
judged across eight aspects of corporate governance.  While there are degrees of consistency, 
consistency is reported on an absolute basis in Table 3.  Thus, there are four possibilities: No 
logic
217
, Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, or both logics.  However, the symbolic or 
substantive nature of this public discourse is not analysed.  While Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic may be embedded in public discourse, these logics may also be decoupled 
from private discourse and practices.
218
  
 
Summarised in Table 3, the discourse analysis shows that Investor Logic is more deeply 
embedded than Corporate Logic in the codes of practice, whereas both Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are deeply embedded in the corporate annual reports.  The principles and 
recommendations found in codes of practice are comparable.  Of the eight aspects of 
corporate governance, there are three aspects where there are differences between the codes of 
practice.  The policies and practices found in corporate annual reports are comparable, but 
there are many subtle differences.  Of the eight aspects of corporate governance, there are 
only three aspects where there are not differences between the corporate annual reports.  
Further, there are many differences between the codes and corporate annual reports.  These 
similarities and differences are discussed in depth in the following section. 
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 In this context, no logic means that there is insufficient discourse on a particular aspect of corporate 
governance for a conclusion to be made, or the discourse on a particular aspect of corporate governance was 
inconsistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
218
 Public discourse refers to texts that are made freely available to anyone, whereas private discourse refers to 
texts that are not freely available to anyone.  The public may not know of the existence of some texts.  
Further, remuneration practices are not observable.  The public learns of remuneration practices through texts 
such as corporate annual reports.  Remuneration practices, which are described in public texts, can be 
symbolic as how remuneration is determined in private may be different to how it is described in public.  
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Table 3: Institutional Logic/s Embedded in Selected Codes of Practice and Corporate Annual Reports 
Aspects of Corporate Governance 
and Remuneration  
UK: FRC Code 
(2006) 
AU: ASX Code 
(2003) 
NZ: SecCom Code 
(2004) 
UK: L&G’s 2007 
Annual Report 
AU: Wesfarmers’ 
2007 Annual 
Report 
NZ: H&G’s 2007 
Annual Report 
Human behaviour Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Corporate objective Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Independence of the board of directors Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
Role of the board of directors 
(particularly non-executive directors) 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
Role of the remuneration committee Investor Logic Investor Logic --- Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic 
Remuneration policies and practices 
for non-executive directors 
Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Investor Logic 
Remuneration policies and practices 
for executives 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic  
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Performance measures for evaluating 
executives 
Investor Logic --- --- Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic Corporate Logic 
Overall (No. of times each logic is 
present in each text) 
Corporate Logic 
(3) and Investor 
Logic (8) 
Corporate Logic 
(3) and Investor 
Logic (7) 
Corporate Logic 
(4) and Investor 
Logic (6) 
Corporate Logic 
(6) and Investor 
Logic (7) 
Corporate Logic 
(7) and Investor 
Logic (5) 
Corporate Logic 
(4) and Investor 
Logic (5) 
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Human behaviour is portrayed in a different ways in the texts.  Consistent with Investor 
Logic, the codes depict directors and executives as corruptible and self-interested.  For 
example, FRC Code (2006, p.4) contends that, “No one individual should have unfettered 
powers of decision.”  Consistent with Corporate Logic, directors, executives and other 
employees are praised in L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  For example, Wesfarmers’ 
(2007, p.5) Chairman writes, “I would… like to extend a personal vote of thanks to my fellow 
directors for their hard work and tireless contribution.”  No thanks are given in H&G’s 
Chairman’s letter.  Instead, consistent with Investor Logic, the Chairman argues that 
shareholders should adopt a new share purchase scheme “…to align the interests of senior 
executives with those of the shareholders” (H&G, 2007, p.7).  
 
The corporate objective is shareholder-orientated in the codes and H&G Report, and 
stakeholder-oriented in L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  In the texts, shareholders are 
separated from other stakeholders and maximising shareholder value is believed to be 
compatible with economic growth.  For example, SecCom Code (2004, p.3) opines that, 
“Good corporate governance should… attract support from investors and other stakeholders… 
[and] make businesses more… financially sustainable.”  While discourse in texts is often 
consistent with Investor Logic, the corporate objectives of L&G and Wesfarmers treat all 
stakeholders as separate ends and are consistent with Corporate Logic.  For example, L&G 
(2007, p.ii) state that there corporate objective is “…to deliver sustainable benefits for 
customers, shareholders and employees.”   
 
Corporate governance concerns the definition of director independence and the proportion of 
directors that are deemed independent.  While director independence is defined in financial 
terms in the texts, independence of mind is also emphasised.  For example, Wesfarmers 
(2007, p.46) states that both non-executive and executives directors “bring independent views 
and judgement to the Board’s deliberations.”  These definitions are consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Further, the codes recommend that the board should be 
comprised of a majority of independent non-executive directors, and the companies do adhere 
to this recommendation.  However, the codes also recommend that the board should include 
“an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive directors” (SecCom, 2004, p.9), and 
the companies’ boards also include executive directors.  Again, this is consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
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The role of the board of directors that is recommended in codes and declared in corporate 
annual reports is to both monitor and advise executives.  Consistent with Investor Logic, a 
control role is strongly emphasised in the texts.  For example, L&G (2007, p.44) affirm that, 
“the Board regularly reviews major projects, considers operating and financial issues and 
monitors performance against plan.”  Consistent with Corporate Logic, a strategic role is also 
strongly emphasised in the texts.  For example, SecCom Code (2004, p.10) states that, “The 
board must guide the strategic direction of the entity, and direct and oversee management.”  
Non-executive directors are capable of being both advisors to and evaluators of executives.  
The texts offer no comment on the potential for conflict between these roles.   
 
The role of the remuneration committee is to design a general framework for the company’s 
remuneration practices, design the CEO’s remuneration practices, monitor the performance of 
the CEO and determine how much the CEO will be paid.  This role may also include 
approving the remuneration of other senior executives.  Described in comparable terms in the 
texts (except SecCom Code), the role of the remuneration committee is consistent with 
Investor Logic.  For example, Wesfarmers (2007, p.126) states that, “The Remuneration 
Committee is responsible for reviewing and making recommendations to the Board on 
remuneration policies for the company”.  SecCom Code barely mentions the remuneration 
committee, so no conclusion regarding consistency with institutional logics is made.  
However, a role encompassing non-financial and intrinsic motivation – consistent with 
Corporate Logic – is not mentioned in any of the texts. 
 
The remuneration policies and practices for non-executive directors in the texts are broadly 
consistent with Investor Logic.  However, justification of the level of non-executive directors’ 
fees in SecCom Code (2004) and Wesfarmers Report, which is consistent with Corporate 
Logic. Overall, non-executive directors only receive fees; they do not receive incentives or 
retirement payments.  This reinforces the financial independence of non-executive directors.  
Aside from shareholder voting against directors’ re-election, how to control the (assumed) 
self-interested behaviour of non-executive directors is not discussed.  However, L&G (2007, 
p.50) does require, “Non-executive directors use at least 50% of their fees, after UK tax, to 
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buy Legal & General shares…”  While this practice reduces the financial independence of 
non-executive directors, it is still consistent with Investor Logic.
219
   
 
The remuneration policies and practice for executives in the texts are broadly consistent with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  A range of justifications of remuneration practices 
are found in all of the texts.  For example, FRC Code’s (2006, p.11) main remuneration 
principle states that, “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate directors of the quality required… but a company should avoid paying more than is 
necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion… should be [linked] to corporate and 
individual performance.”  Similarly, recommended in the codes and described in the annual 
reports are packages that include elements of fixed and variable remuneration.  Consistent 
with Investor Logic, the texts emphasise short- and long-term incentives more than other 
aspects of remuneration.   
 
Short-term incentives are dependent on performance measures.  The codes do not recommend 
any specific performance measures be used, but do recommend a general approach.  For 
example, SecCom Code (2004, p.17) prescribes that, “Executive… remuneration packages 
should include an element that is dependent on entity and individual performance.” A range 
of financial and non-financial performance measures are listed in the annual reports of L&G 
and Wesfarmers, but not H&G.  However, it may be that the performance measures focus on 
stakeholder value, particularly as market-based measures (such as total shareholder return) are 
not included.  For example, L&G (2007, p.50) state that, “The Company is committed to 
treating customers fairly and this is also reflected appropriately in bonus objectives.”  Overall, 
the performance measures recommended and selected in the texts are loosely consistent with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
Long-term incentives are also dependent on performance measures. FRC Code recommends 
that relative total shareholder return be used to measure long-term performance. ASX Code 
and SecCom Code do not recommend any specific performance measures, but do caution 
against using performance measures that may encourage myopic behaviour amongst 
executives.  This is consistent with Investor Logic.  Long-term incentives at L&G are based 
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 This is a logical inconsistent with Investor Logic.  Non-executive directors are assumed to be financially 
independent as long as their shareholding is small.  However, small shareholdings may be financially 
significant for non-executive directors who have small investment portfolios.   
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relative total shareholder return over three years, which is also consistent with Investor Logic. 
In contrast, long-term incentives at Wesfarmers are based on relative and absolute return on 
equity, and H&G are not conditional (H&G provide executives with interest-free loans to 
purchase H&G shares).  Wesfarmers uses an absolute return on equity target for executive 
directors because its objective is “providing a satisfactory [not maximum] return to 
shareholders” (Wesfarmers, 2007, p.125).  This is consistent with Corporate Logic. 
 
5. Discussion 
Multiple writers produce both codes and corporate annual reports.  The writers may have 
different backgrounds, motives and perceptions of an organisation’s intentions and actions.  
Given that the finding have shown that the sampled texts are ordered and structured in a 
comparable manner and have a stable definition of corporate governance, the multiple writers 
of the texts are most likely influenced by the same institutional logics.  The writers may 
intend for the texts to provide incremental informative to stakeholders (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007), meaning that the texts are a faithful representation of the intentions and 
actions of the organisations.  Alternatively, the writers may intend the texts to give 
stakeholders a favourable impression of the organisations (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007), 
meaning that the texts are, to some extent, decoupled from the intentions and actions of the 
organisations.  In any case, the institutional logics have shaped the writers’ perceptions of 
what ought to be (normative) and what is (descriptive) in terms of corporate governance. 
 
This research proposed that there are four possible institutional positions: No logic; Corporate 
Logic; Investor Logic; and Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The evidence shows 
that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded, to varying degrees, in the 
sampled texts.  To accept this conclusion is to reject the possibility that there is no logic 
embedded in the texts.  Alvarez and Mazzo (2000) argue that the managers are not shaped by 
texts, but are intelligent consumers of texts.  It may be that the writers of codes and corporate 
annual reports choose what ideas and practices to adopt and ignore.  From this perspective, 
the recommendations in codes and practices in corporate annual reports are a result of 
intelligent design and organisational learning (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  However, despite 
the subtle differences between the texts, the writers of the sampled texts are reproducing 
comparable ideas and practices.  Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become the 
fashionable and rational way of writing about corporate governance.  
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Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that investors react favourably to the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans and their reaction is more favourable when justified using Investor Logic, 
irrespective of whether the plans were implemented (or used).  They argue that investors are 
fooled by symbolic disclosure.  However, this research does not investigate the symbolic or 
substantive nature of the practices described in corporate annual reports.  It may be that 
directors who attest that incentive schemes are necessary to attract and retain talented 
executives and align executives’ interests to those of shareholders, are writing what investors 
and other stakeholders want to read.  Directors may believe that incentives schemes are 
necessary for other reasons.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) argue that incentive schemes 
are used to enrich executives, rather than rewarding executives’ efforts to maximise 
shareholder value.  It may be that the corporate annual reports are highly symbolic.  However, 
whether symbolic or substantive in nature, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
powerful Mega-Discourses that shape the public discourse on corporate governance. 
  
Zajac and Westphal (2004) argued that US corporations and capital markets transitioned from 
Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in the mid 1980s.  However, Crombie et al. (2010) found 
that both logics are deeply embedded in the 2007 proxy statements of US corporations.  
Similarly, Crombie (2009) found that both logics are deeply embedded in the 2007 corporate 
annual reports of Australia, New Zealand and UK publicly listed companies.  But these 
studies do not show whether both logics can co-exist in the same institutional setting, are 
competing for dominance or have merged into a new institutional logic.  This paper’s findings 
suggest that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have merged despite the opposing 
assumptions of these logics.  Corporate Logic justifies how much directors and executives are 
remunerated, while Investor Logic justifies how directors and executives are remunerated.  
Corporate Logic’s assumption that directors and executives are knowledgeable, trustworthy 
professions tempers Investor Logic’s assumptions that directors and executives are self-
interested.   
 
A merging of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is consistent with Jensen’s (2001) 
enlightened stakeholder theory, where shareholder value is maximised in the long-term by 
satisfying the needs of stakeholders such as customers and employees.  A merging of both 
logics also supports a pragmatic view of human behaviour, where some individuals are self-
interested and will act opportunistically.  In this context, codes set out the minimum standard 
of corporate governance.  Incentives and controls are required to deter the minority of 
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individuals from acting opportunistically.  Corporate annual reports describe the current 
practice of corporate governance, where directors are both monitors of and advisors to 
executives.  This is supported by Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) and Roberts et al. (2005) 
arguments of moving beyond either/or prescriptions of corporate governance.  Despite the 
ambiguity inherent in a merging of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, codes and corporate 
annual reports present a framing of corporate governance that both protects stakeholders from 
opportunistic executives, encourages executives to think and act in the long-term interests of 
stakeholders, and provides directors and executives a significant degree of professional 
autonomy is deciding how to balance the competing interests of stakeholders. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the selected codes and corporate 
annual reports.  This is exemplified by the range of justifications of remuneration found in the 
texts.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, the codes have a principles-based, comply-or-explain 
approach and non-specific recommendations; whereas consistent with Investor Logic, the 
codes assume executives are opportunistic as only non-executives directors who are 
financially independent are able to monitor executives and financial incentives are required to 
align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.  Further, consistent with corporate 
logic, the corporate objectives of L&G and Wesfarmers are stakeholder-oriented and the 
corporate annual reports depict directors and executives as trustworthy, knowledgeable 
professionals; whereas consistent with Investor Logic, the corporate annual reports require 
non-executive directors to be financial independent and use financial incentives to align the 
interests of executives with those of shareholders. 
 
While Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic 
to Investor Logic, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic co-exist in the sampled texts.  Despite only six texts being sampled, this 
finding is significant become these texts are representative (Crombie, 2009) and span three 
countries, namely Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  Further, the evidence indicates that 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic may have merged into a new institutional logic.  In this 
sense, Corporate Logic tempers Investor Logic’s harsh assumptions about human behaviour 
and implications for the independence of the board of director and executive remuneration 
that is contingent.  Combined, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic define how corporate 
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governance should be and is practiced.  This is a pragmatic approach, where investors and 
regulators are trusting of directors and executives, but only to a point.  Codes set out 
minimum standards of corporate governance, and compliance by directors is attested to in 
corporate annual reports.  Beyond this, corporate annual reports also explain how directors 
balance the competing interests of stakeholders and both monitor and advise executives. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) argue that executives exert power over the board of directors 
and use this power to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.  This ties in with 
Westphal and Zajac’s (1998) argument that proxy statements (or corporate annual reports) are 
rhetorical and symbolic in nature; corporate discourse is designed to persuade stakeholders of 
the trustworthiness of directors and executives, which, if successful, reinforces directors and 
executives power to control corporations.  It may be that the policies and practices of 
corporate governance that are described in corporate annual reports are decoupled from how 
boards of directors make decisions behind closed doors.  Further research should investigate 
how directors and executives think and act in order to determine the extent to which 
Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic are embedded in private discourse.  Such research 
should be longitudinal in order to gain insight into the processes of (de-)institutionalisation. 
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Appendix G: Human Ethics Approval 
 
G.1. Introduction 
Two applications to carry out interviews with non-executive directors, senior executives, 
recruitment and remuneration consultants, and representatives of codes issuers were made to 
the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.  Note that the first application did 
not mention recruitment and remuneration consultants.  This is why a second application was 
required.  Both applications were approved.  Reproduced below are the approval letters from 
the Human Ethics Committee. 
 
G.2. Approval for First Application 
 
Ref: HEC 2009/175 
 
31 March 2010 
 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
Dear Neil 
 
Thank you for your request for an amendment to your research proposal “The Discourse on 
Executive Remuneration”.     
 
I am pleased to advise that this request has been considered and approved by the Human 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Michael Grimshaw 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
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G.3. Approval for Second Application 
 
Ref:  HEC 2009/175  
 
15 December 2009  
 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information System 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
Dear Neil  
 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “The Discourse on 
Executive Remuneration” has been considered and approved.   
 
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 12 December 2009. 
 
Best wishes for your project. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Dr Michael Grimshaw 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
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Appendix H: Documents for Interviewees 
 
H.1: Introduction 
Appendix H includes the documents that were sent to individuals that were invited to 
participate in the interview phase of this research.  There are six documents: 
1. An information sheet for non-executive directors and senior executives 
2. An information sheet for recruitment and remuneration consultants 
3. An information sheet for representatives of code issuers 
4. A list of possible interview topics 
5. A consent form for participants 
6. An agreement of security and confidentiality by researcher form 
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H.2. Information Sheet for Non-executive Directors and Senior Executives 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
Information Sheet 
You are invited to participate in the research study: ‘The Discourse on Executive Remuneration’. This research is being 
conducted by Neil Crombie, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University 
of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
The objective of this research is to make sense of the discourse on executive remuneration.  I have already studied a 
sample of the codes of practice, regulations and corporate annual reports from New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom between 1989 and 2008.  I have investigated how the discourse on executive remuneration within these texts 
has changed over time.  For listed companies, the analysis has focused on how their remuneration policies have changed 
over time.  I am now investigating how boards of directors (and their remuneration committees) in listed companies 
determine their remuneration policies and practices.     
 
I am also investigating how and why organisations such as regulators and professional associations produce codes of 
practice and regulations on executive remuneration.  The research aims to determine the extent to which codes of 
practice and regulations have influenced the remuneration policies and disclosure behaviour of listed companies.          
 
This research involves interviews with executives and directors of listed companies as well as representatives of 
regulators and professional associations.  The participants may be former or current members of these organisations.  
Interviews are expected to last between one and two hours.  A digital voice recorder will be used to document the 
interviews, subject to the participants’ consent.  Participants will be given the opportunity to review the interview 
transcript.  The digital voice recordings and interview transcripts will not be available to anyone other than the 
researcher and his supervisors.   
 
The results of this research will be published by way of doctoral dissertation, oral presentations, conference proceedings 
and journal articles.  Note that a doctoral dissertation is a public document which is available from the University of 
Canterbury’s Library database.  While extracts from the interview transcripts will form part of these publications, the 
extracts will not be attributed to the participating executives, directors and the companies which they represent, and any 
identifying material within the extracts will be removed or disguised.  For example, “Mr Joe Blogs” would be changed 
to “Director A” or “Executive A” and “ABC Ltd” will be changed to “XYZ Ltd”.   
 
This research is being carried out for the completion of a Doctor in Philosophy in Accounting and Information Systems 
by Mr. Neil Crombie under the supervision of Prof. Markus Milne and Dr. Warwick Anderson.  Their contact details 
are listed below.  Feel free to contact any of us to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in this 
research study.  
 
Mr. Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems,  
University of Canterbury,  
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 7359 
Email: 
neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
 
Prof. Markus Milne 
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Christchurch 
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Dr. Warwick Anderson  
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Christchurch 
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Email: 
warwick.anderson@canterbury.ac
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H.3. Information Sheet for Recruitment and Remuneration Consultants 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate in the research study: ‘The Discourse on Executive Remuneration’. This research is being 
conducted by Neil Crombie, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University 
of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
The objective of this research is to make sense of the discourse on executive remuneration.  I have already studied a 
sample of the codes of practice, regulations and corporate annual reports from New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom between 1989 and 2008.  My analysis focused on how remuneration policies have changed over time.  I am 
now investigating how boards of directors (and their remuneration committees) of companies determine their 
remuneration policies and practices, including the role of remuneration consultants.   
 
I am also investigating how and why organisations such as regulators and professional associations produce codes of 
practice and regulations on executive remuneration.  The research aims to determine the extent to which codes of 
practice and regulations have influenced the remuneration policies and disclosure behaviour of companies.          
 
This research involves interviews with executives and directors of companies as well as representatives of remuneration 
consulting firms, regulators, and professional associations.  The participants may be former or current members of these 
organisations.  Interviews are expected to last between one and two hours.  A digital voice recorder will be used to 
document the interviews, subject to the participants’ consent.  Participants will be given the opportunity to review the 
interview transcript.  The digital voice recordings and interview transcripts will not be available to anyone other than 
the researcher and his supervisors. 
 
The results of this research will be published by way of doctoral dissertation, oral presentations, conference proceedings 
and journal articles.  Note that a doctoral dissertation is a public document which is available from the University of 
Canterbury’s Library database.  While extracts from the interview transcripts will form part of these publications, the 
extracts will not be attributed to the participating executives, directors and the companies which they represent, and any 
identifying material within the extracts will be removed or disguised.  For example, “Participant Blogs” will be changed 
to “Consultant A” and “Blogs Ltd” will be changed to “Consulting Firm A”.   
 
This research is being carried out for the completion of a Doctor in Philosophy in Accounting and Information Systems 
by Mr. Neil Crombie under the supervision of Prof. Markus Milne and Dr. Warwick Anderson.  Their contact details 
are listed below.  Feel free to contact any of us to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in this 
research study.  
 
Mr. Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems,  
University of Canterbury,  
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 7359 
Email: 
neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
Prof. Markus Milne 
Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems,  
University of Canterbury,  
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 6624 
Email: 
markus.milne@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
Dr. Warwick Anderson  
Department of Economics and 
Finance,  
University of Canterbury, 
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 6624 
Email: 
warwick.anderson@canterbury.ac
.nz 
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H.4. Information Sheet for Recruitment and Remuneration Consultants 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate in the research study: ‘The Discourse on Executive Remuneration’. This research is being 
conducted by Neil Crombie, for completion of a Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems at the University of Canterbury. This research has been reviewed and approved by the University 
of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee. 
 
The objective of this research is to make sense of the discourse on executive remuneration.  I have already studied a 
sample of the codes of practice, regulations and corporate annual reports from New Zealand, Australia and the United 
Kingdom between 1989 and 2008.  I have investigated how the discourse on executive remuneration within these texts 
has changed over time.  I am now investigating how and why organisations such as regulators and professional 
associations produce codes of practice and regulations on executive remuneration.  The research aims to determine the 
extent to which codes of practice and regulations have influenced the remuneration policies and disclosure behaviour of 
listed companies.     
 
This research involves interviews with representatives of regulators and professional associations as well as executives 
and directors of listed companies.  The participants may be former or current members of these organisations.  
Interviews are expected to last between one and two hours.  A digital voice recorder will be used to document the 
interviews, subject to the participants’ consent.  Participants will be given the opportunity to review the interview 
transcript.  The digital voice recordings and interview transcripts will not be available to anyone other than the 
researcher and his supervisors.   
 
The results of this research will be published by way of doctoral dissertation, oral presentations, conference proceedings 
and journal articles.  Note that a doctoral dissertation is a public document which is available from the University of 
Canterbury’s Library database.  As there are few organisations in New Zealand which produce regulations and codes of 
practice on executive remuneration, it not possible to guarantee anonymity for the representatives of these organisations 
which participate in this research.  However, while extracts from the interview transcripts will form part of these 
publications, the extracts will not be attributed to the participants and the organisations which they represent.  The 
identity of the participants and the organisations they represent will be disguised. For example, “Participant Blogs” 
would be changed to “Representative A” and “The Institute of XYZ” will be changed to “Issuer A”.   
 
This research is being carried out for the completion of a Doctor in Philosophy in Accounting and Information Systems 
by Mr. Neil Crombie under the supervision of Prof. Markus Milne and Dr. Warwick Anderson.  Their contact details 
are listed below.  Feel free to contact any of us to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in this 
research study.  
 
Mr. Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems,  
University of Canterbury,  
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 7359 
Email: 
neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
 
Prof. Markus Milne 
Department of Accounting and 
Information Systems,  
University of Canterbury,  
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 6624 
Email: 
markus.milne@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
 
 
Dr. Warwick Anderson  
Department of Economics and 
Finance,  
University of Canterbury, 
Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch 
Ph: (03) 3642987 ext. 6624 
Email: 
warwick.anderson@canterbury.ac
.nz  
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H.5. A List of Possible Interview Topics 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz 
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
General topics to be discussed in the interviews 
 
The interview questions will cover the following general topics: 
 
1. Your philosophy on business and remuneration 
 
2. Your background (e.g. education and work experience), particularly what and who influenced your views on 
remuneration practices 
 
3. CEO remuneration: policies and practices (e.g. what works well and what does not work well?) 
 
4. Executive and non-executive director remuneration (e.g. why are executives remunerated differently to non-
executive directors?) 
 
5. The process of setting and awarding CEO remuneration, particularly the role of the board of directors, the 
remuneration committee and remuneration consultants 
 
6. Challenges faced by the board of directors, remuneration committee and CEO 
 
7. The influence of shareholders’ opinions on directors’ decisions regarding executive remuneration  
 
8. Reporting remuneration in the annual report and at annual general meetings (if applicable) 
 
9. Regulations and codes of practice on remuneration (e.g. Institute of Directors in NZ, 2005, “Code of Practice 
for Directors”) 
 
10. Public debates on remuneration, particularly the role of the media 
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H.6. A Consent Form for Participants 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz 
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
Consent form for participants 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions have 
been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any stage. 
 
I know that: 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage; 
 
3. All face-to-face or telephone interviews will be audio-taped unless I request otherwise; 
 
4. At the end of the research any raw data on which the results of the research or related publications 
depend, as required by the University’s research policy, will be retained in secure storage for five years, 
after which it will be destroyed;  
 
5. I may decline to answer any questions if I so wish, without any disadvantage to myself of any kind; 
 
6. The precise questions to be asked in the interview have not been determined in advance, but will depend 
on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, although the Human Ethics Committee is 
aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able to review the 
precise questions to be used; 
 
7. If the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable, I may decline to 
answer any particular question(s) and I may withdraw from the interview, without any disadvantage to 
myself of any kind;  
 
8. I may withdraw from the process at any time without any disadvantage to myself of any kind. If I 
terminate the interview before its conclusion, or am unable to continue, then the audio-tape and 
transcript will be destroyed at my request; 
 
9. No remuneration is offered for my participation in this project; 
 
10. The results of the research may be published but my anonymity will be preserved; 
 
11. This project has been reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of 
Canterbury. 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
……………………………………..  ……………… 
(Signature of participant)     (Date) 
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H.7. An agreement of security and confidentiality by researcher form 
 
College of Business and Economics 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 7359, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
THE DISCOURSE ON EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
 
Agreement of Security and Confidentiality by Researcher 
 
 
I agree to keep the audio recording and transcript from this interview and any related correspondence 
confidential and secure. 
 
 
I agree to keep your participation in this research confidential. 
 
 
I agree to preserve your anonymity and ensure that any extracts from the interview transcript used in publications 
do not include any identifying material.  
 
 
 
 
…………………………………………………  ………………………. 
(Signature of researcher)     (Date) 
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Appendix I: New Zealand’s Discourse on Executive 
Remuneration 
 
Appendix I reproduces Crombie (2010). This paper was presented at the Fourth New Zealand 
Management Accounting Conference (18-19 November 2010), which was held in Hamilton, 
New Zealand.  The paper was subject to blind peer review before being accepted for 
presentation at this conference.   
 
The findings presented the paper are similar to those in Chapter 7.  While the paper draws on 
an institutional logics perspective, the paper is underdeveloped compared to the findings in 
Chapter 7.  The paper is reproduced below. 
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New Zealand’s Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
Neil Crombie 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand 
Email: neil.crombie@canterbury.ac.nz 
Phone: +64 3 3642987 ext.7359 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that US companies have transitioned from 
corporate (or managerial) to agency (or shareholder) logic.  This study examines the 
institutional logic embedded with New Zealand’s discourse on executive remuneration, and 
how it influences the decision-making of remuneration committees.   
Design/methodology/approach: Data are collected from 33 semi-structured interviews with 5 
executives, 16 non-executive directors, 7 consultants, and 5 representatives of issuers (who 
produce codes of best practice).  The interviews focused on executive remuneration in New 
Zealand publicly listed companies.   
Findings: Non-executive directors draw on a multitude of rationales to justify or legitimise 
their decisions regarding executive remuneration.  The rationales include: agency, consultant, 
fairness, human resources, market, motivation, pay-for-performance, and responsibility.  
However, the market rationale dominated the discourse on executive remuneration.  The 
majority of non-executive directors, executives, and consultants interviewed argued that one 
executive’s remuneration should be comparable to another executive’s remuneration.   
Research limitations/implications: Both the agency and corporate logics have been 
institutionalised in New Zealand.  However, the dominant remuneration rationales fit with the 
corporate logic, rather than the agency logic. 
Practical implications: As the remuneration rationales are taken-for-granted they offer non-
executive directors considerable flexibility in deciding how and how much to remunerate 
executives. Shareholders and regulators need to be aware of this flexibility. 
Originality/value: This study develops and tests a theoretical framework for understanding 
how institutional logics can influence organisational decision-making. 
Type: Research paper 
Keywords: Executive remuneration; Institutional theory; Discourse analysis 
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1. Introduction 
Pay-for-performance has become a taken-for-granted catchphrase of corporations, 
shareholders, media, and the public, yet academic research in New Zealand (Andjelkovic et 
al., 2002; Gunasekarage and Wilkinson, 2002; Roberts, 2005) and overseas (Rost and 
Osterloh, 2009; Tosi et al., 2000; Devers et al., 2007) has been unable to evidence a 
statistically and economically significant relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance over time.  Academic research indicates that CEO pay is related to firm size, 
rather than firm performance.  This lead Bebchuk and Fried (2004) to argue that CEOs have 
too much power over boards of directors and are able to set their own remuneration.     
 
This research investigates New Zealand’s discourse on executive remuneration, particularly 
the institutional logics (and high-order cultural frames) which people use to understand and 
justify organisational decision-making.  Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) found that the 
agency logic replaced the corporate logic as the dominant explanation of corporate 
governance and executive remuneration among US corporations in the mid-1980s.  However, 
they did not investigate alternative remuneration rationales such as pay-for-performance and 
market, which are documented by Wade et al. (1997), St-Onge (2001), and Point and Tyson 
(2006).  Collectively, these studies suggest that isomorphic pressures influence how 
organisational actors make decisions.  Point and Tyson (2006) argues that the language of 
regulations, codes of practice and corporate annual reports are converging.   
 
Drawing on new institutional sociology, this research examines how organisational actors 
conceptualise and rationalise executive remuneration decisions.  The research questions are: 
What institutional logics do organisational actors use to understand and make decisions? How 
do these institutional logics influence organisational decision-making?  The remainder of the 
paper is organised as follows: literature review, theoretical framework, research method, 
findings, discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Institutions are processes and structures which become taken-for-granted by individuals and 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Moll et al., 2006).  Institutional theory asserts 
that coercive, normative and mimetic pressure can lead to organisations substantively or 
symbolically adopting the same structures and processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Scott, 
2008).  Regulatory and professional bodies throughout the world have developed codes of 
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practice to mandate or recommend how companies should be governed (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2010; Enrione et al.; 2006).  It is taken-for-granted that regulatory and professional 
bodies should produce codes of practice, but the content of these codes varies between 
countries.  Also, companies have implemented similar executive remuneration structures and 
processes such as remuneration committees and variable pay schemes (Chambers, 2005).  
However, researchers have rarely studied how these structures and processes have become 
take-for-granted. 
 
Institutional logics provide the ideas and meaning that persuades individuals and 
organisations to adopt certain structures and processes (Thorton and Ocasio, 1999).  In an 
exploratory study, Point and Tyson (2006) found that the language of codes of practice and 
corporate annual reports in Europe are similar; the discourse had become institutionalised.  
Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) argue that there are two institutional logics underpinning 
corporate governance (see table 1).  The agency logic asserts that shareholders should be 
suspicious of management, whereas the corporate logic asserts that shareholders can trust 
management and using their specialised expertise, they can make better decisions than 
shareholders.  These institutional logics imply that different structures and processes are 
required to govern executives.  
 
 Agency Logic  Corporate Logic 
Assumptions about:  
- Top Managers  
Fungible agents  Knowledgeable stewards  
- The Firm  Nexus of contracts  Unique institution  
Concept of resource allocation  Investor capitalism: Diversified 
investor  
Managerial capitalism: Diversified 
firm  
Links to High-Order Cultural 
Frames  
Logic of capital markets  Norm of professional autonomy  
Links to Theories of Organisation  Agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976)  
Managerialist theory (Chandler, 
1962)  
Implications for Governance 
Practices:  
- Compensation  
 
 
Incentives align interests  
 
 
Rewards attract and retain  
- Allocation of cash flow  Return excess to investors  Retain and reinvest in firm  
Table 1: Institutional Logics and Corporate Governance 
(Source: Zajac and Westphal, 2004, p.436) 
 
The agency and corporate logics have different rationales for how executive remuneration 
should be determined.  The agency rationale implies that without variable pay executives 
would not to act in the best interests of shareholders; whereas the human resources rationale 
(corporate logic) implies that as long as the level of remuneration is sufficient, executives will 
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act in the best interests of the shareholders.  Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that in US 
companies in the mid-1980s, the agency rationale replaced the human resources rationale in 
justifying the adoption of long-term incentive plans to shareholders.  However, other 
remuneration rationales were not studied.  Wade et al. (1997) and St-Onge et al. (2001) 
identified other remuneration rationales such as consultant, market, motivation, pay-for-
performance, and responsibility (see table 2).   
 
Remuneration 
Rationales 
Explanations of CEO Pay 
Agency 
Derived from agency theory, the agency rationale describes how the CEO’s interests can be 
aligned with those of shareholders. 
Consultant Remuneration consultants are used to legitimise the CEO’s pay and remuneration practices. 
Human 
Resources 
Derived from resource dependency theory, the human resources rationale asserts that the 
CEO is a scarce resource and organisations can use remuneration to attract and retain scarce 
managerial talent. 
Market 
The market rationale argues the CEO’s pay will depend on the market forces of supply and 
demand. 
Motivation  
Derived from expectancy theory, the motivation rationale describes that pay can be used 
increase the CEO’s effort/performance. 
Pay-for-
Performance 
The pay-for-performance rationale argues that to avoid managerial shirking, the CEO’s pay 
should be linked to the firm’s (financial) performance. 
Responsibility 
Derived from the managerial discretion hypotheses, the responsibility rationale states that 
executive pay rises with their level of responsibility. 
Table 2: Remuneration Rationales 
 
Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) argue that agency and corporate logics influence 
organisational decision-making, but did not study whether these rationales are used in the 
boardroom.  For example, boards of directors may want to adopt long-term incentive plans to 
increase the level of executive remuneration, and use remuneration rationales to legitimise 
their decisions to shareholders.  Olsen and March (2006) argue that organisational decision-
making is rational and/or rule-based.  It may be that boards of directors (and remuneration 
committees) draw on various remuneration rationales in order to make decisions that 
maximise shareholder value.  Alternatively, it may be that boards of directors draw on various 
remuneration rationales because the remuneration rationales confer legitimacy on their 
decisions. 
 
While the following studies did not examine institutional logic and remuneration rationales, 
their findings do shed light on these theoretical constructs. Bender (2004, and 2007) and Main 
et al. (2008) found that the directors, executives and consultants explained executive 
remuneration in terms which are consistent with the many of the remuneration rationales. 
Generally, remuneration committees aim to pay for performance, while conforming to the 
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expectations of shareholders.  Further, Perkins and Hendry (2005) found that the market 
rationale is a key determinant of executive remuneration.  Remuneration committees are also 
concerned with the legitimacy of their decisions and use remuneration rationales to avoid 
criticism (Main et al., 2008; Ogden and Watson, 2008).  However, Beer et al. (2003) found 
that the pay-for-performance and motivation rationales are used to justify the use of incentive 
schemes in order to increase the level of executive remuneration, rather than enhance 
shareholder value. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Discourse and action are connected through the decision making of individuals and 
organisations (see figure 1).  Discourse is the realm of ideas and meaning, which is accessed 
through the production and consumption of texts; whereas, action is the realm of structures 
and processes (Phillips et al., 2002).  Institutional logics influence the preferences, capabilities 
and decision-making of individuals and organisations.  In making decisions, individuals 
produce texts, which can be temporary or permanent, and carry out actions.  For directors and 
executives, producing texts and carrying out actions are often inseparable.  Texts define 
structures and processes in organisations.  As these structures and processes are enacted by 
individuals and organisations, they can become take-for-granted.  Institutions are structures 
and processes that become self-reproducing, as they enable and constrain future discourse and 
action.  Thus, institutions are underpinned by institutional logics.  However, individuals and 
organisations can change or resist institutions and institutional logics if they are powerful or 
willing to accept a loss in legitimacy, or there are conflicting institutions and/or institutional 
logics (e.g. agency vs. corporate logic). 
 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance and Discourse on Executive Remuneration 
 490 
Discourse
Action
Institutional 
Logics
Institutions
Individual or Organisation
Production of 
texts
Consumption 
of texts
Actions are 
enabled and 
constrained
Actions are 
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Realm of 
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processes
 
Figure 1: How discourse and action influence organisational decision-making 
 
Codes of practice are produced by regulatory (e.g. Securities Commission), professional (e.g. 
Institute of Directors) and investor (e.g. Shareholders’ Association) bodies.  Corporate 
scandals have lead to the institutionalisation of codes of practice (Enrione et al., 2006).  Both 
discourse and action is influenced by codes of practice.  The issuers of these codes of practice 
exert coercive and normative pressure on publicly listed companies to conform to their 
recommendations.  Point and Tyson (2006) and Crombie (2009) found that codes of practice 
and corporate annual reports use the same remuneration rationales.  However, these studies 
did not examine the decision-making of boards of directors and remuneration committees.  
Mimetic pressure may also be influencing companies to use the same remuneration rationales.  
Also, while companies use the remuneration rationales to publicly justify their decisions, 
boards of directors may not use different remuneration rationales to privately justify their 
decisions.   
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4. Research Method 
The main objective of this research is to test Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) claim that agency 
logic, not corporate logic, dominates organisational decision-making regarding executive 
remuneration.  The research questions are: What institutional logics do organisational actors 
use to understand and make decisions? How do these institutional logics influence 
organisational decision-making?  A qualitative research method is employed.  Executives and 
non-executive directors are interviewed to understand how boards of directors (and 
remuneration committees) of publicly listed companies determine how and how much to 
remunerate executives as well as what to disclose to the public.  Remuneration consultants are 
also interviewed as they provide data and advice to non-executive directors.  Further, 
representatives of issuers are interviewed as they produce codes of practice which shapes the 
discourse on executive remuneration. 
 
33 individuals were interviewed including 5 executives, 16 non-executive directors, 6 
remuneration consultants, 1 recruitment consultant, and 5 representatives of issuers.  Several 
interviewees could be included in multiple categories, as of the 16 non-executives directors, 9 
are former executives, 2 are consultants, and 2 are representatives of issuers.  The executives 
and non-executives directors represented 38 companies that are or were listed on the New 
Zealand Exchange (NZX).  The non-executive directors have held on average 3 directorships 
in NZX listed companies, and in total several directorships in Australian listed companies. 
The consultants represented 4 consulting firms.  The representatives of issuers represent 3 
issuers of codes of practice.  The interviews lasted 42.5 hours in total or 77 minutes on 
average.  The interviewees are not identified in the research. Quotes from the interviewees are 
presented in italics. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and conducted in person, on the telephone, or on Skype.  
All of the interviewees were send an information sheet, a list of general interview topics, and 
consent forms.  Prior to each interview, the interviewee gave verbal or written consent for the 
interview to be recorded.  The interviews covered a range of topics including the principles of 
remuneration, remuneration committees, disclosure in annual reports, annual general 
meetings, regulations and codes of practice, shareholders and analysts, the media’s reporting 
of executive remuneration, etc.  While interviewees were asked broadly the same questions, 
the researcher asked many unscripted questions as the interviewees raised points of interest.  
The final topic covered in each interview was the remuneration rationales, if time allowed.  
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The researcher described the remuneration rationales and then asked for the interviewees’ 
comments.  Often the interviewees had mentioned the remuneration rationales earlier in the 
interviews, so the interviewees merely stated if they agreed or disagreed with each of the 
remuneration rationales. 
 
Discourse analysis is the study of “the constructive effects of discourse through the structured 
and systematic study of texts” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.4).  Discourse analysis is both 
theory and method.  The claims to knowledge of discourse analysis are embedded in the 
theoretical framework (see figure 1), as discourse constructs the social reality of 
organisations.  The interview transcripts are also texts and form part of the discourse on 
executive remuneration.  Through multiple close readings of the texts, the researcher sought 
to understand how the interviewees think about executive remuneration.  The researcher also 
documented interviewees’ professional experience.  Commonalities and differences between 
the interviewees were identified and analysed.  The discourse analysis allowed the researcher 
to understand what remuneration rationales the interviewees used and how the interviewees 
made decisions.  Also, the researcher examined what, if any, institutional logic/s were 
underpinning the discourse of the interviewees.   
 
5. Findings 
Among New Zealand’s publicly listed companies, the structure of executive remuneration and 
the process by which it is determined is homogenous.  The main components of executive 
remuneration are salary, short-term incentives (STI) and long-term incentives (LTI).  Salary 
and total remuneration is set in reference to comparable positions in other organisations.  STIs 
are based on financial and non-financial performance, and are paid out in cash and shares.  
LTIs are conditional shares or share rights with vesting periods of three to five years.  
Variable components of executive remuneration are based on organisational strategy. 
Remuneration committees gather intelligence from consultants and through director networks, 
and draw on a common set of rationales to justify their decisions.  While codes of practice do 
not influence these decisions, regulations and listing rules do influence what is disclosed.  
Stakeholders such as shareholders, analysts and media act as a constraint on the decision-
making of remuneration committees, as they do not want to make decisions which are seen as 
illegitimate or outside the realm of the taken-for-granted.  These discourse and actions are 
mapped in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: How Executive Remuneration is Determined in New Zealand Publicly Listed 
Companies 
 
The processes and structures that constitute executive remuneration and the rationales used to 
justify these processes and structures are detailed in table 3.  There are many alternatives 
within these processes and structures, but there is much commonality.  There are many 
rationales used to justify which alternatives are chosen, but there are few rationales.  All non-
executive directors except one believed that executives should be paid between median and 
upper-quartile pay relative to their peers depending on their level of performance; whereas 
one non-executive director believed that executives should receive lower-quartile pay relative 
to their peers as executives are also driven by non-financial and intrinsic rewards.  However, 
this non-executive director believed that they did not sit on any remuneration committees 
because their opinion varied from the generally accepted or taken-for-granted view.   
 
The agency and corporate logics are embedded within the discourse on executive 
remuneration and provide the underlying rationale for the existing structures and processes 
(see table 3).  Amongst New Zealand companies, a shift from corporate to agency logic is not 
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evident as both logics are prominent.  Non-executive directors are both the shareholders’ 
representatives and the executives’ partners.  However, non-executive directors view 
themselves and executives as working together to add shareholder value and knowledge 
stewards that are entitled to professional autonomy.  For example, a non-executive director 
commented, “Regulators always regulate too much, they ask for too much material, too much 
detail, they totally loose the plot as to what really matters…” This sentiment is common 
among executives and non-executive directors and extends to their view of analysts and 
shareholders as well.  While the agency logic is present in the discourse, the corporate logic is 
dominant.  Non-executive directors and executives share similar beliefs and ideas about 
executive remuneration because non-executive directors tend to be either former executives or 
advisors to executives.   
 
Institutions Institutional Logics 
Structure (How much to pay?) 
- Basic approach, or 
- Complex approach (job evaluation method) 
Non-executive directors and consultants are 
independent judges of CEO pay; They are able to 
objectively determine how much a CEO should be 
paid (agency and corporate logic) 
Structure (How to pay?) 
- Mix of components 
- Salary  
- Short-term incentive (STI)  
- Long-term incentive (LTI) 
Rationales embedded with the discourse on executive 
remuneration: Agency logic – Agency, market, 
consultant, pay-for-performance, and motivation; 
Corporate logic – Human resources, market, 
consultant, responsibility, and fairness 
Processes – Internal  
- Appointment of a CEO 
- Setting a CEO’s remuneration 
- Setting a CEO’s targets 
- Review an executive’s performance 
While non-executive directors are shareholders’ 
representatives (agency logic), they also are 
executives’ partners (corporate logic) 
Processes – External  
- Annual report 
- Annual general meeting 
- Responding to analysts and shareholders 
- Responding to media and public 
While non-executive directors want to disclose 
information to shareholders (agency logic), non-
executive directors also feel that analysts’ and 
shareholders’ demands for information can be 
excessive (corporate logic) 
Table 3: Institutional Logics and Institutions 
 
The process by which remuneration committees determine executive remuneration is quite 
homogenous.  One non-executive director summarised the process as follows: 
“You’d then decide your strategies ex cetera for the next five years… 
your remuneration would flow out of that… But as you address the 
remuneration issues… you almost have in your mind the pressures, 
you know, from society, whether they be pressures from politics or the 
media… And so, you know, you end up with a bit of a compromise.” 
 
In setting executive remuneration, there are two processes which remuneration committees 
reconcile. First, there is a process of rational decision-making (Cyert and March, 1992), 
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where organisational strategy influence what performance measures, targets and incentives 
are used.  As one CEO commented, “we’ve always got a range of targets that are usually 
fairly highly aligned with our strategic plan’s targets.”  The process that executives and non-
executive directors described matched those described in management and accounting 
textbooks (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Hanson et al., 2005), and by Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2009) performance management framework.  Second, there is a process of rule-based 
(or legitimacy-based) decision-making (March and Olson, 2006), where remuneration 
committees make decisions, or at least disclose decisions in a way, that conforms to 
stakeholders’ expectations.  Non-executive directors believed that the most influential or 
powerful stakeholders are regulators, analysts and shareholders.  For example, one non-
executive director remarked that they could not recruit a US executive to be CEO because the 
US executive’s pay expectations were far higher than what shareholders would tolerate, so a 
local candidate was recruited to be CEO. 
 
Non-executive directors have to reconcile what they believe to be a rational choice with what 
they believe to be appropriate (i.e. societal expectations).  The perceptions of executives and 
non-executive directors of what is rational are shaped by their experiences and the opinion of 
their peers and consultants.  When discussing how much codes of practice influenced 
decision-making, one non-executive director noted that, “the weight goes on the way I have 
seen it done… [and] the independent consultant, rather than the regulatory body providing 
tones of opinion.” However, some non-executive directors believed that consultants are 
simply used to legitimise the board’s decisions to shareholders.  For example, one consultant 
commented, “The key thing is that people require an external validation of remuneration.” 
Non-executive directors believe that they can motivate executives to add shareholder value 
through the use of remuneration schemes that are comparable to their peers; whereas, non-
executive directors believe that satisfying the demands of shareholders, analysts, regulators, 
etc is a constraint and does not add shareholder value. 
 
Executives, non-executive directors, consultants, and representatives of issuers use 
remuneration rationales to understand and explain executive remuneration.  These rationales 
are related to agency and corporate logic, and include agency, pay-for-performance, 
motivation, market, consultant, human resources, responsibility, and fairness.  The 
interviewees used the rationales to justify their beliefs and decisions they had made.  For 
example, when discussing the company’s LTI, one CEO argued that, “[it makes] you think 
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like a shareholder so you care about the share price. It also aligns your interest in the best 
terms and the long term with the shareholders.” When these rationales were outlined to the 
interviewees at the end of the interviews, the majority of interviewees believed that the 
rationales represented the principles of executive remuneration.  This highlights that agency 
and corporate logics have become taken-for-granted.  However, the rationales that are consist 
with the corporate logic are often prioritised ahead of those consist with the agency logic.  
The most emphasised rationale is that of the market, as one non-executive director expressed, 
“if you don’t stay competitive then you risk losing your best people”. 
 
The agency rationale (part of the agency logic) states that LTIs such as shares or share rights 
can align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.  Many interviewees used the 
agency rationale during the interview or agreed with it when asked.  For example, when 
outlining the key concepts of executive remuneration at the beginning of the interview, one 
non-executive director stated that, “We really try align to their [executives’] motives, their 
incentives with the shareholders, and those are for long term steady growth and returns…” 
However, some interviewees believed that incentives scheme cannot fully align the interests 
of executives with those of shareholders because executives face no downside risk when 
performance (or the share price) falls.  Executives still receive their salary and often a portion 
of their STIs even when performance is poor, whereas shareholders can lose a significant 
portion of their wealth. 
 
The pay-for-performance rationale (part of the agency logic) states that executives’ pay 
should vary with performance.  “The trick is, as I’ve said, how do we define performance?”, 
as one non-executive director explained.  Performance is generally defined in financial terms 
such as revenue and profit.  The majority of interviewees believed that executives, particularly 
the CEO, can influence firm performance.  However, the main problem is that incentives can 
work too well, as one non-executive director remarked, “People are rational. If you set up 
performance pay that focuses on a narrow definition of success, you will get the behaviour 
that leads to that outcome”.  Further, some interviewees believed that economic factors have 
the most influence firm performance, so that executives have to work harder when firm 
performance is poor and vice versa.  These interviewees argued that incentive schemes are 
profit sharing schemes in disguise.  Variable pay is linked to performance measures that 
executives cannot necessarily control because shareholders want executives to be held 
accountable for firm performance.  
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The underlying assumption of agency logic is that executives will exert effort when they 
believe doing so will lead to monetary rewards.  This motivation rationale is embedded in the 
discourse of many of the interviewees.  For example, money can motivate executives, as one 
CEO explained:  
“One year the board decided to give me a double STI; it’s only $50k… 
it’s not enough money to fundamentally alter your level of motivation. 
Contrast that [to a larger company], once I got to the senior rank, the 
amount of money available on STI became very material. One year I 
got $700k, I think. Then there’s no question that sort of amount of 
money motivates your attempts to deliver. No question!” 
 
The interviewees believed that executives have differing motivational profiles.  Some are 
motivated by money and status, whereas others are motivated by the challenge and enjoyment 
of the job.  For example, one non-executive director and former CEO believed that the 
challenge of job outweighed the importance of money: 
“It’s the puzzle really… Decision-making under uncertainty, and 
trying to get it right… The best CEOs are the ones that are just 
passionate about business… Those who want to be CEO, they’d do the 
job for half the pay of being deputy CEO. Of course you would. The 
job is so fantastic. You’re going to turn it down because of pay? Give 
us a break.” 
 
The interviewees believed that executives are motivated by extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, 
but all executives are not motivated by the same factors and to the same degree.  Some 
interviewees believed that incentives are used not to motivate executives, but are used by the 
board of directors to justify the level of remuneration to themselves and shareholders.  One 
CEO explained: 
“You are basically saying people will hold back from doing the best 
job they can unless you hang a carrot in front of them. I find that 
offensive! …The remuneration committee and particularly a board 
would find it hard to pay market remuneration if it was fixed… So, to 
get you to the total you need to be competitive, senior executives have 
an at-risk proportion… [But] I don’t think it really changes people’s 
behaviour.” 
 
The market rationale overshadowed the other rationales.  It is the most emphasised and often 
the first rationale to be talked about during the interviews.  When asked about what are the 
key guidelines or principles of remuneration, one non-executive director responded: 
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“In the end, it is always a trade off between ensuring you retain talent 
or good talent, and not over paying. So there is a temptation if you got 
a very, very strong performer or performers, maybe you start pushing 
boundaries… But I am nervous about really pushing the boundary and 
paying people well beyond the market…” 
 
The market rationale appears to fit with the agency logic, which draws on the higher-order 
cultural frame of capitalism (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  The agency logic argues that 
markets can allocate resources more efficiently than management.  The market rationale states 
that firms compete for managerial talent with other firms, and have to pay competitively.  The 
market rationale assumes that the market for managerial labour is efficient in pricing (or 
remunerating) a CEO.  However, some interviewees disagreed with these assumptions, as one 
CEO explained: 
“In New Zealand, most of your businesses are actually de-facto 
government departments. The idea of a war for talent and needing to 
compete for the best people to run those is actually a load of 
rubbish… We tend to sort of apply that idea that the market rules the 
pay and you go [through] those silly job sizing exercises…” 
 
The market rationale fits better with the corporate logic than the agency logic.  The market for 
managerial labour in New Zealand is controlled by non-executive directors, not shareholders.  
While the corporate logic does not state that non-executive directors and executives will make 
self-serving decisions, non-executive directors have a managerial perspective in remunerating 
executives as they are former executives and advisors to executives.  The non-executive 
directors interviewed believed that only they have the expertise to remunerate executives. 
Shareholders, regulators and the public are not able to remunerate executives because they 
have not worked as executives and do not understand the complexities of the job.  For 
example, one non-executive director remarked that, “if [shareholders] don’t like the CEO’s 
remuneration package, just sell your shares.” These arguments support the corporate logic 
and managerial capitalism.   
 
Non-executive directors employ consultants for two reasons: to gain access to intelligence 
about what their peers are paying executives and to legitimise their decisions to shareholders.  
The consultant rationale states that remuneration consultants can provide an objective, 
independent assessment of executive remuneration.  The majority of publicly listed 
companies in New Zealand and overseas employ remuneration consultants (Conyon et al., 
2009; Crombie, 2009; Wade et al., 1997).  However, interviewees suggested that using 
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remuneration consultants has led to an upward pressure on the level of executive 
remuneration.  One non-executive director explained: 
“[Remuneration consultants’] incentive was to bid the whole market 
up as much as you could. So… why did the prize get so big? Who was 
benefiting from the prize? Clearly, the appointed CEO was benefiting, 
but I suspect the hidden agent in all of this is recruitment agencies 
and remuneration consultants.” 
 
The human resources rationale is tightly coupled with the corporate logic.  It states that 
executives are knowledgeable stewards, who can be trusted to make decisions to maximise 
shareholder value without the need for incentives (or coercion).  The vast majority of 
interviewees shared this view of executives. For example, one non-executive director argued: 
“Good people are the ones you do not want to lose… [The difference 
between] what a good performer costs to retain and what can actually 
be delivered is just is not even worth spending any time talking about 
it.” 
 
Although interviewees also acknowledged that some executives are self-serving and do not 
act in the best interests of the company.  For example, one non-executive director described 
how executives in one company put their own interests first: “[The decision] was driven by 
the Chief Executive wanting to, you know, make sure they got their bonuses for that quarter.”     
 
The responsibility rationale is also tightly coupled with the corporate logic. It states that 
remuneration should be tied to an executive’s level of responsibility.  Generally, executives in 
large organisations have more complex jobs as they oversee many people, processes and 
assets.  The responsibility rationale explains why firm size and executive remuneration are 
highly correlated (Tosi et al., 2000).  However, some interviewees argued that the positive 
relationship between firm size and executive remuneration is not desirable.  Firm size is not 
necessarily a proxy for job complexity.  There should be a positive relationship between 
responsibility and executive remuneration, but it is difficult to measure responsibility.  
Consistent with the corporate logic, non-executive directors argued that they are the only 
people able to gauge executives’ level of responsibility.  One non-executive director 
explained: 
“[It is a] question of complexity. Often big is seen as the definition 
that drives remuneration and typically there’s correlation between 
CEO remuneration and revenue... The problem is how do you 
measure complexity? …Running a very large but very simple business 
may actually be less demanding and there may be a larger pool of 
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eligible candidates than running a somewhat a much more complex 
business.” 
 
The fairness rationale states that executive remuneration should be fair, reasonable and 
equitable.  It is consistent with the corporate logic and duplicates the market rationale because 
executives, non-executive directors, and consultants define fairness in terms of horizontal 
equity. For example, one CEO commented that, “fair and reasonable in my mind would be 
when there’re no serious anomalies in what we… and someone else might be paying for the 
equivalent similar job.” Vertical equity is not a significant concern to remuneration 
committees.  Additionally, fairness is defined in terms of performance, and duplicates the 
pay-for-performance rationale.  One consultant pointed out that, “There are some people 
saying fair is equal… and others say equitable in terms to [the executives’] contribution to 
the business.”  Further, fairness is defined in terms of legitimacy, as one non-executive 
director explained: 
“[In determining executive remunerating] you’d say, ‘Well, given our 
size, given our turnover and our earnings growth and stuff like that, 
are we reasonably, fairly positioned?’ And in most cases, we say, 
‘Would the chairman feel comfortable justifying this to the media or to 
shareholders at an annual meeting or a special meeting or whatever?’ 
And that’s the test.” 
 
Embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration are a multitude of rationales, which are 
taken-for-granted and fit with agency and corporate logics.  While the rationales are taken-
for-granted, the interviewees do challenge the underlying assumptions.  The rationales 
represent a pool of ideas that non-executive directors draw upon in making decisions and give 
them much flexibility.  For example, the comparator group is not defined in the market 
rationale, performance is not defined in the pay-for-performance rationale, and fairness is not 
defined in the fairness rationale.  While non-executive directors do have considerable 
flexibility in defining these terms and, ultimately, determining how and how much the CEO is 
remunerated, they are constrained by societal expectations.  However, what is taken-for-
granted is influenced by non-executive directors, consultants, shareholders, regulators, the 
media, etc.   
 
There are several reasons why non-executive directors draw on the rationales in making 
decisions.  First, they may perceive there to be no viable alternatives, as the rationales crowd-
in and crowd-out what is appropriate.  Second, they may believe that certain rationales are 
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true (or lead to better outcomes than other rationales).  Third, they may use the rationales to 
justify decisions that produce outcomes they desire, even though they do not believe the 
rationales are true.  For example, the pay-for-performance rationale will be used to justify 
bonuses to shareholders, even though a remuneration committee may believe that incentives 
do not alter the behaviour of executives.  In this way, taken-for-granted rationales can be used 
to maintain the power or legitimacy of executives and non-executive directors. 
 
6. Discussion 
Zajac and Westphal (1995, 2004) found that the institutional logic embedded in the discourse 
of US corporations changed from corporate logic to agency logic in the mid-1980s.  Crombie 
(2009) found that amongst the largest 50 publicly listed companies in Australia, New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom that this change is not evident.  Instead, both institutional logics 
were present in the discourse on executive remuneration.  Similarly, this paper’s findings 
indicate that both institutional logics are present in the discourse of executives, non-executive 
directors, consultants, and representatives of issuers.  However, the findings also indicate that 
the corporate logic is more prominent than the agency logic.  Non-executive directors believe 
that they are able to determine how best to remunerate executives, and shareholders and 
regulators should trust them to do this task.  Although the agency logic is embedded within 
the discourse on executive remuneration as the vast majority of non-executive directors 
espoused or agreed with the agency rationale at some point during the interviews.     
 
Crombie (2009) postulated that coercive (e.g. laws) and normative (e.g. codes of practice) 
pressure lead public listed companies to adopt remuneration rationales as principles or 
policies within their annual reports.  Note that New Zealand’s codes of practice are voluntary, 
except the NZX’s code but it does not mandate how to remunerate executives. However, the 
findings of this research indicate that executives and non-executive directors are either 
unaware of the existence or contents of the codes of practice, or dismissed the codes of 
practice as unhelpful.  For example, one non-executive director admitted that, “I couldn’t cite 
you the document, neither of them, to be honest. I probably should be able to, but I am not the 
chairman of the remuneration committee anymore.”  At least in New Zealand, codes of 
practice appear to be a reflection of other codes from around the world and what issuers of the 
codes perceive to be best practice.  In other words, normative pressure is weak.  Mimetic 
pressure is far stronger as non-executive directors are concerned with how their peers are 
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remunerating executives.  Consultants reinforce this mimetic pressure by providing non-
executive directors with intelligence on what their peers are doing. 
 
Mimetic pressure has lead to remuneration committees in New Zealand publicly listed 
companies having processes and structures.  All of the companies except one, which the non-
executive directors had been involved with, employed remuneration consultants to gather 
intelligence on their peers.  All of the companies had similar processes for setting and 
reviewing executive remuneration.  All of the companies remunerated their executives with a 
mix of salary, STI (mainly based on financial performance), and LTI (mainly based on share 
price performance).  The interviewees viewed these processes and structures as taken-for-
granted.  These processes and structured are reproduced because the interviewees used the 
same set of remuneration rationales, particularly market, consultant, human resources, 
responsibility, fairness, motivation, pay-for-performance, and agency.  Non-executive 
directors believed that in applying these remuneration rationales they are able to maximise 
shareholder value.  They argue that the aforementioned processes and structures are rational 
and logical.  However, non-executive directors do acknowledge that their decision-making is 
constrained by societal expectations, particularly those of shareholders.  Therefore, the 
decision-making of remuneration committees is both rational and rule-based (Cyert and 
March, 1992; Olsen and March, 2006). 
 
While mimetic pressure has reduced variation in the processes and structures that constitute 
executive remuneration, change is continual.  All non-executive directors commented on the 
trend from mainly fixed pay to mainly variable pay, and the increasing disclosure 
requirements.  Further, some companies want to known the leaders in best practice and 
disclosure, so they follow international trends in executive remuneration.  Some interviewees 
commented that New Zealand follows Australia, who follows the UK and US.  This process 
of institutional change is leading to the convergence of best practice (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010).  External events such as the global financial crisis can also lead to institutional change 
as organisations and actors have to adapt to changing economic and political environments 
(Greenwood et al., 2002).  For example, one consultant commented that, “[during] the Global 
Financial Crisis is the first time that people have taken pay reductions… that is once in a 
hundred years.” However, this research has not studied how the process of institutional 
change occurs, particularly in terms of institutional logic.   
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7. Conclusion 
Executives and non-executive directors draw on remuneration rationales to legitimise their 
companies’ executive remuneration practices.  The remuneration rationales are: agency, 
consultant, fairness, human resources, market, motivation, pay-for-performance, and 
responsibility.  As these rationales are all legitimate, non-executive directors have a lot of 
flexibility in deciding how and how much to remunerate executives.  However, the human 
resource and market rationales dominate the discourse of non-executive directors.  These 
rationales form part of the corporate logic, which assumes that non-executive directors have 
expert knowledge in how to remunerate executives.  The market rationale forms part of 
corporate logic, rather than agency logic because the market for managerial talent is 
controlled by non-executive directors, who are former executives and advisors to executives, 
rather than shareholders. While Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that US companies 
have transitioned from corporate to agency logic, this study shows that while New Zealand 
companies draw on both logics, the corporate logic is dominant.   
 
A theoretical framework is developed in this research (see figure 1) to explain how 
institutional logic and institutions influence organisational decision-making.  Organisations 
are both enabled and constrained by institutional logics and institutions.  The findings show 
that mimetic pressure, embodied in the market and consultant rationales, has led companies to 
imitate their peers.  The corporate logic is embedded in the beliefs and thinking of non-
executive directors through their experiences and the opinions of others.  The agency logic is 
also embedded in the discourse on executive remuneration. However, some interviewees 
suggested that the agency rationale and LTIs are used symbolically to appease shareholders, 
while simultaneously raising the level of remuneration to what executives perceive to be 
competitive.  Again, the corporate logic dominates the discourse on executive remuneration.  
While the findings explain why organisational decision-making reproduces existing structures 
and processes, it does not explain how the corporate logic become to dominant the discourse 
on executive remuneration, and whether there will be a move towards the  agency logic in the 
future.   
 
The findings show that non-executive directors have much discretion in determining 
executive remuneration.  The executives and non-executives directors interviewed certainly 
believe that they are trustworthy and act in the best interests of companies.  They often said 
that maximising shareholder value in the long-term is their main objective.  However, the 
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awareness of codes of practice such as those issued by the Securities Commission, Institute of 
Directors, New Zealand Shareholders’ Association, and Minter Ellison is limited.  Also, 
dominance of the market rationale can lead to upward pressure on executive remuneration 
because it is set at the median to upper-quartile level.  Non-executive directors did not believe 
that their executives are below average performers, yet some executives are by definition.  To 
overcome these problems and others described in the paper, regulators could consider 
adopting a mandatory code of practice.  But the code need not be prescriptive, as both 
Australia and the UK have ‘comply or explain’ approaches, which allows companies to vary 
from the code as long as they explain why.   
 
The main limitation of this research is that executive remuneration has not been quantitatively 
studied.  The remuneration rationales postulate how and how much executives should be 
remunerated.  Similarly, the interviewees often expressed opposing arguments, which they 
suspected to be true.  For example, the market and consultant rationales lead to upward 
pressure on the level of remuneration.  Future research should study the empirical validity of 
these arguments.  This research explains the pay-for-performance paradox; that is, why is 
there no economically significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance when 
the vast majority of firms have a policy of pay-for-performance?  The dominance of the 
market rationale trumps the pay-for-performance rationale, as total remuneration must always 
be median or above.  However, future research is needed to empirical test this argument.   
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